The SR 111 Aide-memoire
(by IASA Australasia)
|Number of wiring incidents world-wide?||Which are related to suspect wiring insulation|
|Metallized Mylar Blankets||FAA testing was
How long to swap out of approx 12,000 aircraft?
|STC Issues [such as with SR 111 Inflight Entertainment System]||How many
more dud STCs have been issued?
Who wears responsibility for approving wiring to MD11 Flight Deck Bus?
Was MD11 simulator electrically modified to reflect the change?
Were crew manuals and checklists modified to reflect new considerations for smoke (wrt IFE on Flight-Deck Bus)?
|The inadequate two-piece smoke masks and goggles||Will not seal
properly [beards and spectacles] and mist up. Must protect eyes from toxic
smoke effects and retain maximum peripheral vision.
Full-face masks should be standard [can be ventilated to stop misting]
emergency cockpit flood-lighting
(that causes distracting internal reflections)
reflections off cockpit windows
A forehead mounted directional focused light is required [mounts atop F/Face smoke-mask or is incorporated into it]
|DFDR and CVR data||Last 30 mins of [and subsequent] Data should be automatically transmitted to Ground via dedicated satellite transponder channels as soon as a crew selects and squawks PAN or Mayday TPDR code 7700.|
|Gases generated by aromatic polyimide burning?||Their toxicity? [includes phosgene deadly]|
|Gases generated by insulation blankets burning?||Toxicity?|
|Nitrogen inerting||Should be
an option for a sealed cockpit [to dampen fires]
|The Virgin Bus [a sensible solution to fire-in-the-air] and perhaps an alternative to swapping out Kapton wire?||See separate Email
submission or Annex S or
Would reassure both Flight and Cabin Crews (for whom this potentially catastrophic emergency is now a daily threat)
|Smoke-in-cockpit checklists||Existing trouble-shooting checklists are dangerous invitations to a fire developing, particularly if mylar blankets are present and circuit-breakers are reset (or such devices as the MD11 smoke/Elec switch are generic)|
|Directives to crews [re what to do in smoke situations]||Removes doubt.
Removes crew concern about being criticized professionally for over-reacting.
|Cockpit fire extinguishers||Are they
adequate to cope with powered elec fires?
Who operates them? The absent Flight Engineer?
How many in cockpit/how many back aft?
Halon or BCF? Or something better?
|The Missing Third Crew Member||Who can be sent
down the back to check reports?
What about the situation when a crew-member is overcome by smoke? [leaving one pilot on his lonesome]
The value of the third man position for line training.
|Simulator Drills||Airline Pilot Forums agree that these are currently inefficient, confusing and very variable from one type to another. A number of examples given on:|
|Cockpit automation||Software bugs?
Auto systems can and will breakdown when systemic electrical failures occur.
System interrelationships and interdependencies are getting beyond flight-crew comprehension (see http://pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/Forum3/HTML/000132.html) and there are many other examples in that forum.
|Forcing the issue with airlines, manufacturers and FAA (educate the cost-bearers who stand to lose most the insurance underwriters)||
|Siteing of standby flight instruments?||Are they scattered all over the MD11 panel or tucked away in dark corners? eg MD11 AH is singularly central low down on fwd centre console.|
|How safe are pilots oxy regulators, valves, bottles etc in case of an E/E bay or Flt Deck fire?||The possibility of pilots oxy supply being compromised in (or feeding) an E/E bay fire is ..? [possible/significant/unlikely etc]|
|Door chafeing of ceiling wires [were wires adjacent to IFE wiring?]||Door circuits are armed but wires should be dormant inflight. However, which wires were found chafed [i.e. what systems were they part of? The IFE?]|
|The impact of the "Insurance factor" on airlines and manufacturers||The best chance of achieving a meaningful result is for the insurance underwriters to take a big claims hit for the Swissair accident. Victims should be able to successfully prove manufacturer, FAA and airline negligence over the blanket lining insulation, the Kapton wiring, the inappropriately designed checklists, poor cockpit emergency lighting, the misbegotten smoke/elec/air switch and the poor standard of pilots smoke masks and goggles.|
|The "ditchability" of large underwing turbofans||Theyre not a survivable ditching proposition so its another strong case for adopting the Virgin Bus as a preferred alternative to allowing catastrophic fires to develop in mid-oceanic flight.|
|The vulnerability of batteries to being flattened by a progressive electrical wiring malfunction such as a massive short [and, in the event of this, the unlikelihood of being able to reset a tripped GEN during rotation of the Smk/Elec switch or being able tocontinue to fly in IMC/night]||Possibly a factor in SR 111 [see:|
|The FAA track record?||Cover-up or incompetence? [can either be proved?] Just how concerned are they about sr111 mark two? And its flow-on effect on the FAA?|
|The EVAS system [Would it make a difference?]||Only if the fire was controllable.|
|Alternatives to EVAS||See Annex T (The Impaired Vision Flight Safety Device Development Proposition)|
|What part does deregulation play in FAA, airline and public attitudes?||Has safety been compromised on the altar of cheaper fares and industry development? Has the public subconsciously accepted a precarious balance between remote risk and low-fare rewards?|
List of Annexes