Pitch Control Failure AD's

Re: the Charlotte MESA Airlines Beech 1900D crash

Not a Great design. Perhaps designers should be designing against failure possibilities and airworthiness should be more about new designs not incorporating any failure modes or possibilities.

Possibly relevant Be1900D ADs:

AD 2002-23-11

The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the balance weight attachment screws from becoming loose. Loose screws could come into contact and interfere with the horizontal stabilizer.
This interference could restrict elevator movement and result in loss of elevator pitch control.
AD 99-16-12

To prevent failure of the electric elevator trim and difficulty operating the manual elevator trim caused by moisture freezing on parts of the electric actuator installation, which would result in the pilot having to apply constant pressure to the control wheel during flight
AD 99-09-15

To prevent any components or wiring from interfering with the flight control mechanism caused by inadequate clearance, which could result in reduced or
loss of aileron and/or elevator control
AD 95-02-17 (does not apply after serial UE-131)

To prevent
in-flight separation of the elevator trim tab control cable, which could lead to loss of control of the airplane,

Beechcraft 1900 Series Aeroplanes

AD/BEECH 1900/10 Elevator Trim Tab Control Cable 4/95


Applicability: Model 1900D aircraft with serial numbers UE-1 through UE-131.

Requirement: Accomplish the following in accordance with Beech 1900D Maintenance Manual,

part number 129-590000-15A11, Chapters 5-20-07, page 203; 6-40-00, page 3; 6-50-

00, page 16; and 27-30-04, pages 202 and 203:

1. Remove access panel Number 333ATC, which is located on the top surface of

the horizontal stabiliser, to gain access to the elevator trim tab cable, guides,

and pulleys.

2. Inspect the cable routing to ensure that cables (at the left, right, and crossover

pulleys) are correctly routed around the pulleys, within the cable guide pins, and

are not contacting any structure.

3. Replace any cable that is incorrectly routed (cable that does not meet the criteria

above) or is chafed.

Note 1: Compliance with all of the procedures in Beech Communique 1900D-112 is

considered equivalent to the Requirement of this Directive.

Note 2: FAA Priority Letter AD 95-02-17 refers.

Compliance: Unless already accomplished, prior to further flight after 1 February 1995.

Background: The FAA received a report of an in-flight separation of the elevator trim tab control

cable on a Beech 1900D aircraft. An investigation revealed that the trim tab control

cable had separated in the vicinity of its guide pulley, due to being incorrectly routed

outside the lower cable pulley guard pin instead of under the guard pin.


AD/BEECH 1900/36 Flap Flexible Driveshaft Assembly 13/2001


Applicability: Beech 1900 (S/Nos UA-2 and UA-3),

Beech 1900C (S/Nos UB-1 through UB-74, UC-1 through UC-174 and UD-1 through

UD-6), and

Beech 1900D (S/Nos UE-1through UE-345, UE-347 through UE-361, UE-364, UE-


UE-373 and UE-379).

Requirement: Inspect each of four flap flexible driveshaft assemblies for correct diagonal wrap and

correct installation in accordance with Raytheon Mandatory Service Bulletin SB 27-

3397. Replace before further flight any driveshaft found to have an incorrect diagonal

wrap or found to have been installed incorrectly.

Note: FAA AD 2001-18-07 refers.

Compliance: Unless previously accomplished, with 200 flight hours after the effective date of this

Airworthiness Directive.

This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 7 November 2001.

Background: Failures of the flap flexible driveshaft have occurred, resulting in flap extension or

retraction problems. Such a failure could result in an asymmetric flap condition in

flight if the flap safety switch fails to function properly.