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A
New Approach to Cockpit and Cabin Fire Safety Captain
Ken Adams Air
Line Pilots Association November
8-11, 1999 Enhancing
Safety in the 21st Century Flight
Safety Foundation Conference Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Ladies
and Gentleman: I
am here today as a representative of the Air Line Pilots Association. I
have been a safety volunteer and “tin kicker” with the Air Line
Pilots Association for over 16 years. I have been a licensed pilot for
40 years and flown for Delta Air lines for 29 years. My background of
scientific and engineering training has helped me in these endeavours,
but my real job is flying a large aluminium tube filled with wires,
electricity, flammable liquids, a lot of flammable material and people.
My purpose here today is to challenge you and this industry to help us
come up with a better methodology to combat fire on board aircraft. Many
countries throughout the world are enacting regulations that will
protect their citizens from electrical arcing problems as well as
regulations requiring fire detection and protection for home residences.
In the year 2002, the United States National Electrical Code will
propose to require arc sensing or “ticking fault” circuit breakers
in new residential construction. Some local codes already require all
new residential buildings to have an automatic fire detection and fire
extinguishing systems. Most countries require some form of automatic
fire detection and fire extinguishing systems in commercial buildings. In
the year 2002 it is very likely that the aircraft industry will be
building aircraft that will hold more than 600 passengers. Yet there is
no requirement or planned requirement for these new aircraft to use arc
sensing circuit breakers, or to use fire detection for the hidden
cockpit areas, avionics or enclosed cabin compartments (except the lavs),
and no requirement for automated fire extinguishing systems for these
areas. At
present the only automated systems required on board modern aircraft are
the automatic fire detection systems for the engines and cargo
compartments and the lavatory waste receptacle fire bottles. Manually
operated extinguishers are provided for the engine and cargo areas.
Pilot controlled fire extinguishing systems exist for both these areas.
Some aircraft have overheat detection in the avionics compartments but
no automated fire extinguishing system. We need an integrated system to
detect and extinguish fires in our aircraft, wherever they occur, before
they can damage the aircraft or its systems. Since
1996, there have been three major aircraft accidents involving fire in
the cockpit and cabin. Two
had no fire detection system; those accidents were fatal. The aircraft
involved in the third accident had smoke detection that enabled the crew
to land before the aircraft was severely damaged. This should make it
clear that fire detection saves lives. There
have been numerous reported incidents of fire and smoke in both the
cockpit and the cabin in the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
(ASRS) database. We need to examine these events and modify aircraft
design philosophy and checklist design philosophy to eliminate the
problems highlighted in those reports. The
facts are that present modern wide-body aircraft have up to 200 miles of
wiring. There are aircraft presently in the design stages that are
contemplating additional uses of electricity throughout the aircraft. We
believe that electrical system fire hazards are likely to increase in
frequency if nothing is done to change the present prevention, detection
and suppression philosophy. Flight Deck Fire Detection and Protection
One
only needs to look at the convoluted and complex “abnormal” or
emergency procedure checklists dealing with fire and smoke to get an
idea of how the current philosophy for fire detection and fire control
is unacceptable. At
the first sign of smoke the crew is required to don their oxygen mask.
While this is beneficial for protecting the crew, it severely curtails
their ability to use their sense of smell to determine the effectiveness
of their next actions in de-energizing/controlling the cause of the
smoke. At present there are no detectors in the aircraft to help the
crew determine where the smoke may be coming from other than those
required for the engines, cargo compartments and lavatories. Our
aircraft need detection systems similar to our own central nervous
system, ones capable of determining not only the origin of the smoke but
the factors causing the smoke. (i.e. Electrical, oil, cigarette) Numerous
problems in the cockpit suggest that fire protection for the cockpit
needs a complete rethinking. The space behind sidewall and ceiling
panels in the cockpit comprise a very large area relative to the amount
of essential control systems present, yet there is no fire detection nor
any system for pilot-controlled discharge of fire extinguishing agent to
this critical area. Flight crews have no [or limited] knowledge of the
airflow in the cockpit and cabin and how this airflow would propagate
the flow of smoke/fire. In many of today’s aircraft, if faced with a
cockpit fire, the flight crew is unable to get to their fire
extinguisher while still attached to their oxygen mask, limited by the
length of the oxygen hose to the mask. There are no apertures for
applying an extinguishing agent to the likely locations where fire may
occur in the cockpit, such as in the avionics bay, behind the glare-shield,
in the circuit breaker panel, etc. In the meantime, of course, the crew
must fly the aircraft and decide where, how and when they can get the
aluminium tube safely on the ground. Fire Protection in the Cabin
History
has shown that fires in the cabin can be even more difficult to attack
than fires in the cockpit. While the lavatories have smoke detectors and
automatic fire bottles for the trash-can, that is the limit of automated
detection and suppression systems. For fire detection, we depend on the
cabin crew and passengers. For fire suppression there are fire
extinguishing bottles spread throughout the cabin (both halon and water)
and the potable water supply is available, as applied via coffee urns.
If the fire is not hidden behind structure, the flight attendants may be
able to extinguish the fire. However, if the fire is hidden behind cabin
structure, it is likely that the flight attendants have no procedures to
combat the fire. There is little that can be done by the flight
attendant, except to try and work with the flight crew to isolate the
electrical power as a potential energy source. In these days as more and
more electrical systems are installed in hidden areas of the cabin, we
need sophisticated detection systems to advise the cockpit and cabin
crews of the precise fire location. There needs to be apertures in the
cabin around potential fire zones to aid the flight attendants in
applying extinguishing agents directly to burning materials hidden from
direct access in the cabin. Until such systems are implemented, our
aircraft cabins will continue to be poorly protected. It
is often forgotten that our aircraft are flying at altitudes in which
they are 15 to 30 minutes from the closest suitable landing site.
Consider the case of the FedEx DC-10 that had an in-flight fire
and received prompt fire warnings.
From the time the alarm sounded at 33,000 feet, it took the crew
20 minutes to land the airplane. We must make changes to better protect
our cabin area and we must do it now. Avionics and E/E Compartments
Avionics
compartments have changed in modern aircraft, yet our concepts in fire
protection for them have not. While avionics and their electrical
systems were historically in one area, our modern air transports with
their large cabins and expanding electrical demands now have many new
electrical compartments scattered throughout the passenger cabin. The
electrical power flowing into the avionics compartment has also
increased with no consideration that at some point there should be fire
protection provided. But these compartments are not required to have a
fire detection system and, of course, thus have no automatic or crew
controlled fire-extinguishing system.
This lack of detection and
extinguishing capability complicates the crew’s ability to determine
if the electrical system is the supplying energy source to the
smoke/fire. The ability of the flight deck crews to select the proper
course of action is severely compromised. Is
further regulation needed? In my opinion, the answer is “yes.” It
appears to me and my fellow pilots that aircraft designers and the
airlines will continue to ignore our concerns for more rapid and
accurate fire detection and suppression systems until they are ordered
to address them. At present we are unable to assure a safe return to
ground in the event of an in-flight fire. It is unconscionable that the
problems identified continue to exist in our modern age.
However, I am not here just to present you with these problems.
I also want to offer some solutions.
Possible Solutions
The
most hazardous and insidious airborne fire threat is in the aircraft
electrical system. However, we believe that the fire threat of this
fundamental system can be significantly reduced through just a few
initiatives. We recommend establishing a requirement to have circuit
breakers that protect against an arcing fault, also known in the
industry as an “intermittent” or
“ticking fault.” The industry, especially the United States
Navy, is currently working on developing an arc-sensing
circuit breaker appropriate for aircraft. With small amount of
additional research this option should be available in a relatively
short time. Developing the new breaker is only half of the circuit
breaker solution. To be truly effective, regulatory authorities
throughout the world must require these circuit breakers.
Further, all existing fleets should be retrofitted so they
include these devices. Checklist Procedures
The
other effective method to reduce the threat of airborne electrical
generated fire would be improving the current abnormal/emergency
checklist procedures. Most of the checklists in use today require the
crew to “trouble shoot” smoke occurrences to identify the origin of
the smoke/fire. Unfortunately, the crew does not have adequate detection
tools available to them to try and isolate possible causes. Past
accidents have shown that time is of the essence. Thus, a much better
methodology would be to simplify the procedure by directing the crew to
divert the aircraft and land as soon as possible. This would relieve the
crew of trouble shooting the problem. While
trouble-shooting may save an airline money (since emergency diversions
can be costly), when a fire is advancing rapidly, the delay can be
catastrophic. After initiating an emergency diversion, the next step for
the crew would be to isolate the electrical system to power only those
items required to safely fly the aircraft to a landing, thus removing
the ignition source in an electrical fire. This concept is sometimes
known as the “virgin bus” or “essential bus.” This essential bus
should be able to provide electrical power to essential systems for up
to the current ETOPS time limit. Better Detection
There
are many detection devices currently available. The detection systems
need significant improvements in reliability. False alarms are far too
common in cargo compartments. This will become even more of a problem as
more narrow-body aircraft are retrofitted with fire protection systems.
However, this is not a reason to deactivate the detectors. Instead, it
is reason to consider using different forms of detectors or changing the
logic that initiates the fire signal. The
big problem with detection is that there are no requirements to have
detection in the majority of areas of the airplane cabin where fires can
occur, as previously discussed. Good detector placement can aid
immensely in rapidly identifying whether the smoke source is electrical
or in the air conditioning system. Placing smoke detectors in each of
the ducts being supplied air from the air-conditioning/pressurization
packs would be very effective method of determining if the smoke was
originating in the air-conditioning/pressurization system. This would
eliminate the most common source of smoke the cabin. Locating detectors
evenly spaced and close by to electrical system routings throughout the
aircraft would give the flight deck and cabin crews a much better
ability to isolate and eliminate the source of an electrical smoke/fire.
Suppression Systems
The
United States Navy has been working to combat aircraft in-flight fires
and shipboard fires for many years. They currently have systems in use
in aircraft today that have shown to be effective in fighting fuel tank
dry bays and power-train zones. They also have a possible solution to
the problem of extinguishing large cabin fires. Currently,
the U.S. Navy has fighter and other combat aircraft flying with a
nitrogen-based fire extinguishing system.
This system has been used to successfully extinguish an actual
power-train zone fire in an airborne aircraft; it is proven technology.
The system as currently configured has both automatic fire detection and
extinguishing. The soul of the system is a nitrogen gas generator
similar in appearance and process to the chemical oxygen generator
system presently used in commercial aircraft. Nitrogen is a
non-polluting gas and can be used to extinguish a fire in concentrations
that would not be harmful to humans. Suppression systems such as a
nitrogen inerting system could prove to be very useful in many areas of
our aircraft. The
cockpit is an area where the use of an automatic or pilot controlled
suppression system could be of enormous help. As the cockpit is
presently designed, there is no ability to direct the fire-extinguishing
agent to a fire originating in the area between the cockpit sidewall,
ceiling and the aircraft structure (skin, frames and stringers). The
cockpit area is probably the most complex area of the aircraft. Every
major system of the aircraft is usually routed into the cockpit and
space in this area is at a premium. This means there is not a lot of
room to add some type of detection and extinguishing system. The
advantage of the nitrogen generator is that it occupies very little
space. It must be sized to match the required agent with the space being
protected; this part of the process yet has to be determined except
through testing. The nitrogen gas generator system can be designed to be
operated either automatically, manually or a combination of both. The
avionics compartment would be another logical area for installation of
fire suppression system. These compartments are located under the
cockpit and in various areas of the passenger cabin as well as both
above and below the main deck. This then requires a flexible system, one
easily controlled, and one that would not cause undue harm to the
passengers and crew. The
problem of how to combat cabin fires will probably require a combination
of systems, depending on the fire location. Fires in the open area of
the cabin can be adequately extinguished by handheld fire extinguishers
if the fire is small. For those vast areas of the cabin that are not
accessible to the cabin crew or passengers there should a system to
discretely apply extinguishing agent to the area where fire is detected.
Fires that would originate in these areas could use the nitrogen
generators. The passenger cabin has many flammable materials
(particularly after years of service collecting oil, lint and debris in
dead spaces in the cabin) and many electrical components in the same
dead spaces that can ignite that combustible material. If a fire started
in one of these dead spaces, it is likely that the equipment presently
on our aircraft would not likely be sufficient to extinguish the fire.
The U.S. Navy has developed a water misting system that might be able to
knock down and extinguish a large cabin fire with very little water. Conclusion
I
hope that this paper has made it clear that the industry has not kept
pace with the demand put on it by significant changes to the design of
electrical systems on airplanes. There needs to be a great deal of work
done to prevent electrical fires from the beginning. We also need
systems designed to provide fire detection and suppression in all the
possible fire regions in the airplane fuselage, both accessible and
inaccessible. Failure to execute these changes will put crews and
passengers at an unnecessarily risk to experience a catastrophic in-flight
fire, a terrible fate experienced by too many already. We can prevent in-flight
fire catastrophes if we want to. We at ALPA stand ready to assist the
airline industry in achieving this important, life-saving goal.
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