Page 5

Significant Relationship

Mark Brown of GRC International Inc. has produced a vivid graphic to back up 
his assertion that there appears to be a near linear relationship between 
aircraft age and the degradation of wiring due to chafing (see ASW, Sept. 
27). The relationship was derived from the inspections last year of the fuel 
tank wiring on some 450 Boeing 737s. The graphic essentially portrays the 
same data reported in tabular form in this publication earlier, but the 
pictorial is more eye-catching (see ASW, June 1, 1998). The illustration 
suggests there is about a one-in-six chance that there is bare wiring on an 
aircraft that has accumulated more than 70,000 wires. Separately, Chris 
Brown, who manages nonstructural research at the FAA's Technical Center in 
New Jersey, estimates that the failure rate (bare wire exposed locally) for 
737s with more than 70,000 hours is about 2.26 per million flight hours. For 
aircraft with 40,000-50,000 hours, he estimates the failure rate is 0.74 per 
million flight hours.

Regarding his graphic, Brown was careful to point out, "Although the data 
shown here is attention getting, the existence of a bare wire may not 
represent a risk to the travelling public." "There is a big difference 
between a bare wire near a fuel tank and one in the wingtip lighting. There 
is an even bigger difference in knowing that the condition of the wiring is 
in an aircraft prior to flight and just hoping that nothing serious is 
wrong," he added. That statement is relevant to the importance of the 
graphic: it is based on an inspection of some 1-2% of the wiring on a modern 
jetliner. Given these preliminary findings, Brown believes the sampling 
results are compelling enough to warrant inspecting all the wiring. To be 
sure, he's in the wire-testing business, but the point is worth considering, 
nonetheless. As Brown argues, the industry does not know how many bare wires 
are flying today, and on which aircraft. >> Brown, e-mail mbrown@grci.com; 
Smith, e-mail smithc@tc.faa.gov << 

The Big Three

A review of some 271 mishaps in the U.S. Air Force between 1989 and March 
1999 attributed to electric/electronic problems found that certain types of 
failures dominated. According to George Slenski, a scientist at the Air Force 
Research Laboratory, conductors, connectors and electrical panel failures 
contributed to more than half of the electrically-related mishaps (relays, 
transformers, switches, generators, batteries, etc. made up the rest):


Conductors (wiring) 29 % 
Connectors 14 % 
Electric panels 8 % 
Total 51 % 


Mishaps in the Air Force can range in damage from $10,000 to $1 million or 
more. Most are minor but, as Slenski pointed out, minor damage can 
potentially lead to the loss of an airplane. Fighter aircraft appear more 
susceptible to aging damage. They feature more complex avionics in tight 
spaces, increasing the opportunity for chafing. Fighter avionics also are 
subjected to higher operating temperatures. However, in this respect, 
fighters may provide a form of "accelerated aging" that may provide insights 
regarding commercial aircraft. >> Slenski, tel. 937/656-9147 << 

This was a finding of fact in the same N-500L case:
>
 "N-500L never flew above 1000 feet; operating at this altitude was a
violation of Federal Aviation Regulations and a proximate cause of the
crash. Finding No. 15. The failure of the pilot of N-500L to keep the
L-1011 in sight, maintain visual separation and maneuver out of
its path violated the good operating practices of the Airman's
Information Manual and the Advisory Circular, was negligence and a
proximate cause of the accident."
>
> In re N-500L CASES. 691 F.2d 15 (1982), at 34

"In addition to these general safety regulations, the
> FAA publishes information regarding wake
> turbulence in its Airman's Information Manual and in
> the FAA advisory circulars. Pilots are bound by 14
> C.F.R. § 61.105(a) to be familiar with the information
> contained in these publications and in the Federal
> Aviation Regulations. These rules, information
> manuals and circulars constitute evidence of the
> standard of care among all pilots. Muncie Aviation,
> 519 F.2d at 1180-81; N-500L Cases, 517 F.Supp. at
> 833."
>
> DYER v. U.S. 832 F.2d 1062 at 1069

"In addition to the FARs, the FAA publishes the Airman's Information
Manual (AIM) in order to explain to pilots the application of the FARs  in various situations. FAA Advisory Circulars are also promulgated on various topics to advise pilots of methods of avoiding certain hazardous conditions. . . . The AIM and Advisory Circulars are evidence of the standard of care among all pilots, Muncie Aviation Corp. v. Party Doll Fleet, Inc., 519 F.2d 1178, 1180-81 (5th Cir. 1975), and it is assumed that all pilots have read and know their provisions. Associated Aviation Underwriters v. United States, 462 F.Supp. 674, 680 (N.D.Tex.1979)."
> 
> In re N-500L CASES. 691 F.2d 15 (1982), at 28

It could take eight years, not the four years proposed, to properly assess the job and to replace metalized Mylar thermal acoustic insulation blankets in some 700 Douglas-built aircraft, according to the Air Transport Association (ATA). The organization represents major U.S. carriers and believes the price tag of
what it estimates may total a half-billion dollar effort could have a "staggering economic impact on the industry." Worse, a hurried replacement program could harm safety, rather than improve it, given the risks of disturbing wire during the thermal acoustic blanket change-out process. Thus, while installing more
fire-resistant "tinder," the effort could create more "matches" in the form of an unknown number of arcing sources. Indeed, this potential hazard has been raised by a number of independent aircraft maintenance and wiring experts.

Last August, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) proposed a massive change-out of metalized Mylar thermal acoustic insulation blanketing in Douglas aircraft over a 4-year period, a time ostensibly intended to allow for the work to be done during scheduled heavy maintenance, when interior furnishings are removed and access to the thermal acoustic insulation batts is easier (see ASW, Aug. 16 and Sept. 6).

In a Sept. 27 letter to the FAA, the ATA suggested a prototyping program to refine estimates of the amount of labor involved, and the best approach regarding material and installation.

In addition, the ATA argued that an 8-year change-out window would not only allow for prototyping to nail down uncertainties, it also would allow the industry to better accommodate the other shoe that has yet to drop: forthcoming airworthiness directives (ADs) concerning aircraft wiring systems. Indeed, many in the industry feel whipsawed by requirements to install modifications or perform inspections on the 737 rudder power control unit. Meeting the mandated deadlines caused major headaches and scheduling complications, which many in the industry are loathe to see repeated for thermal acoustic insulation, according to sources. The ATA, however, did endorse the replacement effort. Replacing metalized Mylar covered insulation, the organization said, "will, in our view, enhance aviation safety." >> ATA, 202/626-4172 << 


Two Prototyping Efforts
1. American Airlines will modify an entire MD-80 commencing Nov. 22, with work estimated to be completed January 21, 2000 (including final electrical and systems checks).

2. Swissair will change out the insulation in a prototype effort commencing Oct. 18, 1999, on one of its MD-11s, with work slated to conclude Sept. 12.

The prototype efforts are intended to validate recommended procedures in service bulletins issued earlier. For example, the bulletins address the fabrication of replacement blankets but do not provide guidance on how best to remove the old blankets or to install the new ones. In addition, the bulletins, in the ATA's
judgment, outline the least effective of four replacement options:

Option - A. Blankets provided in kits from manufacturer Merits/Demerits - The most efficient. Facilitates earliest replacement.

Option - B. Blankets fabricated from measurements in affected airplanes Merits/Demerits - Viewed as costly and time-consuming. May require supplemental type certificate (STC) for each installation configuration.

Option - C. Blankets fabricated using a kit of templates provided by the manufacturer Merits/Demerits - Viewed as prohibitively costly. The manufacturer may not be able to provide them in time to meet 4-yr schedule

Option - D. Blankets fabricated using removed blankets as templates as specified in the service bulletins.
Merits/Demerits - Viewed as the least practical as blankets can be damaged in removal, shrink during fabrication, and become distorted in service.

Source: ATA 

http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/Trans/hpw105-33.000/hpw105-33_0f.htm

    Mrs. FOWLER. Thank you. I want to thank Chairman Duncan for allowing Congressman Barcia and myself to participate in today's hearing. I'm Tillie Fowler from Florida. And I thank my two colleagues here to step ahead of them for just a few moments here to get something on the record.

    Congressman Barcia and I want to express our interest in the area of airframe wire safety standards. And my question is directed to Associate Administrator, Mr. Gardner, however, if Mr. Kallstrom wants to respond, then I would welcome his comments as well, and I'd just like your response for the record.

    Mr. Gardner, on July 2nd, the Washington Post cited FAA officials suggesting that chafed wires could have played a role in the TWA crash. The Post also reported that an inspection of electrical wiring inside early Boeing 747s could have caused explosions if that had been left undetected.

    So even if faulty wiring turns out not to be the cause in this incident, it seems that we should be looking to raise our safety standards as it applies to wiring inside these planes. Now, I understand that FAA requirements for airframe wiring have not changed in 20 years. Yet the technology has advanced greatly in the meantime. There are several companies in this country that are producing a new generation of airframe wire that performs superior performance electrically and mechanically, and it's got virtually no flammability and smoke generation characteristics. And I understand the Defense Department has recognized and is using this new technology, but the private sector is lagging behind.
page 96       PREV page       TOP OF DOC

    The FAA believes that with regard to flammability and smoke, the choices that are being made for today's aircraft provide outstanding performance. To assist manufacturers in the selection of the best available firesafe aircraft wiring, the FAA has developed smoke and arc tracking test methods for incorporation into an upgraded aircraft material fire test handbook, which will be published within the next 6 months.''

    While encouraged by this response, I am nevertheless concerned that an upgraded aircraft material fire test handbook would do little in addressing the safety issues recognized by the McDonnell Douglas and the FAA Fire Safety Section studies, in that such volunteer testing could make accurate wire testing either cost prohibitive or without appropriate supervision, would likely increase the possibility of human error.

    It is my sincere hope that in light of the thoughtful comments made by Congresswoman Fowler, its approval of and incorporation into our Nation's military aircraft and the testimony received today, we can work together in addressing this very important issue.

    [The information follows:]

    In a recent study conducted by the FAA, it was confirmed that wiring with composite hybrid insulation is being used in the manufacture of the newest transport airplanes, such as the MD–95, the B–777 and the B–737. Consequently, we believe no formal government requirement for the use of such wiring is necessary.

    Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Barcia. And with those statements by Mrs. Fowler and Mr. Barcia, we'll proceed with the questioning by Mr. LaHood.

I am preparing a Resume of Issues and am currently condensing the 135 page Memorandum that was sent to KLM outlining IASA's submissions on Wiring Anomalies and Flight Safety. I have a number of questions that I would appreciate some input on: 

1.. An August 1988 FAA study that concluded that the thermal degradation process of Kapton results in carbonization of the insulation material leading to arc-tracking and in-flight fires. Is this the Study that formed the basis of the July 1989 FAA Report "Flammability, Switch and Dry Arc Tracking Tests of Aircraft Electrical Wire Insulations"? 

2.. is the 30 June 1997 letter (TWA to Boeing) in the public domain? I know that it featured on the Panorama programme but need to be sure. 

3.. In 1982 Capt. Donald R Eaton made certain findings available to the pentagon. Do we have any documentary evidence of his findings/concerns? 

4.. I note that in December 1981 the USN ordered the replacement of Kapton BUT Capt. Eatons comments follow in 1982 - which came first the chicken or the egg? There will no doubt be more and I apologise in advance if there are year 1, lesson 1 questions!

Dear Adam, 

1.)These FAA attempts to understand Kapton and wiring problems, go back to my briefing the Energy and Commerce Committee in 1988, and them sending out letters of inquiry to the FAA. The 1988 wet arc-testing lead to the dry arc-track testing where only Kapton arc-tracked. In the wet, cross-linked Tefzel also arc-tracked. This material is still being used by Boeing even though it was; banned by Grumman for manned aerospace applications due to its smoke toxicity, found by the FAA in 1995 that it had a 97% smoke obscurity rating compared to 2% from any other insulation, banned by NASA in oxygen enriched areas due to its flammability. 

2.)I have the TWA letter and I believe it is on Patrick Price's website. 

3.)I have Captain Eaton's Briefing and was a member of that Pentagon panel. In 1981 Capt. Eaton said no to Poly-X and Kapton, but rather to use XL-ETFE (cross-linked Tefzel). In Fiscal year 1983, he asked for $360 million to replace poly-X in the F-14 and to rewire with Kapton. No mention of XL-ETFE. 

4.) There was a briefing I gave McSweeny, the Navy, FBI, GAO. etc. in Apr 97 that covered every bit of this issue. After my 4 hour presentation McSweeny leaned over to Admiral Cook and asked, "What do you mean problems with poly-X?" This statement epitomized the disconnect between what the Navy knew and what they told the FAA. 

ED Block

Airworthiness Articles

A fire on-board a Piper PA 23-250 aircraft during a VFR flight highlighted a potential problem with cable supporting clamps. The fire developed behind the instrument panel and a subsequent investigation revealed that the cable connecting the battery to the ammeter had melted coincident with the point where it passed through the metal supporting clamp. The investigation further revealed that the clamp did not have an insulating sleeve and was too large for the cable. This enabled the cable to rub inside the clamp thus damaging the cable insulation. This in turn caused arcing of the bare wire and resulted in a fire. Inspection also indicated that poor routing of the ammeter cable had allowed the co-pilots control column to rub against the cable.

Airworthiness Directive AD/PA-23/86 was raised to address the immediate problem with the Piper 23 Series aeroplanes. However, the problem may not be isolated to this aircraft type. It is strongly recommended that all aircraft electrical wire supporting clamps be inspected to ensure that they are the cushioned (insulated) type and that these clamps are in good order. Additionally, it is also recommended that all aircraft electrical wire be inspected on a regular basis for abrasions, defective insulation and wire routing methods.

http://www.casa.gov.au/aw_std/AAC/PART-1/1-078.HTM 

Smoke became visible in cabin 14 minutes after take off. Crew emptied all fire extinguishers through decompression holes in an attempt to fight the fire. Plane landed 14 minutes after first smoke was visible.

Findings: canon plug of heater had signs of short. Arcing occurred igniting mylar blankets in vicinity which led to a secondary fire...

Very lucky all these 118 souls

However, the denatured version:
From the NTSB DATABASE:
NYC99IA231
NTSB Identification: NYC99IA231
Scheduled 14 CFR 121 operation of DELTA AIR LINES

Accident occurred SEP-17-99 at COVINGTON, KY
Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas MD-88, registration: N947DL
Injuries: 118 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors.
Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. 


On September 17, 1999, about 2230 eastern daylight time, a McDonnell-Douglas

MD-88, N947DL, operated by Delta Air Lines as flight 2030, performed a precautionary landing at the Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport (CVG), Covington, Kentucky. There were no injuries to the 2 certificated cockpit crewmembers, 3 flight attendants, and 113 passengers. The airplane received minor damage. Flight 2030 was operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan under 14 CFR Part 121. Flight 2030 was a scheduled flight between CVG and LaGuardia Airport (LGA), New York, New York. The airplane was pushed back at 2150, and was airborne at 2201. At 2214, as the airplane was climbing through  FL230 (23,000 feet), the flight crew reported that there was smoke in the cabin and declared an emergency. The airplane was handed off to Covington Approach Control for a return to CVG. The airplane landed on Runway 18L at 2230, and
was stopped on the runway. The emergency exits were activated, and the occupants exited the airplane. Initial examination of the airplane revealed thermal damage to a 5 by 5 foot area located under the main cabin floor, and about 2 feet behind the aft side of the forward cargo door on the right side of the fuselage.This was the area where the right side alternate static port was located. The damage consisted of sooting, and heat distress to the underside floor structure and a fiberglass potable water bottle. The covering on three metalized mylar insulation blankets was missing and the edges of the blankets were charred.

A fiberglass cargo bin wall panel in the vicinity was burned. In addition, in the cabin, soot damage was visible on the right cabin sidewall in the vicinity of passenger row 11. The heating element for the primary and alternate static sources was controlled from a cockpit switch, which could be activated on the ground or in the air. A thermal sensor regulated the temperature of the heating elements within pre-determined limits. The circuit breaker to the electric heat for the static ports, located in the cockpit, had not tripped. An insulation resistance check conducted on the right side alternate static port heater revealed lower than normal resistance. The heater element plate and associated hardware was retained for further examination.

 RAdm Eaton Briefed the FAA on use of Kapton in the "80s

 >> Eaton, who ordered Kapton removed from Navy planes in the 1980s, told USA TODAY that aircraft manufacturers should not continue to install polyimide wire on new jets.  ''The manufacturers need to seriously understand what they're doing and realize that there are better substitutes out there,'' he says.

''We're dealing with aircraft in the commercial fleet, and they operate in different environmental conditions than military planes,'' says Beth Erickson, director of the FAA's aircraft certification office.>>

 Beth Erickson knows more than RAdm. Eaton??  I DON'T think so.  She talks the same line as Tom McSweeny.  Two peas from the same pod.  The FAA has known how dangererous KAPTON wire is, as they were briefed back in the '80s by RAdm. Eaton, and the FAA Hughes Tech Center in NJ has published Pat Cahill's test reports on the dangers of electrical arcing of Kapton wire.  

 So the FAA takes the stand, that they have to compare oranges and apples (different environments).  Let us make another comparison.  You take a STICK of DYNAMITE and place it in a Indy 500 race car and place another stick of dynamite in a chauffeur driven limo.  Different environments but 2 sticks of dynamite that are dangerous.  Kapton wire is a potential stick of dynamite as evidenced by Swissair 111 and many Military jet aircraft.  So as long as the FAA maintains this attitude of "SELF DENIAL," people will die on commercial jets.  Rightly so, the lawyers of SR 111 victims, can sue not only DuPont, Boeing but also the FAA for NOT banning Kapton wire, as it does NOT meet the regulations of FAR 25 and they are well aware of the dangers of Kapton wire.

 RAdm. Eaton stated, . . . ."realize that there are better substitutes out there,'' he says."  Ask Boeing why they do NOT use TKT (BMS 13-60) on all of their jets.  We know why they use it on 737 and 757s because they could NOT sell UAL anymore 737 and 757 models with Kapton wire.  The TKT wire was suppose to be used on the 777 model but as I was told, politics came into play, and Boeing uses Raychem's BMS 13-48 (X-link Tefzel type wire) instead of TKT. 

 Was Boeing blackmailed into using BMS 13-48 for 747, 767, and 777 models by Raychem?  John Berlin, CEO of Tensolite, assured me that they could have supplied all the TKT type wire for the model 777 as needed.  So ask Boeing, why they do not use TKT type wire on all of their models in lieu of the following statement by Boeing engineering?

 In a letter dated May 24, 1991  B-GlOB-M9l-209 from Alex Taylor, Boeing engineer in charge of aircraft wiring that was a letter of commendation he wrote:  "We now have a released specification for new wire and cable design that not only we, but the whole company, can be proud of. As a result of your efforts, we are able to offer the Design Projects, Manufacturing and our airline customers an alternative to BMS 13-51 and BMS 13-48, an alternative that overcomes the arc resistance problems associated with the former and the weight penalties associated with the latter.

·        We are the only airframe or aerospace manufacturing company that has developed a specification for, and qualified, lightweight, high performance, arc resistant, composite construction, general purpose airframe wire and cable. In addition, we are the first company in the aerospace industry to issue a wire and cable specification that uses SPC as the basis for assuring the quality of the product. BMS 13-60 is the standard to which the rest of the industry will aspire.  Thank you."

                                          (signed)

                                          Alex Taylor

 Patrick A. Price                   http://hometown.aol.com/papcecst/Elect.html

JUNE 8,1995  (a prior Valujet Accident)

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable
cause of this accident was the failure of Turk Hava Yollari
maintenance and inspection personnel to perform a proper inspection of
a 7th stage high compressor disk, thus allowing the detectable crack
to grow to a length at which the disk ruptured, under normal operating
conditions, propelling engine fragments into the fuselage; the
fragments severed the right engine main fuel line, which resulted in a
fire that rapidly engulfed the cabin area. The lack of an adequate
record-keeping system and the failure to use "process sheets" to
document the step-by-step overhaul/inspection procedures contributed
to the failure to detect the crack and, thus, to the accident.   http://bluecoat.eurocontrol.fr/reports/NTSB_96_Valujet.html 

http://www.seattlep-i.com/business/air10.shtml 

*********************************   ***********************   ************************************

Thursday September 23 6:32 AM ET

Lawyer: Swissair Knew of Dangers

By MEKI COX Associated Press Writer

PHILADELPHIA (AP) - An attorney contends both Swissair and the manufacturer of MD-11 aircraft knew at least seven years before the crash of Flight 111 that wiring aboard the plane posed a fire hazard.

Attorney Lee Kreindler said evidence shows the airline and the manufacturer, McDonnell Douglas - which was bought by Boeing in 1997 - knew that insulation on the plane's wiring could wear down in ordinary use and pose a fire danger.

``That goes to the heart of why the manufacturers are liable, and conceivably liable for punitive damages,'' Kreindler said. The allegations were filed in federal court Wednesday.

The exact source of a fire aboard the plane has not been identified. Flight 111, flying from New York to Geneva, crashed off Nova Scotia on Sept. 2, 1998, killing all 229 people aboard.

Just before Flight 111 crashed, the pilots mentioned a strange smell in the cabin and then complained of dense smoke. Canadian investigators later found heat-damaged wiring on the wrecked plane, prompting U.S. air safety officials in January to recommend that airlines inspect all MD-11 planes for electrical problems.

Mike Holland, an attorney representing Swissair, Boeing and Delta - which had a ticket-sharing arrangement with Swissair - did not return a message seeking comment Wednesday.

Defense lawyers have argued that the Death on the High Seas Act applies to the case, a law that only allows for the recovery of compensatory damages, or real losses associated with income and medical costs, and not punitive damages.

Lawyers for the plaintiffs have rejected a settlement package worth about $300 million in compensatory damages for family members of those killed, saying they believe they can get $1 billion in punitive damages from a jury.

The plaintiffs' court documents maintain that when Swissair bought the plane in 1991, the dangers of the wire coating and insulation were well known. The products were made by DuPont Co., which is being sued separately.

Another emergency landing due to fire [from: John Flatekval, Waldwick]
Sun, 1 Feb 1998 14:21:40 -0500 (EST) 

I boarded United flight 853 from Newark to San Francisco after a one hour wait to check in due to
computer problems. The Boeing 767 was not full as evidenced by the number of empty seats in
connoisseur class. Four hours into the flight, the smell of smoke permeated the cabin from the first
class section directly behind the cockpit. I figured there was an oven fire and all would be okay. Within
a couple of minutes, the interior lights turned off and the air ducts stopped. All passengers were
concerned, some more so than others, but the flight attendants continued their jobs as if nothing was
happening. 

I noticed one flight attendant rush by with a large fire extinguisher covered by table linens. The
demeanor of the flight crew led me to believe that everything was fine. Finally, the head flight attendant
announced that all of the flight crew should report to the front of the plane. At this point all on board
knew there was a serious problem. We were told to that there was a fire on board and the pilot was
making an emergency landing. The passengers were told to read the emergency landing manual and to
practice the emergency landing position. 

The plane began to descend and turn quickly. As we practiced the emergency position the flight crew
told us to remove all sharp instruments, glasses, and pens from our person. When they yelled "brace"
we were to assume the position. One of the attendants was noticeably shaken and was instructed to
take her seat by the head attendant. At no point were passengers told at which airport, if any, the pilot
would be attempting to land. In fact the only time the pilot addressed the passengers is when he said "
Flight attendants, three minutes to touch down. Prepare for emergency procedures". Not knowing
where we were, I decided to look out the window. Within 5 minutes the plane had dropped from cruising
altitude to several hundred feet above snow capped mountains. Again, there was no indication that we
going to land at an airport. 

When the flight attendants yelled brace, we all held our breath until we felt the wheels touch the
ground. The plane quickly went to the gate and was surrounded by fire personnel. All passengers were
ordered off of the plane immediately. Luckily one of the passengers had been in the Salt Lake City
airport before, because no United employee addressed the passengers. All 57 passengers were left to
mill about the airport. The flight crew gathered in a huddle, knelt down and said a collective prayer of
thanks. The head flight attendant claimed that this was only the second time in her 29 years of service
that something this serious had happened. At no time did any United official address the emotional
state of the passengers, many of whom were noticeably crying and trembling. 

[Details of subsequent mistreatment at airport ommitted for brevity.] 

A couple of items need to be addressed. A.) Your web site contained a similar experience aboard a
United 767 from Zurich to London on January 12, 1998. I think United should look into this problem
immediately before the next emergency landing ends in disaster. B.) United personnel should be
trained in addressing the emotional needs of the passengers, particularly after a near tragedy. 

I have never been treated so poorly by so many different people in so many locations as I was by
United on January 17, 1998. I will request that my company not pay the business class airfare, and
rethink their carrier of choice. 

Emergency landing 
Mon, 12 Jan 1998 18:56:10 -0500 (EST) 

As a long-term UA customer, my faith in United was somewhat dented by an incident at London
Heathrow last week. I'd be interested if anyone has information about the "electrical fault" aboard
UA965 from Zurich, Switzerland to Washington Dulles on Jan 9, causing an emergency landing in
London? As the aircraft, a 767, started its engines in Zurich a continuous unfamiliar sound was heard
by passengers from one engine. The aircraft remained on the ground at Kloten for several hours while
the crew reportedly contacted UA's principal European base at Heathrow. UA London apparently
advised that the flight should operate, but less than an hour after take-off (while luckily the 767 was still
over land) the forward cabin and cockpit began to fill with smoke. The crew announced an emergency
approach into LHR and the airplane descended very rapidly, other traffic having presumably been
cleared. Once the aircraft came to a halt in London, where fire trucks awaited it, emergency chutes
were deployed, but one failed to function. 

The aircraft was evacuated and passengers were told by Heathrow fire crew to run away from the plane.
They were given blankets and waited in a grassy area for an extended period before they were picked
up by buses. The UA crew were reported uncommunicative and understandably shocked. Passengers
were then taken to an airport hotel, re-united with their carry-on luggage and offered psychological
counselling should they need it. Two were injured in the evacuation but there were no fatalities. I'd like
to know (a) what "electrical" incident actually occurred and why the plane filled with smoke, (b) what
concerns the crew had on the ground in Zurich about the airworthiness of the plane and why its
departure was delayed, and (c) if there were safety concerns, how were they dealt with or -- if
information from Zurich is correct -- why did the 767 attempt its flight after consultation with UA's
London office? 

As far as I know this incident has not been widely reported in the press, though it is recorded on the
FAA's database. I am told that two attorneys aboard the flight are considering a case against United. 

2. Revamp design and installation practices. Specific areas to be addressed should include power sources, intermixing of insulation types in the same wire bundle, fastener design and bundling methods.

3. Incorporate modular construction. Modular wiring, McCarthy suggested, would allow for ease of replacement on a scheduled basis.

4. Evaluate/incorporate fiber optics. Aircraft entertainment systems, running 115v power into seats, and interior lighting, "seem two good candidates for this type of technology," McCarthy said.

5. Evaluate alternative signal transmission methods. Infrared (IR) and frequency modulated (FM) radio technology used in other industries should be considered for aviation use as well.