Chairman
Mica, Congressman DeFazio and members of the Subcommittee,
thank you for inviting us to testify today on the
reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA). Professional Airways Systems Specialists
(PASS) provides exclusive representation for more than
11,000 of the FAA’s Systems Specialists, Flight Inspection
Pilots, Procedures Development Specialists, Aviation
Safety Inspectors and safety support staff. Our members
install, maintain, troubleshoot and certify this country’s
air traffic control (ATC) system; they inspect, provide
oversight through surveillance and enforce aviation
regulations throughout the commercial and general aviation
industries; and they flight check ground-based systems,
develop approach and departure procedures and perform
quality analyses of aviation systems.
The
entire aviation industry is experiencing one of the most
challenging periods in its history. Major airlines are
struggling just to survive as the industry itself is
recovering from the aftermath of September 11 amidst a
slow economy. As the industry recovers, modernization of
the National Airspace System (NAS) will be crucial to
ensuring that we do not return to the gridlock we had two
years ago. PASS believes that strong funding for the
operations and facilities and equipment programs is
critical to ensuring the nation’s aviation system operates
smoothly, efficiently and, most of all, safely.
Air Traffic Services (ATS)
NAS Modernization Skills
Three
years ago, PASS briefed this Subcommittee on the need to
change the way technical training is provided to the FAA
Systems Specialists charged with maintaining and
certifying the NAS. PASS was excited that our new
collective bargaining agreement contained provisions that
would actually facilitate NAS modernization. Our agreement
was intended to change the nature of the work and
accommodate new technologies. To accomplish this, a new
method of providing skills to the workforce was developed
to replace the FAA’s centralized, quota-driven training
method, which is too costly in both time and money. The
PASS-FAA model is based on need – the training goals align
with the business goals of the agency. Because the Agency
is relying more on commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)
systems, the ‘core skills’ identified in the model are
based on industry standards. And because the training is
commercial, it is available locally, which will save
valuable funds that would otherwise be spent on course
development and travel.
The
PASS-FAA model is similar to those successfully used in
the private sector. In January of this year, the General
Accounting Office (GAO) published the results of its study
concerning private-sector practices for training
information technology (IT) and non-IT professionals
(e.g., business managers and other staff needing IT
training). According to GAO, “The rapid pace of
technological change, with its potential to transform the
way the government delivers services, makes information
technology (IT) human capital a critical issue for federal
agencies.”
With this in mind, the study examined private-sector
companies recognized for their effective and innovative IT
training programs and provided models and examples for
federal agencies. According to
GAO’s review of private-sector practices, training should
not be a support function, but a strategic element in
achieving corporate objectives.
Two years
after working with the FAA to implement perhaps the most
innovative training program in the federal government,
PASS must report little progress. Early on there was
tremendous resistance from the FAA’s own training
bureaucracy. But this was expected. What was unexpected,
however, is the opposition that we still encounter from
Airway Facilities (AF), the very organization that would
benefit most from the training program. While FAA
Administrator Marion Blakey and AF Director Steve Zaidman
have been supportive, many other managers, including some
who report directly to Mr. Zaidman, have been less than
cooperative, repeatedly throwing obstacles in the way.
Considering the lack of progress to date and the constant
bureaucratic push back to a centralized, quota-driven
system, PASS believes an additional 1,000 Systems
Specialists are needed to maintain the NAS. Additional
staffing, however, will not eliminate the need to re-skill
the workforce.
PASS is
proud of the training plan we developed collaboratively
with the FAA; we are frustrated that the FAA does not seem
to share that pride. We believe it is a model that would
prove beneficial to others in the federal government. To
ensure the FAA keeps pace with its own technological
advances, and because training the AF technical workforce
is crucial to NAS modernization, PASS will continue to
work with AF in an attempt to truly bring this training
model to fruition. We realize centralized training cannot
be eliminated altogether, but we ask this Subcommittee to
instruct the FAA to make local ‘core skills’ training a
priority and that this Subcommittee authorize funding to
ensure it will happen.
Information Security
Securing
the ATC computer systems that provide information to
controllers and flight crews is critical to the safe and
expeditious movement of aircraft.
Had the security of the NAS been compromised at the time
of the September 11 attacks, the ability to safely land
more than 4,500 aircraft within hours may have been lost.
Security issues must be addressed with technology, policy
and training. To protect the integrity of the NAS, the FAA
must take Information Systems Security (ISS) very
seriously.
The FAA
does not apply ISS consistently or properly, taking a
piecemeal rather than NAS-wide approach to security. This
practice leads to individual systems being deployed in a
networked environment without proper security, password
protection or security training for the Systems
Specialists charged with maintaining them. These problems
are the direct result of program offices independently
developing their own security controls and the lack of
necessary security requirements in contracts.
The NAS
is a complex mix of legacy equipment interfaced with more
advanced COTS systems, many of which have known
vulnerabilities. Advanced technologies can dramatically
increase the efficiency of the NAS by improving processing
capability, functionality and information flow. This is
done, in part, through increased interconnectivity between
systems. In turn, this increases the susceptibility of
those systems to intrusion by outside entities.
Appropriate security measures must be in place and
employees must be trained with the proper tools and
skills. Without proper security and training, breaches in
security may not be detected, potentially resulting in the
loss of essential data and service disruptions. Security
incidents that are discovered may take an unreasonable
amount of time to isolate and correct.
The FAA
is not prepared for an attack on its information systems
and, therefore, cannot ensure the integrity of the NAS.
PASS asks this Subcommittee to direct the FAA to set aside
adequate resources to ensure that the tools and training
necessary to secure the NAS are provided. Given the
seriousness of this issue, PASS also believes that the FAA
should be required to brief this Subcommittee, at least
annually, on its progress in this area.
Contracting Out
PASS is
strongly opposed to the administration’s plan to contract
out safety-related work to the private sector. As this
Subcommittee knows, agencies have been directed to open
for competition 15 percent of the jobs in their Federal
Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act inventories this
year and 50 percent by 2006. In the most recent release of
the FAA’s 2002 FAIR Act inventory, over 3,500 positions
from PASS bargaining units are listed as commercially
competitive. Of these, approximately 1,000 may be subject
to immediate cost comparison. PASS believes that the
administration’s one-size-fits-all outsourcing quotas,
which give no consideration to the uniqueness of each
agency, will harm the FAA’s ability to effectively carry
out its mission of ensuring aviation safety.
The NAS
cannot be divided into individual components, just as the
work of those responsible for maintaining it cannot be
contracted out as independent functions. The NAS is an
integrated arrangement of thousands of distinct systems,
regulations, procedures and people. Intercommunication
between all aspects of the NAS is essential in order to
accomplish one of the most complex missions in the world –
ensuring our country’s ability to safely and efficiently
monitor and control aircraft.
Today’s
contractors are only responsible for their “piece” of the
system – they are unable to support the intercommunication
so vital to maintaining the safe functioning of the NAS.
It is simply not possible for a contractor to understand
the effect they can have on the whole system and on the
safety of the flying public.
Systems
Specialists, on the other hand, are not limited to a
single task or to a single system. They can – and do –
perform their work everyday without losing sight of the
big picture. Systems Specialists are end-to-end service
providers regardless of vendor or system, ensuring that
the complicated, interconnected systems are operating
efficiently and safely. Furthermore, they answer to the
people they work for – the flying public – not to a
corporate board only interested in profit.
Some say
we should try to mirror other countries in their
privatization efforts. However, none of them have as
complicated or as safe a system as ours, and their
privatized air traffic control systems have had less than
spectacular results. The bottom line is that Systems
Specialists install, maintain and certify the safest air
traffic system in the world. The events of September 11
highlight the failure of using contract personnel for
airport security, and demonstrate the inherent weakness of
allowing commercial profit to override public safety.
PASS
believes that jobs that protect the public interest cannot
be safely privatized. Therefore, we urge this Subcommittee
to include language in the FAA reauthorization bill that
would prevent the administration from contracting out the
operations, maintenance and oversight of the air traffic
control system.
Office of Regulation and
Certification (AVR)
Oversight and Surveillance
PASS
represents approximately 2,800 Flight Standards Field
Inspectors and 150 Manufacturing Inspectors. Together,
these highly skilled individuals are responsible for
certification, education, oversight and enforcement of the
commercial and general aviation industries. This includes
approximately 2,000
manufacturers of aircraft and aircraft component parts,
7,000 air operator certificates, 6,000 air agency (repair
station) certificates, 240,000 aircraft, 637,000 active
pilots, 400,000 non-pilot personnel, 83,000 flight
instructors and over 30,000 designees. Due to the state of
the economy and increased demands on the Inspector
workforce, however, Inspector staffing is not adequate to
provide sufficient safety oversight. The following
highlight the events and conditions contributing to PASS’s
request for additional Inspector staffing.
·
Financially troubled airlines: FAA Orders
require Inspectors to increase oversight of financially
troubled airlines, including any airline that has
significant layoffs of personnel, major changes in route
structure or increases in repeat maintenance logbook
discrepancies. Air carriers have struggled in the past two
years with the slumping economy and higher security costs
in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks. These
conditions are increasing the number of financially
challenged airlines and, correspondingly, the need for
more Inspectors to satisfy FAA requirements.
·
Regional airlines: The industry’s current
efforts to provide more cost-efficient air carrier
services has led to an increase in regional airlines that
fly short-haul operations and use more fuel-efficient
aircraft. According to the Regional Airline Association,
regional airlines carried approximately 82.8 million
passengers in 2001, more than double the passengers
carried in 1991.
The increase of regional airlines dramatically raises the
number of commercial operator certificates, puts more
aircraft and aircrews in the system and increases the
demand on repair facilities – all contributing to the need
for more oversight by the FAA.
·
Repair stations: DOT Inspector General
Kenneth Mead recently testified before this Subcommittee
that in 1996 major air carriers spent $1.6 billion (37
percent of their total maintenance costs) for outsourced
aircraft maintenance. In 2001, this amount had increased
to $2.9 billion (47 percent of their total maintenance
costs). The increased demand on repair stations calls for
an equivalent increase in Inspector staffing, and Mead’s
testimony cautions the FAA to pay close attention to the
level of oversight it provides for repair stations.
·
Aging aircraft: The FAA recently issued
regulations in response to the Aging Aircraft Act of 1991
that require aircraft to undergo inspections and records
reviews by an Inspector after the fourteenth year in
service and at specified intervals thereafter to ensure
the adequate and timely maintenance of an aircraft’s
age-sensitive components. More Inspectors are necessary in
order to ensure the continued airworthiness of aging
aircraft and to satisfy this requirement.
·
Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS):
Mandated by Congress in the wake of the ValuJet crash, the
90-Day Safety Review identified the need to significantly
increase Inspector staffing and reevaluate safety
oversight procedures. In response to this, the FAA
developed the Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS),
a “system safety” approach to oversight of the air carrier
industry. ATOS aims to ensure that airlines comply with
FAA safety requirements and that they have operating
systems to control risks and prevent accidents.
Unfortunately, ATOS has never been fully implemented. When
ATOS is implemented in all Part 121 air carriers,
according to the FAA’s own estimation, the Agency will
have a staffing shortfall of approximately 259 Inspectors.
As a result of attrition and the Agency shifting money to
other priorities, Inspector staffing has now declined to
numbers approximating those prior to the ValuJet accident.
PASS is concerned that insufficient staffing, inadequate
training, data analysis problems and lack of commitment by
FAA management will continue to hamper full implementation
of ATOS.
Increased
Inspector staffing is necessary to meet the demands
required to oversee a financially distressed industry, to
increase aging aircraft inspections, to fully implement
ATOS and to provide all of the current oversight
responsibilities. Disappointingly, the President’s FY 2004
budget proposal requests only $3 million to hire an
additional 20 aviation safety staff. Therefore, we ask
this Subcommittee to authorize the hiring of 300
additional Flight Standards Field Inspectors, 30 safety
support staff and 50 additional Manufacturing Inspectors
each year for the next three years.
Training
The
aviation industry introduces new technology at a rate far
in excess of the FAA’s willingness to provide training on
that technology (e.g., advanced avionics and automation,
new composite materials for aircraft and aircraft parts,
new hydraulic systems, new procedures in air carrier pilot
manuals, etc.). Thus, while Inspectors come to the Agency
skilled in state-of-the-art technology, that expertise
becomes quickly outdated. In addition, with the exception
of a relatively small number of Operations (pilot)
Inspectors, Inspectors are not required to remain current
in their areas of expertise. For the most part, any
required FAA training Inspectors receive is administrative
in nature (e.g., how to fill out paperwork or apply
regulations). When technical training is provided, it is
commonly six to ten years behind the industry standard.
Contributing to this problem is the FAA’s unwillingness to
utilize commercially available training, even though the
best training on state-of-the-art technology is only
available commercially. When commercial training is
utilized by the Agency, it is conducted on a centralized
rather than local basis. For example, Operations
Inspectors in Los Angeles, California, who need training
on a B-747 must obtain that training in Minneapolis
because the FAA has contracted with Northwest Airlines to
provide that training. However, B-747 training is
available in Los Angeles and local training would provide
significant cost savings to the Agency. The FAA’s approach
to training is not only extremely costly, but it does not
take full advantage of the benefits of employing locally
available commercial training.
Aviation
safety is dependent on Inspectors receiving technological
training on the most up-to-date equipment available.
Therefore, PASS asks this Subcommittee to direct the FAA
to implement regulations that require all Aviation Safety
Inspectors be current and qualified in the aircraft and/or
specialties for which they have regulatory oversight
responsibility. We also ask this Subcommittee to direct
the Agency to acquire local technical training from
commercial sources when available.
Designees
A
designee is a private individual or company serving as a
representative of the FAA and authorized by law to
examine, test and/or conduct inspections necessary for the
issuance of a certificate (e.g., airmen, airworthiness,
etc.). In the beginning, the designee program worked by
allowing experienced industry personnel – who had
developed a working trust with FAA Inspectors – to take on
some of the more repetitive types of certification
activities. Unfortunately, as the program expanded over
the years, the amount of experience and trust diminished
while the number of designees soared.
The
creation and subsequent expansion of the designee program
is a result of the Agency attempting to compensate for
inadequate Inspector staffing. Instead of hiring
additional Inspectors to offset increases in work, the FAA
simply appoints more designees. This unbalanced system has
resulted in an unmanageable number of designees – over
30,000 for Flight Standards and over 2,000 for
Manufacturing Inspection District Offices (MIDO) – that
makes oversight nearly impossible. Furthermore, since
designees are not FAA employees and are either
self-employed or employed by airlines, repair stations,
manufacturers, etc., they are paid by the very entity that
is seeking their approval. This system of designees,
acting on behalf of the FAA and paid by the industry, has
resulted in the industry overseeing itself.
Consider the recent
evidence that the crash of Swissair Flight 111 – which
killed 229 people in September 1998 – was attributable to
a lack of designee oversight by the FAA.
The findings indicate that the Agency did not detect
problems with the design of an interactive entertainment
system used in the aircraft because no one directly
employed by the FAA reviewed the system’s design or
installation plans, supervised the installation or signed
off on any work. Instead, that work was done for profit by
a company that the FAA authorized to approve airplane
modifications on its behalf – individual Designated
Engineering Representatives – and a corporate Designated
Alteration Station.
Despite
having no training requirements, designees are responsible
for the same types of inspections as those performed by
Inspectors. While some designees are required to hold a
certificate (e.g., Designated Maintenance Examiners must
hold an Airframe and Powerplant certificate), most
designees only need to submit an application and are not
required to demonstrate their experience or training. It
takes three to five years for a qualified FAA Inspector to
be considered at full performance level. Designees need
only attend a biannual standardization seminar on how to
fill out paperwork.
Furthermore, designees are not held to any guidelines that
require them to perform work to a specific standard. For
example, soon after
September 11, PASS learned that the Saudi citizen Hani
Saleh Hanjour, believed to have flown a hijacked airliner
into the Pentagon, obtained three US Airmen certificates
without ever being examined by an FAA Inspector. Instead,
designees allowed Hanjour to train in jet passenger
aircraft at an Arizona flight school and, despite having
what instructors later described as limited flying skills
and an even more limited command of the English language,
issued his US Airmen certificates. Even more alarming,
since there are no standards that designees are held
accountable to, the designees that certificated Hanjour
are still on the job!
PASS is
also concerned that the FAA’s current plans to create
“organizational designees” for MIDO will further decrease
FAA oversight. Presently, the work of manufacturing
designees is reviewed only 8 hours per year. Due to the
workload imposed by that small amount of oversight, the
FAA wants all companies with multiple designees to
establish “organizational designees,” where the company
itself is responsible for appointing, training and
overseeing its own designees. On paper, organizational
designees would reduce FAA oversight from 8 hours per
year, per person, to 20 hours per year for the entire
company. Therefore, a company with five designees – that
would have normally received 40 hours of oversight – will
now receive only half that amount.
PASS asks this
Subcommittee to address the growing designee problem by
directing the FAA to implement regulations requiring
designees to demonstrate their technical proficiency to
FAA Inspectors annually. This should include direct
observations of designees actually performing their
functions. We ask that the regulation also place limits on
the ratio of designees to FAA Inspectors that do not
exceed 7:1 for individual designees or 4:1 for company
designees. This ratio should be based upon the actual
number of Inspectors having direct oversight of the
designees.
Contract Negotiations
In 1996,
Congress granted the FAA personnel and acquisition reform.
As a result, FAA employees were removed from coverage
under most provisions of Title 5. This required the FAA to
develop a new personnel system for its employees and
bargain with its unions over this new system. This move
was intended to give the FAA the flexibility to operate
more like a business and to modernize more quickly.
Unfortunately, seven years later, personnel reform has
still not been implemented in four of the five bargaining
units PASS represents due to the lack of new contracts. As
a result, morale is at an all-time low and the Agency is
unable to realize cost savings that would have resulted
from negotiated contracts. While our Inspectors should be
focused on safety, particularly when so many carriers are
in financial distress, the FAA’s inaction has left them
focused on the outcome of contract negotiations.
In the
Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, Congress
established a mediation process for resolving bargaining
disputes. That mediation process does not provide for
binding resolution. Instead, the Administrator may either
unilaterally impose a settlement after submission to
Congress or choose not to act at all. PASS would like this
Subcommittee to include language in the FAA
reauthorization bill that would amend Title 49, Section
40122(a) (2), to require that if the parties cannot reach
agreement with assistance from the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, the outstanding issues in dispute
will be resolved by the Federal Service Impasses Panel
under Title 5, Section 7119.
Regional Consolidation
As stated
earlier in our testimony, and as DOT Inspector General
Kenneth Mead testified before this Subcommittee, the FAA
has not met the goals of personnel reform granted to the
Agency in 1996. As a result, the FAA has not realized the
cost savings and efficiency that FAA reform was intended
to deliver. PASS believes that streamlining regional
operations would help the Agency achieve some of the
cost-saving goals envisioned with personnel reform.
The FAA
is currently structured into nine FAA regional offices,
each a discrete “fiefdom” – an independent center
providing services such as human resources management,
financial management, cost reporting, information resource
management, procurement and supply management, property
administration and various logistical support functions to
employees and managers within a limited geographic
boundary. Regional offices all perform the same
administrative functions but operate under different,
regionally based policies and processes. The effect of
this is inconsistent types and levels of services provided
to managers and customers from one region to the next,
often causing them to “region shop.”
For
example, there is a human resources management (HRM)
office in each of the FAA’s nine regions. In addition, the
“line” offices (e.g., Air Traffic, Flight Standards and
Airway Facilities Divisions) also operate their own unique
HRM branch within each region, variously referenced as
“Resource Management” or “Administrative Services.” These
branches provide redundant HR services to their own
divisions and their field facility managers and employees.
Therefore, nationwide, there is a total of nine distinct
regional HRM divisions and 27 distinct branches, in
addition to the headquarters’ HR bureaucracy. Each branch
or division provides what should be similar services to
their customers, but the services are in fact
inconsistent, requiring different processes and resulting
in major duplication and overlap at great cost to the
American taxpayer. The FAA has not addressed these very
costly regional redundancies, and the costs are escalating
substantially every year with greater inefficiencies in
regional operations.
FAA
regional consolidation should be an integral part of the
agency’s efforts to become more productive and efficient.
With limited resources and funding, the FAA must address
the elimination of unnecessary bureaucratic layers, move
those employees to the field where they are needed,
thereby increasing the size of the workforce providing
services to citizens. In 1997, the National Civil Aviation
Review Commission estimated that consolidating from nine
to three FAA regions would have resulted in savings of
approximately $400M through FY 02.
The development of an actual implementation plan must be
required of the FAA in order to “reshape the organization”
to become more efficient. Therefore, we ask that this
Subcommittee direct the Administrator, in collaboration
with affected employee unions, to develop a plan for
restructuring/consolidation.
Thank you
for inviting PASS to testify today. We appreciate the
opportunity to speak on behalf of strong funding for the
FAA’s operations and facilities and equipment programs,
and to present our concerns and ideas. PASS looks forward
to working with this Subcommittee and the FAA on these
all-important reauthorization issues.
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