Doomed flight originated in Mac

The Leaking of Internal Airline Safety Bulletins

 
Attention please . . . are you on the right plane?

28may05

YOUR attention please, ladies and gentlemen. The ground staff in Brisbane aren't trained to close the cargo hatch of this aircraft but don't worry – the

flight attendant will have a look before we take off.

You might want to check that you're on the right plane, though, because we've recently had two cases of passengers being put on the wrong one. In fact a woman ended up in Maryborough, instead of Hervey Bay.

And when a crucial check light on the control panel failed to illuminate it was comforting that the captain said: "We know the system is working, otherwise we would be off the runway by now."

Mistakes, glitches and occasionally serious safety lapses are daily fare for Sunshine Express Airlines – the Maroochydore-based carrier that boasts former ironman Grant Kenny as a director and shareholder, and which will fly an estimated 95,000 people this year.

In the three months to March 1 this year, 78 "occurrences" were documented by the airline's safety department, approaching an average of six a week.

Regulator the Civil Aviation Safety Authority considers this entirely unremarkable and insists Sunshine Express's safety record is typical of an operation of its size.

Yet, copies of the airline's in-house safety bulletin obtained by The Courier-Mail open a window on the rarely seen tensions that play out in regional airlines as staff struggle to meet the competing demands of safety, tight schedules and wafer-thin cost margins.

The stakes have been thrown into sharp relief by the May 7 Metroliner tragedy near Lockhart River which killed 15 people, and revelations that two former pilots with Brisbane-based carrier Transair had tried to alert civil aviation authorities of their doubts about the airline's safety ahead of the crash.

Sunshine Express chief executive Phil Laffer issued a statement strongly defending its approach to improving safety and preventing accidents.

"The airline does not see the merit in debating safety issues in the mass media," he said.

In fairness to Sunshine Express, CASA spokesman Peter Gibson pointed out that the number of incidents written up in its March-April 2005 safety bulletin was not in itself of concern. The total of 78 was "fairly typical for that size of operation . . . you could say average, normal".

In fact, Sunshine Express was to be congratulated for being so open about its safety record.

"We view the publication of information like this incredibly positively," Mr Gibson said. "Our policy is to encourage airlines to do it. It's all about sharing information and knowledge when things go wrong."

The mix-up which allowed two passengers to separately board the wrong aircraft is a case in point.

"In both incidents, the aircraft was running late, the crew were in a hurry to make up time and both passengers showed up at the boarding gate with a stapled boarding pass requiring a manual boarding," the safety bulletin reported.

"In neither case was the boarding pass checked for the proper flight number. Nor was the computer information checked against the manifest.

"As a result, one passenger was allowed to fly from Brisbane to Maryborough before being detected and the other passenger was detected while still on the ramp because the correct passenger with that seat allocation was running late. Not only is this against company policy, it is also a breach of security."

In another incident, Sunshine Express personnel complained that ground staff in Brisbane did not know how to close some aircraft cargo doors. While it was the responsibility of the ground services contractors to provide "on-the-job training", the safety bulletin noted that standard operating procedure required the duty flight attendant to "visually check that the pogo stick had been correctly stowed and that the ground staff have closed the cargo doors".

"If these checks are conducted then the ground staff can always be further directed, as was the case in this instance," the airline said.

After the right "beta" light failed to illuminate in the cockpit as a Sunshine Express service rolled into Coffs Harbour, the concerned pilot who had the fault repaired contacted the crew which had last taken the aircraft out. The indicator is crucial, because when lit it shows that it is safe for the pilots to reverse the engines on landing, aviation sources say.

"I called the previous FO (first officer) to inquire about the fault," the pilot reported.

"The FO advised that the previous captain('s) . . . response was: 'We know the system is working, otherwise we would be off the runway by now'."

Clearly dismayed, the pilot went on: "That sort of attitude is unsafe and unprofessional. I believe the captain continued flying for commercial reasons rather than ground the airplane for safety."

In an attached summary of its subsequent safety investigation, Sunshine Express said: "The captain stated that it was a rushed process and that he should have thought more clearly about the implications of the failed light."

Mr Laffer said Sunshine Express was fully committed to and proud of its safety culture.

The leaking of its safety bulletins "jeopardizes the trust in this system and may damage the safety-focused culture that the airline has been tirelessly trying to promote", he said.

link