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|
The
SR 111 Aide-memoire
(by IASA Australasia) |
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|
Issues
|
Commentary
|
| Number of wiring
incidents world-wide? |
Which are related
to suspect wiring insulation |
| Metallized Mylar
Blankets |
FAA testing was
ridiculously inadequate
How long to swap out of approx 12,000 aircraft? |
| STC Issues [such
as with SR 111 Inflight Entertainment System] |
How many
more dud STC’s have been issued?
Who wears
responsibility for approving wiring to MD11 Flight Deck Bus?
Was MD11 simulator electrically modified to reflect the change?
Were crew manuals and checklists modified to reflect new
considerations for smoke (wrt IFE on Flight-Deck Bus)? |
| The inadequate
two-piece smoke masks and goggles |
Will not seal
properly [beards and spectacles] and mist up. Must protect eyes from toxic
smoke effects and retain maximum peripheral vision.
Full-face masks should be standard [can be
ventilated to stop misting] |
| Inadequate
emergency cockpit flood-lighting
(that causes distracting internal
reflections) |
Causes internal
reflections off cockpit windows
A forehead mounted
directional focused light is required [mounts atop F/Face smoke-mask or is
incorporated into it] |
| DFDR and CVR data |
Last 30 mins of
[and subsequent] Data should be automatically transmitted to Ground via
dedicated satellite transponder channels as soon as a crew selects and squawks
PAN or Mayday TPDR code 7700. |
| Gases generated
by aromatic polyimide burning? |
Their toxicity?
[includes phosgene – deadly] |
| Gases generated
by insulation blankets burning? |
Toxicity? |
| Nitrogen inerting |
Should be
an option for a sealed cockpit [to dampen fires]
See:
http://www.geocities.com/Eureka/Concourse/7349/responses.html |
| The Virgin Bus
[a sensible solution to fire-in-the-air] and perhaps an alternative to swapping
out Kapton wire? |
See separate Email
submission or Annex S or
http://www.geocities.com/Eureka/Concourse/7349/virgin.html
Would reassure both Flight and Cabin Crews (for
whom this potentially catastrophic emergency is now a daily threat) |
| Smoke-in-cockpit
checklists |
Existing trouble-shooting
checklists are dangerous invitations to a fire developing, particularly
if mylar blankets are present and circuit-breakers are reset (or such devices
as the MD11 smoke/Elec switch are generic) |
| Directives to
crews [re what to do in smoke situations] |
Removes doubt.
Removes
crew concern about being criticized professionally for over-reacting. |
| Cockpit fire extinguishers |
Are they
adequate to cope with powered elec fires?
Who operates
them? The absent Flight Engineer?
How many in cockpit/how many back aft?
Halon or BCF? Or something better? |
| The Missing Third
Crew Member |
Who can be sent
down the back to check reports?
What about the situation when a crew-member is overcome
by smoke? [leaving one pilot on his lonesome]
The value of the third man position for line training. |
| Simulator Drills |
Airline
Pilot Forums agree that these are currently inefficient, confusing and very
variable from one type to another. A number of examples given on:
http://www.geocities.com/Eureka/Concourse/7349/index.html |
| Cockpit automation |
Software bugs?
Auto
systems can and will breakdown when systemic electrical failures occur.
System interrelationships and interdependencies are getting beyond flight-crew
comprehension (see http://pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/Forum3/HTML/000132.html) …and there
are many other examples in that forum. |
| Forcing the issue
with airlines, manufacturers and FAA (educate the cost-bearers who stand
to lose most – the insurance underwriters) |
- Educate the Insurance underwriters and actuaries about the
geriatric airliner threat [including faulty wiring, insulation, deadly checklists, two-man
crews and the competition-caused cost-cutting wrought by deregulation].
- Educate public about fact that military has abandoned Kapton
insulation [and the above factors]
|
| Siteing
of standby flight instruments? |
Are they scattered
all over the MD11 panel or tucked away in dark corners? eg MD11 AH is singularly
central low down on fwd centre console. |
| How safe are pilots’
oxy regulators, valves, bottles etc in case of an E/E bay or Flt Deck fire? |
The possibility
of pilot’s oxy supply being compromised in (or feeding) an E/E bay
fire is ……..? [possible/significant/unlikely ……etc] |
| Door chafeing
of ceiling wires [were wires adjacent to IFE wiring?] |
Door circuits
are armed but wires should be dormant inflight. However, which wires were
found chafed [i.e. what systems were they part of? The IFE?] |
| The impact of
the "Insurance factor" on airlines and manufacturers |
The best chance
of achieving a meaningful result is for the insurance underwriters to take
a big claims hit for the Swissair accident. Victims should be able to successfully
prove manufacturer, FAA and airline negligence over the blanket lining insulation,
the Kapton wiring, the inappropriately designed checklists, poor cockpit
emergency lighting, the misbegotten smoke/elec/air switch and the poor standard
of pilot’s smoke masks and goggles. |
| The "ditchability"
of large underwing turbofans |
They’re not
a survivable ditching proposition – so it’s another strong case
for adopting the Virgin Bus as a preferred alternative to allowing catastrophic
fires to develop in mid-oceanic flight. |
| The vulnerability
of batteries to being flattened by a progressive electrical wiring malfunction
such as a massive short [and, in the event of this, the unlikelihood of
being able to reset a tripped GEN during rotation of the Smk/Elec switch
or being able tocontinue to fly in IMC/night] |
Possibly
a factor in SR 111 [see:
http://www.geocities.com/Eureka/Concourse/7349/solution.html
http://www.geocities.com/Eureka/Concourse/7349/switcher.html
|
| The FAA track
record? |
Cover-up or incompetence?
[can either be proved?] Just how concerned are they about sr111 mark two?
And its flow-on effect on the FAA? |
| The EVAS system
[Would it make a difference?] |
Only if the fire
was controllable. |
| Alternatives to
EVAS |
See
Annex T (The Impaired Vision Flight Safety Device Development Proposition) |
| What part does
deregulation play in FAA, airline and public attitudes? |
Has safety been
compromised on the altar of cheaper fares and industry development? Has
the public subconsciously accepted a precarious balance between remote risk
and low-fare rewards? |
