STATEMENT OF
CAPTAIN PAUL McCARTHY
EXECUTIVE AIR SAFETY CHAIRMAN
AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS AND
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SEPTEMBER 15, 1999
AIRCRAFT WIRING
Madam Chair and Members of the Subcommittee, I am
Captain Paul McCarthy, Executive Air Safety Chairman of the Air Line
Pilots Association (ALPA), which represents 55,000 professional pilots
who fly for fifty-three commercial airlines in the United States and
Canada. ALPA appreciates this opportunity for me to appear before you
today to join with other members of the aviation community to discuss
deficiencies associated with the wiring and circuit protection practices
in today's transport aircraft.
Although the subject of aircraft wiring has been a
central part of at least two recent airline accidents, I wish to make it
clear that nothing I say here should be construed as being directed at
any of these specific investigations. Rather, they should be taken as
general comments on this aspect of aviation safety. I also want to make
it clear that we at ALPA are not trying to issue any sort of general
alarm about wiring concerns. Our members continue to operate these
airliners, including the older models, with abundant confidence in their
airworthiness.
Having said that, I do want to thank the Subcommittee
for holding these hearings on what we perceive to be an important
component of aviation safety. Various events and accidents have made it
imperative that we examine all aspects of aircraft wiring, from the
design characteristics, to the materials used, to how they are installed
in the aircraft. We also must revise our previous notions of how well
wiring holds up under aging and use. And wherever possible, we must
pursue technological improvements that provide better alternatives to
electrical wiring.
I will deal with all of these in more detail in the
remainder of my statement.
Introduction
First generation airliners had a relatively minimal
need for wiring. Their cockpits contained primarily mechanical
instrumentation, and much of the wiring that was installed was used to
provide electrical power for lighting and basic radio equipment. In most
cases, the thickness of the wire insulation was the same as or greater
than the wire thickness.
Times and technology have changed. In terms of their
dependence on wiring, modern transports such as the MD-11 and the B-777
(one of the newest aircraft entering the fleet), are very different from
early airliners. In today's aircraft, nearly all of the instrumentation
and the majority of the aircraft systems are electrically powered or
controlled. These wires are quite thin, and there insulation even
thinner, often about the thickness of 3 human hairs. The reason for this
decreased insulation thickness is very simple - weight. Modern wide-body
aircraft can contain nearly 200 miles of wiring, so the appeal of
reduced insulation thickness (& therefore, weight) is obvious. This
vastly increased use of wiring, in conjunction with decreased insulation
thickness, has increased the incidence of wire-related aircraft safety
problems, including short circuits, electrical equipment malfunctions
and failures, and fire.
This paper addresses some of the causes of and
contributors to these safety problems, the current state of the
associated industry practices and regulatory guidance, and some
potential solutions.
Ticking Faults
Over 30 years ago, an electrical wiring phenomenon
known as a 'ticking fault' was identified. This phenomenon was also
cited as having caused or been a causal factor in aircraft accidents.
Aircraft longevity has increased, and correspondingly, the average age
of the fleet has also increased. The resultant aging of the wiring
insulation in these aircraft has increased the potential for this
ticking fault phenomenon to occur.
On some aircraft, wire bundles contain many different
wires with several different types of insulation. We presently have wire
bundles that are composed of AC power cables, DC power cables, signal
(circuit controlling) wires, and circuit ground wires. We also have
bundles that carry power from different power sources ('busses'). These
conditions make it extremely difficult to protect any circuit in such a
bundle, where an insulation failure could result in an electrical
problem that has multiple power sources and current paths to feed it. It
is not difficult to envision the complexity or severity of problems that
could arise from shorting, arcing or some other type of damage to a
bundle with this mix of wires.
Think of these bundles as I have described them and
now imagine a 'ticking fault.' A ticking fault is electrically much
different than a 'short to ground' type of fault. The 'ticking fault' is
an arcing event that has duration of just a few milliseconds. In such an
event, the voltage will typically drop to some lower level, while the
amperage (current) will increase by a factor of 10 or more. This results
in a localized discharge of a great amount of heat and energy. This
phenomenon has been shown in laboratory test to explosively track along
the wire. Visually, it resembles the burning of an old-fashioned black
powder fuse.
Mr. Jerome Lederer, founder of the Flight Safety
Foundation, encountered moisture-related wire faults over 30 years ago.
He determined that these "wet wire" fires, as he called them, caused
more than a few accidents. The phenomenon appears to have been a form of
the ticking fault now known as 'wet arc tracking.' Wet arc tracking is
enabled and supported by moisture-damaged insulation.
Wet arc tracking causes a carbonization of the
insulation. The high temperature of the arcing event "dries out" the
area, but leaves a carbon deposit behind. This carbon deposit is
conductive. Over time a carbonaceous path forms and lengthens until it
is close enough to a ground or open circuit. This is when the dry arc
tracking occurs, and the explosive loss of an entire wire bundle can
occur. Because of the need for free carbon, this type of failure only
occurs in insulation types with a high carbon content, such as polyimide
or Kapton.
Finally, microscopic cracking occurs in wire
insulation as the insulation ages. Aging wiring and associated
deterioration of the insulation increases the probability that ticking
faults will occur in our aircraft.
Aging Wire
Laymen tend to think of aging only in terms of
elapsed time. However, when it comes to aircraft structure and
components, including wiring, the aging or degradation of these items is
also a function of the operating environment and conditions that they
are exposed to. The term 'aging' when used to refer to wiring primarily
denotes the deterioration or failure of the insulation, as opposed to
the conductor. Aircraft wiring aging rate is principally affected by the
four factors discussed below.
Vibration is one of the factors affecting wire aging.
Vibration is not at a single, constant level throughout the aircraft. It
varies greatly as a function of location in the aircraft, and as such it
affects the wiring running through those areas differently. Mixing wires
of different types in the same bundle has been shown to be detrimental
to wire life, because the harder coating on one wire can cut through the
other when the wire bundle is subject to vibration. Wheel wells, engine
compartments, and areas near the air-conditioning packs all have
different vibration cycles, and yet the current regulatory and industry
approaches to wiring do not take those differences into account.
As mentioned previously, moisture is another major
contributor to wire aging. Most insulation material is a very complex
long-chain polymer, and moisture accelerates changes to this complex
polymer. These changes decrease the insulating qualities, and can occur
over a very short period of time.
Temperature is another factor affecting the aging
rate of wire insulation. Elevated temperatures increase the aging rate,
as do large, repeated temperature variations ('thermal cycles'). Wiring
insulation is subjected to heat generated by the wire itself, as well as
the heat from the surrounding equipment.
The configuration of the installation of the wire can
also affect wire aging rate. Each aircraft is slightly different, and it
is common for the same wire runs on different aircraft to differ
slightly from one another. Most insulation types are unable to withstand
tight radius bends. During our examinations of aircraft wiring, we have
seen wires with bend radii exceeding the industry bend radius standards.
In addition, the wire clamping and bundling devices add to the stress
and strain on the insulation. Some insulation types are tolerant of
these installation irregularities while others are vulnerable to them.
All these factors can and do affect the aging rate.
Location of the wiring in the aircraft determines the
combination of vibration, moisture, heat and physical installation
stresses that the wire will be exposed to. Different locations will have
some or all of these factors, and at varying levels, and as such, the
aging rates will vary. A company called Electromec has been working with
the US Navy on predictive failure rates of insulation. They are
quantifying the different aging rates as a function of the environment
that the insulation is exposed to. It is expected that these data will
be used to determine when to remove and replace wiring, before failure
becomes likely, in order to prevent some of the problems we are
experiencing today. In summary, aging wiring effects must be accounted
for in the regulations and practices which govern the design and
maintenance of the aircraft.
Wiring Guidance, Standards and Practices
The Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) which
regulate the installation of electrical equipment on today's aircraft go
back to 1964; the latest revision to them was made over 20 years ago, in
1978. FAR Part 25.1353, paragraph (a) defines the requirement to prevent
a single point failure in electrical equipment, controls and wiring, and
states: "Electrical equipment, controls, and wiring must be installed so
that operation of any one unit or system will not adversely affect the
simultaneous operation of any other electrical unit essential to the
safe operation." Paragraph (b) deals with the wire grouping, routing and
spacing, and states: "Cables must be grouped, routed, and spaced so that
damage to essential circuits will be minimized if there are faults in
heavy current carrying cables." On numerous occasions, ALPA has found
that what the manufacturer considers a significant loss of essential
equipment differs greatly from what the average line pilot considers
that to be.
As evidenced above, FAR Part 25 is vague in it's
wiring guidance. Advisory Circular (AC) 43.13-1A (last updated 1977)
does provide some additional guidance in this regard. However, much of
the determination as to what constitutes good installation practice is
left up to the discretion of the manufacturers and operators. The Air
Transport Association has produced and made available to its members a
standard wiring practices manual. This document is quite comprehensive,
but there are indications that many maintenance personnel are not aware
of most of these suggested practices.
In ALPA's view, polyimide-only (as opposed to
composite polyimide) wire insulation is not satisfactory in any wire
application which carries a significant load. Polyimide-only wire
insulation was used in many transport aircraft for many years, and is
still being widely used by Airbus today. This insulation has been proven
by numerous studies to be susceptible to deterioration and cracking when
subjected to moisture and heat, which in turn can lead to arc tracking &
subsequent failure. Other wire types have not been found to have this
negative quality. There have been many events where this has happened,
but because of poor data collection the breadth of this can not be
readily identified. As one effort to quantify this problem, the Aging
Transport Systems Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ATSRAC) is looking at
improved Service Difficulty Report (SDR) reporting of wire faults.
It appears that there is a general lack of awareness
of many of the line maintenance personnel with regards to the proper
handling and installation of wires, and the problems associated with
intermixing different wire and insulation types in single bundles. In
addition, electrical equipment and wiring have changed a great deal
since the applicable FARs and Advisory Circular were last revised. The
number and type of "black boxes", computers and entertainment systems
have grown exponentially. For all these reasons, we need a more fully
defined FAR Part 25.1353 and AC 43.13 in order to satisfactorily address
these changes.
Ticking Fault Arc Protection
Existing design, fabrication and maintenance
standards rely on circuit breakers to prevent damage and fires from
electrical wiring problems. A transient arcing event is sometimes, but
not always, a precursor to a hard fault, which normal circuit breakers
will protect against. However, the short duration of a ticking fault arc
prevents normal circuit breakers from protecting the wiring and aircraft
against damage from such an arc. The temperature of an arcing event is
well above the lower flammability limit of the insulation and virtually
all other aircraft materials. Thus, an arcing event is usually hot
enough to burn the insulation from the subject wire, and will likely
also damage other wires in the same bundle. If there is sufficient
flammable material in the area, a fire could result. Clearly, this is an
unacceptable condition in an aircraft.
New technology, in the form of arc fault detection
circuitry, can provide the necessary protection. Such systems would
protect critical aircraft wiring, equipment and functions while
preventing nuisance circuit breaker tripping. ALPA believes that these
new arc fault detection technologies hold great promise for improving
and ensuring the safety of modern, wire-intensive transport aircraft.
Conclusion
The recommendations I would like to present are really quite simple:
-
Enhance FAR 25.1353 and AC 43.13: Considering the expansion in
the quantity and complexity of electrical devices in use on today's
aircraft, and the resultant amount of wire, existing regulatory
guidance does not adequately address the current technologies and
practices.
-
Revamp design and installation practices: Consideration must
be given to recent industry knowledge gained from incident and
accident investigations. Specific areas to be addressed should include
power sources, intermixing of insulation types in a single wire
bundle, fastener design, and bundling methods.
-
Incorporate modular construction: Insulation does not last
indefinitely, and therefore provisions for relatively easy replacement
(such as modular construction) should be incorporated into new
aircraft wiring designs. Modular wiring would allow for ease of
replacement on a scheduled basis.
-
Evaluate/incorporate fiber optics: Not all the systems in our
aircraft need wires for signal transmission; in fiber optics, light is
the signal carrier. Aircraft interior lighting and entertainment
systems seem to two good candidates for this type of technology
-
Evaluate/incorporate alternative signal transmission methods:
Newer types of signal transmission methods such as infrared (IR) and
frequency modulated (FM) radio technology are used in other
industries; maybe there is a way for us to use these as well.
Madam Chair, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you
today on this important subject, and I would be happy to answer any
questions you and the members of the subcommittee may have.