When
you Tie it all Together......... 
it's a NOOSE
FAA proposes Alaska Air fine; judge revokes mechanic's license
By Steve
Miletich
Seattle Times business reporter
In a scathing ruling, a judge with the National Transportation Safety Board today revoked the mechanic's license of an Alaska Airlines supervisor, finding the supervisor had deliberately falsified a maintenance record in 1998.
The action came as the Federal Aviation Administration, in a separate action, announced it is proposing a $211,000 civil penalty against Alaska for allegedly operating a damaged plane on 47 flights without making required logbook entries.
Alaska today was preparing responses to both actions, which dealt the airline the harshest blows it has received since last year, when the FAA forced it to make sweeping changes in its maintenance program in the aftermath of the Jan. 31, 2000, crash of Alaska Flight 261.
Judge Patrick Geraghty of the NTSB's administrative court harshly criticized Alaska in handing down his ruling against the supervisor, calling some of its maintenance practices "illogical and incredible."
Geraghty, who issued his decision in a hearing room in Seattle's Henry M. Jackson Federal Building, said the NTSB requires maintenance records to be "scrupulously accurate."
"That is because the entire maintenance system is an honor system," the judge said.
"So if the records aren't accurate," Geraghty added, "the whole system collapses. And that certainly affects the flying public and air safety."
The supervisor, John Nanney, failed to carry out his responsibilities with the highest degree of care required under the law, Geraghty said.
Geraghty also noted that Nanney falsified the record on the day the aircraft was due to be released for service, saying the scheduled release could be seen as a motive for the action.
The FAA sought the revocation of Nanney's license, alleging that he falsified a maintenance record on Dec. 1, 1998, at the company's Oakland repair facility.
The FAA's proposed fine stems from an incident that began March 30, 1999, when pilots received an indication of an unsafe landing gear on an MD-80 aircraft.
The crew followed Alaska procedures by landing the plane with the main landing-gear doors extended, the FAA said.
"The left main landing-gear door skid plate was damaged and should have been replaced," the FAA said.
But Alaska continued to operate the plane on 47 flights before replacing the plate, flying the plane without approved technical data in violation of airworthiness regulations, the agency said.
Alaska also failed to prepare an airworthiness release or make logbook entries for those flights, the FAA said.
The airline has 30 days to respond to the proposed fine, in which it could appeal the action.
In Nanney's case, his attorney, Steve Bauer of San Francisco, said his client would appeal to the full safety board and, if necessary, to the federal courts.
Geraghty's ruling came a day after a top manager at Alaska Airlines testified that supervisors at its Oakland maintenance facility have been allowed to sign off on repair work performed by others, even as Geraghty pointed to a company manual that seemed to prohibit that.
Attorneys for the FAA contend that by disregarding their own written procedures, Alaska supervisors risked approving work they couldn't verify had been done.
The testimony, which could have a bearing on a related criminal investigation, came during an administrative court hearing.
Although the case stems from an event before the crash of Alaska Flight 261 off the California coast, it is being closely watched because Alaska's maintenance practices have been under scrutiny since the crash.
Among those in the courtroom were a dozen relatives of crash victims. Some wore buttons with pictures of their loved ones.
Also there were agents of the FBI and the federal Department of Transportation's inspector general's office, who are conducting a separate criminal inquiry into the 1998 incident. That investigation was later expanded to include Flight 261, although the case against Nanney involves separate allegations.
The FAA also is seeking to revoke the licenses of two other Alaska supervisors in similar cases that occurred before the crash. And the agency is pursuing a $44,000 fine against Alaska separate from the $211,000 fine proposed today.
Nanney was accused of signing an Alaska log sheet saying he corrected engine throttles that were running at excessively different speeds on an MD-80 jetliner Dec. 1, 1998. The problem can create results ranging from minor to catastrophic, particularly on takeoffs and landings, when pilots must know how much power they have in each engine.
John Liotine, an Alaska mechanic who became a whistle-blower against the company in late 1998, wrote up the throttle discrepancy Dec. 1, shortly before the plane was to be released for service after a major check.
Bauer told Geraghty that Nanney signed the form because another Alaska employee told him Liotine was wrong, and that the problem had been fixed the night before.
Nanney examined paperwork to assure the work had been done, the attorneys said, although they didn't dispute the FAA's assertion that no further checks were made to determine if Liotine actually was in error. Liotine took the plane for a final check, finding a problem he said had been missed.
Testifying for the defense, Art Fitzpatrick, a longtime manager at the Oakland facility who now is Alaska's southwest regional maintenance manager, said it was not unusual for supervisors there to sign off for work done by mechanics, even when they hadn't performed the work themselves.
Fitzpatrick said the practice was acceptable, as long as the supervisor made efforts to verify the work had been completed.
Asked by FAA attorney Naomi Tsuda how supervisors could do that when Alaska's maintenance manual states in capital letters that problems "MUST" be corrected and signed by the person doing the work, Fitzpatrick replied, "It doesn't say you can't."
Geraghty, seeking to clarify the matter, asked Fitzpatrick in an incredulous tone if - despite the manual's language - he believed it was acceptable for supervisors to take such an action.
"That's correct," Fitzpatrick said.
As Geraghty began asking the question, Bauer objected, prompting the judge to angrily respond, "Counsel, don't interrupt me."
Alaska spokesman Jack Evans said last night that Alaska has been changing its manual in the last few months to clarify that supervisors may sign off for a mechanic's work with "reasonable verification" the work has been performed.
Other major airlines follow that practice, Evans said.
Nanney's defense also included testimony from Robert Ricarte, an Alaska quality-control supervisor, who testified he told Nanney on Dec. 1, 1998, that Liotine was wrong because paperwork showed the throttle had been checked.
But Ricarte, under questioning by Tsuda, said no independent check was done of Liotine's claim.
Ricarte also testified Nanney told him, "How can we get rid of this discrepancy?"
Liotine wasn't called to the stand because FAA attorneys based their case on paperwork, Alaska's maintenance manual and the testimony of an FAA inspector.
It was Liotine who later became a key figure in the Flight 261 investigation, when it was disclosed that in September 1997 he had ordered the replacement of a part suspected of failing just before the crash.
Liotine concluded that the jackscrew assembly, which helps control the plane's horizontal stabilizer, was too close to its wear limit. The stabilizer controls the plane's up-and-down movements.
In that case, mechanics in Oakland overruled Liotine's decision to replace the jackscrew after performing more tests that showed the part to be well within its wear limit.
Liotine secretly wore a hidden microphone for federal agents in 1998, and recorded what he has said were admissions by Nanney about the throttle problem. FAA attorneys chose not to introduce the tape.
Nanney, a longtime supervisor at the Oakland facility, didn't testify yesterday.
In closing arguments, Bauer told Geraghty he should rule on the facts of the 1998 incident and not be swayed by the crash in January 2000.
Tsuda said the 1998 entry should have been "accurate, complete and precise, so anyone coming along to read that entry knows the history of that aircraft."
She said Nanney "made this entry deliberately in order to move that aircraft."
But Bauer said Nanney's entry was simply a matter of negligence, not known falsification. Steve Miletich can be reached at 206-464-3302 or smiletich@seattletimes.com.
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/134290811_alaskaweb01.html
Copyright © 2001 The Seattle Times Company
Local News : Tuesday, May 01, 2001
Questions over Alaska's repairs: Conflict noted between airline's policy, practice
By Steve Miletich
Seattle Times business reporter
A top manager at Alaska Airlines testified yesterday that supervisors at its Oakland maintenance facility have been allowed to sign off on repair work performed by others, even as a judge pointed to a company manual that seemed to prohibit that.
Attorneys for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) contend that by disregarding their own written procedures, Alaska supervisors risked approving work they couldn't verify had been done.
The testimony, which could have a bearing on a related criminal investigation, came during an administrative court hearing in Seattle in which the FAA is seeking to revoke the mechanic's license of John Nanney, an Alaska supervisor. The FAA alleges Nanney falsified a maintenance record in December 1998.
The allegation stems from an event 14 months before the crash of Alaska Flight 261 off the California coast. But the case is being closely watched because Alaska's maintenance practices have been under scrutiny since the crash.
Among those in the courtroom were a dozen relatives of crash victims. Some wore buttons with pictures of their loved ones.
Also there were agents of the FBI and the federal Department of Transportation's inspector general's office, who are conducting a separate criminal inquiry into the 1998 incident. That investigation was later expanded to include Flight 261, although the case against Nanney involves separate allegations.
The FAA also is seeking to revoke the licenses of two other Alaska supervisors in similar cases that occurred before the crash. And the agency is pursuing a $44,000 fine against Alaska.
Judge Patrick Geraghty of the National Transportation Safety Board's administrative-law court said he would issue his ruling this morning on whether Nanney's license should be revoked.
But by refusing a motion by Nanney's attorneys to dismiss the case, Geraghty signaled there was a good chance of revocation.
Nanney is accused of signing an Alaska log sheet saying he corrected engine throttles that were running at excessively different speeds on an MD-80 jetliner Dec. 1, 1998. The problem can create results ranging from minor to catastrophic, particularly on takeoffs and landings, when pilots must know how much power they have in each engine.
John Liotine, an Alaska mechanic who became a whistle-blower against the company in late 1998, wrote up the throttle discrepancy Dec. 1, shortly before the plane was to be released for service after a major check.
Nanney's attorneys, Steve Bauer and Dan McBride of San Francisco, told Geraghty that Nanney signed the form because another Alaska employee told him Liotine was wrong, and that the problem had been fixed the night before.
Nanney examined paperwork to assure the work had been done, the attorneys said, although they didn't dispute the FAA's assertion that no further checks were made to determine if Liotine actually was in error. Liotine took the plane for a final check, finding a problem he said had been missed.
Testifying for the defense, Art Fitzpatrick, a longtime manager at the Oakland facility who now is Alaska's southwest regional maintenance manager, said it was not unusual for supervisors there to sign off for work done by mechanics, even when they hadn't performed the work themselves.
Fitzpatrick said the practice was acceptable, as long as the supervisor made efforts to verify the work had been completed.
Asked by FAA attorney Naomi Tsuda how supervisors could do that when Alaska's maintenance manual states in capital letters that problems "MUST" be corrected and signed by the person doing the work, Fitzpatrick replied, "It doesn't say you can't."
Geraghty, seeking to clarify the matter, asked Fitzpatrick in an incredulous tone if - despite the manual's language -- he believed it was acceptable for supervisors to take such an action.
"That's correct," Fitzpatrick said.
As Geraghty began asking the question, Bauer objected, prompting the judge to angrily respond, "Counsel, don't interrupt me."
Alaska spokesman Jack Evans said last night that Alaska has been changing its manual in the last few months to clarify that supervisors may sign off for a mechanic's work with "reasonable verification" the work has been performed.
Other major airlines follow that practice, Evans said.
Nanney's defense also included testimony from Robert Ricarte, an Alaska quality-control supervisor, who testified he told Nanney on Dec. 1, 1998, that Liotine was wrong because paperwork showed the throttle had been checked.
But Ricarte, under questioning by Tsuda, said no independent check was done of Liotine's claim.
Ricarte also testified Nanney told him, "How can we get rid of this discrepancy?"
Liotine wasn't called to the stand because FAA attorneys based their case on paperwork, Alaska's maintenance manual and the testimony of an FAA inspector.
It was Liotine who later became a key figure in the Flight 261 investigation, when it was disclosed that in September 1997 he had ordered the replacement of a part suspected of failing just before the crash.
Liotine concluded that the jackscrew assembly, which helps control the plane's horizontal stabilizer, was too close to its wear limit. The stabilizer controls the plane's up-and-down movements.
In that case, mechanics in Oakland overruled Liotine's decision to replace the jackscrew after performing more tests that showed the part to be well within its wear limit.
Liotine secretly wore a hidden microphone for federal agents in 1998, and recorded what he has said were admissions by Nanney about the throttle problem. FAA attorneys chose not to introduce the tape.
Nanney, a longtime supervisor at the Oakland facility, didn't testify yesterday.
In closing arguments, Bauer told Geraghty he should rule on the facts of the 1998 incident and not be swayed by the crash in January 2000.
Tsuda said the 1998 entry should have been "accurate, complete and precise, so anyone coming along to read that entry knows the history of that aircraft."
She said Nanney "made this entry deliberately in order to move that aircraft."
But Bauer said Nanney's entry was simply a matter of negligence, not known falsification.
Steve Miletich can be reached at 206-464-3302 or smiletich@seattletimes.com.
Copyright © 2001 The Seattle Times Company
Copyright
© 2001 The Seattle Times Company
Local
News : Sunday, April 29, 2001
Plane-repair problems continue at Alaska Air
By Steve Miletich
Seattle Times business reporter
An Alaska Airlines jetliner was abruptly grounded April 15 after pilots discovered a problem with a key flight-control backup system, just two weeks after the plane underwent an extensive maintenance check.
The plane had been released from a repair facility in Phoenix that does maintenance work for Alaska.
The Federal Aviation Administration is investigating the matter, focusing in part on how the problem escaped the notice of Alaska's quality-control technicians, who are required to ensure outside repair work is properly done.
The incident suggests Alaska has been unable to completely shake itself of maintenance problems as it tries to rebuild confidence in its operations, undermined by last year's fatal crash of Alaska Flight 261. The recent problem involved the same type of flight-control system as suspected in the crash.
The use of outside repair facilities also has a troubling history that goes beyond Alaska, marked by questions about their reliability.
After the inspection at the Phoenix facility, the plane flew for two weeks before the problem was discovered.
The repair of the Boeing 737-200, a combination passenger and cargo plane, was done by mechanics at Aviation Management Systems (AMS), which does maintenance work for Alaska and other airlines.
The plane was grounded after pilots flying it into Anchorage reported they heard rattling sounds every time they adjusted the horizontal stabilizer, a winglike mechanism in the tail section that helps control the aircraft's up and down movements.
Jack Evans, an Alaska spokesman, said an inspection revealed that a key part of a cable setup controlling the stabilizer's backup system was loosely attached, placing it at risk of breaking free. The part, fastened in place below the cockpit floor, coils a cable used to control the horizontal stabilizer.
The cable system is "the third level of redundancy" in case the primary and secondary motors controlling the stabilizer should fail, Evans said.
A total failure of the horizontal stabilizer can have catastrophic consequences. Alaska was so alarmed by the incident it ordered its inspectors to conduct around-the-clock oversight at AMS.
"Basically, we have somebody there supervising 24 hours," Evans said.
Alaska plans to sever its relationship with AMS when work is completed on a plane there now, until AMS shows it can do a better job, Evans said.
The incident was troubling because the failure of a horizontal stabilizer is thought to have led to the Jan. 31, 2000, crash of Flight 261, which killed all 88 passengers and crew.
That plane, an MD-83, plummeted into the Pacific Ocean off the Southern California coast.
If the primary motors of the 737 stabilizer system failed and the drum "becomes disconnected, comes apart, then you have an issue like Alaska 261," said Charles Eastlake, a professor at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Daytona Beach, Fla.
"You certainly never voluntarily go up with any part of the control system not functioning," Eastlake said.
Evans said the plane would be flyable even if all the mechanisms failed, but an Alaska pilot who requested anonymity said it would be almost impossible to control.
Alaska notified the FAA of the problem shortly after it occurred, invoking federal rules that bar the FAA from discussing the matter if an airline self-reports a problem.
But an FAA official confirmed the agency is looking into the incident.
Major changes made
Alaska has faced sharp scrutiny since the crash. It has made major changes in its maintenance program, including hiring more mechanics, under pressure from the FAA.
The 737 was released from AMS March 29, where the overhaul would have required an inspection of the horizontal-stabilizer system. At that time, Evans said, fasteners on the drum should have been checked to make sure they were tight.
Finding loose fasteners just two weeks after a check was abnormal and led to the grounding April 15, he said.
The plane was fixed in Anchorage, then flown to another independent repair station, B.F. Goodrich Aerospace in Everett, where additional items were repaired, Evans said. He didn't know the nature of those repairs.
Evans said Alaska had eight technicians at AMS during the overhaul of the 737. Those quality-control officials examined all the paperwork and did some spot checks. The technicians don't have authority under FAA regulations to sign off on the work and don't work side-by-side with AMS mechanics and inspectors, Evans said.
All of the task cards, detailed lists that spell out required work, were completed, he said.
Nonetheless, Evans said, "We certainly recognize that any work they do is under our license."
Evans said AMS is an FAA-approved facility that has been reliable in the past.
But given what the airline has gone through since the crash, the problem was "something we didn't need to come up and something we're not happy about," he said.
Two more Alaska technicians and one structural engineer have been added to the Phoenix site while the current work is under way, with a requirement that they examine all work before panels on the fuselage are closed, Evans said. That step goes beyond normal industry standards, he said.
John Martin, president and chief executive officer of AMS, said he couldn't discuss the matter because of the contractual relationship between AMS and Alaska.
"Certainly, as a general statement, we comply with all the regulatory regulations and we have a good relationship with Alaska," Martin said, adding, "We take pride in the work we do."
He said if problems arise, AMS works with carriers to fully investigate the matter and rectify any shortcomings.
SabreTech under scrutiny
AMS acquired the assets of the Phoenix facility two years ago when it bought the commercial maintenance operations of Sabreliner, which operated aviation-repair centers under the name SabreTech. SabreTech fell under scrutiny in 1996 for work it had done on a ValuJet plane that crashed that year in the Florida Everglades.
A SabreTech repair station in Orlando, Fla., had worked on that plane, returning it to the airline with a shipment of emergency oxygen generators that were improperly labeled. The generators ignited in the plane's cargo hold, triggering a crash that killed 110 people.
The crash prompted the U.S. General Accounting Office to cite systemwide lapses in the FAA's monitoring of repair stations. The GAO noted repair-station work had been implicated in three other aircraft accidents.
Airlines must monitor work
Despite the FAA's oversight role, federal regulations place the burden on airlines to oversee the work done by independent repair centers. Airlines are required to have quality-assurance technicians at the sites.
Alaska has used the repair facilities in Phoenix and Everett to handle some of its repair work, though the bulk of its major maintenance is done by its own mechanics in Seattle and Oakland.
Independent repair stations have become increasingly popular with carriers wanting to save time and money. Evans said the repair stations are needed because of the cyclical nature of repair work that can overload the airline's capacity to do timely heavy repair checks.
But mechanics and pilots have frequently complained about the use of such facilities, claiming they are substandard.
The release of the 737 from the Phoenix facility is reminiscent of a similar incident last April, when FAA inspectors conducting an audit of Alaska discovered the airline had released two planes from major maintenance checks with incomplete paperwork. That work was done at Alaska's own facilities.
The audit, ordered after the crash of Flight 261, uncovered serious flaws in Alaska's maintenance program that forced the airline to make sweeping improvements, such as hiring more mechanics and top-level executives, to avoid a threatened shutdown of its major repair facilities.
Whistle-blower initiated
Alaska's maintenance practices have been under scrutiny since late 1998, when the FBI and the federal Department of Transportation's inspector general began investigating a whistle-blower's allegations that company supervisors had falsified repair records.
The investigation was expanded to include Flight 261 last year, and a federal grand jury in San Francisco is hearing evidence. No charges have been filed.
The National Transportation Safety Board is separately investigating the crash, trying to determine the cause. Steve Miletich can be reached at 206-464-3302 or smiletich@seattletimes.com.
Local News : Wednesday, April 25, 2001
Airline tool, similar to piece tied to Alaska crash, mysteriously appears
By Steve Miletich
Seattle Times business reporter
A tool was recently found in a mysterious cardboard box at Alaska Airlines headquarters in Seattle, raising new questions about the airline's ability to track its equipment.
The tool doesn't appear to be directly related to the crash of Alaska Flight 261 last year.
But National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigators looking into the crash closely questioned Alaska employees last week about the tool's sudden appearance because of its relationship to a similar tool tied to the investigation, according to government and company sources.
"It mysteriously appeared, and no one knows where it came from," one source said. "There are no records on it."
The tool is used to measure wear on a key part in planes like the one that crashed, and the NTSB is examining the reliability of such tools.
The surprise discovery is somewhat of an embarrassment for Alaska, coming 15 months into an investigation in which the NTSB thought it had a full accounting of all tools associated with the crash investigation.
Investigators have been looking at whether sloppy procedures at Alaska contributed to the crash, which killed 88 people Jan. 31, 2000, when an MD-83 jetliner plunged into the Pacific Ocean off the Southern California coast.
The casual use of undocumented tools is an industry-wide problem, a source said.
An NTSB spokeswoman, Terry Williams, declined comment, as did the Federal Aviation Administration. The FAA began conducting its own inquiry after Alaska disclosed the discovery, sources said.
Alaska officials referred questions to the NTSB.
In another development, preliminary tests conducted by the NTSB on two incompatible greases used on the plane that crashed failed to show they could have caused a catastrophic failure, according to the sources. But further tests under different conditions are still being conducted. Alaska has pointed to the greases as a possible cause of the failure of the plane's jackscrew assembly, a part in the tail that helps control up and down movements of the aircraft's horizontal stabilizer.
If the greases are ruled out as a factor, the focus would fall on other issues, such as the reliability of tools and maintenance intervals.
The tool found in the box is a restraining fixture that is used for critical wear measurements of the jackscrew assembly.
An Alaska employee, who recently went into a storage room after a weekend off, noticed the box because it hadn't been there the previous week, the sources said.
The box, which also contained broken tools, had arrived from somewhere in Alaska's maintenance system, but no one was able to pinpoint from where it was shipped, the sources said.
"It's something that shouldn't have been laying around," a source said.
The NTSB has been looking at the reliability of the restraining fixtures used by Alaska in light of key wear tests performed in September 1997 on the plane that crashed.
In one set of tests, a lead mechanic at Alaska's Oakland, Calif., maintenance facility determined that the jackscrew assembly was too close to its wear limit and ordered the part replaced. But a different crew re-examined the assembly three days later, finding it to be well within its legal limit.
The plane was released and crashed before the next scheduled examination of the jackscrew.
NTSB investigators had thought, prior to the crash, Alaska owned only one restraining fixture, which was kept in Oakland.
Investigators have been looking into whether that device, which was fabricated in-house by Alaska and in use since 1984, was reliable and why it hadn't been repaired since the day it was produced.
Tests will be conducted on the newly discovered fixture, which appears to have been made by McDonnell-Douglas, the original manufacturer of the MD-83, to determine its reliability.
But investigators still think the device kept in Oakland was the one used on the aircraft that crashed because it has been identified by mechanics who performed the 1997 tests, sources said.
Alaska manufactured 11 similar devices after the crash, leading to the grounding of its MD-80 planes in August after questions were raised about the reliability of the tool and whether it conformed to standards. The planes were briefly kept out of service until wear checks performed on their jackscrew assemblies were verified. Steve Miletich can be reached at 206-464-3302 or smiletich@seattletimes.com.
Nation & World : Friday, April 27, 2001
Inspection problems cost FAA official his post
By Steve Miletich
Seattle Times business reporter
A top Federal Aviation Administration official has been removed from his post because of problems with a 2½-year-old inspection system, including its failure to detect serious maintenance problems at Alaska Airlines before the crash of Flight 261 last year.
Nick Lacey, who headed the agency's national Flight Standards Division in Washington, D.C., has been assigned to a new job overseeing long-range planning. He had been flight-standards director since January 1999, shortly after the FAA began a new inspection program created in the wake of criticism the agency received after the 1996 crash of a ValuJet plane in Florida's Everglades.
Lacey's reassignment is the first sign of a shakeup within the FAA since the Alaska crash, which killed 88 people on Jan. 31, 2000. Though no cause has been determined, theories have focused on the airline's maintenance of a critical part that failed. The National Transportation Safety Board, due to rule on a cause late this year or early next year, has aimed much of its investigation at the quality of the FAA's oversight of Alaska's maintenance operation.
The FAA would not discuss Lacey's reassignment, saying only that the agency was "tapping the leadership talents" of Lacey for a new role and that he would be replaced by Nicholas Sabatini, who for more than 10 years has managed the FAA's Eastern Region Flight Standards Division.
Lacey, the FAA official who last year announced the agency's threat to shut down Alaska's major maintenance operations, couldn't be reached for comment yesterday.
But sources familiar with the move said it came because of problems with the new inspection program overseen by the former consultant and airline executive.
The Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS) was supposed to move the FAA beyond spot checks and detect root causes of air-safety problems at the nation's 10 largest carriers.
But ATOS came under sharp scrutiny after the crash of Flight 261, in which an MD-83 plunged into the Pacific Ocean off the Southern California coast, its pilots struggling with a jammed mechanism designed to control the plane's up-and-down movements.
The FAA reviewed the ATOS program in May in response to the crash and heard complaints from many of its inspectors nationwide.
An FAA audit of Alaska Airlines after the crash found serious deficiencies in Alaska's maintenance program that had existed for months and even years before the crash, but went undetected by the FAA's regional headquarters in Renton.
As a result of the audit, Alaska made major changes in its maintenance program, including hiring more mechanics, to avoid the threatened shutdown of its repair facilities.
The FAA's officials in Renton acknowledged late last year that they had struggled to implement ATOS. In interviews with the NTSB they said inspectors had become bogged down in training and in gathering reams of information for a system heavily weighted toward collecting data without leaving time to analyze it. Efforts to meet the program's demands led to cutbacks in spot inspections at Alaska, they told the NTSB.
One former FAA official who retired shortly before the crash told the NTSB the switch to ATOS was a "terrible transition."
Some critics of ATOS have said it was rushed into place too soon, without adequate planning and training.
Improvements were made after the FAA's review, including clearer directions that gave inspectors more discretion to conduct on-site checks.
ATOS also came under criticism from top airline executives last year when the FAA, in response to the breakdowns in Alaska's oversight, began conducting special audits of the nation's nine other top carriers.
Time magazine reported in March that airline officials complained the FAA rushed to complete the audits before the NTSB held a preliminary hearing on the Alaska crash in December, so the FAA could show it was doing its job. Some of the officials alleged the FAA had reached erroneous conclusions and used inspectors lacking in quality and experience, the magazine said.
A dispute also arose between the airlines and Lacey over whether the results would be made public. The FAA has disclosed no findings.
ATOS is being audited by the Department of Transportation's Inspector General, a watchdog agency that oversees the FAA.
In a previous review, the General Accounting Office, which reports to Congress, found in 1999 that while ATOS was a good concept, it had suffered from an "overly ambitious implementation schedule."
The FAA postponed a wider adoption of the program in response to the findings.
Steve Miletich can be reached at 206-464-3302 or smiletich@seattletimes.com.
Airline Mechanic Admits Falsifying Work Records
Witness: Supervisors Sign Off On Work Not Done
PORTLAND, 8:24 a.m. PDT May 2, 2001 -- A senior Alaska Airlines mechanic admitted in court that supervisors regularly sign off on maintenance work that has not been completed.
The families of victims say that they are incensed about the blatant disregard for regulations.
"It's painful, it's painful here to see the coverup that's gone on," crash victim father Mark Hall said.
This is the first time since that crash that a current Alaska Airlines employee has openly stated that maintenance supervisors do not follow their own regulations.
Meanwhile, a federal judge said that an international treaty prevents crash victims from collecting punitive damages.
He says that the Warsaw Convention Treaty does not allow air disaster victims to receive damage awards, according to KOIN.
Copyright 2001 by Channel 6000. All rights reserved.
http://www.channel6000.com/c6k/news/stories/news-75087220010502-100532.html
