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NEWSFLASH: At least 120 people are now feared dead after an airliner crashed into a Milan Linate airport building, apparently after being cut off on the runway by a smaller aircraft.

The SAS MFD-80 airliner was about to take-off in thick fog when a small Cessna aIrcraft is said to have crossed in front of it. The airliner, en route to Copenhagen, reportedly crashed into a baggage-handling building after taking evasive action in an attempt to avoid hitting the other plane. The SAS airliner had 104 people on board, 56 foreigners and 48 Italians.

Some of the wreckage fell several hundred yards away from the scene of the accident. Rescuers say it is unlikely there will be any survivors. All four aboard the Cessna are reported dead. Fire crews are at the scene extinguishing the fire.

Linate is Milan's second airport, after its main hub at Malpensa.

SAS - Scandinavian Airlines System - is jointly operated by Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

dreadle = http://www.iasa-intl.com/dreadle.html

"Real Time" Black Box System Proposed

(Idea stolen from IASA: http://www.iasa-intl.com/folders/Safety_Issues/dfdr-cvr/YourIridiumLegacy.html )

Oct 4, 2001

A satellite operator says it could offer the aviation industry a 'black box' which broadcasts live throughout every flight.

Real-time cockpit voice and flight data monitoring might address some of the security concerns raised following the attacks on the US.

Iridium Satellite says the service could be in place quickly using off-the-shelf components and its 66 low earth orbit satellites. It has submitted its proposal to the US Federal Aviation Administration and other government organizations.

Iridium claims to operate the only system with complete coverage of the Earth capable of handling such voice and data transactions.

The system could replace black boxes because flight data could be transmitted to a secure monitoring and recording center thousands of miles away from the aircraft.

The company's chairman, Dan Colussy, says: "With existing systems, officials on the ground have only limited visibility into what is happening inside an aircraft in flight. Using its global footprint and voice and data capabilities, combined with existing commercially-available equipment, Iridium gives ground personnel unrestricted access in real time to vital voice and data communications from the aircraft."

http://www.airwise.com/

British pilots fear that plans to strengthen cockpits to deter hijackers could put flight crews at risk.

The British Airline Pilots' Association (BALPA) says flight crews could become trapped in the event of a fire.

Two US airlines have already begun reinforcing cockpit doors. British Airways and Virgin Atlantic are considering following suit.

Chris Darke, BALPA general secretary, said: "Sealing the cockpit like a prison may not be the answer. Pilots see the cockpit door as one of their emergency routes of escape. If it becomes inadvertently locked in an accident they could be trapped."

Pilots are also worried cabin crew may not be able to get into the cockpit to warn pilots about safety problems or help if a pilot is taken ill.

BALPA says the emphasis must be on preventing terrorists from boarding in the first place.

American Airlines and United Airlines, who lost two planes each in the terrorist attacks, have begun putting metal bars in cockpit doors.

Date: February 9, 2000

EVAS Closes Long Term Supply Agreement with Net Jets

An agreement between Vision Safe Corporation, Aircraft Services Group, and Executive Jet Services to supply the fractional operator with EVAS (“Emergency Vision Assurance System), was executed on 14 January 2000. The agreement calls for the entire Net Jets fleet to be outfitted with EVAS, for both the pilot and co-pilot, by September of this year. Vision Safe and Aircraft Services Group expect to deliver some 400 EVAS units to Executive Jet, between April and September, with an additional 470 units to follow during the term of the agreement.

Aircraft Services Group markets and sells the safety system, EVAS, for the manufacture Vision Safe. Aircraft Services Group Vice President, Jonathan Parker, said, “We believe that the commitment made by Executive Jet, along with the other flight departments who have purchased EVAS, sets a new minimum standard for safety in the industry.” Aircraft Services Group is also closing an agreement with ight Safety to provide EVAS simulator training throughout the United States.

Thanks to EJA and Flight Safety, Parker expects sales to surge this year, “Aircraft operators need to address the threat of continuous smoke in the cockpit, EVAS offers a solution and Flight Safety offers the training.” Aircraft Services Group will launch an aggressive campaign this year of print advertising and trade show presence.

EVAS is the only safety system available which has been FAA tested and certified to ensure pilot vision in the presence of dense continuous smoke in the cockpit. In Simulator tests with EVAS, pilots have landed safely with smoke so thick they that, even with goggles, could not see their hand in front of their face. EVAS is self contained, battery operated, and requires no installation.

Still, the call to redesign flight deck access, unlike some of the other security proposals taking shape in the aftermath of the Sept. 11 hijacking attacks, has nearly unanimous support from policymakers, lawmakers and flight crews.

"The lock is only meant to keep your friends out," one veteran pilot said about existing cockpit doors, which do not impede determined intruders.

On Sept. 11, hijackers gained access to the cockpits of four commercial jets and apparently took the controls, ramming two into the World Trade Center and one into the Pentagon. The fourth crashed in a field in Pennsylvania.

Bush said Thursday in Chicago that his administration would dedicate $500 million, included in a $40 billion federal emergency aid package, to help finance projects to fortify the cockpit.

The Air Line Pilots Association said current doors were "weak and flimsy" and recommended a short-term measure of installing a deadbolt lock on the inside of cockpit doors that cannot be overridden with a key from the outside. Behind the door would be a mesh screen for extra protection.

QUICK ACCESS TO CABIN

The stopgap design must ensure that pilots can get into the passenger cabin quickly in case of an emergency.

"This will offer a relatively small but needed additional margin of security over today's cockpit doors," union president Duane Woerth said in recent congressional testimony. He said the retrofit could take as long as a year to complete.

While the concept of replacing doors seems uncomplicated, the reality of the project is anything but, industry and government experts agreed.

"It is not as simple as finding a heavier door and taking the old door off its hinges and putting on a new one," said Tim Neale, a Boeing spokesman.

There are more than 7,000 airliners in the U.S. commercial fleet, of which roughly two-thirds were made by Boeing Co. All four hijacked planes -- two 767s and two 757s -- were Boeing aircraft.

There are 40 different cockpit door designs that are made to Federal Aviation Administration specifications on Boeing and other commercial planes.

A Boeing spokeswoman said cost has not been part of the discussion, but some planners have made a full-time job in recent days of finding a solution that would meet the new safety and engineering challenges.

"One of the challenges we face in aircraft design is that you have to account for a lot of different things," Boeing Chairman and Chief Executive Phil Condit said this week.

At issue is developing a door and related systems that can withstand the force of a determined intruder but still enable the crew to get out in an emergency or access the passenger cabin for other reasons, such as observing a faulty engine not visible from the cockpit.

EVACUATION THROUGH COCKPIT

There are also times during an accident or fire when passengers might have to be evacuated through the cockpit.

A door that is too light or weak will not solve the security issue. A door that is too strong might satisfy security concerns but could fail on safety.

A central issue with safety is depressurization of the aircraft, which is very rare but can be disastrous if equal distribution of pressure is impeded by something like an airtight steel door.

Another problem facing engineers is that replacing the door itself might not be enough.

"The door is really part of a system that controls access to the cockpit," said one expert, who suggested multiple changes might be required. "The door and the bulkhead to which it is attached is anchored to the airframe."

One solution gaining currency with regulators in recent days, an FAA official said, is a design in which two lightweight doors separated by a small area would secure access to the cockpit.

Some have suggested using a lightweight material, like Kevlar, a synthetic substance made by DuPont Co. that is superstrong and used as reinforcement in aircraft construction and in bulletproof vests.

The money will come from the Transportation Department as grants, cost-sharing agreements or other arrangements. Since the airlines are responsible for ensuring their aircraft are safe, they will have to apply for the grants, and only U.S. carriers will be eligible.

At a congressional hearing last week, Boeing Vice President Hank Queen cautioned lawmakers that the 7,000 commercial jet airplanes in the U.S. fleet have about 40 different flight deck door systems that would need to be retrofitted.

``We have to be careful not to rush into something without understanding all the consequences,'' Queen told a joint hearing of the House and Senate Appropriations transportation subcommittees.

Finally, it is possible that many FAA regulations governing the specifications for each model of cockpit door would have to be changed -which could be a tedious process.

The Boeing 767 had just reached cruise altitude at flight level 330 approximately 40 minutes out of Singapore enroute to Perth, when the flight crew noted smoke and electrical fumes on the flight deck. The source of the smoke and fumes could not be readily identified. The pilot in command elected to have the flight crew don oxygen masks, and diverted to Jakarta.

The operator's engineering personnel examined the aircraft and found the right DME (Distance Measuring Equipment) circuit breaker open. Technicians isolated the problem to the right DME interrogator unit. The malfunctioning DME unit was disabled in accordance with the MEL (Minimum Equipment List) guidelines to allow the aircraft to continue to Perth. Following arrival in Perth, the unit was replaced.

Examination of the unit by the manufacturer revealed that the DME unit's A5 modulator had overheated. This failure mode was similar to two other units, which had overheated on a different aircraft in January 2000 (see Occurrence 200000055). The failure mode of those units was such that the A5 modulator had overloaded the positive 86 volt DC power supply and overheated the power transformer. Compliance with service bulletins recommending product improvements to this unit were not mandatory, and the recommended modifications had not been incorporated into this unit, or the previous two units that had sustained failures.

SAFETY ACTION

As a result of the investigation into this occurrence, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau has simultaneously issued Safety Advisory Notices 20000278 and 20000279 to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and the Federal Aviation Administration respectively. These advisories suggested the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and the Federal Aviation Administration take appropriate action to mandate compliance with Service Bulletins DME 700-34-10, 17, 23, 34, and 35.

http://dynamic.dotrs.gov.au/atsb/aviation/occurs_detail.cfm?ID=40

AIRLINE SECURITY
SEPTEMBER 24, 2001

How safe can we get?

The system has been vulnerable for years. Marginal improvements aren't enough

By DANIEL EISENBERG

Just how does a plane become a guided missile? The answer, in part, is
that the air-security system in the U.S. is porous in so many ways that a
breach was not surprising--only the incomprehensible dimension of it. For
aviation experts, who are all too familiar with the gaping holes in the
nation's vast network of 100 large airports, there was a sad, easy
explanation for Sept. 11: you get what you pay for.

For years, countless critics, from government watchdogs and consumer
groups to industry officials, have railed against and exposed the nation's
lax, inadequate airline-safety net, one they say has broken down in every
aspect: policy, personnel, technology and oversight from the Federal
Aviation Administration and Congress. After years of foot dragging, only
recently has the faa started to put stronger rules into effect, requiring
more stringent employee background checks and training as well as mandating
that all checked baggage be scanned by sophisticated bomb-screening
devices--by 2014. Two weeks before the tragedy, a veteran pilot told Time:
"It's absurd to think we're safe."

http://www.canoe.ca/TimeCanada0109/24_time10.html 

FAA's top safety regulator is leaving
Dateline: Friday August 31, 2001

FAA Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification Tom McSweeny will be leaving the agency in the next 4-6 weeks to take a job with Boeing.

Reports said McSweeny was departing owing to a dispute concerning the recent downgrading of South Korea's safety rating to Category 2 in the International Aviation Safety Assessment program. However, the agency denies all elements of that report. An FAA spokesperson said that after the initial IASA assessment in May concluded a downgrade was in order, Korean government officials maintained mistakes had been made by the FAA team. McSweeny responded by launching a second team and that team also concluded a downgrade was indicated. FAA Administrator Jane Garvey was unaware of these events until after the second team's report was filed.

No replacement for McSweeny has been named. Deputy Assistant Administrator for Certification and Regulation Peggy Gilligan is positioned to assume his duties.

http://www.atwonline.com/indexfull.cfm?newsid=1044

August 17, 2001 - Passenger Plane Forced To Make Emergency Landing

AUSTRALIA - A passenger plane was today forced to make an emergency landing at Narrabri in the NSW state's northwest.

The pilot declared an emergency when he noticed smoke in the cockpit prompting a full emergency alert, police said.

The plane with 12 people aboard landed safely on the local airstrip about 1.20pm, 10 minutes before schedule.

A Narrabri police spokeswoman said firefighters were checking the plane.

No-one was injured during the Sydney to Narrabri flight and the passengers left the plane safely, the spokeswoman said.

An Air Transat L1011 evacuated a full load of passengers on the taxiway in Orlando Florida on Sat 18Aug01.
Passengers and Flight Attendants spotted smoke coming from the air vents and got a strong smell of smoke.
The good news is that the aircraft was emptied within 2minutes via the chutes with no injuries.....

Dean Beeby
The Canadian Press

Stephen Savoia, The Canadian Press

HALIFAX - Another aircraft electrical system has come under suspicion by the team investigating the crash of Swissair Flight 111.

Tests have shown the aircraft's overhead aisle and emergency lights could be linked to the cockpit fire believed to have brought down the MD-11 aircraft on Sept. 2, 1998, near Peggys Cove, N.S. All 229 aboard died.

Ceiling panels recovered from the wreckage show heat discolouration apparently from the 28-volt incandescent bulbs used in the passenger-cabin lighting system.

And test results obtained under the Access to Information Act show temperatures in the aisle light fixtures of three other MD-11 aircraft rose as high as 200C in experiments.

The high temperatures caused the discolouration of ceiling panels as well as some deformation of the lights' plastic coverings.

Tests also showed the aisle light bulbs on MD-11s typically draw electrical current levels 143% higher than they were designed to withstand.

"We haven't eliminated the possibility that an aisle light might have been involved," Larry Vance, an investigator with the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, confirmed in an interview from Hull, Que.

The complex investigation, which is approaching its third anniversary, has also raised doubts about three cockpit map lights. Other MD-11 aircraft have had heat problems with their map lights, which have been ordered deactivated in many of the aircraft.

Only two of the three map lights in the Swissair Flight 111 cockpit have been fully recovered and neither shows evidence of heat damage. Investigators believe they have recovered pieces of the missing third map light, used by the pilot, but they also show no signs of fire, Mr. Vance said.

The aircraft's in-flight entertainment system shows damage to its power-supply wires, raising questions about whether it was the source of fire. And investigators are examining whether the aircraft's general wiring, some of which was found charred with burnt insulation, caused or was merely affected by the fire.

The latest finding is more evidence the MD-11 aircraft was beset by electrical problems -- at least one of which was likely responsible for the tragedy.

The overhead aisle and emergency lights were manufactured by Luminator Aircraft Products, based in Plano, Tex. The firm has provided lights for every Boeing aircraft model since the 1950s, as well as for such McDonnell Douglas aircraft as the MD-11.

A company spokesman said the Transportation Safety Board forwarded its test results for the lights, but the firm's own investigation showed no similar problems.

"We ran our own tests here for weeks, and could not duplicate that," said Bob Presnell, adding no customers have complained and the company has had no previous evidence of problems.

The bulb type could be changed if the board concludes there is a serious problem, Mr. Presnell said from Plano, near Dallas.

No Canadian carriers operate MD-11s, which were built in the United States.

The Swissair investigation showed temperatures in the aisle light fixtures tended to be much higher in the front part of the passenger cabin, in the first-class compartment nearest the cockpit, than in the rear. The team is expected to release a final report next year on the cause of the disaster.

LONDON, England - Airline pilots are reportedly blocking the installation of cockpit cameras which could help establish the causes of crashes.

They say cameras are an invasion of privacy and fear they could lead to disciplinary action being taken against them. The cameras would record a plane's final moments and could be analysed alongside voice and data recorders.

Ken Smart, the Chief Inspector of Air Accidents, says pilots are blocking th>e introduction of cameras but he says their body language and actions could give crucial clues.

The British Air Line Pilots' Association says it doesn't object to cameras trained on instruments but it would strongly resist any attempt to film pilots.

A spokesman said: "In view of the history of misuse of flight recorders we believe that the intrusion of cockpit video recorders in the working environment is offensive and an invasion of privacy."

Data from flight recorders is confidential under British law but other countries have yet to guarantee the information will be given only to accident investigators, reports The Times.

British pilots have not forgotten how a cockpit recording was released to the media shortly after a BA Trident was involved in a mid-air collision over Zagreb in 1976. The pilots could be heard discussing the price of tomatoes.

Their conversation took place 30 minutes before the collision but the media claimed it was seconds before the disaster.

The International Civil Aviation Organisation has recommended cockpit camera>s be installed on all new planes from 2005. It is looking into ways to persuade pilots to drop their opposition.