[Federal Register: July 2, 2001 (Volume 66, Number 127)]
[Notices]
[Page 34983-34986]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr02jy01-128]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
Policy Statement Number ANM-01-04; System Wiring Policy for Certification of Part 25 Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.
ACTION: Notice of policy statement; request for comments.
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SUMMARY: This notice announces the FAA's policy with respect to the
type design data needed for the certification of wiring installed on
transport category airplanes. The policy is necessary to correct
deficiencies associated with the submittal of design data and
instructions for continuing airworthiness involving airplane system
wiring for type design, amended design, and supplemental design
changes. This notice advises the public, in particular applicants for
type certificates, amended type certificates, supplemental type
certificates, or type design changes, of the range and quality of type
design data that the FAA will expect applicants to submit as part of
any certification project. This notice is necessary to advise the
public of FAA policy and give all interested persons an opportunity to
present their views on the policy statement.
DATES: Send your comments on or before August 1, 2001.
ADDRESSES: Address your comments to the individual identified under FOR
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gregory Dunn, Federal Aviation
Administration, Transport Airplane Directorate, Transport Standards
Staff, Airplane and Flight Crew Interface Branch, ANM-111, 1601 Lind
Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98055-4056; telephone (425) 227-2799; fax (425)
[[Page 34984]]
227-1320; e-mail: gregory.dunn@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
The FAA invites your comments on this proposed general statement of
policy. We will accept your comments, data, views, or arguments by
letter, fax, or e-mail. Send your comments to the person indicated in
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. Mark your comments, ``Comments to
Policy Statement ANM-01-04.''
Use the following format when preparing your comments:
Organize your comments issue-by-issue.
For each issue, state what specific change you are
requesting to the proposed general statement of policy.
Include justification, reasons, or data for each change
you are requesting.
We also welcome comments in support of the proposed policy.
We will consider all communications received on or before the
closing date for comments. We may change the proposals contained in
this notice because of the comments received.
Background
The safety standards for civil transport category airplanes are
specified in Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), part 25. If
an applicant demonstrates that a particular design (i.e., a particular
model) complies with these standards, the FAA issues it a design
approval. The drawings and other data that describe that design are
known as the ``type design.'' When an applicant submits the necessary
documents required for type certification to the FAA for approval, the
compilation of those documents is known as the ``type design data
package.''
Certification projects submitted to the FAA for approval generally
fall into two different categories:
1. Multiple Approvals: Multiple approvals are approvals for
modifications that may be installed on any airplane of a specific type.
These approvals require a data package that defines the installation so
that it may be duplicated on another airplane by an installer. It is
FAA's policy to require that type design data packages for multiple
approvals include the following:
A drawing package that completely defines the
configuration, material, and production processes necessary to produce
each part in accordance with the certification basis of the product.
Any specifications referenced by the required drawings.
Drawings that completely define the location,
installation, and routing, as appropriate, of all equipment in
accordance with the certification basis of the product. If the
modification being approved is a change to a type certificated product,
the modification must be equivalent to and compatible with the
previously approved type design standards.
In addition, any applicant for a type certificate (TC),
supplemental type certificate (STC), or type design change must submit
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness in accordance with Sec. 21.50
(``Instructions for continued airworthiness and manufacturer's
maintenance manuals having airworthiness limitations sections'').
2. One-Only Approvals: Some modification approvals are specific to
only one airplane by serial number. These modifications are often
referred to as ``one-only approvals.'' For one-only approvals,
duplication of the installation is not necessary and different (i.e.,
lesser) data standards may apply. The certification regulations for
one-only approvals permit the use of photographs and other similar data
to document the modification. The degree of compliance of the policy
statement herein for one-only design approvals is left to discretion of
the certification engineer.
Based on certification projects submitted to the FAA for review in
recent years, the FAA has become aware that there is some confusion
among applicants as to the definition of ``type design,'' especially
with respect to the inclusion of drawings and specifications necessary
to define the wiring configuration associated with equipment
installation. In a number of recent certification projects, type design
data packages that were submitted did not include wiring diagrams
showing the source and destination of all wire associated with the
installation. Also, wire installation drawings showing airplane wire
routing, grounding, shielding, clamping, conduits, etc., either were
missing or lacked sufficient detail. The wiring diagrams and
installation drawings did not contain the necessary information
intended by the relevant regulations. These drawing packages did not
adequately and clearly define the configuration of the model to be
certificated. In addition, Instructions for Continued Airworthiness, as
required by the regulations, were not defined.
Current Regulatory Requirements
The type and quality of data required for type design data packages
and requirements for Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness are
indicated in the regulations. The pertinent sections of 14 CFR are as
follows:
Sec. 21.31 (``Type design''): This section defines and describes
``type design.''
Sec. 21.33 (``Inspection and tests''): This section, specifically
Sec. 21.33(b), provides additional insight as to the contents of the
type design data package.
Sec. 21.21 (``Issue of type certificate: normal, utility,
acrobatic, commuter, and transport category aircraft; manned free
balloons, special classes of aircraft, aircraft engines; propellers''):
This section lists pertinent requirements for a type certificate.
Sec. 21.50 (``Instructions for continued airworthiness and
manufacturer's maintenance manuals having airworthiness limitations
sections''): This section requires applicants to submit instructions
for continued airworthiness as part of their type design data package.
Paragraph 21.50(b) is relevant to this policy statement.
Sec. 21.101 (``Designation of applicable regulations'') and
Sec. 21.115 (``Applicable requirements''): These sections make it clear
that these data requirements apply to changes to type certificates.
Procedures for accomplishing the evaluation and approval of
airplane type design data can be found in FAA Order 8110.4B, ``Type
Certification,'' dated April 24, 2000. This document gives
comprehensive guidance on what constitutes a design package and what is
necessary to make acceptable findings of compliance.
Identified Problems
Ambiguous Definition of Configuration: As mentioned above, the FAA
has identified a number of recently submitted type design data packages
that did not meet the intent of Sec. 21.31(a). Specifically, these
packages did not completely define the certification configuration. For
example, these packages did not completely define specific routing and
installation of wiring on the airplane, which then left an inordinate
portion of the installation to the discretion of the installer.
The routing of wiring is an important aspect not only to the system
being modified, but also to other systems that can be affected by that
wiring. It is important that the routing of wiring strictly follow the
criteria established by the FAA in the certification basis, as
reflected in the holder's original or subsequently approved type
design. This requires installation drawings and instructions that
completely define the required routing and installation with sufficient
detail to allow repeatability of the installation.
[[Page 34985]]
System Safety Assessment: A system safety assessment is done as
part of the installation of any equipment on the airplane. This
typically consists of a functional hazard analysis, failure mode and
effects analysis, zonal analysis, or other safety analyses appropriate
to the system being installed. In the past, insufficient emphasis has
been placed on an examination of failures of wiring external to the
actual line replaceable units being installed. Failure of wiring in
bundles due to chaffing, contamination, or other causes may affect the
continued safe operation of the airplane.
References to General Guidance: Problems occur when applicants over
rely on ``standard practices'' or other general guidance for
installation details. Often, type design data packages make references
to FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 43-13, ``Acceptable Methods, Techniques,
and Practices--Aircraft Inspection and Repair,'' for installation
instructions. That guidance is general in nature and offers applicants
multiple options for compliance. Because the installer can choose from
a number of options for installation details, it is difficult for the
FAA to find that the configuration complies with the criteria
established by the FAA in the certification basis for a previously
approved type design. An installer could make inappropriate choices of
method, depending upon his or her previous experience and training.
The practice of referencing general guidance, on those occasions
when safety assurances and certification criteria necessitate strict
adherence to specified certification standards, could result in an
incomplete definition of the installation configuration.
Omission of Manufacturing Process Specifications: There also have
been cases where crucial manufacturing process specifications were
omitted in the type design data packages pertaining to wiring
installation details. This has led to insufficient control of the
production of parts, and consequent airworthiness problems related to
faulty parts manufacturing. This omission error frequently occurs when
the type design approval holder routinely uses a complex process, but
has not carefully defined the process in the type design data. As a
consequence, it can result in approval of replacement parts that may
not comply with necessary but undefined processing requirements.
Modifications Not Compatible With Original Type Design Standards:
Another common problem occurs when a modifier is unaware of, or does
not specify, installation and routing practices that are compatible
with the certification standards established for the original type
design.
Some manufacturers provide an abbreviated version of their
installation and routing specifications in the maintenance manual that
they prepare for their products. These specifications may not be
readily available to modifiers. This can result in ``inadvertent non-
compliance'' with certification requirements. One example of this kind
of inadvertent non-compliance would be the installation of a power wire
for a modification in a wire bundle containing critical wiring that the
original manufacturer was required to isolate from other systems. This
type of situation can be prevented by the applicant using experienced
design engineers, doing physical inspections of the airplanes to be
modified to ensure compatibility, and using the original airplane
manufacturer's wiring installation guidelines.
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness: A review of past
certification projects indicates that the maintenance aspects of system
wire external to the installed equipment is not being adequately
addressed. The integrity of the wiring is typically left to those doing
general airplane maintenance that relies on visual inspections.
However, visual inspections may not be adequate for wiring routed in
metal or opaque conduits, wire in high vibration areas, or wire located
in difficult to inspect areas. Equipment installers need to address any
special maintenance requirements for the airplane wiring associated
with equipment installation.
Statement of FAA Policy
Unambiguous Definition of Configurations: Type design data packages
should meet the intent of Sec. 21.31(a). These packages should
completely define the certification configuration. Specifically,
routing and installation of wiring on the airplane should be addressed.
It is important that the routing of wiring strictly follow the intent
of the criteria established by the FAA in the certification basis as
reflected in the original or subsequently approved type design approval
holder's design. The installer should provide with each application for
design approval the following:
Wiring diagrams showing source and destination of all
airplane wiring associated with equipment installation;
Installation drawings.
Installation drawings that completely defines the configuration
typically will identify:
Equipment locations,
Wiring routings,
Mounting and support details, and
Other such details of features.
System Safety Assessment: Certain airworthiness criteria require
failure analyses (i.e., failure mode and effect analysis, zonal
analysis, or other safety analysis) to demonstrate that a failure of
the system under consideration:
Does not, in itself, constitute an unacceptable hazard,
and
Does not result in damage to other systems that are
essential to safety.
The system safety assessment should include an assessment of the
effects of failures of the airplane wire and its associated wire bundle
for equipment installed on the airplane. The analysis should consider
the possible effects wire system failures would have on systems
required for safe flight and landing due to damage in collocated wiring
bundles and the possibility of smoke and/or fire events.
Failure of other systems must not damage a system being modified if
the modified system is essential to safety. Such analysis requires that
any possible interaction between systems be examined. This, in turn,
requires definitive knowledge of the configuration through design
control and an understanding of the airplane manufacturer's wire
installation rules, especially any requirements that pertain to wire
separation.
Specific Installation Drawings Instead of General References: The
FAA expects the applicant to provide definitive drawings instead of
merely statements such as ``install in accordance with industry
standard practices,'' or ``install in accordance with AC 43.13.'' The
FAA considers such statements inadequate because the standard practices
cannot define the precise location or routing of the wiring.
Process Specifications and Modifications Compatible with Original
Standards: As noted in Sec. 21.21, certain of the airworthiness
requirements require analysis or tests to define the strength,
durability, and life of components associated with the installation of
wiring in the airplane (i.e., connectors, brackets, wire constraints,
grommets, ground terminations, etc.). These tests and analyses require
complete definition of the parts so that:
Conformity of the parts to the type design may be
verified, and
The characteristics of the parts important for test or
analysis may be determined.
The airplane wiring parts specification provides the basis for
necessary stress, durability, and life analysis. A complete definition
of the
[[Page 34986]]
parts, including wiring and wire installation hardware, requires a
drawing package that clearly and completely identifies:
Shape,
Material,
Production processes,
Any other properties affecting strength or functionality
of each part, and
The arrangement of each part in the final assembly.
As an example, the FAA expects drawings to identify the material
specification, heat treat, corrosion protection or other finish, and
any other important characteristic of each part subject to test or
analysis for showing compliance with the airworthiness requirements.
Much of this information can be provided by reference on the drawings
to material or process specifications; the references then become part
of the drawing and, consequently, part of the type design data package.
Modifiers of aeronautical products should use practices that
reflect the certification criteria applicable to the original airplane
manufacturer (OAM). The applicant should demonstrate that installation
specifications and routing practices for the wiring used by modifiers
is either the same as, or compatible with, those that are used
presently for showing compliance to the type design certification
requirements. Specifically, wire separation, wire types, wire bundle
sizes, brackets, and clamping should be consistent with the approved
standards. This may require the applicant and/or modifier to:
Obtain or determine the applicable OAM design standards
and/or practices for a given installation,
Do a physical inspection of the airplanes to be modified
to ensure compatibility, and
Develop processes and procedures to address compatibility
between the original installation and the modification.
Modifiers and installers should use the airplane manufacture's
maintenance manuals, such as Maintenance Manual Chapter 20 (``Standard
Practices Airframe''), Maintenance Manual Chapter 70 (``Standard
Practices Engines''), or Chapter 20 (``Standard Practices Wiring'') as
the primary source of wiring installation information.
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness: Paragraph 21.50(b) of the
regulations requires that Instructions for Continued Airworthiness
(ICA) be supplied by the modifier for modifications to aircraft and
related products. The ICA for any specific wiring maintenance should be
addressed where Sec. 25.1529 is included in the certification basis.
Assessment of wire condition relies heavily on visual inspection.
Consequently, the ICA should address inspectability of wire in conduits
and difficult to inspect areas of the airplane. Where wire cannot be
inspected visually, the ICA should address wire removal for inspection,
when necessary, and the use of inspection techniques that do not rely
on visual inspection alone. For example, wire in metal conduits may
require repeated inspections for wear.
The FAA expects applicants for modifications to provide
airworthiness instructions for the proposed changes in a format
compatible with other maintenance instructions for the aircraft
involved.
Effect of This Statement of Policy
The general policy stated in this document is not intended to
establish a binding norm. It does not constitute a new regulation and
the FAA would not apply or rely upon it as a regulation. Those tasked
with the responsibility of airplane certification should generally
attempt to follow this policy, when appropriate. In determining
compliance with certification standards, each certification office has
the discretion not to apply these guidelines where it determines that
they are inappropriate. However, the certification office should strive
to implement this guidance to the fullest extent possible to facilitate
standardization and ensure that wiring installation details are
adequately addressed during certification. Applicants should expect
that the certificating officials will consider this information when
making findings of compliance relevant to certification actions.
Applicants also may consider the material contained in this policy
statement as supplemental to that currently contained in 14 CFR part 21
when developing a means of compliance with the relevant certification
standards.
Finally, as with all advisory material, this statement of policy
identifies one means, but not the only means, of compliance.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 25, 2001.
Vi L. Lipski,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 01-16602 Filed 6-29-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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NTSB
To Push Certification Study, Roselawn Revisit
By Sean Broderick / WASHINGTON
16-Feb-2001
4:19 PM U.S. EST
Acting U.S. National Transportation Safety Board Chairman Carol Carmody
is pushing to get her agency moving on a pair of long-standing, controversial
matters: a wide-ranging study on aircraft certification and closing the
book on a 1994 American Eagle ATR crash near Chicago.
"Certification has come up a number of accident investigations,"
Carmody told AviationNow.com Friday. "The board has told itself
twice now to do a study of certification. That's one of my main priorities,
to get that under way."
Certification issues were main parts in probes of the 1994 crash of USAir
427, a Boeing 737, near Pittsburgh and the 1996 in-flight explosion of
TWA 800, a Boeing 747, off the Long Island, N.Y., coast. During each of
those investigations - arguably the two most complicated and cumbersome
air crash probes ever done - the
board said it would do an independent study of U.S. Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) certification standards and practices.
In final report on the TWA crash, NTSB cited several design flaws. The
most significant was putting heat-generating systems like air-conditioning
packs directly under the 747 center fuel tank, which add heat to fuel
vapors in the tank, boosting the chances that an explosive fuel-ignition
combination could form.
The USAir 427 report questioned the 737 rudder design, which lacks adequate
redundancy in a key system blamed for contributing to the crash and is
being re-designed as a result.
In both probes, FAA's reasoning behind certifying the systems came under
fire.
Several other major accidents, including Alaska Airlines Flight 261 in
1999 and the 1994 American Eagle crash, have led investigators to scrutinize
certification issues.
In the past two years, the study has been pushed off due to higher-priority
tasks, including wrapping up the TWA 800 probe and heading up the EgyptAir
990 investigation. With the TWA report out and EgyptAir close to final
draft form, Carmody believes the certification probe's time is now.
"As we get into accident investigations, we keep coming back to
questions about certification," Carmody said. "That indicates
there's something we need to be doing."
Carmody, a 20-year industry veteran who spent time at FAA, in Congress,
and at the International Civil Aviation Organization before joining the
board last June, has heard that FAA is doing its own study. While she
welcomes the agency's input, she stresses that FAA's efforts will not
alter the board's plans.
"FAA seems to be doing its own certification study in hopes they
can deflect us," she said. "But this is a case where we can't
hold hands with FAA. We need to do our own. I'm not saying all the expertise
is in this [NTSB headquarters] building, but we need to be in charge of
the study."
Carmody was named NTSB vice chairman last month, and immediately became
acting chairman when former Chairman Jim Hall's term expired and he left
the agency. She expects to be the interim boss until the middle of the
year at least. Until then, her main goals are to urge her people to keep
their report-publishing schedule on track, tackle day-to-day issues as
they arise, and see that the board is unified.
"I see myself as a caretaker," she said. "I want a board
that moves together."
As far as major, potentially controversial decisions go, "I would
probably defer them to the next chairman." She adds, however, that
nothing fitting that description is on the board's plate right now.
While Carmody isn't looking to create controversy in her own agency,
she has firmly established that during her tenure as boss, NTSB will push
its single-focus agenda of safety improvement as forcefully as ever. Last
week, NTSB sent FAA a
strongly worded letter questioning a recent deal between FAA and an
air traffic controllers' union that the board believes could shrink safety
margins.
"I do think it is part of our role to, if you will, keep the heat
on," Carmody said of NTSB's relationship with the regulatory agency.
"FAA is under tremendous pressure from the industry right now, and
FAA's under tremendous pressure from the Congress, on a variety of issues.
I don't want the safety to take a back seat, I don't think FAA would do
that deliberately, but we all respond to pressure. When there's huge pressure,
I don't want our voice to be any softer than the others."
Internally, significant aviation-related issues that Carmody wants to
keep the board moving on include final reports on Alaska 261, EgyptAir
990, and the Learjet crash involving pro golfer Payne Stewart.
Carmody said the board hopes to have a draft final report of the EgyptAir
crash in the Egyptians' hands by March 15. A final report taking into
account comments the Egyptians would have on the draft could be out by
fall, she said. General target dates for Alaska and the Learjet crash
final reports are mid-summer and fall, respectively.
Besides the certification study, her other bold initiative is putting
to rest the long-unresolved reconsideration of the board's report on the
American Eagle crash. In that accident, the ATR 72 was in a holding pattern
awaiting clearance to land at Chicago O'Hare. During the wait, ice formed
on the wings of the twin-engine ATR turboprop, sending it out of control
and into a field in Roselawn, Ind.
The board cited oversights by ATR, French regulatory and safety authorities,
and FAA as contributors to the crash, and generally concluded that the
accident could have been prevented had the regulators and manufacturer
communicated more effectively. ATR, France's DGAC regulatory agency, the
country's BEA accident investigation bureau, and FAA sharply disagreed
with the board's conclusions. ATR and the French government submitted
petitions for reconsideration backed by additional technical analysis,
and FAA added its input in the form of comments on the French government
report.
"We want to get those reconsideration petitions resolved soon,"
Carmody said. "It needs to be done, and I will push to get it done."
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