In Reply to the post by B.A. Reynolds [bareynol@earthlink.net]

Some thoughts on a Remote Piloting/Autoland capability

The RoboLander concept is described at:  http://www.iasa.com.au/folders/RoboLander_files/RoboLander.htm

1a)  What about aircraft which are not CAT-IIIc equipped or certified?

(remember that in the US this is the general case)

Answer: See article on the DGPS-based pseudolyte system here (and the two articles at the end of this paper). http://www.iasa.com.au/RoboLander_files/alternatives_to_cat_iii_ils_auto.htm

1b)  Given the current economic situation, who will pay for new

equipment and/or upgrading old equipment?

Answer:  Firstly let it be said that RoboLander is not tomorrow's technology (it's for the day after tomorrow and simply recognises that fantatical suicidal religious terrorists can be expected to just keep on coming - thinking in terms of decades at least here). In the current and prospective economic climate (see later comments) much of the older non-FBW equipment will be permanently parked in the desert. Non-FBW aircraft remaining in service that are inappropriate to assimilate RoboLander technology would have to be otherwise protected - but Ray Hudson has solutions for that also. The overall final dollar cost of the events of 11 Sep 01 are a little difficult to define in monetary terms, but it has been declared that the 9 month cleanup of the WTC site alone will cost in excess of $60BN.  One abiding problem has been (and will continue to be) the perpetuated loss-of-confidence of a large proportion of the air-travelling public in both the old and the new security arrangements. That voluntarily travelling segment of the passenger horde will be lost forever unless something quite substantive is done to recover their lost trust. They constitute the bums on seats that have enabled a deregulated industry to operate with an unsubsidised profit margin. I would suggest that the cost of any tech-fix could be shared between these Stakeholders below:

a.  A Government anxious to repair the damage to the national and global economy and retreat from the necessity of subsidising carriers, underwriting airfares for pax of airlines that might go under and having to itself assume the War and Terrorist risks. [ALPA's Duane Woerth (before Congress committee):"One of the lessons of this tragedy is that our nation truly does rely on the aviation industry as the wings of our economy — and without a strong airline industry, our economy is in serious trouble."]

[http://www.alpa.org/internet/news/2001news/nr01099.htm]

b.  Passengers who are prepared to pay a little extra in order to feel quite safe once again - in particular as the War against Terror drags on, reprisals occur and non-aviation terrorist incidents keep reminding them both of their vulnerability and of 11 Sep.

c.  Airline personnel (Flight, cabin, maint and ops support - and their families) by way of salary sacrifice, because they would like to somehow regain job and personal security.

d.  Aerospace manufacturers who may see in it both a recovery-engine for the industry and the sort of technology-driven return to prosperity that can accompany industry responses to national crisis and solution of industrial trauma. At this point you should reflect upon the rapid technological advances made during the Wars of the 20th Century. http://www.iasa.com.au/RoboLander_files/weaponryadvances.htm

e.  Contributions (and entrepreneurial investment) by philanthropic and patriotic Americans and US Corporations.

f.  Off-the-plan sales of the system to Foreign airlines who will be anxious not to see their international traffic drifting away to American airlines equipped with an effective ultimate anti-terrorist and non-terror-related safety backup facility.

g.  Funding diversions from the Military Budget (as they always benefit from such technological advances - which would be required to be incorporated in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet anyway).

h.  Up-front Contributions from Foreign Governments who know that US technology works and who will want to buy into the ground support infrastructure at the lesser costs of being part of the developmental stage.

i.  Partnership between Boeing and Airbus as Part of the Coalition effort - and in order to reduce development costs / achieve compatibility.

j.   Precedent and Business Opportunity Exploitation. After it became apparent that the rudimentary STC and flawed 3rd party installation of the IFEN onboard Swissair aircraft had likely contributed to the sr111 accident, not coincidentally Boeing very shortly thereafter cranked up Boeing Airplane Services. In doing so they offered customers an inhouse facility with the built-in reassurance that any such add-on marketing-initiated system could be added by the airplane manufacturer in a wholly safe manner. New business is good business and calamity breeds new business.

k.   Insurance "breaks" for those airlines who take extra precautions aginst acts of terror and penalties for those who don't. It would appear that the events of 11 Sep, in true actuarial fashion are to be reflected in insurance risk premiums in their totality - as they should be.

1c)  What restrictions will be put on aircraft lacking this capability?

answer: non-equipped? Enhanced precautions including SkyMarshals.

For aircraft with failed systems, see

http://www.iasa.com.au/RoboLander_files/RoboLander1.html - fail

2a)  To whom will control be "given?"   The ICAO FANS Committee would probably specify that an ATSU within each ATS Provider would be required to set up and man the RoboLander CNS/ATM interface. The automated ground-to-ground data link messaging system known as AIDC  would be utilised to handoff between Air Traffic Services Centres. 

§         Notes:

1.   Since 27th January 2000 FANS-1 equipped aircraft have been using Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) as the primary communications medium. Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS) is also being used in Australian FIR's to improve controller situational awareness and to automatically update their TAAATS Flight Data Record [The Australian Advanced Air Traffic System]. Aircraft operators currently using data-link services in Australian airspace include:

Ansett Australia, QANTAS, Air New Zealand, United Airlines, Cathay Pacific, Singapore Airlines, Thai International, Malaysian Airlines, Lauda Airlines, Korean Airlines, Emirates, Boeing, South African Airways, Aerospatiale Matra Airbus. A list of current ATS-1A ATS providers can be found here:

[http://members.mpx.com.au/~cjr/news3.htm#Current]

2.  Reaching consensus on standardising system parameters would be a responsibility of the FANS Interoperability Team (FIT)

[http://members.mpx.com.au/~cjr/fit1.htm] [http://members.mpx.com.au/~cjr/news3.htm#CPDLC Proves Usefulness].

Problem Reports would be filed with the Central Reporting Agency (CRA) as presently happens with ADS problems under FANS-1.  The CRA role is currently performed by Boeing.

Due to RoboLander being satellite-based one or any number of T-ATSU should be able to control the aircraft enroute and throughout diversion.  If the duplex data-link (TWDL) is lost, hand-off should be automatic to the next downtrack T-ATSU (which can also be monitoring any emergency in a ready-support role).  If the link is irretrievably lost, by design the aircraft automatically reverts to autonomous onboard control (aka de-latching). So the ultimate fall-back position, after that unlikely 10¯9 failure occurs is simply the status quo ante. A simple analogy of de-latching is loss-of-system-power through a relay that is no longer held in position by a solenoid (following a protracted data-link signal loss).

2b)  Under what circumstances will control be given?

Answer: see http://www.iasa.com.au/RoboLander_files/RoboLander1.html - control

2c)  Under what circumstances will control be taken?

Answer: see  http://www.iasa.com.au/RoboLander_files/RoboLander1.html - taken

2d)  How is hijacking of the remote control itself system prevented?

Answer: http://www.iasa.com.au/RoboLander_files/RoboLander1.html - etc

A further development of  the existing capability of CPDLC (Controller-pilot data-linking). Secure VHF/VDL data-linking as has been around in Military Command & Control NTDS TADIL-A Link-11, Link 16 and Link 4A systems for about three decades. MIDS or JTIDS Link 16 is a reliable highly secure, jam-resistant, high data-rate tactical data system that would be very amenable to both uplink data-dumping and two-way control linking for numerous units simultaneously. This technology is very mature, quite secure and amenable to commercial satellite data-linking (Inmarsat (Swift64), Iridium, Globalsat etc). It has the advantage of being a known quantity (to the US military), has a large number of technicians well versed in it and is compatible with an ARINC 660A data-bus interface [http://www.arinc.com/About/Press_Releases/09-11-01_b.html] . It is assessed as a low risk technology in the development of a certifiable RoboLander system. As an addition to FANS-2 (Future Air Navigation System embracing Free Flight) it would be nowhere near as complex as  Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B)  or its subordinated DARPS program (Dynamic Airborne Re-route Planning System). Safe Flight 21 is the name of the most closely associated program [http://www.caasd.org/proj/safeflight/index.html].  Its Ground Broadcast Servers (GBS) (as used in the Capstone project) would obviously be inadequate for Oceanic and any RoboLander system would need to be a satellite-based architecture utilising Inmarsat, Iridium or Globalsat plus WAAS and LAAS based upon the secure military PPS subset of GPS. The militarily hardened PPS is much less vulnerable to jamming than SPS and recognises that there could always be a possible reinstatement of the intentional degradation of SPS accuracy (known as selective availability) in a time of crisis or heightened tension.. The likelihood of a terrorist organisation penetrating a RoboCoded system would be about the same as them tapping into high-level Pentagon crypto. they are simply not in that league cryptographically speaking. In fact it's been said that their ubiquitous cell-phones often suffer outages from being plugged into the wrong charging systems. It's worth noting that Globalsat's existing vehicle tracking and reporting system (GlobalTrac) is a passive/semi-active format Robo system (in that it can remotely locate, track and disable a stolen vehicle). Their model 5040 also does automatic periodic polling of the subject vehicle's system status (in case intervention is required).

3a)  How many aircraft can be under "remote" control? How many would need to be? This was assessed as a result of an Air Safety Week Query as being maximum 100 flying with unserviceable equipment and a maximum of two under RoboLander mode control at any one time (within CONUS) - rising to four with any coincident terrorist activity. The capabilities of the system (volumetrically and geographically) would need to be decided. CPDLC is presently used to points south of 45 deg south on QANTAS Antarctic Tours.

3b)  What happens when one, two or "n" more are added?

They would each use different data-link channels (proposed mode T). Satellite transponder capabilities are considerable and here we could cite the considerable number of GlobalTrac units in service. Not seen as a limiting factor.

4a)  Are there remote pilots or is the system entirely autonomous?

Ground-Monitored Autonomous control as per a programmed flight-path into descent and recovery(as per Global Hawk). Whether or not onboard weather radar returns would cause track deviation is a design issue. Computer inputs to flight control, propulsion systems, reconfiguration and simple non-complex emergencies is no black art. System electrics would need to be isolated in inaccessible code-lockable E&E bays and main and subsidiary load-centres (in a designed system).

4b)  If there are remote pilots how do they maintain currency on all possible aircraft they may be called upon to operate?

Not applicable/no pilots (see this link) - as airplane manufacturers will provide type specs for the data-base. Think of it as being really no different to the arrester cable guys dialling up RA-5C, A-7, F-14 etc on board a Carrier. They rarely ever get it wrong even under the intense pressure of rapid deck-landing cycles. Of course when they do, it's spectacular. But it would be an added incentive to clearly spell out your aircraft type on the ICAO Flight-Plan.

5a)  What are the instructions for continued airworthiness for both the airborne and ground based elements of such a system?

Answer: Obviously an FAR would be required to cover certification requirements. CAASD (Mitre Corp) in conjunction with the FAA's William J. Hughes Technical Center, Raytheon (or Honeywell, Smiths) and NASA Langley are best placed to conjointly develop any such system. CAASD is a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC). They are already working on Capstone, CPDLC, Free Flight, Safe Flight 21, SatNav, Airspace Management, TCAS, Oceanic Routing Analysis and Collaborative Routing Coordination Projects. RoboLander would be simply additive to their underway projects as far as a feasibility, integration study and impact statement would need to go.

[http://www.caasd.org/about/index.html]

5b)  How is the system tested to ensure it is fault-free at any given point in time?

Answer: Aircraft:  BITE checked on startup, tested serviceable every 20 mins by the periodic (20 min) passivity probe sounding the warbler (or annunciating an audible/visual alarm both in the aircraft and on the ground if nil transponder response - prior to the captain injecting and re-radiating his personal Robo-code) The subject of aircraft system pre-start serviceability and inflight unserviceability is covered at:

http://www.iasa.com.au/RoboLander_files/RoboLander1.html - fail

Serviceability of the ground-station would be via BITE, FAA calibration flights and requests of aircraft to enter the pilot-monitored mode. These aspects are covered in the master document and faq's at:

http://www.iasa.com.au/robofaq.htm#failsafer

5c)  How is this system dealt with in the MMEL and a reasonable dispatch policy?

Answer: See http://www.iasa.com.au/RoboLander_files/RoboLander1.html - fail

6)  As GPS is the current technology on maintaining position awareness, what happens when GPS has a concurrent failure?

Answer:  This would be a very irregular occurrence and you could ask the same question about ADS-B reliability. The simple answer is that even persistent RAIM problems are rare enough that it's an outside bet that an inadequate GPS system could cause a sustained loss of navigability. For it to happen during an emergency would be an even more infinitesimally remote possibility. The density and coverage of the GPS/GLONASS constellations could be adjusted to give the required safety factor. It's worthwhile noting that even the most intense meteorite shower ever recorded caused no satellite outages. The assessed losses of Global Hawk are infinitesimally small in this regard. Nevertheless there are two proposed modes for RoboLander:

ONE: anti-terrorist (pilot-out-of-loop) - flight-control is irreversible but not irrevocable (see explanation here)

TWO: non-terrorist related (typical emergency scenarios outlined here)

flight-control is "pilot-monitored" (i.e. no different to the very mature autoland systems of today - except with greater automation). Vulnerability of GPS is covered here (pdf file of 467kb) or the abstract here.

7)  By definition, this system would remove the capability of anyone controlling the aircraft from the flight deck, including authorized crew members.  The usual functional hazard assessments include one or more paths in which credit is taken for the flight crew recognizing anomalous behavior and implementing the appropriate action to mitigate the situation.  With this system that would not be possible as all control would be removed from the flight deck (otherwise what is the point?)  How will this change fault-mitigation schemes which are currently acceptable for autoflight and autolanding systems?

Answer: In mode 6(2) above, not a problem as the system is pilot-selected, pilot-monitored and pilot-de-selectable. In a way, you could see mode 6(2) as being the normal mode and mode 6(1) as being an emergency mode. In many emergency modes of operation one's choices do tend to be somewhat constrained. In mode 6(1) (the anti-terrorist mode) the captain either actively cedes control by lifting a guard and pushing a button (or passively does so, under duress, by failing to dial up the four digits of his personal code each 20 minutes). The loss of flight-crew inputs in the anti-terrorist mode must be seen to be a natural adjunct of the primary intent of RoboLander and a case of not being able to both have the cake and eat it. It reflects the mood of the previous BlueCoat quote below the line below (see (1) below).

commentary interspersed in blue

<begin editorial comment>

We are technologists and all problems to us therefore must be solved

with technology. Similar to the old adage that if the only tool you have is a hammer, all problems appear to be nails.  The technology for this has been available for years when aircraft are converted to drones. The questions should be "This is one solution, is it the best?" This begs the question of whether the recently re-introduced "fixes" are simply revisitations of old-wives' cures (harking back to the aftermath of the 1970 Black September hijackings). The Leila Khaled hijack touched off the 1970 Black September war between Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization inside Jordan. Thirty-one years later, the 11 Sept suicide attacks in the United States make it apparent how little the world had learned from that hijack era. Cockpits have always had doors and some SkyMarshals of yesteryear are now in their 80's - but has the problem changed … or simply mutated?

The issue of the use of a commercial aircraft as a weapon is best dealt

with in two tiers of defense: Prevention and Mitigation.  Intelligence

and Security address Prevention, denying access to the flight deck under any foreseeable circumstances, cabin video, and Sky Marshals deals with Mitigation. I would have thought 11 Sep was an outstanding example of the failure of Intelligence and Think-Tanks. For a two-man crew, could not the requirement (or failure) to monitor cabin video be seen as a total distraction (inevitably leading to its own fatal complications)?

We have a tendency to fight the last war; but when one set of targets is hardened, the planners move on to the next.  Gen-Av, air freight, and large vehicles (including petrochemical tankers) all come to mind.  The targets this time were symbolic.  The next time they could be real.

Power plants, refineries, distribution terminals.  Our beautiful

airplanes are not the only means to deliver evil.  There are other modes of transportation, and other systems of delivery, let's not bankrupt the industry with an inappropriate technologically intensive solution when stouter doors, and a more robust flight deck access policy would have thwarted this last attack.  Low tech, no sex, but more appropriate.  A contrary argument might well be that another successful suicidal hijacking (whether it achieves a target or not) would predictably be the aim of the global terror network. Why so, given the heightened security? If the terrorists could pull another one off (an unsuccessful but probably fatal hijacking), then please define for me what you think would be the subsequent effect upon the air-travelling public and an industry already in decline. Would I be correct in saying that it would lead to an almost total lack of confidence, globally, in deterrence and prevention? The logical sequitur to that assumption is that that is precisely what they will do - because they always act "for effect". You are correct that RoboLander cannot deny access to the plentiful market of second-hand cargo-jets that might be leased and utilised for similar atrocities. But in an ideal future world, the absence of it might give cause for heightened alert. It takes very little effort to discover just where the soft underbelly of security is. They got it right with Logan airport - that was probably no coincidence. However none of the measures announced, with the possible exception of sturdier cockpit doors (and a wholly different policy on jumpseaters) would have had any effect on the 11 Sep outcome.

In my opinion of course.

<end editorial comment>

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1.  As of 11 Sep 01, the first priority of the flight crew in a hijack

situation is to prevent seizure of the aircraft by any means available.

Arms in the cockpit are the second to last line of defense (just prior

to pulling all the fire handles and picking a stretch of field to

crash-land in), making passengers, cabin crew, and the air marshals

expendable.

Some Points to Ponder and Quotable Quotes:

2.  DoT home page

 "Reduction in the unrestrained flow of Global commerce  leads to a domino effect upon other industries (including oil production).  Such capacity cuts worldwide are leaving airlines with too many planes.  Lack of any cohesive approach to tackling the problem. "For more than ninety years, the United States' aviation industry has led the world, making air travel safer and more accessible to hundreds of millions of travelers and shippers.  Air transportation is now an $80 billion U.S. industry employing over half a million Americans."

 Just shows how tenuous is the airline industry's hold on profitability.  What intrinsic value is there in a parked aircraft that is unlikely ever to fly again?

3.  Revealing just how much surplus capacity is in the market, Irish budget airline Ryanair was instantly offered up to 200 Boeing 737s since it advertised in the trade press for up to 50 of the aircraft, an aviation financial source told Reuters in Budapest.

4.   Ironically, after a year of heavy losses, El Al's bookings have soared since Sept. 11, with many passengers too fearful to fly other airlines. In stark contrast to other airlines, El Al shelved its plans to lay off 500 people and withdraw some of its Boeing 747-200 aircraft.

5. Duane Woerth prefaced his specific recommendations on security improvements by making two general points: 1) The country must embark on a mission to achieve one level of security throughout the airline industry, and 2) All airline security must be viewed as a component of national security from this day forward. "ALPA’s position," Capt. Woerth summarizes, "is simple: An industry that the government deems critical to our economy and national transportation system—an industry that is one of the most heavily regulated in the country on matters from mergers to security to labor activities—is an industry that is also important enough to warrant federal aid during this extraordinary hardship."

Capt. Woerth emphasizes, "I have given the Task Force a mandate that all airport and flight security initiatives and improvements are to be fully considered. Nothing is, or should be, ruled out!"

 [http://www.alpa.org/internet/news/2001news/nr01099.htm]

Reference the emboldened statement above:  However there is such absolute and general anathema towards that part of the President's statement that mentioned non-autonomous recovery, that ALPA's news release and many (if not most) of the newspaper reports just expunge it entirely.

6.  Stun guns as a solution?? Really? See the comments here:

http://www.iasa.com.au/RoboLander_files/stunguns.htm

7.   Communications Security concerns for RoboLander Administration:

These are readily resolved by existing technology [http://www.iata.org/digicert/]

8.    The misleading IATA projections for recovery of airline passenger travel at [http://www.iata.org/pdf/iaf.pdf]  are based upon the Gulf War experience. Their graphs show a dramatic decline in Dec 90, a trough in Feb 91 and a rapid pickup after August 91 to a plateau'd level 10% short of the pre-crisis global traffic. Why are those Gulf War based projections misleading when considering our post 11 Sep 01 industry destiny? Quite simply the advent of  terrorism's "hallowed martyrdom" utilising airliners as cruise missile Weapons of Mass Destruction has given a completely new dimension to the airline security threat.  What must be faced in the future is the stark fact that all the terrorists need to do is carry out one further outrage and the resultant dip will be greater and more sustained than we have seen since 11 Sep. Extrapolate that further into the future and reflect upon what an effective weapon the searing imagery of media-reported mass terror is. And we'd thought that bringing Vietnam battlefields into the lounge-rooms of America was a bad move. Each successive incident reinforces the public's perceptions of incontrovertible vulnerability. The advantage of having a large sleeper terrorist population around the world is simply that they can travel at will, look for an opportunity and only act once they encounter a loophole or a potential exploit. That this will happen is almost guaranteed, whether it is within the US or on a non-US carrier will make little difference to the perceptions of passengers about the vulnerability of airline travel in general. That there will be a "twist-in-the-tale" of subsequent atrocities is almost assured. What is apparent from the IATA statistics is that there is a direct correlation between World GDP growth, International Air Freight Demand and Passenger Carriage Figures. So the conclusion must be that terrorists can and will use the insecurity sensitivity of the air-travelling public to directly attack the prosperity of Western Nations. Considerations go far beyond the impact upon Global Airline profitability, investment, tourism and the cost of insurance and demurrage. Expenditure and investment used to be based on underlying trends. The future inability to follow seasonal and economic factors will be a great deterrent for industry investment. Eventually disinvestment based upon uncertainty will dilute future industry prospects, introduce a disconnect between revenue and profit trends and lead to an industry whose new hall-mark will be the potential for inconceivable chaos. Freedom of trade and international commerce are indisputably the soft underbellies of the Western capitalist way of life. So perhaps we should next anticipate mysterious disappearances of vessels and aircraft upon the High Seas? Uncertainty goes hand in hand with insecurity.

9. Airline World News:   "In 2001, carriers expected steep losses before the terrorist attack. Corporate profits tanked, fuel prices remained high, and consumers cut back travel. If you add to this the far-reaching costs of the tragedy, the impact is staggering.

The airline industry, which employs about 700,000 workers -- probably about 600,000 now -- is a staple of the economy. It accounted for approximately 3% of U.S. gross domestic product, or about $273 billion in 1998, according to the ATA. In addition to billions of dollars of  expenditures on food, fuel, manufactured goods, parts, and salaries, the industry contributes to the economy in ways more difficult to imagine: Air carriers, for example, pay a large fuel tax, the proceeds of which were used to pay down the federal deficit, according to the ATA.

Planes are flying empty. Two days ago my sister flew from Chicago to Syracuse on a plane with nine people. They had to move everyone to first class just to balance the aircraft. Based on an analysis by the airline industry, Mullin expects airline traffic will reach just 60% of previous expectations by December; 75% by the end of March, and about 85% in June."

10.  Spin-off Effects:

As the erratic nature of the airline industry [as a career] starts to become apparent, the industry will find that the pool of skilled and experienced applicants in all areas and trades will begin to dry up.

11.   Because they were on a learning curve, the Al Qaida terrorists seem not to have paid much attention to concealing their tracks, beyond assuming false identities. That they will do so in future is to be expected. Claiming responsibility for terror attacks is an outmoded 20th Century terrorist model. The new modality of leaving the matter of responsibilty as yet another unknown is another reinforcing aspect of an effective terror campaign. Mystery disappearances and unresolved disaster tends to foment public anxiety which is, after all, the terrorist's main aim. Cost/benefit analysis and risk management now seem about as relevant as the Geneva Convention, the Maginot Line and Mutually Assured Destruction. That they will always have the ability of taking the potent initiative is the greatest weapon in their arsenal. Elapsed time will never be as important to the terrorist as timing so   …..  How long can the Western Coalition keep up an effective defence? When will the next atrocity take place? How can we turn around public anxiety as they wait for that next shoe to drop?

12.  The Inbuilt Problem with Security Policy.

     Because at a certain point in any Congressional Hearings on airline security the proceedings must always retire to be then held in camera (and be thereinafter classified), one can never be certain what transpired. However a reasonable bet would be that the ATA and its members (plus an always supportive FAA) would have presented convincing cases for backing off the security effort based upon the perceived threat and the horrendous cost of maintaining a credible deterrent. In a profits-driven deregulated airline industry you could be almost certain that it wasn't the other way around. So allowing the airlines to be responsible for their own security is, for want of a better analogy, the fox guarding the hen-house. After all, to be fair, prior to 11 Sep 01 the worst-case scenario had always been that a negotiator would get to test his skills.  But in a world where self-immolation and suicide bombing is commonplace, overlooking the next stage for aerial terrorism simply shows how detached from reality (and blinkered) all the International Think Tanks really are. The lesson is that neither they, nor the Intelligence Agencies, should be trusted to give one the correct time. But they always do reflect well upon the lessons of history and their portents for the future - as they trade their scholarly studies and learned papers.

13.  A Technological Future for Airline Security?

As the tentacular nature of Al Qaida and its global fraternal networks is becoming evident, so too is the inappropriateness of Western Military might as an adversary. The real trap laid by bin Laden would probably have been complete if Flt 93 hadn't been delayed and the passengers then aware of the fate awaiting them. So that was a blessing in disguise that avoided the clincher of their strategy being the destruction of the White House or Capitol. If there had been that clincher then pubic clamour would have demanded a massive retaliatory response and a widening Middle East War. That the Pentagon seemed to have been more easily visually found than other Washington targets was also likely fortuitous because that event has now mightily concentrated the attention of the US military. So how do you fight this new manifestation of terror? The answer is in reducing your vulnerability through layered defences. Where does RoboLander fit in? It would be a waste of time trying an 11 Sep tactic on an aircraft thus equipped so a terrorist would probably look at a different target. You can then concentrate other resources, such as SkyMarshals, on defending those targets.

14.   GPS/DGPS Based Precision Landing Systems

a.  In addition to the autolanding system based upon the centimetric accuracy achieved with pseudolytes, (see  http://www.iasa.com.au/RoboLander_files/RoboLander1.html#centimetric), there are many other projects looking at non-ILS based auto-land systems.

b  WAAS (Wide Area Augmentation System)

http://www.caasd.org/proj/satnav/waas.html

   In 2000, the FAA organized a WAAS Integrity Performance Panel (WIPP) to assess the feasibility of achieving GNSS Landing System (GLS) performance from WAAS. CAASD was involved in performing numerous analyses and trade studies in support of the WIPP's GLS efforts and helped determine the feasibility of, and to define an implementation roadmap to GLS.

c.  LAAS  (Local Area Augmentation System)

CAASD (www.mitre.org) is also working with the FAA to develop a ground system specification for the Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS), a Ground-Based Augmentation System (GBAS) that will provide all-weather approach capabilities to aircraft within airport-line-of-sight distances via a very high frequency (VHF) data broadcast. CAASD's role in specification development and validation includes analyses of signal integrity and availability. In addition to LAAS specification activities, CAASD is providing technical expertise in FAA's partnership with industry to develop LAAS equipage and ensure the international standardization of GBAS applications. Finally, CAASD also is working with the FAA to ensure the integrity and safety of a future LAAS system that will support approaches and landings to operations during the most demanding weather conditions allowed for aircraft in the foreseeable future.

http://www.caasd.org/proj/satnav/laas.html

http://www.raytheon.com/c3i/c3iproducts/c3iatc/atcnls.htm

d.  JPALS 
The Department of Defense selected Raytheon to develop, prototype, and test the Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS).  JPALS is an all-weather, all-mission, all-user landing system based on local area differential GPS.  http://www.raytheon.com/c3i/c3iproducts/c3iatc/atcnls.htm

e. DIAS-3100 DGNSS 
Raytheon's DIAS-3000 series DGNSS Instrument Approach System uses the GPS satellite constellation to make precision approaches practical at airfields and heliports not equipped with precision landing aids, at a cost far less than ILS or MLS. [http://www.raytheon.com/c3i/c3iproducts/c3iatc/atcnls.htm]

The LAAS introduces a revolutionary new generation of precision air navigation equipment built around the Global Positioning System (GPS). 

Working in conjunction with the GPS, LAAS provides the high accuracy, reliability, and safety required for low-visibility and all-weather precision approach and landing. LAAS substantially increases the accuracy of the GPS, monitors the GPS performance, and provides timely warnings to users when unsafe conditions exist.  It also provides additional GPS-like satellite ranging signals from ground-based pseudo-satellites to increase the availability of the navigation service.  LAAS eliminates expensive ILS and allows more runways to have a better capability CAT I.

f.  MARLBOROUGH, Mass., Oct. 1 /PRNewswire/ -- A government-industry team

accomplished the first precision approach by a civil aircraft using a military Global Positioning System (GPS) landing system Aug. 25 at Holloman  AFB, N.M., Raytheon Company.

The FedEx Express 727-200 aircraft at Holloman successfully conducted a total of sixteen Category I approaches.  After completing a number of pilot flown approaches for reference the aircraft conducted six full autolands using the JPALS ground station.  "The consistency of the approaches allowed us to proceed to actual autolandings with very little delay," said Steve Kuhar, Senior Technical Advisor Flight Department for FedEx Express.  The aircraft was guided by differential GPS corrections, integrity information, and precision approach path points transmitted from the Raytheon developed JPALS ground station.  Although the approaches were restricted to Category I, accuracies sufficient to meet Cat II/III requirements were observed. 

Conclusion

The US response has now cooled from one of war to one of a concerted campaign against terror. Nothing wrong with that approach except that it does concede that the initiative will always remain with the terrorist and his hallowed martyrdom. It's not beyond the realms of plausibility that repetitive terror-induced recessionary tendencies could break the normal Western cycle of boom and bust economics and induce a 30's style full-blown depression. The martyrs simply need to get their timing right.

The proper defence strategy will be designed around a lengthy campaign. Do not underestimate the effect of the searing graphic imagery of 11 Sep 01. The prospects of turning that around with the possibility of SkyMarshals blazing away, isolating and cocooning pilots, inflight aerobatics, shutting off all engines and forced landing, enhanced pre-boarding security profiling, confiscating nail-cutters and safety razors? Hardly likely.

Avionics and ATC Acronyms: 

a.  http://www.zimbo.freeserve.co.uk/CNSATM/CNS_ATM/Acronyms.htm

-----Original Message-----

From: bluecoat-bounce@bluecoat.org [mailto:bluecoat-bounce@bluecoat.org]On Behalf Of Prof2MDA@aol.com

Sent: Tuesday, 2 October 2001 1:31 AM

To: bluecoat@bluecoat.eurocontrol.fr

Subject: [bluecoat] GPS precision approaches

Thought that this topic may be a worthwhile distraction!:

Raytheon and Air Force Demonstrate Civil-Military Interoperability for GPS-Based Precision Auto-Landing System.

MARLBOROUGH, Mass., Oct. 1 /PRNewswire/ --

A government-industry team accomplished the first precision approach by a civil aircraft using a military Global Positioning System (GPS) landing system on Aug. 25 at Holloman AFB, N.M., Raytheon Company (NYSE: RTN) announced today. A FedEx Express 727-200 Aircraft equipped with a Rockwell-Collins GNLU-930 Multi-Mode Receiver landed using a Raytheon-developed military ground station. Raytheon designed and developed the differential GPS ground station under an Air Force contract for the Joint Precision Approach and Landings System (JPALS) program. The JPALS system is being developed to meet the Defense Department's need for an anti-jam, secure, all weather Category II/III aircraft landing system that will be fully interoperable with planned civil systems utilizing the same technology. Raytheon and the U.S. Air Force have been conducting extensive flight testing for JPALS at Holloman over the last three months. The FedEx Express 727-200 aircraft at Holloman successfully conducted a total of sixteen Category I approaches. After completing a number of pilot flown approaches for reference the aircraft conducted six full autolands using the JPALS ground station. "The consistency of the approaches allowed us to proceed to actual autolandings with very little delay," said Steve Kuhar, Senior Technical Advisor Flight Department for FedEx Express. The aircraft was guided by differential GPS corrections, integrity information, and precision approach path points transmitted from the Raytheon developed JPALS ground station. Although the approaches were restricted to Category I, accuracies sufficient to meet Cat II/III requirements were observed. Raytheon is the world leader in designing and building satellite-based navigation and landing solutions for civil and military applications. In addition to developing JPALS for the Department of Defense, Raytheon is also developing both the Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS) and the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) for the Federal Aviation Administration. The JPALS and LAAS will provide an interoperable landing capability for military and civil applications. "Raytheon is committed to developing and deploying satellite based navigation and landing systems for the military and the flying public," said Bob Eckel, Raytheon vice president for Air Traffic Management. "We understand the importance of this technology and are proud to be a part of the success achieved this summer during JPALS testing at Holloman." With headquarters in Lexington, Mass., Raytheon Company is a global technology leader in defense, government and commercial electronics, and business and special mission aircraft.

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