JOHN BARRY SMITHS PUBLIC ADDRESS
Barry Smith addresses to the media, experts [the FAA, the NTSB, Boeing and others] attorneys and politicians [the Congress and Senate].
Dear elected and appointed officials, manufacturer spokesman, reporters, and attorney, 12 November 1998. You are in my book. My "Wiring/Cargo Door" book. This email will be in it. It will all be in there. All our carefully thought out correspondence to and from each other will be in it. Can I do that? My web site of 1200 pages plus will be in the book. Official US government documents will be in my book. To write a book....I have a mental block about writing a 'book'. I need a Muse..and I believe it is power and that means government, manufacturer, media, and the law. So, gentlemen, lady, you are my Muse for my "Wiring/Cargo Door" book.
Where were we? Oh yes, real evidence in the style of high resolution color close up photograph of the forward midspan latch area of TWA 800 as seen in the NTSB wreckage reconstruction, photo below: Yes, the TWA 800 forward midspan latch has not been recovered, listed, examined nor hung on the NTSB wreckage reconstruction above. It's missing, along with the manual locking handle, eight viewing ports, overpressure relief door, torque tubes, and most of the outer skin of the forward cargo door.
Yes, an FAA aviation engineer from the Northwest Region said "The paint markings and structural deformation that you cite, do indicate an outward explosion, generally accepted to be caused by the explosion of the CWT" He is Neil Schalekamp, Manager, Propulsion & Mechanical Systems and Cabin Safety Branch Transport Standards Staff, FAA. Thank you, Neil, for agreeing with me. Or am I agreeing with you? Or have you changed your mind?
Yes, I'm using your own words and pictures and evidence to persuade you to my view. We agree on so much. We agree there was a center tank explosion. We agree it was not a missile or bomb involved. We agree that wiring is a problem in aviation especially in aging 747s with Poly X aromatic polyimide insulation type wiring. We agree NTSB wrote NTSB AAR 92/02 and NTSB AAR 90/01. We agree that NTSB believed that an electrical problem with an early model 747 caused the forward cargo door to open in flight causing explosive decompression which caused outward peeled skin and unusual paint markings in the cargo door area, a sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt data loss to the FDR for UAL 811. Do we agree it could have happened again? To TWA 800? Because the facts listed above match up TWA 800 and UAL 811?
Above is UAL 811 forward cargo door after recovery showing outward peeled skin in aft midspan latch area. The rupture area is larger than on TWA 800 because the eight bottom latches stayed latched while UAL 811 had all latches unlatch.
Did you know that both UAL 811 NTSB AAR reports do not state the latch status or condition of the two midspan latches? Only the bottom eight, just like Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit No. 15C, Report Number 97-82, Section 41/42 Joint, Forward Cargo Door, "Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached [along with pieces of the door itself] to the pins along the lower door.
UAL 811, NTSB AAR 92/02, "The cargo door and its associated hardware are designed to carry circumferential [hoop] loads arising from pressurization of the airplane. These loads are transmitted from the piano hinge at the top of the door, through the door itself, and into the eight latches located along the bottom of the door. The eight latches consist of eight latch pins attached to the lower door sill and eight latch cams attached to the bottom of the door. The cargo door also has two midspan latches located along the fore and aft sides of the door. "
"The forward mid-span latch pin was relatively undamaged. The aft mid-span latch pin had definite areas of damage. Both pins had wear areas where the cams would contact the pins during latching." "All eight lock sectors were found in the locked position--actually past the fully locked position." "All eight lower latch cams were found in a nearly unlatched position." AI 182 report is also silent on the status of the two midspan latches of the forward cargo door although it implies the bottom eight latches held on that door too. Here is Indian authority AI 182 description of forward cargo door as seen in video by remote vehicles:
"All cargo doors were found intact and attached to the fuselage structure except for the forward cargo door which had some fuselage and cargo floor attached. This door, located on the forward right side of the aircraft, was broken horizontally about one-quarter of the distance above the lower frame. The damage to the door and the fuselage skin near the door appeared to have been caused by an outward force. The fractured surface of the cargo door appeared to have been badly frayed."
PA 103 AAIB report is silent too but does state aft and bulk doors were locked but is mute on latch status of forward cargo door. What shall we assume is the ten latch status of the unreported forward cargo door? If same as latched it would have been reported like other two reported as latched, so assumption can be made the forward cargo door was unlatched and unreported. The dilemma can be easily resolved by an examination of the latches of the forward cargo door of PA 103 in the wreckage reconstruction at Farnborough. Could a US aviation official ask UK AAIB for that information?
There were four high time 747s that suffered hull ruptures forward of the wing on the right side in the forward cargo door area and all four accident reports omit any mention of the two midspan latches, yet talk at length about the bottom eight identical latches. That's eight latches and not a word on their post accident condition in all four of the reports. Curious,
And please don't present midspan latches as trivial. The electrical designers knew the importance of the two midspan latches by putting in a separate open or closed switch for each midspan latch, that's one for the forward and one for the aft. It would be worthwhile to do the 'lit or unlit bulb burnt filament' thing with those two bulbs. There is only one bulb and an open or closed switch for all bottom eight latches. That filament in the bulb should be checked also. It is possible to confirm or refute wiring/cargo door explanation with real evidence if discovered. So far, no refuting evidence has been presented.
An eight foot slice out of a curved pressurized fuselage with only one latch in the middle is holding back up to 8.9 PSI differential which on a 99 by 110 inch door is 96921 pounds on that whole door. TWA 800 is said by NTSB to have a 3.5 PSI differential at time of event. That's 38115 on that door. It's an outward opening non-plug door. What holds door in is a hinge all along the top nine feet, eight bottom latches for bottom nine feet and one midspan latch for each of the eight foot sides. Each midspan latch holds together eight feet of skin, four on each side, without benefit of locking sectors which were omitted in the design. Bottom eight latches have locking sectors, midspan latches don't.
And usually all ten of the latches curl around the ten latching pins and hold until intentionally released. Once in a while they don't. Actually twice officially in a while they didn't, PA 125 in 1987 and UAL 811 in 1989.
I'm saying they didn't hold for TWA 800 in 1996. The midspan latches, both of them, ruptured in flight. Here's a picture of the aft midspan latch area: Above is the outward petaled and peeled skin near midspan latch of TWA 800. The red paint markings match the forward midspan latch area.
And yet, the wiring/door explanation goes unconfirmed and uninvestigated by government or manufacturing authority. Why is that? Ah, readers, this is a book after all. Readers may ask, what did the government say when you showed them the pictures of the ruptures? A reader may ask, did you ask them to comment? Did you ask to meet with them? Were you polite? Did you use swear words? Did you capitalize whole words for emphasis? Did you avoid the evidence and talk about shadowy conspiracies? Or did you stick to official facts, data, and evidence?
All good questions. I did ask officials, manufacturer, lawyers, and media for comments, here, I'll do it right now, again: "Dear Government officials, elected and appointed, would you please comment on real physical NTSB evidence that appears to show outward explosions at the midspan latch areas of the forward cargo door of TWA 800?"
I was polite, I did ask to meet with them, I did not use swear words, I did not capitalize for emphasis, and I did stick to facts, data, and evidence.
Readers may ask, what did Boeing say when you showed them the pictures of the ruptures? Boeing thanked me for my interest in aviation safety and referred me to NTSB. I'll ask Boeing again, "Mr. Young of Boeing, would you please comment on real physical NTSB evidence that appears to show outward explosions at the midspan latch areas of the forward cargo door of TWA 800?"
Readers may ask, what did the media say when you showed them the pictures of the ruptures? Nothing yet. I'll ask again, "Mike Busch of AVweb, would you please comment on real physical NTSB evidence that appears to show outward explosions at the midspan latch areas of the forward cargo door of TWA 800?"
Jane Garvey recently said, "The Federal Aviation Administration [FAA] has one job: aviation safety." " Examples include the extensive wiring inspections ordered in recent years in passenger planes and the FAAs recent acceleration of an ongoing fire safety program to improve airplane insulation and save lives. There also is the long running aging airplane program and the FAAs new aging-airplane-systems program that could lead to life limits on key aircraft systems, such as wiring." Jane Garvey, FAA Administrator, 10 Nov 98.
I ask FAA safety officials, would you comment on the bare conductor under the aromatic polyimide insulation found in the actual wreckage of TWA 800 cargo door area which is the same area as another fatal early 747 hull rupture forward of the wing on the right side, UAL 811?
"The Systems Exhibit 9A page 116 of Pubic Docket 516A, TWA 800: "Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A have numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found."
Thank you, government officials and manufacturer, for reading my web site as shown by the statistics about the Wiring/Cargo Door website, www.corazon.com. The attached excerpt of stats reveal 213 'endusers' from FAA have accessed it and seven from NTSB. Boeing has accessed it 2901 times in 35 days. [Mr. Young, what are you looking for? May I help you find it?] The site received 85000 hits from domains from all over the world.
My goal is to prevent death by preventing airplane accidents by preventing hull ruptures forward of the wing on the right side in flight on early 747s by preventing ruptures at the midspan latches of the forward cargo door. The doors must be made into plug type or sealed and that is up to the manufacturer, Boeing, and its subcontractor, Northrop Grumman. They will only act when FAA directs them to via an Airworthiness Directive. The AD may be issued after recommendations by NTSB. NTSB may make the recommendation after confirming the probable cause of an accident. The probable cause may be made after examination of the evidence, such as a high resolution pictures of the outward rupture explosions at the midspan latches of the forward cargo door on the wreckage of TWA 800.
I offer to meet with Boeing officials to discuss this evidence and present my nine years of research and conclusions for critique. I offer to meet with government aviation safety representatives to discuss this evidence and the implications.
John Barry Smith
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135 certificate holder. US Navy reconnaissance navigator, RA-5C 650 hours. US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours. Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy. Retired US Army Major. Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours. Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C