Even if you're on the right track, you can still get run over if you just sit there.-Will Rogers

To be a leader you have to demonstrate leadership qualities such as honesty, integrity, credibility, veracity, candidness, "quality first" specifications .....all quite commercially compatible virtues.

If, however, you hide safety concerns in internal memo's classified Commercial-in-Confidence or Proprietary Secret, you have something to hide. You've then given up any aspirations toward leadership and you're then just one of the "MADDING CROWD" - no matter what your stature or size.

 
 

1. Is Boeing aware that the mfg. of the ship's wiring on TWA 800 was rated
max at 60,000 hrs? (accident a/c had 93,303 hrs) and that BMS13-42-B was
banned by the military due to premature aging found in laboratory tests
affirmed by the IEEE as failing after 2,000 hrs? Was Boeing concerned after
they themselves discovered this failure after only 6,000 hrs in 1979?.


2. Who is responsible for the wiring approval/selection process, FAA or
Boeing?


3. Will BMS 13-13 PVC/nylon pass the FAA's 60 degree flame test? The FAA says
no.
When exactly did Boeing first have to meet the 60 degree flame test as
required by FAR 25 for the certification approvals on their various models
that used this type wire (DC-9s, 727s, 737s)?


4. Was Boeing aware that NASA has a restriction on the flammability
characteristics of BMS 13-48 in a 30% oxygen enriched area"


5. Was Boeing aware that Lockheed demonstrated arc-tracking characteristics
of kapton wire(BMS 13-51) in 1972?
What means does Boeing use to guesstimate or project the service life of
their wiring?


6. If ,as Boeing admitted in 1997 that no MSG-3 testing has ever been done on
the wiring, (to see what-if this failed), how can it be assumed/assured that
the basic idea of redundancy of wiring systems helps rather than hurts, when
the proximity/lack of separation/convergence of bundles issues all work
against the idea of maintaining circuit integrity when considering the
dramatic failure mode of BMS13-51)?


7. How do Boeing's wiring diagrams compare to real-world installation
practices regard to wire separation requirements.


8. What formula is used by Boeing in designing a wire bundle in regard to
ambient temp., wire size, number of conductors, currents/voltages available,
EMI& HIRF sensitivities?


9. Is Boeing aware that the wires used in BMS13-42 C&D (stilan or
polyarylene) are banned by NASA and the Dept. of Defense?


10. What inspection criteria is given to the operators to detect the
particular failure modes with the various wire insulations?


11. Is Boeing aware of the 1992 declaration by the NTSB on not re-energizing
kapton insulated wires?


12. Why was BMS 13-48 removed from pressurized areas in 1988?


13. Would mixing BMS13-48 and BMS 13-51 in the same wire bundle be cause for
alarm based on the differences in abrasion resistance and mechanical
strengths at rated temperatures?


14. Is Boeing aware that BMS 13-48 has a 97% smoke obscurity rating as found
by the FAA/


15. Would there be any concern over the need to maintain overall system
temperature ratings by mixing various wire insulations, if in fact wire is
wire ?


16. Has Boeing done any vibration testing on mixing wire types at elevated
temperatures? If so, at what temperatures?


17. Is Boeing going to issue any advisory circulars to alert operators with
kapton wired a/c about the danger of re-energizing this type of wire?


18. What kind of CAS program is in place to identify any common-thread
occurrences with the various a/c types and their specific wire types? (i.e.
747 -400/MD11 have had numerous ADs on the same kapton wire failures,
DC-10/747s both had similar problems with radial cracking of poly-x).


19. Is Boeing aware that Grumman banned BMS13-48 wire from manned aerospace
applications due to the toxicity of that material? Or that NASA cited
concerns of BMS 13-48 exploding in an oxygen enriched area(i.e. cargo-bay)?


20. How does Boeing discern the difference in wiring burned in an external
fire versus an electrically induced burned wire when they participate as
Designated Engineering Representatives for the NTSB?


21. If Boeing was aware of the longitudinal splitting problems of extruded
teflon since 1971, why didn't they inspect/replace that type wire used in
their center fuel tanks?


22.How many areas of the a/c had to have teflon sleeves placed over the
cracked poly-x wires on the 747? How many ADs were issued on those areas?


23. What percentage of the wiring gets replaced on an in the course of its
lifetime? What percentage of the a/c's wiring is considered inaccessible for
even inspections?
Why does Boeing still use BMS13-48 still in their large transports if all
those aforementioned short-comings are known, especially in calling for them
as replacement wires in the 747 wing tanks as recently as 1997-1998?


24. Why does only the smaller transports 737,757 use BMS13-60 and why not use
this improved wire type across the board?


25. Based on all these references to the various wire types and their
associated failure modes, would it be safe to assume that insulation type
matters in regard to smoke-checklist instructions (not re-energizing kapton;
BMS 13-48), flammability of certain wire types (BMS13-13, & BMS13-48),
projecting/providing for the shortened service life of poly-x, BMS 13-42B,
and even fire-fighting concerns since some wire types (PVC/nylon) turn into
hydrochloric acid when hit with water when burning (BMS 13-13)?


26. Is Boeing aware of the susceptibility of BMS13-42D to hydraulic fluid and
deicing fluid and the resultant crazing (or internal fracturing) not visible
with the naked eye?


27. Has Boeing either considered or tested for the effect that electrical
anomalies would have on the 737s rudder problem? Boeing stated 12/97 that
wire failures were never tested for in their MSG-3 program (i.e. wiring or
connectors)


28. What would happen if the autopilot on a 737 shorted out, would there be
any way of recovering from the a/c's last commands that would be locked-in,
unless the yoke is broken by the pilot? Would throttling-up work against you
if the flight surfaces were still locked-in via the short?
What is the difference and what would be the effects of momentary metal to
metal contact between conductors or conductor and structure having
insufficient time to build up heat and thermally trip circuit-breakers via
degraded wire insulation versus arc-tracking of conductors?


29. Is Boeing aware that BMS-13-48 will wet arc-track?


30. Does Boeing consider, like the FAA does, that wire is wire?

There is one thing stronger than all the armies of the world, and that is an idea whose time has come. -Victor Hugo to IASA In order to get somewhere, you have to know where you want to go. No matter where you go, there you are! to Tell-Tale Docs If voting could really change things, it would be illegal.

                                                                        THE MEMO