ALPA Advocates a Virgin Bus

In this letter an Airlines Chief Pilot calls for a number of Electrical Changes to MD11 and 767 aircraft, adoption of a Virgin Bus approach to combatting the smoke in the cockpit problem, and advocates nitrogen inerting and not resetting CB's - all original IASA ideas. The ideas are expanded in another paper designed to be delivered at a Flight Safety Foundation Symposium in Rio later in 1999. To see that, click here. To view this author's other paper click here

May 24, 1999

Mr. John Marshall

Vice President Safety and Compliance

Delta Air Lines

Dear John:

Per our conversation at the recent Safety Forum, I have prepared the following for your review.  I have tried to list the items in order of importance and urgency as well as what can be accomplished in the near term and those of a longer term.

Short Term Goals:

Re-routing and the incumbent rewiring of the MD-11’s Left Emergency AC & DC Bus wires as well as the Right Emergency AC & DC Bus wires, the Bat and Bat Direct bus wires.  As it is presently wired, the MD-11 is not in compliance with FAR part 25.1353 in spirit or intent. This can be remedied only by re-routing these wires.  This will require our engineers working in close consort with Boeing to design the necessary wire drawings. The condition as it exists exposes the MD-11 to a single point failure that would deprive the aircraft of all its flight instruments and its ability to control all other aircraft systems.

The present wiring of the non-essential systems on our B-767-ER (i.e., seats, IFE, etc.) does not allow proper functioning of the Utilities Bus switch. The pilots expect and the system should be so wired that when the Utilities Bus switch is activated, electrical power is removed from all non-essential equipment. This can be accomplished by reviewing the various power sources for all non-essential equipment and then rewiring these so that they can be electrically controlled with the Utilities Bus switch.

We need a philosophical approach to develop our checklist procedures for smoke in the cabin and cockpit. A simple set of rules will enable our crews to deal with this complex problem. I would like to suggest the following:

a.                               LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.  We presently list this in our checklist but need to continue to emphasize to our crews that they head for the nearest airport. This helps relieve them of the responsibility of diverting.  They can cancel if they identify the source of smoke. 

b.                              Identify whether the smoke in the cabin or the cockpit?

c.                               If it is in the cabin, use the Utilities or Cabin Bus switches to isolate. If it is in the cockpit, remove electrical power down to the minimum necessary electrical power to land the aircraft. (i.e., if at 30 West then more electrical power might be necessary than in the domestic system) 

d.                              Can the origin of the smoke be identified as coming from a specific component? If so, leave this unit de-powered for the remainder of the flight. 

e.                               If the origin cannot be determined, do not re-power any electrical circuit.

There have been several papers published as to the necessity of proper font type, font size and color of a Smoke/Fire Checklist design. At present there is no standard at Delta regarding Smoke/Fire checklists. ALPA has several Human Factor experts who would be willing to help the Delta Safety and Flight Operations departments in designing a standard checklist that would give our crews the best chance of reading the checklist in a dark, smoke filled cockpit.

Flight Operations is planning to replace our present system of separate smoke masks and goggle to a full face mask system.  This change is planned at present to take several years. This replacement must have the highest priority and be accomplished as quickly as the new masks are available. In addition, the hose for this mask should be of a length so that either crewmember can get out of his/her seat and reach all areas of the cockpit without having to remove the mask.

Long Term Goals:

·        Examine all electronic aircraft in our fleet to ensure that non-essential equipment can be isolated by a use of a cabin bus switch or utilities bus switch.

·        Examine all electronic aircraft to determine the effectiveness of the checklist in reducing the electrical power down to the essential bus needed to fly the aircraft. Presently, the Smoke of Unknown Origin Checklist on the MD-11 does not effectively reduce power to essential levels and in addition has the capability of restoring power to a damaged bus. Industry tests have shown that re-powering a damaged circuit could possibly start a fire.

·        At present there is no system to detect smoke or fire in an avionics compartment and no way to extinguish a fire. These conditions exist for the cockpit as well. In two-person cockpit aircraft this is safety hazard that can be rectified using state of the art technology. The U.S. Navy has developed several different fire-fighting systems that could be retrofitted to the avionics compartment or the cockpit.  Other manufactures have developed sensing devices that also can be easily fitted to these compartments. Considering that we can detect and extinguish a fire in a cargo compartment or an engine, it seems only reasonable to include the cockpit and avionics compartments.

John, this covers most of the concerns at present. As always, we stand ready to help you and the Delta Safety Department in implementing these and other ideas that will make flying safer.

Sincerely,

Captain Ken “Mule” Adams

DAL MEC Accident Chairman

cc:  Capt. Charles S. Giambusso
Chinese Proverb: Man with feet on ground and head in clouds - mighty big man

No man can reveal to you ought, but that which already lies half asleep in the dawning of your knowledge. Gibran, Kahlil

float like a butterfly sting like bee. Muhammad Ali

Return to HOT off the PRESS