Page 6

Sean Broderick

Data gleaned in part from the probe of the Swissair MD-11 crash near Halifax, Nova Scotia in September 1998 has kick-started a Boeing-led effort to prepare for pending insulation replacement mandates on Douglas-made planes by doing upgrades during scheduled heavy checks, AS&M has learned. The effort, launched with a swap of insulation material in the cockpit and certain cabin sections of a Swissair MD-11, will be duplicated with other types of Douglas aircraft, a Boeing spokesperson in Long Beach confirms.

"Replacing insulation blankets in an airplane is not something you can do overnight," Boeing's John Thom tells AS&M. "It's just good for us to be ready, to know what it's all about. If an operator is going to make a major maintenance check on an airplane and has the ability to look at the change-out of insulation blankets, then we want to be there with them."

FAA earlier this year issued two notices of proposed rulemaking calling for insulation replacements on Douglas DC-9, MD-80, MD-90, DC-10, and MD-11 models (AS&M, Aug. 20). Specifically, FAA wants any aircraft with metallized polyethyleneteraphthalate (MPET) blankets to have the metal-covered blankets replaced. Comments on the rules were due at the end of September.

Swissair is replacing insulation covered with metal-coated Mylar with Tedlar Insulfab 330 blankets, which the carrier terms a "particularly fire-resistant brand of insulation." The carrier is putting the blankets in "strategic zones of the stripped-down aircraft's fuselage" with two goals in mind: enhancing the fire-retardant properties of the insulation blankets as well as "defining the time required and the most correct work methods" for doing the work.

Thom says that "most of the MD-80s and 90s," about one-fourth of the DC-10s, and "many" MD-11s in the world fleet have insulation with metal-coated Mylar. Swissair says it plans to upgrade its entire 19-jet MD-11 fleet "irrespective of an eventual mandate" by the feds. The carrier says its other aircraft contain insulation blankets made of other materials and "are not influenced by this action."

Thom says Boeing is moving before the NPRMs become final rules to get a jump on the work. "It's going to be real useful to know what it's going to take" to swap out insulation on the models in question, he says.

Swissair says it and Boeing are splitting the cost of the work on the guinea pig MD-11, which is being done during a scheduled D-check. Swissair says it is paying about $97,000 labor costs while Boeing is picking up some $32,000 in materials expenses. The manufacturer plans to apply information from the upgrade to future maintenance and overhaul guidelines, Swissair says.

The upgraded MD-11 is expected to re-enter service by the end of this month, the carrier says. Thom says that similar swaps on single Douglas models are in the works, including a joint effort with American on an MD-80. "We recognized pretty early on that if it comes to a change-out for planes in the fleet, it's going to be a big job," he says. "We want to know what it's going to take." -Aero Safety & Maintenance 12/3/1999

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
APA 113-99
December 8, 1999
Contact: Alison Duquette
Phone: 202-267-8521

FAA Orders Replacement of Boeing 777 Backup Engine Generators

WASHINGTON - The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) today
ordered operators of Boeing 777-200 and -300 airplanes,
regardless of engine model, to inspect backup generators and
replace any found with sheared shafts within 14 days.

The FAA's immediately adopted Airworthiness Directive (AD)
affects Boeing 777-200 and -300 airplanes with PW4000, GE90
and Rolls Royce Trent 800 engines. The AD is prompted by two
recent reports of inflight engine shutdowns caused by a failed
engine backup generator. The FAA is still investigating the exact
cause of the failures, including maintenance practices.

The AD requires the following actions within 14 days:
· Operators must revise their airplane flight manuals to prohibit
777 airplanes with sheared shafts from flying.
· Operators must inspect all backup generators and replace any
with a sheared shaft. If both left and right backup generators are
replaced at the same time, the operator must perform a
non-ETOPS flight before resuming ETOPS operations.
· Operators must prohibit servicing of both left and right backup
generators by the same person.

Boeing 777 airplanes are qualified for ETOPS, a special FAA
certification that allows a two-engine airplane to fly over water for
up to 180 minutes from the nearest airport. Boeing 777 airplanes
are designed to operate safely in the event of an engine
shutdown.

There are 233 airplanes in the worldwide fleet affected by this AD,
61 of which are registered in the United States. Operators include
American Airlines, Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, and United
Airlines. The estimated cost to revise the airplane flight manual is
$60 per airplane. Backup generator inspections for sheared shafts
are estimated at $60 per airplane. Replacement and servicing
costs vary depending on the condition of the backup generator.

December 6, 1999 - Boeing Tells Airlines to Inspect Wiring on Some 737s

SEATTLE, Washington (USA) - Boeing Co., the world's biggest airplane
maker, said it's telling airlines to check for faults with the wiring in older-model 737 jetliners after one of the planes was forced to turn around last month.

Pilots returned the Alaska Airlines 737-400 to the airport in Portland, Oregon, on Nov. 11 after seeing a warning light. Mechanics later found a heat-damaged wire bundle in the forward cargo hold, Boeing spokesman Bob Saling said. The wiring's insulation had worn away because it was located too close to a fiberglass shroud, he said.

Boeing is sending letters to airlines advising them to check the wiring during maintenance, Saling said. It also addressed the problem on four 737s in production by moving the bundles farther away from the fiberglass parts, he said, adding that Boeing doesn't consider the issue a risk to safety.

``Just like any piece of equipment, whether it's a car or whatever, as it operates there's a little bit of give in various components,'' Saling said.
``We use the reporting of instances in- service as a way to recognize what's going on in the fleet.''

Boeing shares fell 1 13/16 to 38 9/16.

The wiring fault was reported in today's Seattle Post- Intelligencer. It comes at a time of heightened scrutiny of Boeing's production practices. The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration said last week it would begin a special audit of Boeing's quality-control procedures after the disclosure of glitches
that include faulty adhesives and loose bolts.

FAA spokeswoman Kirsti Dunn said investigators don't think the wiring fault reported on the Alaska Airlines jet is related to other directives the agency has issued ordering inspections of fuel-tank wiring. U.S. safety investigators have said they suspect TWA Flight 800, a Boeing 747, exploded
 in 1996 because an electrical spark ignited fuel vapors.

 The wiring glitches don't involve many planes on Boeing's production lines. The older-model 737s, which include the 737-300, 737-400 and 737-500, are being phased out in favor of new models. The last of the older-model 737s will be delivered early next year

NTSB Identification: SEA00IA019.  Scheduled 14 CFR 121 operation of ALASKA AIRLINES .  

Accident occurred NOV-11-99 at PORTLAND, OR. 

Aircraft: Boeing 737-400, registration: N772AS .  

Injuries: 2 Uninjured.
      On November 11, 1999, approximately 1520 Pacific standard time Alaska Airlines flight 500,
a Boeing 737-400 (N772AS), returned to land when the crew noted fuel low pressure lights and
popped circuit breakers after departure and climb-out from Portland International Airport,
Portland, Oregon.  There were no injuries to the five crewmembers or 140 passengers, and the
airplane's electrical wiring system sustained minor damage. The flight was en route to San
Francisco, California.  The crew stated during climb-out from Portland, the #2 fuel tank low
pressure light illuminated.  Thirty seconds later, the center tank fuel plow pressure light
illuminated. Circuit breakers for the center right pump and the #2 fuel pump popped.  The crew
elected to pull the aft pump circuit breaker, and returned to Portland for an uneventful
landing.  During the trouble-shooting process the circuits were repowered.   A master caution
light illuminated and other circuit breakers opened.  Inspection revealed heavily sooted and
compromised wires (with melted insulation) in wiring bundles near station 410 in the cargo hold.

It is most important to find out when this airplane came off the assembly
line.  If it came off the line in late 1992, then it was wired with TKT
wiring.  So far I haven't been able to find any 737 or 757 that was wired
with TKT wiring having any trouble with destroyed wiring.  Maybe an
electrical component might let go and you would have some damage to wiring
but it would have to have been caused by an electrical component.  Let me
know when you find out when it was produced.

Patrick

NEW YORK (Reuters) - The U.S. Transportation Department is writing
safety guidelines that would increase scrutiny of U.S. airlines' ticket-sharing pacts with foreign carriers, the Wall Street Journal
reported on Friday.
The standards are being drafted amid concern over the safety of foreign
airlines, including the crash of EgyptAir Flight 990 which killed 217
people on Oct. 31, and the crash of Korean Air Flight 801 in Guam, which
killed 228 people in 1997.
Though a final decision has not been made on the exact form of the
standards, they are expected to be based on voluntary practices already
accepted by six major airlines and the Defense Department in an agreement
in August, the Journal said.
The guidelines could include examinations of training, maintenance and other practices, the report said. The U.S. airlines' assessment programs would need to meet the standards in order for code-sharing pacts to get Transportation Department approval.
Such code-sharing agreements have proliferated as airlines have sought
to increase their international reach without investing in new planes. In
September, a Transportation Department report called for higher scrutiny of foreign carriers in such pacts with U.S. airlines.
Currently, the Federal Aviation Administration has had some limited
oversight of foreign carrier operations.
The new standards are expected to be announced in early December, the report said.

Those Smelly, Smoky "Mechanical" Problems

November 24, 1999
Web posted at: 3:44 a.m. EST
(0844 GMT)

MEXICO CITY (AP) -- The Mexican
airline Taesa, accused of shoddy
maintenance practices by its former
flight attendants, has been grounded
by Mexican authorities two weeks
after the crash of one of its DC-9s
killed 18 people. 

The government announced Tuesday
it was suspending the airline while it conducts a sweeping investigation,
looking into the carrier's policies, procedures, maintenance, training and
operations. 

It did not say how long the airline would be suspended, but the grounding
right before the busy Christmas season is a blow to an airline that has
struggled with financial problems, labor complaints and safety questions. 

Government investigators who inspected Taesa planes after the Nov. 9
crash found a "series of anomalies and incidents," said Deputy
Transportation Secretary Aaron Dychter Poltolarek. "Even as the company
has been correcting (the problems), they keep on recurring." 

He did not specify what those problems were. 

"It's important to stress that this measure is being taken ... to fully guarantee
the security of passengers and crew," Dychter said. 

Officials from Taesa could not be reached for comment. 

Taesa came under scrutiny when its Mexico City-bound flight 725, with 13
passengers and five crew members aboard, crashed into an avocado
orchard near Uruapan in the western state of Michoacan. 

The plane had 91 passengers aboard when it departed Tijuana, but most got
off in the first two stops, Guadalajara and Uruapan. 

Former flight attendants have charged that Taesa planes, including the one
that crashed, have had a series of mechanical problems resulting from
inadequate maintenance. The flight attendants, who claim they were fired for
union activities, had complained about mechanical problems both before and
after the crash. 

The airline has denied the accusations, claiming any problems have been
corrected. 

But the questions about air safety have prompted federal police to launch a
criminal investigation into the crash. 

Taesa's problems have continued. Two planes were forced to turn around
last weekend because of mechanical problems. One flight leaving from the
Pacific Coast city of Acapulco had problems with a generator, the airline
reported. The other had a loss of pressure after leaving the Caribbean resort
city of Cancun. 

The airline has acknowledged that ticket sales fell 18 percent after the crash.
On Tuesday, the airline canceled two domestic flights and a flight to Laredo,
Texas, because of a lack of passengers, the Mexican government news
agency Notimex reported. 

Taesa was founded in 1988 as an executive air charter service and it
expanded to commercial operations in 1991, using cut-rate fares to
challenge established carriers Mexicana and Aeromexico. It flies to 21
destinations in Mexico and four in the United States: Chicago; New York;
Oakland, Calif.; and Laredo. 

The airline transported 1.73 million passengers in the first nine months of the
year and has 27 planes, Notimex said, citing government figures. 

Dychter said other airlines have agreed to try to make up for Taesa's lost
service.

01:35 PM ET 11/22/99

Hubble Repair Mission Delayed Again

Hubble Repair Mission Delayed Again
CAPE CANAVERAL, Fla. (AP) _ NASA's repair mission to the Hubble
Space Telescope has been delayed again, this time by three days
because of more damaged wiring found aboard space shuttle
Discovery.
Shuttle managers today set a new launch date of Dec. 9.
That will give technicians time to repair minor damage to
electrical wires that run between Discovery and its external fuel
tank, officials said. The problem was discovered last week. That
also will give workers the Thanksgiving holiday off.
The mission originally was scheduled for mid-October, but was
delayed along with everything else in order to fix exposed wires
found throughout the shuttle fleet. Liftoff slipped to Dec. 2, then
Dec. 6 because of additional wiring problems and a contaminated
engine.
Discovery's flight has taken on an added urgency: Hubble cannot
conduct any astronomical observations until the shuttle arrives
with new gyroscopes for pointing. Spacewalking astronauts also will
install a new computer, radio transmitter, battery voltage kits and
thermal insulation.

Discovery damage not thought to be serious; pad fix possible

CAPE CANAVERAL, Fla. - NASA has found more damaged electrical wires on shuttle Discovery, officials said Thursday, prompting new inspections on the ship as work continues toward a Dec. 6 launch to the Hubble Space Telescope.

Officials don't know yet if the checks and repairs will delay the liftoff, said Kennedy Space Center spokesman Joel Wells. All the work can be done while the shuttle sits on its launch pad, he said.

Described as minor, the new damage was found on wiring between the spaceship, its external tank and solid rocket boosters.

Technicians found minor flaws in the insulation of wiring needed to relay electrical power from the shuttle to the external fuel tank and solid rocket boosters, Wells said. The discovery was made after cracks were found in similar wiring aboard Endeavour.

The solution could be as fast and easy as applying tape for extra insulation, or could be much more complicated, Wells said. All work can be done at the launch pad, he said.

Originally scheduled in October, the flight was postponed when NASA ordered wiring inspections on its entire fleet after shuttle Columbia experienced a troublesome short circuit during a July launch.

"The important thing here is that we are operating in an environment of heightened awareness over wiring issues," Wells said. "We are being very meticulous in our inspections."

When launched, the ship is to carry seven astronauts to repair Hubble's precision-pointing system.

Swissair is replacing the Mylar insulation in the cockpits and certain cabin sections of its MD-11 fleet with Tedlar, a "particularly fire-resistant brand of insulation," the carrier reported. The carrier said the work is being done on its own initiative and is based on information from the continuing investigation into the crash of SR 111. Swissair is taking advantage of D-checks to install the new Insulfab 330 insulation blankets in strategic zones of stripped down fuselage sections. -Aerospace Daily

• The loss of Swissair flight sr111 on Sept. 2, 1998, was a major event for the aviation insurance industry and has contributed to a modest level of rates strengthening in 1999, particularly in aviation reinsurance lines. Polygon's net loss from sr111 was a modest US$2.3 million (after reinstatement premium). The sr111 loss is a good demonstration of the group's very conservative approach to underwriting.

http://biz.yahoo.com/bw/991111/ny_s_p_2.html 

By the first or second quarter of 2000, the FAA expects to come out with a new ruling on falsification of records and deliberate false statements with respect to aviation maintenance. The rule, which initially will be issued as an notice of proposed rulemaking for comments, seeks to fill in the gaps and tie up the loose ends in other related rules under Parts 21, 43, and the new draft 145.

Speaking on October 7 at an Aviation Maintenance Critical Issues Forum, "Safety Versus Profit," Ken Reilly, manager of the FAA’s suspected unapproved parts program office, said the pending regulation would fall under Part 3 and would not affect any existing rules that address document falsification and false statements. He also said the rule would reach out to both certificated and non-certificated personnel. "If someone deals in aircraft parts and says something is serviceable when it is not, they would be subject to violation by the FAA" under the new rule, he explained. But the rule goes beyond just parts, covering "any falsification of information to the FAA or maintenance people," said Reilly.

Publication of the new rule, he added, most likely will be accompanied by an advisory circular and other material aimed at providing guidance to inspectors "so the overzealous ones don’t implement something that’s supposed to be done equally and fairly." Finally, Reilly emphasized repeatedly that the maintenance community should take a close look at the NPRM when it is published next year and provide thoughtful feedback, looking carefully at the issues, the cost-benefit, and whether or not the language is ambiguous. Such comments, he said, are essential to turning this proposal into a useful, effective rule.

http://www.aviationtoday.com/reports/pencil.htm 

http://www.aviationtoday.com/reports/avmaintenance/

Nov 11, 1999 

Mechanics at the giant Boeing aircraft manufacturing company have admitted making fuel tank repairs without logging their work as required and debris has been found in newly delivered planes The Herald of Everett reported today.

Asking that their names not be used, the mechanics told the Washington newspaper that fuel tank repairs were consistently made after inspections and were not recorded, voiding the validity of leak checks, The Herald said.

In some cases planes left the factory with dented wings and fuel systems, raising a risk that weak spots or leaks could develop, they told the paper. Mechanics also have discovered rivet guns in wings after final inspections were done.

As a result, the mehanics must now take classes and sign statements that they understand federal regulations, The Herald said.

Documents cited by the paper also said the change was made to bolster confidence among buyers of 747, 767 and 777 commercial jet models, which are assembled in Boeing's largest plant about 25 miles north of Seattle.

Boeing spokeswoman Debbie Nomaguchi confirmed that "integral fuel-tank integrity" classes began at the end of October. She said today that in some recent cases the putty that inspectors put on fuel cell doors to show they have been inspected was misapplied or missing.

"This raised a concern as to whether proper processes... were being followed 100% of the time," she said. "Where this occurred, airplanes were re-inspected." The Federal Aviation Administration requires that all fuel tank repairs be listed in log books that accompany each plane along the assembly line and become a permanent part of the plane's records.

Boeing was criticized recently by the National Transportation Safety Board for a delay of nearly three years in telling investigators of the TWA Flight 800 crash about a fuel tank safety study the company made in 1980. Federal investigators believe the most likely cause of the TWA crash was an explosion in the central fuel tank of the Boeing 747.

The classes reflect a greater attention to questions of jet fuel volatility and aircraft design, construction and maintenance, said Chuck Eastlake, professor of aerospace engineering at Embry-Riddle University in Daytona Beach, Fla.

"The design and maintenance assumptions around for 45 years were kind of brought into question because of TWA 800," Eastlake said. "Jet fuel under certain temperatures and pressure conditions isn't as hard to light up as everybody thought... That's why avoiding leaks is so important."

A new state law may prevent the family of golfer Payne Stewart, killed
in a Learjet crash, from suing the manufacturers of the plane. How would this law
have affected the families of ValuJet 592? The Florida legislature
passed HB 775, which states that if a plane crashes in Florida and if the plane is over
20 years old, there can be no lawsuits against the manufacturer. Do you have
information on, or a comment about HB 775 -- Send us your FeedBack:
mailto:FeedBack@AirlineBiz.Com?subject=FLHB775

http://www.leg.state.fl.us/session/1999/House/bills/billinfo/html/HB0775.html

FEDEX MD-11 damaged by crew pull-up

30 Jun 99

enroute Japan-Manila

McDD MD-11

N582FE

Federal Express

Structural damage during emergency manoeuvre while descending

weather conditions unknown (daylight)

NIL

DCA99WA066

Structural damage to elevators and associated structure was found after reported GPWS escape manoeuvre apparently resulted in stall or overspeed buffet. This damage has occurred on at least two other occasions under similar circumstances in 1979 and 1997.

FedEx MD-11 substantially damaged

NTSB Identification: NYC00LA005
Nonscheduled 14 CFR 121 operation of FEDEX
Accident occurred OCT-05-99 at NEWARK, NJ
Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas MD-11F, registration: N606FE
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.
On October 5, 1999, at 0540 eastern daylight time, a McDonnell Douglas MD-11F, N606FE, operated by FedEx as flight 1700, was substantially damaged while landing at Newark International Airport (EWR), Newark.
In interviews, the flight crew reported the en route flight and
approach to runway 4R were normal. The airplane was configured with
the wing flaps at 50 degrees, and the auto-brakes were selected to
the maximum setting. The captain described the touchdown as "firm"
but not hard. He said he wanted to touchdown in the first 1,500 feet
of runway. As the nose wheel was lowered to the runway, the pilots
felt a vibration. They reported it was similar to a deflated tire.
One of the pilots thought he felt the vibration was on the
longitudinal axis of the airplane. During the landing rollout
the center landing gear unsafe light illuminated. As the airplane
was clearing the runway, the central aural warning system (CAWS)
generated a voice warning about unsafe landing gear. After the
airplane exited the runway, it crossed Runway 4L, and stopped
on a parallel taxiway. The master caution light illuminated and
hydraulic system #3 was found to have an empty reservoir. After
consulting with the checklist, the captain elected to taxi
straight ahead at a slow speed, toward the FedEx ramp area.
The airplane was stopped after it entered the ramp area, and the
airplane was towed to the gate. Examination of the airplane revealed
that the center landing gear, which normally points 15 degrees forward
was pointed about 45 degrees aft. The upper link of the drag brace was fractured and the cap on the center landing gear retraction cylinder had been pulled out. Both tires on the center landing gear had contacted the bottom aft fuselage. The aft side of the landing gear strut had pushed against the aft bulkhead of the center landing gear well. The metal was deformed and torn in the area that had contact with the center landing gear strut. Records from the airplane revealed the landing weight was 435,820 pounds. A check with Boeing - Long Beach Division (formerly McDonnell-Douglas Aircraft) revealed that similar events happened twice in 1992. McDonnell-Douglas then outfitted a test airplane and was able to duplicate the event again. Based upon the findings from those events, the anti-skid control box was modified, and operators were advised to install the modified anti-skid control box. N606FE was delivered to FedEx in 1993.
A check of N606FE revealed that it contained the modified anti-skid control box. The drag brace was examined in the NTSB metallurgical laboratory. The examination found features on the fracture face that was consistent with overstress. Examination of the flight data recorder revealed the initial touchdown was +1.39g, which then reduced to +0.6g, and then increased again to +1.59g. The two peaks were separated by about 1.6 seconds. The flight recorder also revealed that spoiler extension started prior to nose wheel touchdown, and the auto-brakes engaged.
http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/NYC/00A005.htm

Senator Chuck Grassley the Iowa Republican to watch BOEING

IASA to watch Grassley

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Congressional investigators probing Boeing failure to pass a 1980 report on fuel tank safety to federal officials probing a 1996 TWA crash found no evidence of a conspiracy to hide the report, a senior lawmaker said. Senator Chuck Grassley the Iowa Republican who initiated the probe, nevertheless said he
would maintain a close watch on the company. The 19-year-old report on fuel tank heating in a military version of the Boeing 747 was prepared for the U.S. Air Force, which also failed to pass it on to the National Transportation Safety Board probing the 1996 TWA 800
explosion. NTSB believes an electrical fault touched off fuel fumes in TWA 800's center fuel tank killing all 230 on board just after take-off from New York. "The General Accounting Office investigators found no evidence of a conspiracy on Boeing's part to withhold the study," Grassley told reporters. Grassley said if NTSB had the report earlier it could have pressed the Federal Aviation Administration to order changes in fuel tank operation and design sooner than the proposals FAA issued last week.
http://biz.yahoo.com/rf/991104/4r.html

AIR CRASH RESCUE NEWS:

November 7, 1999 - Smoke in Cabin Diverts Flight

FORT WORTH, Texas (USA) - An American Airlines jet on a flight to Puerto Rico made an unscheduled landing Sunday night in the Bahamas because of smoke in the cabin, a spokeswoman said.

Flight 606, a Boeing 757 with 188 passengers and eight crew members aboard, was diverted several hours into the flight, which departed from Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport at 2:25 p.m, said Minnette Velez, a spokeswoman in San Juan, Puerto Rico. The jetliner landed safely at Nassau International Airport at 6:30 p.m. local time, she said. Passengers deplaned normally and another plane was sent Sunday night to Nassau to ferry them to their destination, she said. The cause of the smoke had not been determined, Ms. Velez added.

Hi Lyn.  Following is the article carried by www.asahi.com on 10/29/99.
The Asahi Shimbun is one of Japan's largest national newspapers (they have
offices in the United States too) and their site is updated every day:
>
> REPORT BEGINS
>
Japan to chide FAA on fatal flaws in MD-11s

A Transportation Ministry panel recommends formal complaint to the Federal
Aviation Administration about system problems that contributed to death and
injuries aboard a 1997 flight.

 Asahi Shimbun

A Transportation Ministry panel will admonish the U.S. Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) for what it identifies as "inappropriate" design of the
automatic flight-control systems found responsible for a severe jolt of a
Japan Airlines MD-11 jetliner in June 1997 that killed one and injured 11,
sources told the Asahi Shimbun.

Observers said that it is unusual for a nation that does not make a
specific aircraft to chastise authorities of a nation that does.

Sources on the panel said the decision to send recommendations and
criticism to the FAA was made because the same kinds of jolts have been
reported in other countries as the result of malfunctioning automatic flight
control systems.

The panel has been investigating the strong jolt that injured 12
passengers and crew members who were flying over Mie Prefecture on the way to Nagoya from Hong Kong.  One of the crew members died in February of the effect of injuries sustained in the incident.

The panel's final report pointed out that JAL pilots were unable to fully
comprehend the aircraft systems because of  "insufficient" operating manuals. MD-11s are manufactured by McDonnell Douglas, which merged with Boeing Co. in August 1997.  The panel's recommendations are to be submitted to Transportation Minister Toshihiro Nikai, perhaps in November.

The panel specifically recommends urging the FAA to instruct the
manufacturer to modify the automatic flight control system of the MD-11,
under which the nose of the airplane tends to be lifted or lowered suddenly
when the control is switched from automatic to manual.

The panel's report says the jolt was likely caused when the system could
not respond to a sudden change of wind that forced the plane to fly at more than 675 kilometers an hour.

That is the plane's top speed and the maximum endurance for its operating systems. The system apparently overreacted to the pilot's attempt to reduce speed and the nose was lifted higher than necessary.  The pilot's effort to bring the jet back to normal flight position resulted in only five jolts, the panel's report said.

The recommendations to the FAA will also propose that the automatic flight control system should carry an alarm to inform the pilots when the system is switched to manual control.  The pilot of the MD-11 involved in the incident has refuted the panel's finding of the cause of the accident.  He said the nose lifted before the flight control system was switched to manual operation from automatic control.
>
> REPORT ENDS

PHILADELPHIA, Pennsylvania (USA) -Arthur Alan Wolk, internationally-known
aviation attorney based in Philadelphia, on Friday, October 22, achieved a
landmark first domestic settlement from Swissair flight 111.

Today, Wolk announced that he is donating a portion of his fee to
establish a panel of unbiased experts to study and recommend critical improvements in aircraft wiring and fire safety.

The settlement, reached on behalf of the family of 37-year-old Richard
Coburn, a husband and father of three, formerly of East Brunswick, NJ, is
hoped to be the first of many from the tragic plunge into the waters of
Halifax, Nova Scotia of a Swissair MD-11. Wolk and Coburn's widow both
hope to achieve some lasting benefit from the tragedy by working to improve
aviation safety.

The cause of this accident is still under investigation by Canadian and
U.S. authorities. Privately, however, most agree that Wolk's assessment, made
within hours of the crash was correct - - that the disaster was
preventable.

Wolk has been on the plaintiffs' steering committees of most of the
country's major aircrash disasters and has correctly identified the causes of each
disaster well in advance of the release of official findings. He is also
credited with many times providing vital information to government
investigators.

Wolk, who is a member of the Swissair 111 plaintiffs'steering committee;
the group that is guiding all of the victims'cases through the courts, says
that this early settlement will accelerate the process of closure for
victims'families whose agony has been prolonged due to the lack of
settlements thus far.

"Now the Coburn family will be secure with Richard Coburn's legacy and can
begin the most important job of cherishing the memory of their wonderful
husband and father. By working to improve aviation safety it is our hope
that no other family will again suffer such unspeakable pain," said Wolk.

For more information, please contact Mr.Wolk at his office, 215/545-4220.                  30 Oct 99

FAA Says:

 Working On that Boeing 777 Generator Issue 

Updated 1:03 PM ET October 28, 1999
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Federal regulators said Thursday they were examining problems in backup generators on the Boeing 777 aircraft that could affect the jetliners' permission to make some extended flights over water.
"We are obviously looking into this but have made no decisions as to the types of restrictions or anything like that," Federal Aviation Administration spokeswoman Kathryn Creedy said.
The Wall Street Journal reported Thursday that the FAA was drawing up a safety directive following repeated malfunctions and reliability problems affecting the 777's two backup generators which are designed to provide power if the primary pair of generators quit.
The newspaper said premature wear of parts, oil leaks and other difficulties had prompted a series of voluntary design changes by Boeing and its suppliers but they had only been partially successful in overcoming the problems.
As a result, the FAA was moving to mandate tougher safeguards, including more frequent checks of the generators and considering some restrictions on over-water flights under certain circumstances, the report said.
Boeing Co could not immediately be reached for comment.
First delivered in 1995, the twin-engined 777 is the newest in Boeing's series of wide-bodied planes. Any restriction in its long-range over-water operations might make it much harder to market to airlines for long Pacific Ocean routes.
Creedy declined to give any details of FAA deliberations but did concede the long-range oceanic use of the plane was a factor in the agency's thinking. "It increases the interest factor," she said.

B747 Fire and Ditching near Mauritius
At the end of 1987, I was waiting to take over from an incoming crew in Mauritius. They were flying an SAA 747 Combi from Taipei loaded with freight & passengers. NINE hours after leaving Taipei they called Mauritius declaring they had smoke in the cockpit and asking for an emergency descent to 14000'. (sound familiar?)
I rushed to the tower to see if I could be of assistance - the last we heard from Captain Dawie UYs was when he read back the QNH 12 mins after his first transmission.
Later after pulling the wreckage from 3,000 meters of water and re-constructing it in a hangar, the investigating authorities discovered the fire had originated in the cargo hold.

SA Flt 295 28 Nov 87

http://aviation-safety.net/database/1987/871128-0.htm

Cost Benefit Analysis in Aviation          20 Oct 99

"Self regulation never works in aviation because it is not bolstered by any commercial incentive to exceed minimum legal standards. Perversely, when a commuter operator flouts regulations many passengers benefit. Skimping on maintenance allows on time departure. Skimping on landing minima allows on time arrival. Skimping on structural weight allows the installation of luxury cabin fit-out or in-flight entertainment systems. Aviation statistics are such that no single infringement is likely to cause an accident, or to be detected or to be punished; so infringements tend to escalate in magnitude and number. The risks are hidden from passengers until the cost is eventually borne by those on an accident flight. "

Martin Aubury (CAA) 1994 

(Australian Parliamentary Submission)

UNITED in Adversity                                                   18 Oct 99
Another emergency landing due to fire from: John Flatekval, Waldwick
Sun, 1 Feb 1998 14:21:40 -0500 (EST)

I boarded United flight 853 from Newark to San Francisco after a one hour wait to check in due to
computer problems. The Boeing 767 was not
full as evidenced by the number of empty seats in
connoisseur class. Four hours into the
flight, the smell of smoke permeated the cabin from the first class section directly behind the cockpit. I
figured there was an oven fire and all would be okay. Within a couple of minutes, the interior lights
turned off and the air ducts stopped. All passengers were
concerned, some more so than others, but the flight attendants continued their jobs as if nothing was
happening.

I noticed one flight attendant rush by with a
large fire extinguisher covered by table linens. The
demeanor of the flight crew led me to believe
that everything was fine. Finally, the head flight attendant
announced that all of the flight crew should
report to the front of the plane. At this point all on board
knew there was a serious problem. We were
told to that there was a fire on board and the pilot was
making an emergency landing. The passengers
were told to read the emergency landing manual and to
practice the emergency landing position.

The plane began to descend and turn quickly.
As we practiced the emergency position the flight crew
told us to remove all sharp instruments, glasses, and pens from our person. When they yelled "brace"
we were to assume the position. One of the
attendants was noticeably shaken and was instructed to
take her seat by the head attendant. At no
point were passengers told at which airport, if any, the pilot would be attempting to land. In fact the only
time the pilot addressed the passengers is when he said "
Flight attendants, three minutes to touch down. Prepare for emergency procedures". Not knowing where we were, I decided to look out the window. Within 5 minutes the plane had dropped from cruising altitude to several hundred feet above snow capped mountains. Again, there was no indication that we going to land at an airport.

When the flight attendants yelled brace, we all held our breath until we felt the wheels touch the ground. The plane quickly went to the gate and was surrounded by fire personnel. All passengers were ordered off of the plane immediately. Luckily one of the passengers had been in the Salt Lake City  airport before, because no United employee addressed the passengers. All 57 passengers were left to mill about the airport. The flight crew gathered in a huddle, knelt down and said a collective prayer of
thanks. The head flight attendant claimed that this was only the second time in her 29 years of service that something this serious had happened. At no time did any United official address the emotional state of the passengers, many of whom were noticeably crying and trembling.

[Details of subsequent mistreatment at airport omitted for brevity.]

A couple of items need to be addressed. A.) Your web site contained a similar experience aboard a United 767 from Zurich to London on January 12, 1998. I think United should look into this problem immediately before the next emergency landing ends in disaster. B.) United personnel should be trained in addressing the emotional needs of the passengers, particularly after a near tragedy.
I have never been treated so poorly by so many different people in so many locations as I was by United on January 17, 1998. I will request that my company not pay the business class airfare, and rethink their carrier of choice.

Emergency landing
Mon, 12 Jan 1998 18:56:10 -0500 (EST)

As a long-term UA customer, my faith in United was somewhat dented by an incident at London Heathrow last week. I'd be interested if anyone has information about the "electrical fault" aboard UA965 from Zurich, Switzerland to Washington Dulles on Jan 9, causing an emergency landing in London? As the aircraft, a 767, started its engines in Zurich a continuous unfamiliar sound was heard by passengers from one engine. The aircraft
remained on the ground at Kloten for several hours while
the crew reportedly contacted UA's principal European base at Heathrow. UA London apparently advised that the flight should operate, but less than an hour after take-off (while luckily the 767 was still over land) the forward cabin and cockpit began to fill with smoke. The crew announced an emergency approach into LHR and the airplane descended very rapidly, other traffic having presumably been cleared. Once the aircraft came to a halt in London, where fire trucks awaited it, emergency chutes were deployed, but one failed to function.

The aircraft was evacuated and passengers were told by Heathrow fire crew to run away from the plane. They were given blankets and waited in a grassy area for an extended period before they were picked up by buses. The UA crew were reported uncommunicative and understandably shocked. Passengers were then taken to an airport hotel, re-united with their carry-on luggage and offered psychological counselling should they need it. Two were injured in the evacuation but there were no fatalities. I'd like to know (a) what "electrical" incident actually occurred and why the plane filled with smoke, (b) what concerns the crew had on the ground in Zurich about the airworthiness of the plane and why its departure was delayed, and (c) if there were safety concerns, how were they dealt with or -- if information from Zurich is correct -- why did the 767 attempt its flight after consultation with UA's London office?

As far as I know this incident has not been widely reported in the press, though it is recorded on the FAA's database. I am told that two attorneys aboard the flight are considering a case against United.

HERO - Hazard of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance

Rodney Hoffman <Hoffman.El_Segundo@Xerox.com> 
Fri, 21 Dec 1990 13:47:30 PST


Summary of a 30-column-inch article in the Dec. 21, 1990 'Los Angeles Reader'

WORLD'S MOST ADVANCED ARMY IS IN DANGER OF ZAPPING ITSELF

The Hazard of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance,
Or, How an Electronic Accident Could Ignite a Gulf War

By Patricia Axelrod and Capt. Daniel Curtis (USAF Ret.)

HERO, a feature of the electronic battlefield the Pentagon prefers to keep secret, can launch a rocket or crash a plane without warning. During the Libyan air strike, it caused an American fighter bomber to crash and accidentally bomb friendly embassies and residences.

USAF Col. Charles Quisenberry says electronic emissions from US weapons "were interfering with each other" in the Libyan attack, and that "we did it [the mishaps] to ourselves." He also blames HERO for a series of UH-60 Black Hawk Army helicopter crashes.

Quisenberry is conducting a classified 3-year study of HERO called the Joint Electromagnetic Interference Study -- JEMI. Quisenberry says preliminary JEMI findings are that combinations of US weapons transmitting radio waves at
certain frequencies can bring down an aircraft by putting it into an uncommanded turn or dive or by turning off its fuel supply.

The Pentagon classifies the electroexplosive device (EED), as especially HERO-prone. The EED is used universally throughout the weapons industry as a fuse trigger, activating everything from artillery to nuclear missiles.
Charles Cormack, Navy EED specialist, claims that the EED has caused 25 weapons accidents, but civilian experts believe that there have been many more. Defective wiring such as "Kapton," which can cause HERO, is reported to be used on more than 50 types of aerospace vehicles.

Among many possible HERO-caused accidental firings, explosions, bombings, crashes, etc., a worst case scenario might be the accidental explosion of a Tomahawk or other nuclear device. The electromagnetic pulse following such an
explosion could then trigger HERO chain reactions.

Analog vs Digital Controls

Martin Ewing <EWING@Venus.YCC.Yale.Edu> 
Thu, 6 Sep 90 22:27 EDT


Analog controls are not really the opposite of digital. The main difference is that digital logic often uses saturated transistors and obscure data coding as a representation, or analog, of a physical parameter. Digital systems do tend to use an enormous number of transistors for even the simplest operations, but they are integrated into a manageable number of chips.

Analog systems are plagued by poor gain calibrations, temperature drifts, nonlinearities, and noise. Nonlinearities can result in saturation and "latch-up" behavior. AC systems suffer from crosstalk, parasitic oscillations, and lots of other ills. A component failure can easily produce as drastic a change in output as a digital failure might.

The "advantage" of analog systems is that they don't have software. However, they do have all the troubles listed above, which tend to limit functionality. They also have circuit designers instead of programmers.

The safest control systems are passive ones, which use no analogs: reactors that get less reactive at high temperatures and aircraft that fly themselves with no control forces.

Martin Ewing, 203-432-4243, Ewing@Yale.Edu
Yale University Science & Engineering Computing Facility

<STORY_GLENN#TSII@comm.tandem.com> 27 Oct 89 11:50:00 -0700

The following is copied from our internal "humor" distribution list, condensed from Flight International:

A DC9 with 104 people aboard made an emergency landing in Colorado last week. The aircraft, Northwest flight 109 from Minneapolis to Phoenix diverted to Monte Vista municipal airport after losing both generators and the auxilary power unit in mid-air.

The aircraft landed safely on the 1,830m runway, with no injuries, although it overan the runway by about 300m. The airline says the captain was forced to use an axe to open the forward cabin door, after the cabin began to fill with smoke. After evacuating the passengers, the captain then had to walk to the terminal and use a payphone to summon help.

Glenn Story, Tandem Computers

Cut cockpit wiring found on airliner

Matt Welsh <mdw24@cl.cam.ac.uk> 
12 Jun 1997 09:04:10 GMT


AP via CNN's web site (www.cnn.com) reports on June 11, 1997 that "Cut wires were found underneath the cockpit of a Pan Am plane undergoing routine maintenance checks at Kennedy International Airport Wednesday, but the safety of the plane was not compromised, officials said."

The remainder of the article is at
http://www.cnn.com/US/9706/11/plane.wires.cut.ap/index.html (CNN
Interactive URLs are almost always valid indefinitely) although as
one expects from such a report there are little technical details
and a lot of hot air from 'officials' trying to cool the situation down.

M. Welsh, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.

Be careful not to let your engine control computers overheat.

Dr Peter B Ladkin <pbl@compsci.stirling.ac.uk> 
22 Dec 93 21:20:52 GMT (Wed)


Flight International, 22/12/93-4/1/94, p11.

"Dangerous overheating in an Airbus Industrie A320 engine-starter unit led to
complete in-flight engine-control failure [..].
The starboard [engine ....] suddenly wound down to idle power at
4,000ft (1,200m) in the climb from London Heathrow on 13 December, 1992.
Reversion to manual control had no effect because the circuit breakers
for the full-authority digital engine control (FADEC) and engine-interface
unti had tripped and would not reset. The aircraft returned safely to
Heathrow. [...] Temperatures reached 400\degC inside the engine cowl,
damaging the FADEC wiring. The AAIB says that the engine wind-down was
probably caused by short-circuiting, which gave false signals about
thrust-reverser position.
In October 1989 a similar [..] event led to the issue of the 1991
Service Bulletin. A Bulletin issued after the incident was not applied to the
[aircraft in this report]. The AAIB recommends making it mandatory."

Peter Ladkin

I've been thinking about how 'Designated Alteration Stations' play dual roles. 

Take SBA for example. On one hand, they were an aircraft retrofitter, and on the other hand, they were doing testing and approvals on behalf of the FAA. Not only inspecting and approving other people's work, but perhaps their own as well. I understand the reasoning for this, because it's unrealistic for the FAA to employ staff in hundreds of approving offices all over the country. But my concern is about the potential for a conflict of interest. 

So how does the system avoid conflicts? Regulations. 

"...Systematic showing of compliance to the FAA regulatory requirements to the design..." according to Ronald Wojnar (deputy director, aircraft certification service, FAA). That means the approving technicians adhere to strict rules, and the FAA field office closely monitors them. As long as modifications meet regulations prescribed by the FAA, the Designated Alteration Station-slash-Retrofitter can perform approvals without being in a conflict of interest. 

Two problems remain:

One-
You can't regulate common sense.


Two- 
This was a relatively new appliance. What are the chances that there was a specific regulation in place saying something like: "The In-flight entertainment network must not share electrical power from the same bus used by essential flight instruments and controls"? 

Oops let me rephase that - how about this instead:

"Thou shalt not connect Essential entertainment accessories, like Gameboys, onto an electrical distribution bus used by Non-Essential accessories such as Primary Flight Displays, Autopilots, and Artificial Horizons."

OK, fun aside, I read through a bunch of FAA regulations, and I couldn't find anything at all specific about load sharing, or special safety measures for connection of accessories. Not entertainment systems. Not movie systems. As near as I can tell, accessories, regardless of what they are, are only restricted by a very basic framework of regulations. Rigid yes, but minimal. In effect, the regulations haven't kept up with the push for installation of new entertainment technologies.

Prior to take-off, passengers are religiously reminded about the regulations pertaining to use of radios, laptops, cel phones, and video cameras (due to potential Electro-Magnetic Interference to the on-board electronics). And yet there's really nothing substantial governing what kind of accessories can share the same electrical bus as essential flight controls and instruments.

Whether we like it or not, it may turn out that the design and installation of the IFEN in Swissair met all of the existing regulations for Airworthiness. 

Or did it? 

In the next few days, I'll post copies of FAA regulations that I found regarding DAS Authorizations, STC's, and Airworthiness; ones that I think pertain to this IFEN installation. 

Movie equipment systems has been on aircraft for years. Have they always been connected in this same manner? Or was this IFEN extraordinarily power hungry? Was the IFEN originally designed and intended to be connected to the Cabin bus, and then switched to the 'Essential' bus during installation?

Were certain executives at Swissair and IFT able to influence the regulatory system and elbow their IFEN to a quick approval? I suppose you need like-minded individuals for that to happen. Or people who were motivated in achieving the same goal. Perhaps a promise of attractive stock purchases or future work contracts? 

So I still have some outstanding questions:

1.   Was SBA 'rated' by the FAA to do electrical authorizations on aircraft?

2.   Since this was probably classified as a 'Major Alteration', was the FAA involved in all aspects of the process that it should have been?

3.   Apparently Swissair announced it's IFEN deal in 1996 (exact date not specified). Karl Laasner purchased 2,700 shares in (IFT) on April 30, 1996. The STC was issued by Santa Barbara Aerospace on November 19, 1996. Hollingshead installed the IFEN in Swissair HB-IWG at Zurich in January 1997, and it reportedly had an in-service date of January 23, 1997. Did anyone at Hollingshead, SBA, the FAA, or Hollingshead purchase shares in IFT prior to the in-service date of the IFEN? 

4.   I believe Santa Barbara Aerospace started first as Aero Spacelines Inc, then was sold to Tracor Aviation in 1981. Tracor sold to Lucas Aviation, then becoming SBA. In April '97 SBA began leasing two hangars at Santa Barbara Airport, with plans to repair and maintain 747's & DC-10's. At the time they employed over 570 workers. So why did SBA 'go bankrupt'? 

Welcome to Santa Barbara Aerospace, Inc. 495-B South Fairview Avenue Santa Barbara, CA 93117 805-681-9300 VGAACA AOL.com WHO WE ARE Santa Barbara Aerospace "SBA" is a wholly owned subsidiary of Quaker Holding Company, www.sbaerospace.com  - Santa Barbara Aerospace, Inc - Santa Barbara CA 

Scheduled 14 CFR 129 operation of SWISSAIR Accident occurred SEP-02-98 at NOVIA SCOTIA Aircraft: Douglas MD-11, registration: HBIWF Injuries: 231 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On September 2, 1998, about 0930 pm EDT, a MD-11, HB-IWF, operated by Swiss Air as flight 111, crashed into a bay near Blandford, Nova Scotia. (the nearest area is called Peggy's cove). The airplane was a regularly scheduled passenger flight from JFK International Airport, Jamaica, New York to Geneva, Switzerland, operating under 14 CFR Part 129. The flight also operated as Delta flight 111 under a code sharing agreement. The reports from the scene indicate that the airplane was destroyed and the 217 passengers (including 2 children) and 14 crewmembers were killed. The accident is being investigated by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada. The Safety Board is assisting in the investigation under the provisions of Annex 13 to ICAO as the State of Manufacturer. Technical advisors to the U.S. Accredited Representative are the FAA, ALPA, Boeing Long Beach Division, and Pratt & Whitney.

Incident occurred MAR-29-99 at SAN BERNARDINO, CA Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas MD-11, registration: N274WA Injuries: 1 Uninjured.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On March 29, 1999, maintenance personnel in San Bernardino, California, discovered evidence of a fire on board a McDonnell Douglas MD-11, N274WA, operated by World Airways. The time and circumstances of the fire went unreported and are unknown. The airplane received minor damage, and no injuries associated with the event were reported. Maintenance personnel at Santa Barbara Aerospace in San Bernardino contacted the Safety Board when they noted evidence of the fire while opening up the aft cargo bay floorboards during a scheduled "4 C" maintenance check. The airplane, a freighter, was manufactured in 1992 and accumulated about 18,300 hours since delivery. A deferred maintenance item dated February 22, 1999, was noted in the aircraft logbook that reported a inoperative electric cargo loading system. A routine task card was scheduled to remove the floorboards, so the operator opted to defer this item until the 4C check (the floorboards had never been removed). Upon removal of the floorboards, the insulation blanket between stations 1661 and 1681 was found burned. An detailed inspection of the area revealed that a wiring harness, containing 20-guage wires insulated with Kapton, was routed across and onto frame 1681. One wire was separated, and the insulation of seven other wires were damaged and chaffed where they contacted the frame. The bundle emanated from the aft cargo loading system control box, which routes 115 volt 3-phase power to electric floor rollers when the aft cargo door is in the fully open position. Evidence of wire chaffing and arcing was present on the wire bundle and the frame where the bundle was contacted it. The metalized mylar that covered the entire insulation blanket (measuring about 60 inches feet by 20 inches) that fit into the bay between frame 1661 and 1681 had completely burned away, exposing partially burned insulation material beneath it. A 1.25-inch hole in the blanket was found underneath the chaffed portion of the wire bundle. The mating edge of the adjoining insulation blanket (forward of frame 1681) was also burned. The metalized mylar is DMS 2072K, type 2, class 1, grade A, lot no.2024. The tape that held the mylar in place is DMS 1984 tape. Two wire bundle "stand-offs" were installed on either side of the arced area of the wires. The wire run was 14 inches between the stand-offs. The outboard stand-off was 1 inch high, and the inboard stand-off was 1.5 inches high, with an effective stand-off clearance of 3/4-inch from the frame.

NTSB Identification: DCA99RA002
Scheduled 14 CFR 121 operation of DELTA AIRLINES, INC.
Incident occurred OCT-08-98 at SHANNON
Aircraft: Douglas MD-11, registration: N805DE
Injuries:
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On October 8, 1998, at 1248 Irish time, the flightcrew of a Delta Airlines Boeing MD-11, N805DE, experienced an electrical odor in the cockpit. The aircraft was
approaching flight level 350 in a climb out of Manchester, England, enroute to Atlanta, Georgia. There were two pilots, one jump seat rider, eleven flight attendants, and
213 passengers on board at the time. No injuries occurred. This incident occurred over the Atlantic Ocean, about two hours west of Ireland. The flight diverted
uneventfully into Shannon, Ireland.
Index for Oct 1998 | Index of Months

Scheduled 14 CFR 121 operation of AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. Incident occurred JAN-31-99 at SEATTLE, WA Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas MD-11, registration: N1765B Injuries: 80 Uninjured.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On January 31, 1999, about 1500 PST, American Airlines Flight 27, N1765B, a McDonnell Douglas MD-11, experienced smoke in the cabin and performed an emergency landing at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. The captain, first officer, 14 crewmembers, and 64 passengers were not injured. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed and a company flight plan had been filed. The 14 CFR Part 121 scheduled international passenger flight had departed Seattle about 1350 and was en route to Narita, Japan. According to representatives of American Airlines, the airplane was airborne for about 1 hour and 10 minutes while cruising over north Vancouver Island, British Columbia, Canada, when the event occurred. A "buzz" was first heard over the public address system, so the flightcrew reset the circuit breaker for it. Smoke was then observed in the first class cabin area. The crew immediately declared an emergency and turned back to Seattle. A crewmember located the source of the smoke and opened up an overhead bin just forward of the R2 door located near the right rear section of the first class cabin. A halon fire extinguisher was discharged onto a video system control unit (VSCU) and the smoke dissipated with no further incident. No reports of fire were made, and no fire damage was found. Examination of the VSCU by representatives of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revealed that part of a circuit board was charred. Further examination of the entire video system revealed internal damage to several video distribution units (VDUs) downstream of the VSCU. A "cannon plug" power connector that linked the damaged components exhibited evidence of moisture damage and a short circuit between two pins. All video system wiring was intact and undamaged. The video system was manufactured by Rockwell Collins Passenger Systems and certified by the FAA Long Beach Aircraft Certification Office. It was installed in the incident airplane by McDonnell Douglas prior to the aircraft's delivery from the factory. According to manufacturer records from Rockwell Collins, the connector failure was the first of its kind.

Incident occurred NOV-27-98 at SINGAPORE Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas MD-11, registration: UNK Injuries:

On November 27, 1998, a McDonnell Douglas MD-11 operated by Swissair experienced smoke in the cockpit upon climbout. The incident is being investigated by the government of Singapore.

Full narrative available 

Index for Nov 1998 | Index of Months

Air Safety Week/Canadians rewiring
10/11/1999 11:56 pm EDT

Wholesale wire replacement

The Canadians have already implemented a complete aircraft re-wiring program for older planes while the problem is still being investigated in the U.S. Under an effort known as the "Energizer" program, Air Canada replaced virtually all the wiring in 10 of its 16 DC-9 aircraft (the 5 remaining are not planned to be kept in service by the carrier that much longer). The program was completed in November, 1998. A carrier official said, "We kind of gutted everything and started over." 

The affected airplanes ranged from 25-32 years old, with up to 68,000 flight cycles and up to 75,000 flying hours. 

Hundreds of pounds of wire, some 300 miles worth per airplane, was removed and replaced, according to the carrier. The cost was some $1,360,000 per airplane, about equally divided between materials and labor (Note, the book value of a 25-year old DC-9 is roughly $3.5 million). 

Officials from Transport Canada were not involved, as this was a replacement program, not a modification. The carrier said "normal findings" characterized the condition of the removed wiring. Evidence of chafing was observed. Degradation of the wiring in the tail area was observed, where de-icing fluid tends to collect. The program was spurred by the need to increase capacity, and the carrier did not want to be saddled with the high financing cost of new aircraft should a downturn occur. "We needed aircraft we could deploy quickly, and remove if there was a downturn," the carrier official said. The DC-9's, owned free and clear, were obvious candidates. "We thought it was smarter to extend their life and improve their general state," the official said. 

The carrier has experienced a "significant improvement" in dispatch reliability and on-time performance for the "Energizer" aircraft. Indeed, in a piece titled "Wired World," Air Canada touted the Energizer program in an issue earlier this year of Enroute, its in-flight magazine. 

Historical note: Air Canada lost a DC-9 at Cincinnati, Ohio, June 2, 1983, in which 23 died and the airplane was destroyed, to a fire that began in flight. The probable cause in the resulting investigation was "fire of undetermined origin." The investigator in charge was our Contributing Editor Rudy Kapustin, who suspects faulty wiring may have been involved in this tragedy. >> Air Canada, tel. 514/422-5788; Kapustin, tel. 410/730-4410 << 

U.S. Airlines Spent Millions To Ground Passenger Rights Legislation 

Oct 11, 1999 

United States airlines spent USD$3 million on lobbying and USD$1.3 million in 
political donations in their efforts to ground legislation for a passenger 
bill of rights according to a study by the group Common Cause. 

The report claims that Northwest Airlines, which had been the target of 
protests from passengers for holding packed planes on runways last winter, 
alone spent USD$1.3 million for lobbying during the first half of 1999. Delta 
Airlines spent USD$38,000 in political donations during the same period, the 
study says. 

The Air Transport Association, the trade group for the major carriers, spent 
nearly USD$1 million for its lobbying effort during the first half of this 
year, according to the Common Cause study. 

Political donations by the industry shot up in the first half of this year, 
said Common Cause, when the airlines contributed USD$1.3 million to political 
parties and candidates. In a comparable period in 1997, they donated 
USD$630,000, and in the first half of 1995, the contributions totaled 
USD$306,000. 

The Common Cause analysis tracked political spending at a time when public 
outrage over treatment by the airlines prompted promises of new legislation 
on Capitol Hill. Passengers told of being held prisoner for hours aboard 
packed planes that were stuck on runways by winter blizzards and spring 
storms and complaints filed against airlines doubled to 5,000 compared with a 
year earlier. 

In June the major airlines persuaded Congress to accept their offer to set up 
a voluntary improvement plan and in September issued their individual 
"customers first" proposals. 

A study by the General Accounting Office, the investigating arm of Congress, 
concluded that most of the rights listed in the airlines' plans do not go 
beyond existing legal requirements. 

Prototype First

It could take eight years, not the four years proposed, to properly assess 
the job and to replace metalized Mylar thermal acoustic insulation blankets 
in some 700 Douglas-built aircraft, according to the Air Transport 
Association (ATA). The organization represents major U.S. carriers and 
believes the price tag of what it estimates may total a half-billion dollar 
effort could have a "staggering economic impact on the industry." Worse, a 
hurried replacement program could harm safety, rather than improve it, given 
the risks of disturbing wire during the thermal acoustic blanket change-out 
process. Thus, while installing more fire-resistant "tinder," the effort 
could create more "matches" in the form of an unknown number of arcing 
sources. Indeed, this potential hazard has been raised by a number of 
independent aircraft maintenance and wiring experts.

Last August, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) proposed a massive 
changeout of metalized Mylar thermal acoustic insulation blanketing in 
Douglas aircraft over a 4-year period, a time ostensibly intended to allow 
for the work to be done during scheduled heaving maintenance, when interior 
furnishings are removed and access to the thermal acoustic insulation batts 
is easier (see ASW, Aug. 16 and Sept. 6).

In a Sept. 27 letter to the FAA, the ATA suggested a prototyping program to 
refine estimates of the amount of labor involved, and the best approach 
regarding material and installation.

In addition, the ATA argued that an 8-year changeout window would not only 
allow for prototyping to nail down uncertainties, it also would allow the 
industry to better accommodate the other shoe that has yet to drop: 
forthcoming airworthiness directives (ADs) concerning aircraft wiring 
systems. Indeed, many in the industry feel whipsawed by requirements to 
install modifications or perform inspections on the 737 rudder power control 
unit. Meeting the mandated deadlines caused major headaches and scheduling 
complications, which many in the industry are loathe to see repeated for 
thermal acoustic insulation, according to sources. The ATA, however, did 
endorse the replacement effort. Replacing metalized Mylar covered insulation, 
the organization said, "will, in our view, enhance aviation safety." >> ATA, 
202/626-4172 << 


Two Prototyping Efforts
1. American Airlines will modify an entire MD-80 commencing Nov. 22, with 
work estimated to be completed January 21, 2000 (including final electrical 
and systems checks).

2. Swissair will change out the insulation in a prototype effort commencing 
Oct. 18, 1999, on one of its MD-11s, with work slated to conclude Sept. 12.

The prototype efforts are intended to validate recommended procedures in 
service bulletins issued earlier. For example, the bulletins address the 
fabrication of replacement blankets but do not provide guidance on how best 
to remove the old blankets or to install the new ones. In addition, the 
bulletins, in the ATA's judgment, outline the least effective of four 
replacement options:

Option - A. Blankets provided in kits from manufacturer
Merits/Demerits - The most efficient. Facilitates earliest replacement.

Option - B. Blankets fabricated from measurements in affected airplanes
Merits/Demerits - Viewed as costly and time-consuming. May require 
supplemental type certificate (STC) for each installation configuration.

Option - C. Blankets fabricated using a kit of templates provided by the 
manufacturer
Merits/Demerits - Viewed as prohibitively costly. The manufacturer may not be 
able to provide them in time to meet 4-yr schedule

Option - D. Blankets fabricated using removed blankets as templates as 
specified in the service bulletins.
Merits/Demerits - Viewed as the least practical as blankets can be damaged in 
removal, shrink during fabrication, and become distorted in service.

Source: ATA



------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--

Thrice Burned

Three fires occurred over a 2-year period involving Chinese-registered MD-11 
and 737-300 aircraft, according to a 1996 report by the Aircraft 
Airworthiness Center of the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC). 
One of the fires, on an MD-11 in 1995 revealed the flammability of metalized 
Mylar insulation. Even though the CAAC report was provided to the FAA, it did 
not act until Swissair flight 111, involving another MD-11, crashed in Sept. 
1998, two years after the Chinese advised there was a flammability problem 
with the metalized Mylar insulation on the MD-11.

The Chinese also reported two fires involving 737s, delivered in 1992 and 
1993, in which the insulation burned. The 737-300 is outfitted with a 
non-metalized Mylar insulation. In the case of the B737 incidents, the 
Chinese said:

"The covering material of Boeing 737-300 airplane's insulation blanket was 
fire flammable. After the insulation blanket was made by sewing, the covering 
at the edge of the blanket consists of four layers and made steady by thread. 
This kind of sewing was easy to be burned. IN the meanwhile, the edges of 
these insulation blanket were mainly located in the frame of the fuselage, 
and made its ignited possibility by the sparkles of the short circuit.... It 
was a potential danger for the safety of the aircraft." (From the original of 
the CAAC's English-language report) 


Three Fires in Two Years
Oct. 10, 1994. B737-300. After landing, insulation blanket under rack E2 in 
the E&E bay on fire. Wires short-circuited, igniting the fire. 
Sept. 16, 1995. MD-11. E&E bay fire. Long-time vibration led to short-circuit 
melting through 11 wires, igniting insulation blanketing. 
Nov. 13, 1995. B737-300. Film ignited by drill shavings during maintenance.
Source: CAAC

No Longer Valid

More than a year after Swissair Flight 111 crashed and some three months 
after action was recommended by a special review team, the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) acted last week, prohibiting the installation on other 
MD-11s of the kind of interactive in-flight entertainment network (IFEN) 
found on the accident aircraft. Originally, the FAA apparently planned to 
allow the IFEN to remain on MD-11s, subject to modifications recommended by 
the special certification review team. That course clearly has been rejected 
in favor of an outright ban on further installations.

The FAA's Sept. 28 airworthiness directive left a key point unsaid. It 
explained that electrical power eventually would be removed from the IFEN via 
the SMOKE ELEC/AIR rotary switch, which cuts powers each of the airplane's 
three electrical systems in turn. What the AD did not say is that it would be 
possible to re-apply power to the IFEN by moving the switch through its 
various positions, as called for in the SMOKE ELEC checklist.

The IFEN was manufactured by Interactive Flight Technologies (IFT) of 
Phoenix, Arizona. At a Sept. 30 stockholders meeting, CEO Irwin Gross said 
IFT will no longer manufacture entertainment systems for commercial aircraft. 

Original June 14, 1999, Recommendations of the Special Certification Review 
Team
Recommendation 1: The FAA's Los Angles Aircraft Certification Office...will 
issue an airworthiness directive (AD) to mandate design changes to ensure 
that the IFEN system electrical power is connected to, or controlled by, the 
CAB (cabin) BUS switch.

Recommendation 2: The FAA's Los Angeles Certification Office...will issue an 
AD to mandate a design change to include an electrical power interruption 
(ON/OFF) mechanism for the IFEN system that is accessible to the flight 
and/or cabin crew. This mandated change can be incorporated in the AD issued 
in response to Recommendation No. 1. 

Source: FAA

ASIAN DEATH CARRIERS
Almost one in three of nearly 9,000 deaths in jet aircraft accidents around the world this decade occurred on flights operated by Asian airlines, according to the aviation magazine Orient Aviation. The magazine said in its October issue that Asia accounted for 2,480 of the 8,751 passenger and crew fatalities in jet aircraft accidents from 1990 to 1999. The figure places Asian airlines "considerably ahead" of their counterparts elsewhere, the magazine said. African airlines accounted for 1,530 deaths. The death toll aboard South American carriers was 1,391 during the same period. North American airlines, with 877 fatalities and European carriers with 811 fatalities had the best safety records, the magazine reported.

 "While no one disputes several of the industry's safest carriers world-wide are Asian flag operators, the review of crashes reveals that poor performance and repeated lapses by others are continuing to reflect badly on Asia's overall air safety reputation," the magazine said. "There are more fatalities than elsewhere, more non-fatal accidents and a crash ratio to departures higher than the world average," it said. "Although the fatality statistics are absolute, and do not take into account the revenue kilometers flown by airlines, they clearly show why Asia has built up a bad name in the air safety arena." The article singled out Korean Air and China Airlines of Taiwan. A Korean Airline 747 flew into a hillside in Guam in 1997, killing 226 of 254 people on board. Taiwan's China Airlines had its worst accident in February 1998, when an airliner crashed outside Taipei killing all 196 people aboard and six on the ground.

 On August 22 three people were killed and more than 200 injured when a China Airlines 747 crashed and flipped at Hong Kong. Leroy Keith, technical director of the Association of Asia Pacific Airlines, (AAPA) said some carriers had their "heads in the sand" over safety. "I don't just mean Taiwan and Korea. I mean the membership of the AAPA," he said. "I think there was a denial for a number of years, a belief we just had some bad luck, but I think in the past year or so there has really been a serious wake-up call. The rest of the world is saying the rates are worse in the Asia-Pacific, and the public knows it. You can't deny it, the facts are there," Keith said. 

With wiring inspections and repairs of Discovery and Endeavour nearing completion and similar work beginning on Atlantis, Shuttle program managers today set new planning target launch dates for the next three Space Shuttle missions. Based on an assessment of the work remaining on Discovery and Endeavour and the inspections which have begun on Atlantis, managers set the following as target launch dates for upcoming flights: 

"Our number one priority for the Space Shuttle is to fly safely, and that is why we delayed our launch preparations and have performed comprehensive
wiring inspections and repairs," Space Shuttle Program Manager Ron Dittemore said. "As a result of our inspections, we've made significant changes in how we protect electrical wiring. We believe those changes, along with changes to the work platforms and procedures we use in the Shuttle's payload bay, will prevent similar wire damage from recurring," Dittemore added. 

05:00 PM ET 10/07/99 

Hubble Repair Bumped to December  CAPE CANAVERAL, Fla. (AP) _ NASA has bumped space shuttle Discovery's flight to the Hubble Space Telescope to December so workers can complete wiring and valve repairs. Shuttle managers said Thursday they're targeting a Dec. 2 launch date for Discovery. The telescope-repair mission had been scheduled for mid-October, then mid-November. A radar-mapping mission by Endeavour, meanwhile, has been moved to January. And the next flight to the international space station, by Atlantis, is now set for February. The missions were delayed following Columbia's marred launch in July. A short circuit five seconds into the flight knocked out computers for two of the three main engines; defective wiring was to blame. Wiring defects subsequently were found in the other shuttles. NASA also is contending with bad valves aboard Discovery. Two leaking valves in the right orbital maneuvering system must be replaced. With only two shuttle launches so far in 1999, and only one more scheduled, this will be the leanest year for NASA since shuttles resumed flying in 1988 following the Challenger disaster.