Attached is a short (6 page) summary of GAO Reports critical of FAA
procedures and database accuracy.  References to the GAO source URLs to
these summaries and to the full GAO reports are given.  In a Word
format, this summary captures all the GAO reports listed from 1994 to
the present and counters the FAA's frequent claim that they have no
reports or records when asked to take regulatory steps and mandatory
actions.

   Administrator Garvey has made reference to 'incomplete and
inconsistent record-keeping', and the General Accounting Office agrees. 

With poor data
quality, safety decisions will not be data driven and will not
effectively support the FAA's inspection and certification systems and its
mandate to safeguard the aviating public.

 

11 GAO REPORTS AND REVIEWS OF FAA

             PROCEDURES AND DATABASE ACCURACY                                           

                                Source; http://www.gao.gov/reports.htm

 

 

             Abstracts of GAO Reports and Testimony, 1994

 

          FAA and the State Department Can Better Manage Foreign

            Enforcement Cases.   (Letter Report, 03/17/94, GAO/RCED-94-87).

 

    In November 1992, a foreign-operated aircraft departing from Miami International Airport experienced engine failure, ditched into the Atlantic Ocean, and sank.  The aircraft was overweight on takeoff, could not climb to the proper altitude, and narrowly missed high-rises in a heavily populated area before it crashed.  The operator had no liability insurance on the aircraft and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) discovered that the plane did not meet international safety standards.

     FAA has not effectively managed its enforcement workload, and as a result, foreign governments and FAA have not acted on all safety violations that they have referred to one another.  This inability to act was mainly due to the length of time FAA took to process cases, which FAA attributed to staffing shortages and other priority work.  Furthermore, FAA did not follow up on foreign referrals and, consequently, could not say which governments were not acting or why.

    Delays in processing violations and following up have resulted in cases being closed without being investigated.   FAA found deficiencies that weakened foreign countries' enforcement capabilities.  Overall, 16 of the 26 countries that FAA assessed between August 1991 and September 1993 did not meet international safety standards.  Deficiencies included a lack of inspectors to look into violations, no technical expertise to carry out inspection programs, and no regulations for taking enforcement actions or assessing penalties. 

    The Transportation Department assessed 26 penalties totaling about $1.25 million against foreign carriers between 1989 and 1992.  Only two of the carriers failed to pay up, and the Department revoked both carriers' operating authority.

 

Source and Full Report;  http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces160.shtml 

                                      Under “Issue Date”, enter 03/17/94  To  03/17/94,  See Item 5 of 7.

 

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                 Abstracts of GAO Reports and Testimony, 1995 

 

Aviation Safety: Data Problems Threaten FAA Strides on Safety Analysis System.    (Chapter Report, 02/08/95, GAO/AIMD-95-27).

 

    Overall, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has done a credible job analyzing and defining the requirements of the Safety Performance Analysis System, an automated decision support system that FAA is acquiring to help it target its limited inspection and certification resources.  However, FAA's current estimates for system software are subjective, not supported by verifiable analysis, and therefore may be unreliable.  To identify aviation safety risk precursors, the system depends on information from many databases, including those compromising FAA's Aviation Safety Analysis System.  As previously reported by GAO, FAA, and others, these Aviation Safety Analysis System databases contain incomplete, inconsistent, and inaccurate data. If the data quality is poor, the system's input into safety decisions will not be reliable and will not effectively support FAA's inspection and certification system.

 

Source and Full Report;  http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces160.shtml 

                                      Under “Issue Date”, enter  02/08/95  To  02/08/95,  See Item 1 of 6

 

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                 Abstracts of GAO Reports and Testimony, 1996 

 

Targeting and Training of FAA's Safety Inspector Workforce, by Gerald Dillingham, Associate Director, Transportation and Telecommunications Issues, before the Oversight of Government Management and the District of Columbia Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. [Text] [PDF].   T-RCED-96-26, Apr. 30, 1996  (11 pages). 

 

     Although accident rates for air travel in the United States are among the lowest in the world and aviation remains one of the safest means of transportation, recent fatal accidents have raised concerns about the safety of air travel.  GAO testified that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) needs to target the resources of its safety inspection program to the areas of greatest risk. Because of the magnitude of inspectors' workloads, targeting is essential because FAA may never have enough resources to inspect all pilots, aircraft, and facilities.

    Although FAA has been working since 1991 to develop a $31 million system to target resources for aviation inspections, data quality problems, such as information on the results of safety inspections, jeopardize the system's potential benefits.  During the past decade, GAO and others have reported on problems with the technical training of inspectors, including those performing inspections for which they lacked proper credentials.  Inspectors have been unable to take courses that they believe are necessary for them to do their jobs.  Cuts in FAA's budget have reduced the money available for technical training by 42 percent during fiscal years 1993-96. FAA projects that it will have a shortfall of $20 million for technical training that FAA had earlier deemed essential.

Source and Full Report; http://www.gao.gov/AIndexFY96/abstracts/rc96026t.htm

                        or          http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces160.shtml  

                                     Under “Issue Date”, enter  04/30/96  To  04/30/96,  See Item 3 of 7.

 

 

FAA Generally Agrees With, but Is Slow in Implementing, Safety Recommendations. [Text] [PDF].  RCED-96-193, Sept. 23, 1996 (59 pages).

 

    The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is responsible for promoting safety in civil air transportation. GAO and the Transportation Department's Office of Inspector General review FAA's safety programs, and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigates aviation accidents. The three organizations make recommendations to FAA aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of FAA's activities and functions and at improving aviation safety. This report answers the following two questions:  What is FAA's overall record in

responding to, agreeing with, and implementing significant recommendations made by GAO and the Inspector General from 1990 to 1994, as well as recommendations made by NTSB or added to NTSB's "Most Wanted" lists of safety recommendations during that same period? To what extent have GAO's recommendations concerning aircraft certification, airline inspections, and oversight of foreign carriers and NTSB's recommendations concerning safety on runways been fully implemented?

 

Source and Full Report; http://www.gao.gov/AIndexFY96/abstracts/rc96193.htm

or                                  http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces160.shtml 

                                     Under “Issue Date”, enter  09/23/96  To  09/23/96,  See Item 1 of 3

 

                   Abstracts of GAO Reports and Testimony, 1997 

 

Challenges to Implementing the Recommendations of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, by Gerald Dillingham, Associate Director, Transportation Issues, before the Aviation Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation. [Text] [PDF].  T-RCED-97-90, Mar. 5, 1997.  (9 pages). 

 

    Last year, 380 people died in accidents involving large U.S. airlines--the largest number in 11 years. The crashes of TWA Flight 800 off Long Island and Valujet Flight 592 in the Florida everglades accounted for most of these deaths. Although the nation's air transportation system remains the safest in the world and the Federal Aviation Administration is a model for other countries, these tragic events underscore the need to continuously increase the existing margin of safety.

    The recently released report of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security made 57 recommendations concerning safety, security, air traffic control, and disaster response. GAO testified that these recommendations are good start toward ensuring greater safety and security for passengers, restructuring the relationships between government and private industry, and maintaining America's global leadership in aviation. However, key questions remain about how and when the recommendations will be implemented, how much they will cost, and who will pay the cost. This testimony focuses on the challenges to converting the Commission's recommendations from concepts to realities.

 

Source and Full report; http://www.gao.gov/AIndexFY97/abstracts/rc97090t.htm

or                                 http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces160.shtml  

                                    Under “Issue Date”, enter  03/05/97  To  03/05/97,  See Item 5 of 13.

 

FAA Has Begun Efforts to Make Data More Publicly Available. [Text] [PDF].  RCED-97-137, Apr. 25, 1997.  (15 pages). 

 

    Beginning in July 1996, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) took several steps to provide the public with information on aviation safety. FAA formed a working group of senior agency officials and adopted a three-pronged approach to better inform the public on aviation safety issues: it launched a web site on the Internet, began publicizing significant enforcement actions, and initiated a public education campaign. Since FAA started its aviation safety site on the Internet, it has seen a fourfold increase in the number of users who have accessed the web site each week. Usage has increased during those weeks when a public announcement related to the site has been made.

    In addition, FAA's data show that users are spending more time browsing the site. It is too soon to know, however, if these trends will continue. FAA plans to expand the number of databases that it posts on its aviation safety web site throughout the rest of 1997. It expects to incorporate information on the airlines' composition, such as the make, models, and ages of planes in each airline's fleet, and other indicators of aviation safety, such as data on near mid-air collisions.

 

Source and Full Report; http://www.gao.gov/AIndexFY97/abstracts/rc97137.htm

or                                  http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces160.shtml  

                                     Under “Issue Date”, enter  04/25/97  To  04/25/97,  See Item 2 of 8.

 

New Airlines Illustrate Long-Standing Problems in FAA's Inspection Program. [Text] [PDF].  RCED-97-2, Oct. 17, 1996.  (48 pages). 

 

    New airlines, on average, have experienced higher accident rates and more Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) enforcement actions than have established airlines. This does not mean that new airlines are unsafe, but it does argue for better targeting of FAA's limited inspection resources. During the five-year period GAO reviewed, FAA policies did not require new airlines to be monitored any differently than established airlines, and actual inspection rates varied widely among new airlines. GAO believes that the performance of new airlines should be closely monitored during their first years of operations and that airlines with greater safety risks should be targeted for more comprehensive inspections.

    On a broader scale, serious problems continue to hamper the effectiveness of FAA's safety inspection program. Although FAA has tried to better target its inspection resources and has

reevaluated safety inspector training and work assignments, several unresolved issues remain. Resource constraints resulting from budget cuts in such areas as safety inspector training present a continuing challenge for FAA.  GAO believes that recent FAA initiatives, such as its 90 Day Safety Review, may significantly improve the inspection program, but only if they are effectively implemented. Public concern about the safety of the nation's aviation system has escalated recently as a result of the ValuJet and TWA crashes, and several groups have urged FAA to publish safety data for specific airlines. GAO agrees that the time has come for FAA to begin the process that would lead to the publishing of such information for use by the traveling public.

 

Source and Full report; http://www.gao.gov/AIndexFY97/abstracts/rc97002.htm

or                                 http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces160.shtml 

                                    Under “Issue Date”, enter  10/17/96  To  10/17/96,  See Item 5 of 6.

 

                   Abstracts of GAO Reports and Testimony, 1998     

 

Proposed Domestic Airline Alliances Raise Serious Issues, by John H.Anderson, Jr., Director, Transportation Issues, before the Aviation Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation. [Text] [PDF].   T-RCED-98-215, June 4, 1998.  (20 pages). 

 

    Six airlines that carry about 70 percent of domestic passengers in the United States-Northwest, Continental, Delta, United, American, and US Airways--plan to form three alliances. The airlines say that these alliances will yield such consumer benefits as expanded route networks and combined frequent flier programs.  Critics contend that the consolidation will undermine the benefits of deregulation by decreasing competition, which will ultimately reduce passengers' choices and increase fares. This testimony describes the competitive implications of the proposed alliances, including their potential benefits and disadvantages to consumers, and issues that policymakers need to consider in evaluating the net effects of the proposed alliances.

 

Source and Full Report; http://www.gao.gov/AIndexFY98/abstracts/rc98215t.htm

or                                  http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces160.shtml  

                                     Under “Issue Date”, enter  06/04/98  To  06/04/98,  See Item 7 of 9.

 

 

Efforts to Implement Flight Operational Quality Assurance Programs.

[Text] [PDF].  RCED-98-10, Dec. 2, 1997.  (38 pages).

 

   The analysis of aircraft data recorded during flight has played a crucial role in determining the causes of crashes.  Recently, however, some U.S. airlines have begun to analyze flight data from uneventful airline flights to identify potential problems and correct them before they lead to accidents. This report examines efforts by the Federal Aviation Administration and U.S. airlines to implement flight operational quality assurance programs. These programs use flight data to detect flaws, unsafe practices, or conditions outside of desired operating procedures early enough to allow timely intervention to avert accidents.

    Currently, about 33 foreign airlines and four U.S. airlines--United, US Airways, Continental, and Alaska--have implemented such programs.  GAO discusses (1) how such programs will enhance aviation safety, (2) the costs and benefits of such programs, and (3) the factors that could impede their full implementation and steps that could be taken to overcome such barriers.

 

Source and Full Report; http://www.gao.gov/AIndexFY98/abstracts/rc98010.htm

or                                  http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces160.shtml  

                                     Under “Issue Date”, enter  12/02/97  To  12/02/97,  See Item 1 of 2.

 

 

Weaknesses in Inspection and Enforcement Limit FAA in Identifying and Responding to Risks. [Text] [PDF].  RCED-98-6, Feb. 27, 1998.  (124 pages). 

 

    About 96 percent of the 2 million safety and security inspections conducted by two offices of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) resulted in no reports of problems or violations. However, GAO questions whether this rate is a meaningful indication of the aviation industry's compliance with regulations. First, many inspectors do not report all observed problems or violations. Second, many inspections are not thorough or structured enough to detect many violations. Third, FAA's inspection-tracking systems do not distinguish major from minor violations.

    FAA's information on compliance in the aviation industry is thus incomplete and of limited use in providing early warning of potential risks and in targeting inspection resources to the greatest risks.

 

Source and Full Report; http://www.gao.gov/AIndexFY98/abstracts/rc98006.htm

or                                  http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces160.shtml 

                                     Under “Issue Date”, enter  02/27/98  To  02/27/98,  See Item 11 of 12.

 

 

                 Abstracts of GAO Reports and Testimony, 1999   

 

FAA's New Inspection System Offers Promise, but Problems Need to Be Addressed. [Hard Copy].  RCED-99-183, June 28, 1999.  (40 pages). 

 

    The aviation industry has forecast a potential 66-percent increase in passenger travel from 1999 to 2008.  The U.S. aviation accident rate, which has remained relatively constant during the last two decades, must be substantially lowered to avoid escalating numbers of aviation deaths as air traffic increases. A key to reducing the aviation accident rate is for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to have an effective process for inspecting the nation's airline operations. GAO and others have raised concerns about the adequacy of FAA's inspection process to meet that challenge.

    The report addresses the following questions:  To what extent does the Air Transportation

Oversight System address past concerns about FAA's aviation safety inspections? What factors, if any, surfaced during the system's implementation that could impede its success? What is FAA doing to address any factors that could impede the system's success? GAO found that the system is largely responsive to past concerns raised about key aspects of FAA's aviation safety inspections and the usefulness of inspection data.

 

Source and Full Report;  http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces160.shtml  

                                      Under “Issue Date”, enter  06/28/99  To  06/28/99,  See Item 2 of 6.

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End –  jking1@mediaone.net  4/14/00

 

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