This letter
was written by Mary Diefenderfer, lead inspector of Alaska
Airlines prior to the AK261 crash. March 13, 2003
Mr. Kevin
V. Ryan
United
States Attorney Northern District of California
450 Golden
Gate Ave., 11th Floor Box 36055 San Francisco, CA 92102
Dear Mr.
Ryan:
This letter is in reference to your re-opened investigation
of the crash of Alaska Airlines 261. It contains pertinent
information about the FAA’s contributory actions in that
crash. This information will also point to possible criminal
activities on the part of FAA officials who allegedly
assisted Alaska Airlines in preventing FAA inspectors
from discovering safety deficiencies, from making the
appropriate reports, and/or from pursuing safety violations
against the airline. This occurred both in Seattle and
in Oakland. Although my testimony regarding these activities
is contained in NTSB records, this letter is intended
to remind you that the FAA created an environment that
allowed such alleged criminal activities to take place,
and may have even assisted the airline through actions
against inspectors. These points should be examined while
you are conducting your thorough investigation, as they
are an integral part of the chain of events that led up
to the accident. The evidence will point to cultural problems
within the FAA that allowed safety deficiencies at the
airline to occur.
I am a
former airline principal operations inspector (POI) of
the Federal Aviation Administration in Renton, WA, the
office that has oversight responsibility for Alaska Airlines.
In my former capacity, I had main operational oversight
and legal signatory authority for Alaska Airline’s operational
approvals from 1993 to 1997. This is the timeframe for
which Alaska Airline’s alleged criminal activities are
in question.
Prior to
the crash, I provided testimony to the Office of Inspector
General, FAA Administrator, and others, which pointed
to gross mismanagement by FAA officials, abuse of authority,
and even potential RICO activities by FAA officials in
Renton with regard to safety deficiencies at Alaska Airlines.
My testimony, and that of others, was not only ignored,
but those testifying found themselves subjected to retaliation
for their reports, some even losing their careers, while
the FAA perpetrators received promotions and bonuses.
An independent investigation was conducted by the Airline
Investigation Unit (www.airlineinvestigationunit.com)
that arrived at the same conclusions. The final report
contained specific evidence from both before and after
the accident, but FAA leaders also ignored that evidence.
From the early 1990’s until the crash of Alaska Airlines
261, principal operations and maintenance inspectors assigned
to the airline identified and reported an increasing trend
of significant, if not extremely serious safety violations,
combined with an increasing arbitrary and regulatory non-compliant
stance by the airline. This included knowingly making
false statements about the conduct of airline programs
and employee training, completion of safety qualification
training that was never actually initiated, falsifying
pilot and instructor training records, not fulfilling
legal employee training requirements in accordance with
FAA approved training programs, using unapproved de-icing
fluids (vodka), forcing line pilots to fly below legal
weather minimums in hazardous terrain, and creating a
culture that encouraged pilots and mechanics not to write
up maintenance deficiencies unless it was convenient.
This last point resulted in pilots occasionally flying
a broken airplane for four or more flight legs. In one
case, a pilot knowingly flew a B-737 for four legs with
a red gear alert light illuminated in the cockpit. This
could easily have resulted in a landing crash. In another
case, Alaska Airlines knowing flew an MD-80 for hundreds
of flight legs with an internally leaking fuel tank thereby
creating the opportunity for a fiery explosion. About
the same timeframe, the airline allowed a B-737 to continue
to fly with a cracked walking beam, which could have resulted
in a take off or landing crash. These broken airplanes
were flown with passengers onboard. The specifics are
documented in FAA archives.
The airline progressively became more retaliatory against
those they considered “problem” or “rogue” inspectors,
or those that discovered safety problems, while apparently
also becoming progressively more retaliatory against their
own internal whistleblowers. This was the beginning of
the end of the lives of the 88 souls on Alaska Airlines
261.
FAA inspectors were threatened by airline officials, and
were subjected to false testimony by airline officials.
In one case, an Alaska Airlines Vice President forced
two management pilots to make specific false allegations
against an inspector who was processing a violation against
the airline. The management pilots did so, but later recanted
their claims when they learned the inspector could be
fired. This case is documented in FAA Civil Aviation Security
files.
Airline officials took an active approach in influencing
FAA management in the Renton, WA office to “fix” any inspectors
who found deficiencies insisting on a series of severe
facilitated inspector reprogramming sessions. While these
sessions were ongoing, FAA officials made extreme efforts
to silence FAA operational and maintenance inspectors
through a hostile work environment, and restrictions on
activities and surveillance. Furthermore, they stopped
documented violations by losing evidence or simply ordering
the inspectors to cease pursing the case. Any inspectors
who failed to cease, questioned management’s actions,
or made a report to other departments or hotlines, were
simply punished and isolated. The leaking fuel tank case,
as well as the walking beam case had fines reduced by
hundreds of thousands of dollars to under $50,000 after
Alaska Airlines CEO threatened an FAA supervisor with
a lawsuit. (Any fines over $50,000 are published on the
FAA website, and the CEO did not want the violations to
be public).
In the Oakland FAA office in the 1997-98 timeframe, an
Alaska Airlines whistleblower informed an inspector of
an alleged case of falsification of maintenance records
in the airline’s Oakland maintenance base. When that FAA
inspector attempted to pursue the case, he too was threatened
and reassigned by his office manager. The accident might
not have ever occurred if the FAA had allowed the inspector
to pursue appropriate action, and if the Renton office
had supported the finding, which they did not. This is
documented in FAA and FBI files.
Ultimately,
most of the inspectors who had any oversight responsibility
for Alaska Airlines in Renton and Oakland prior to the
accident were reassigned to other duties. Less knowledgeable
and/or experienced inspectors were placed on the Alaska
Airlines oversight team. The new principal operations
inspector had an immediate family member working as an
accounting executive for the airline and reporting to
the CEO. This conflict of interest could only serve to
increase Alaska Airlines influence over FAA officials
in their safety decision-making. The conflict was reported
to FAA officials, but ignored. Alaska Airlines officials
applauded the changes.
I was one of the casualties of the agreement between Alaska
Airlines and the FAA to subdue inspectors. As POI of Alaska
Airlines, I was convinced that the negative safety and
regulatory
trends
demonstrated by Alaska Airlines would result in a major
accident. After reporting my findings to local FAA authorities,
the OIG and FAA Headquarters in 1997, I was reassigned
and endured retaliation to an extent that had not been
previously seen in Renton. The retaliation went on from
1997 until 1999, when I was reassigned to a supervisor
who had been jailed for an assault conviction. His increasing
abuse towards me was condoned by senior management, and
continued until I was forced to take a constructive discharge
to preserve my career and health. The remaining inspectors
learned to keep silent, lest they endure the same fate.
The final result of the Alaska Airlines and FAA management
stance against inspectors was a degradation of safety
through less oversight and fewer inspections, while FAA
management (instead of the inspectors with the expertise)
worked out violations. Purging the case from the database
usually took care of this. Even after the accident, the
FAA manager of the Alaska Airlines oversight team met
with Alaska Airlines officials and offered to conduct
a “white glove” inspection, but to not document any deficiencies.
This is not only contrary to FAA policy, but it is contrary
to public law. This is documented in FBI files.
The bottom line is that a very disturbing culture existed
and probably still exists within the FAA that allowed
the chain of events leading up to this accident to occur.
The same FAA officials are in charge, so why should anything
change? Those that are no longer in Renton received promotions
as a reward for their protectionism of the airline and
their retaliatory actions against safety inspectors. Must
we wait until Alaska Airlines has another fatal accident
to realize that the indicators are present, but nobody
chooses to address them once again?
FAA management are experts at explaining away individually
documented incidents with claims the employees were “disgruntled”,
that “no policy exists”, that they “studied the situation
and found no basis for action”, and so forth. The fact
is, FAA management was aware of the safety
implications
of the inspector’s trend identification, did nothing except
assist the airline in silencing the inspectors, and 88
fatalities occurred as a result.
I have
not used the names of the guilty parties to protect them
from any media attention.
You can contact me for a list of their names and specific
details, but as I mentioned previously, these details
and much more are contained in NTSB and FBI files, and
in FAA archives. May I also suggest that you subpoena
phone records, including cell phone records of the Office
Manager of the Alaska Airlines Certificate Management
Office (CMO) from the date of the accident until the present
date. You are likely to find numerous calls between the
FAA Manager and Alaska Airlines attorney’s, CEO, and VPs
at irregular hours on a regular basis. This type of activity
may or may not be in accordance with current FAA policies,
but it certainly is questionable based on recent historical
events, the particular manager’s background, and FAA management’s
propensity to bury inspector safety recommendations.
Sincerely,
Mary
Rose Diefenderfer Seattle, WA 98168
CC:
FBI, SFO Family members of Alaska Airlines 261 victims,
Representative DeFazio, Oregon, Senator Santorum,
Pennsylvania
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Mary Diefenderfer
Fired for Doing her FAA Job too well |
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|
Diefenderfer
Posts to her Professional Forum (MS
Word Doc) |
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|
The
Mary Rose Diefenderfer Story |
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|
Another
Alaska WhistleBlower - John Liotine |
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