Daily News: Swissair-spawned safety group applauds new FAA rule on wiring

Tuesday, June 5, 2001

Swissair-spawned safety group applauds new FAA rule on wiring

By RICHARD DOOLEY -- The Daily News

An aviation safety group formed after the 1998 crash of Swissair Flight 111 off Peggy's Cove is touting a little-heralded order by the world's largest airline regulator as an important victory.

Late last month the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration ordered operators of DC-9/MD-88 and MD-90-30 series commercial jets to inspect wiring around small heaters in the fuselage used to keep ice from forming on devices that measure air pressure. The FAA said airlines should inspect the wiring for chafing, loose connections and evidence of burning or arcing and make repairs.

The airworthiness order also directed airlines to remove flammable insulation called metalized mylar from around the heaters.

The directive applies to 593 airplanes registered in the U.S. and will likely affect planes registered in other countries as aviation regulators follow the FAA lead.

The order is the result of a Sept. 17, 1999 incident involving a Delta Airlines MD-88 that had a fire in the forward cargo hold after taking off from a Kentucky airport. The plane made a safe landing within minutes of the fire's discovery.

An investigation discovered that a spark from a heater had ignited the flammable insulation surrounding it.

While the latest directive is not linked to the Flight 111 crash, an aviation safety group formed after the crash says it is evidence its concerns are being taken more seriously.

The Sept. 2, 1998 crash near Peggy's Cove killed all 229 people aboard the New York-to-Geneva-bound MD-11 jet. The cause is still under investigation, but the Canadian Transportation Safety Board has already issued a number of safety recommendations on chafed and damaged wiring and the use of metalized mylar.

Lyn Romano, whose husband Ray was killed aboard Flight 111, founded the International Aviation Safety Association to lobby for practices such as wiring inspections aboard passenger jets.

She says the group's lobbying and the Flight 111 investigation is slowly changing the way airlines and safety regulators view aircraft wiring.

"Wiring is a national concern, and the tides are turning, because the FAA doesn't have any other choice but to pay attention to it," she said.

Investigators found evidence of arced wires in Flight 111 debris, but have so far not determined if the arcing started the fire that disabled the jet. It could be a year before their final report is finished and made public.

To briefs | The Daily News Online | Talk back!

NTSB: Delta Air Lines MD-88 makes emergency landing -- Smoke in Cabin

NTSB Identification: NYC99IA231 Scheduled 14 CFR 121 operation of DELTA AIR LINES

Accident occurred SEP-17-99 at COVINGTON, KY Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas MD-88, registration: N947DL Injuries: 118 Uninjured. On September 17, 1999, about 2230 eastern daylight time, a McDonnell Douglas MD-88, N947DL, operated by Delta Air Lines as flight 2030 performed a precautionary landing at the Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport (CVG), Covington, Kentucky. There were no injuries to the 2 certificated cockpit crewmembers, 3 flight attendants, and

113 passengers. The airplane received minor damage. Flight 2030 was a scheduled flight between CVG and LGA. As the airplane was climbing through FL230 the flight crew reported that there was smoke in the cabin and declared an emergency. The airplane was handed off to Covington Approach Control for a return to CVG. The airplane landed on Runway 18L at 2230, and was stopped on the runway. The emergency exits were activated, and the occupants exited the airplane. Initial examination of the airplane revealed thermal damage to a 5 by 5 foot area located under the main cabin floor, and about 2 feet behind the aft side of the forward cargo door on the right side of the fuselage.

This was the area where the right side alternate static port was located.

The damage consisted of sooting and heat distress to the underside floor structure and a fiber-glass potable water bottle. The covering on three metallized mylar insulation blankets was missing and the edges of the blankets were charred. A fiber-glass cargo bin wall panel in the vicinity was burned. In addition, in the cabin, soot damage was visible on the right cabin sidewall in the vicinity of passenger row 11. The heating element for the primary and alternate static sources was controlled from a cockpit switch, which could be activated on the ground or in the air. A thermal sensor regulated the temperature of the heating elements within pre-determined limits. The circuit breaker to the electric heat for the static ports, located in the cockpit, had not tripped. An insulation resistance check conducted on the right side alternate static port heater revealed lower than normal resistance.

http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/NYC/99A231.htm

7:59 AM 1999-09-28

Back to..........menu