12.1.5 Brake Servo Valve Case
| An alloy part, identified as the brake servo valve case,
from the left main landing gear, was found at Slab 175 level. This
part was sooted and had clearly been overheated. It had impact deformation.
Part found at Slab 175 level
|
12.1.6 Piece of Concrete and Signs of Explosion
Signs of an explosion and a piece of concrete torn from the runway were
found at the Slab 181 level. The piece of concrete was about one centimetre
thick, 10 centimetres wide and 25 to 30 centimetres long. Found intact,
it was later broken in two.
12.1.7 Lighting
The runway edge light at the Slab 293 level (about 2 800 m from the origin)
was broken and small pieces of the light were found nearby. Ground marks
showed that this light was broken by the Concordeıs left main landing
gear.
12.1.8 Tyre tracks

Irregular marks made by the left landing gear were noted up to the
broken light (around 2 800 metres).
After this point, the marks became intermittent then disappeared
at about 2 830 m from the runway threshold.
| From Slab 161 level to Slab 232 level, that is between
1 807 and 2 340 m, the mark of a flat tyre with an incomplete tread
was observed.
This mark was parallel to the runway axis (at about 3.8 m) then
diverged at about 2 200 metres.
When this mark disappeared at about 2 340 m, its displacement from
the centreline was about 8 m. This corresponded to the right front
tyre of the aircraftıs left landing gear.
Mark left by the left truck and broken light
|
12.1.9 Soot Deposit
Traces of soot, produced by incomplete combustion of kerosene, were apparent
on the runway 1 860 m onward from the origin (Slab 168). These were large
and dense up to 2 300 m and then became less dense and rich in carbon
up to taxiway S4, at 2 770 metres. The traces, which were on average 7
m wide, were initially centred on the damaged wheel ground mark and progressed
to a position corresponding to the far left of the aircraft.

Slab 202
A further sooted area was apparent after taxiway S4 up to the broken
edge light.

Slab 290
Between Slabs 310 and 340
The grass was burnt adjacent to the runway edge, between 2 902 and 3
165 metres. This area, also featuring soot deposits, indicated that there
was an extensive flame after the aircraft became airborne.
12.2 Between Runway 26 Right and the Site of the Accident
In the 1 000 m after the end of the runway, along the extended centreline,
the following elements were identified:
- a piece of fire-damaged fuel tank,
- the tail cone anti-collision light,
- a severely fire-damaged inspection panel from the wing lower surface,
- seven inspection panels identified as coming from the upper surface
of the left wing dry bay, with no signs of fire,
From 1 000 to 2 500 m after the end of the runway:
- an inspection panel identified as also coming from the upper surface
of the left wing dry bay, showing no signs of fire,
- a fire-damaged piece of duct,
- fire-damaged structural parts that appear to have come from the aircraft
tail cone.
Burn marks on the ground were visible where certain items of debris were
found, particularly where the tar had melted adjacent to items found on
the roofs of buildings in the freight zone. A wheat field was damaged
by fire 2 500 m from end of the runway.
Beyond this point, the following was noted:
- wo hydraulic shutoff valves, one damaged by fire,
- two lower inspection panels from the engine nacelle, one melted, the
other intact,
- debris from the wings, in particular fuel tank parts,
- a fire-damaged hydraulic line.
Leading up to the crash site, many small pieces of metal, honeycomb components,
pieces of riveted structure and parts of the rear fuselage, were found.
Most of these parts show traces of fire and their distribution was continuous
along the aircraftıs track.
12.3 The Accident Site
12.3.1 Description of Site and Plan
The crash occurred south-west of Paris Charles de Gaulle airport at about
9 500 m from the threshold of runway 26R in a level area. The altitude
of the area is 400 feet. The wreckage was at the intersection of the N17
and the D902 roads.
BEA/IGN/FLEXIMAGE image, Aerial photo of the accident area
The crash site was divided into a grid. The various areas were referenced
to this grid.

Map showing aircraft wreckage distribution at the crash site

Aerial view showing grid
Examination of the site showed that the aircraft had struck the ground
on heading 120° left, with little horizontal speed. After the impact,
it broke and spread generally to the south, with the aircraft upright.
The wreckage was extensively burnt. Only the front parts of the aircraft,
found mainly in areas C3, D4 and Z4 escaped the ground fire, together
with a few pieces of the fuselage scattered over the site. Most of the
wreckage, with the exception of the cockpit, remained within a rectangle
measuring a hundred metres long by fifty metres wide (areas CB2, D3 and
E3).
Signs of ground impact were found to the north of the site at the intersection
of areas A and B. There was a row of trees about three metres high, oriented
east to west, then a crater at the bottom of which was rear tank No. 11.
Pieces of engine air intake were found half-buried at A3 and signs of
ground impact were apparent at A3 and CB2-North. Wheel N° 6 was embedded
in the ground.

Ground impact marks
At B3, an impact mark was visible in the asphalt. Forward parts of the
aircraft were in a line embedded in the earth, including the front left
door sill and a hinge from the aircraftıs droop nose. Near these items
of debris, the grass was sparse.
Aerial view showing location of the main parts
The hotel located at CB2-North was almost entirely flattened. The lower
parts of the left and right main landing gears were close to the initial
impact marks.
The outer part of the left wing, with the outer elevons still attached,
was found melted on the ground. Nearby was the inner part of the wing
with the left dry bay with engines 1 and 2 still attached. The rudder
was found between these two parts. The fin was resting on the dry bay.
The left inner elevon was found beneath the two engines, still linked
to part of the wing (this assembly is normally located between the left
powerplants and the fuselage). The engines were resting on a water tank
1.5 m in height. Many wing parts were found nearby, including the lower
surfaces of tanks 6 and 10.
The left main landing gear leg, still connected to its side strut, was
found at CB2-South. Examination of the strut's locking mechanism showed
that the landing gear was down and locked at the time of impact.
In the western area of the CB2-South rectangle, part of the ground floor
of the hotel was still standing. A large number of items of debris from
the building were found in the eastern area.
At C3, a large number of parts belonging to the cockpit had impacted
an electric power transformer. The pilots' seats, the throttle levers
and the autopilot control unit were found at this point. The seven landing
gear ground lock pins were found with their stowage bag.
Next to this there was a section of the fuselage in which it was possible
to recognise the aisle between cockpit and cabin. From this wreckage the
QAR and the main components of the flight crew instrument panels were
extracted (description follows).
Nearby, the nose landing gear was found, extended.
The main components of the Concorde's structure were found at D3 and
E3, along the axis of the wreckage scatter. The passenger cabin was identifiable
from pieces of fuselage, together with a large number of items of debris
from the hotel. The passenger seats and most of the victims were found
in these areas. The hydraulic tanks normally located in the rear hold
and the CVR were found at E3 and the radio altimeters installed in the
forward hold were found at D3. The structures of the main landing gear
wheel well were grouped together at the intersection of areas D3 and E3,
near the landing gear legs.
The right dry bay with engines 3 and 4 still partially attached was found
at D3, to the right of the passenger cabin. Nearby, a large number of
pieces of the right wing were found, including the three PFCU's that control
the right elevons. The left main landing gear attachment structure was
found to the left of the passenger cabin.
The right main landing gear attachment structure and a melted piece of
the right wing were found at E3, to the right of the passenger cabin.
Pieces of fuselage were found in the peripheral areas H and I and in
Z2.
12.3.2 Instrument Indications
The emergency landing gear extension selector on the rear of the flight
deck centre console was not selected. The following indications were noted
on the instruments found on the central panel:
Engine speed indicators:
| Engine 1
| Engine 2
| Engine 3
| Engine 4
|
N1
| Absent
| Absent
| 52 %
| 58 %
|
N2
| 28 %
| 4 %
| 80 %
| 85 %
|
Fuel Flow indicators: For engine 4, a (yellow) pre-set display showed
19.6 kg/h x 1000.
| Engine 1
| Engine 2
| Engine 3
| Engine 4
|
FF
| 0
| Burnt
| Burnt
| Close to 0
|
EGT indicators:
| Engine 1
| Engine 2
| Engine 3
| Engine 4
|
EGT
| 580°C
| 220°C
| 600°C
| 600°C
|
Brake pressure indicator: 400 Psi left and 1,500 Psi right.
AJ indicators: unreadable, the needles were missing for engines 3 and
4.
- one Primary Nozzle Area Indicator, S/N AA115
- one unidentified and unreadable temperature indicator.
On the FO instrument panel, the following items were noted:
- the Nose/Visor lever was in the "Down" position
- the landing gear selector was towards the "Down" position, past the
gate
- on the rudder position indicator (damaged on impact), the rudder indicators
were at 20° left for the upper control surface and 12°
right for the lower control surface on "G" (Green). The indicators for
the elevons were on "M" (Mechanical) and provided no information
- the airspeed shown on the airspeed indicator was 99 Kt, "STBY" flag,
and V2 bug was on 230 kt
- HSI heading 105°, ADI 30° roll to the left and 32° nose down. Vz
1 800 ft/min, altimeter - 240 feet "STBY" flag, radio altimeter unreadable,
VOR1 028°, VOR2 038°
- FD switch on number 2
- NAV INS2
- clock on 14 hours 45 UTC
Instrument panel
On the Captain's instrument panel, the following items were noted:
- HSI heading 105°, ADI 15° roll to the left and 75° nose down, standby
horizon 90° roll to the left and 18° nose-up, Vz 1 200 ft/min, altimeter
- 250 feet STBY, radio altimeter on 0, angle of attack indicator unreadable,
RMI ADF heading 100°
- trim indicator on 54.3 %
- TCAS broken
On the coaming the following items were noted:
- auto-throttle 1 and 2: Off
- autopilot 1 and 2: Off
- flight director 1 and 2: Off
- auto-throttle, selected speed 285 kt
- altitude selected 9 500 feet
- left display, heading 329°, course 285°
- right display, heading 338°, course 287°
On the overhead panel, the following items were noted:
- servo-control hydraulic selectors on "Normal"
- Engine Flight Rating switches: No. 1 CRZ, No. 2, 3 and 4 CMB
- Auto Ignition 1, 2 and 3 switches "On", n° 4 melted
- auto-throttle 1, 2, 3 and 4 switches "On"
- Engine Rating Mode switches 1, 2, 3 and 4 on "Take-Off"
- HP Valve selector switches damaged and on positions: 1 "Open", 2 broken,
3 "Shut", 4 "Open"
- engine shutdown/fire handle No. 2 pulled and pointing upwards
- extinguisher bottle fired indicators unreadable
- flying control electrical system selectors:
| 1
| 2
|
Auto stab
| Unreadable
| Pitch axis: "Off"
Roll axis: unreadable
Yaw axis: "Off"
|
Artificial feel
| Blue circuit
Pitch axis: "Off"
Roll axis: unreadable
Yaw axis: "Up"
| Green circuit
Pitch axis: "Off"
Roll axis: "Off"
Yaw axis: "Off"
|
Electric trim
| "Off"
| "Off"
|
- inverter controls difficult to read, with the following possible positions:
- blue inverter on "Power Off" and control broken
- green inverter on "Off"
- flight control mode selectors damaged, in the following possible positions:
- outer and middle elevon on "Mech" (Mechanical)
- inner elevon on "Green"
- rudder on "Blue"
- anti-stall 1 and 2 unreadable
The warning panel was destroyed, separated from the rest of the upper panel
and most of the covers and bulbs were missing.
- fire loop selectors: 1 "both", 2 "loop A", 3 "loop B", 4 "neutral",
switch twisted and blocked
On the flight engineer's left panel, the following items were noted:
| Engine 1
| Engine 2
| Engine 3
| Engine 4
|
P7 indicators
| 18 Psi
| 12 Psi
| 18 Psi
| 18 Psi
|
The rest of the right part of this panel was unreadable. The air intakes
panel was not read at the site.
On the flight engineer's upper left panel, the following items were noted:
- Engine Control Schedule function: selector on "Flyover", switch blocked
on "HI"
- brakes hydraulic pressure: 6 000 Psi with flag
- brakes fan switch on "On"
- clock stopped at 14 hours 45 UTC
- brake temperature: 170 °C, pushbutton No. 3 crushed and deformed
| Engine 1
| Engine 2
| Engine 3
| Engine 4
|
secondary nozzle indicators
| 0°
| 15°
| 5°
| broken
|
The pressurisation system indications featured on this panel were not
read out at the site.
On the flight engineer's central upper panel (fuel and air conditioning),
the following items were noted:
Tank 9
- indicated quantity of fuel "11 t",
- left pump on "Auto", right pump on "On"
- main left Inlet Valve on "Shut" (free movement of the switch which has
no locking device), Override on "O/ride"
- main right Inlet Valve on "Auto", Override on "Off"
Tank 10
- indicated quantity of fuel "12 t",
- left pump on "Off", switch damaged, right pump on "Auto"
Tank 5A
- indicated quantity of fuel "2.4 t",
- two pumps on "On"
Tank 7A
- indicated quantity of fuel "2.2 t"
- two pumps on "On"
Also
- Standby Inlet Valves 5, 6 and 1 on "Open", 2 on "Shut"
- Standby Inlet Valves 3, 4, 10 and 7 on "Shut", 8 on "Open"
- Jettison tank switches 1 and 3 in intermediate position, 4 on "Open",
2 on "Shut"
- Master Jettison and Trim Pipe Drain switches unreadable
On the flight engineer's central panel (fuel), the following items were
noted:
Tank 5
- indicated quantity of fuel "2 t"
- pump switches unreadable
Tank 6
- indicated quantity of fuel "4.6 t"
- left pump switch unreadable, right pump switch on "On"
Tank 1
- indicated quantity of fuel "4.2 t"
- main pump on "On", STBY1 on "On", STBY2 on "Off"
Tank 2
- indicated quantity of fuel "0.1 t"
- three pumps on "On"
Tank 7
- indicated quantity of fuel "6.6 t"
- pump switches unreadable
Tank 8
- indicated quantity of fuel "12.8 t"
- two pumps on "On", right pump switch damaged
Tank 3
- indicated quantity of fuel "4.3 t",
- pump switches unreadable
Tank 4
- indicated quantity of fuel "4.3 t"
- pump switches unreadable
Tank 11
- indicated quantity of fuel "10 t"
- left hydraulic pump on "Auto", right on "Off"
- position of electric pumps unreadable
- main left Inlet Valve on "Shut", Override unreadable
- main right Inlet Valve and Override unreadable
FQIP (Fuel Quantity Indicator Panel) had the following pre-setting indications:
- ZFW (Zero Fuel Weight): 91.9 t
- CG 52.29 %,
- "Main" lane
- otal Contents indicator: 78.8 t with flag
On the flight engineer's right upper panel (electrical and hydraulic
generation), the following items were noted:
Green Circuit
- Level below zero with flag
- Shut Off Valve indicators of pumps 1 and 2 with flags
- hydraulic pumps 1 and 2 indicators on "On"
- hydraulic pumps 1 and 2 switches on "On"
- hydraulic pressure 2 000 Psi with flag
Yellow Circuit
- "6 US Gal" level with flag
- Shut Off Valve indicators of pumps 2 and 4 with flags
- hydraulic pumps 2 and 4 indicators on "On"
- pump selector switches 2 on "Auto", pump 4 on "On"
- pressure unreadable
Blue Circuit
- "2.7 US Gal" level with flag
- Shut Off Valve indicators of pumps 3 and 4 with flags scratched
- hydraulic pumps 3 and 4 indicators on "On"
- pump selector switch 3 on "Off", pump 4 on "On"
- hydraulic pressure 6 000 Psi with flag
Also
- "Yellow Pump" switch on "Normal"
- IDG 1, 2 and 3 indicators unreadable, 4 on "60 KW"
- all alternator switches on "On"
On the flight engineer's right side panel (electrical generation), which
was heavily damaged and burnt, only the following items providing information
were noted:
- transformer rectifier unit (TRU) ammeters: 1 burnt "0", 2 broken
"0", 3 "30A", 4 broken "70A"
- TRU selectors: TR1 unreadable, TR2 on "Normal", TR3 on "Isol", TR4
selector missing
- Eng 1 & 4 and Eng 2 & 3 nozzle safety switches on "Normal"
but damaged on impact
- fuel tank pressure: "0" (touching red index)
On the flight engineer's lower right panel, which was heavily damaged
and burnt, the following items were noted:
- passenger oxygen pressure: 40 Psi with flag
- crew oxygen pressure indicator damaged, indicating "0"
- oxygen selector missing
- four fire extinguisher cartridge indicators: "Full"
- extinguisher check selector unreadable
12.3.3 Examination of Engines
Secondary exhaust nozzles
| General view of engine no. 4 upper secondary exhaust
nozzle
|
The upper secondary exhaust nozzles were still in place on engines 1, 2,
4 and separated from the nozzle structure on engine 3. The lower secondary
exhaust nozzles were separated from the structure and three of them were
found intact. The upper actuators from engines 2 and 4 were attached to
the structure and to the nozzles. The lower actuators were found at the
site with the exception of that of engine 3.
Primary exhaust nozzles

Engine no. 2 primary exhaust nozzles
The primary exhaust nozzle from engine 3 was separated from the structure
of the secondary nozzle. The latter was torn away from the rest of the
engine. The nozzles from engines 1, 2 and 4 were in place but flattened
by the impact with the ground.
General findings
The primary and secondary nozzles showed no signs of overheat on any
of the engines. Black marks were visible on the inner panels of the engine
1 nozzles. Traces of soot were also found on the upper right part of the
structure of the engine 2 nozzles. No trace of damage caused by an uncontained
engine burst was noted.
The position of engines 1 and 2 nozzles was about 21°, a position compatible
with the takeoff phase or the shutdown of an engine. The position of the
engines 3 and 4 nozzles was 0°.
Examination of engine no. 2 appears to indicate a negligible N1 before
impact. The rotor of the LP compressor of engine no. 1 apparently made
less than a quarter of a revolution after the impact before being stopped
by the casing being crushed.

Engine no. 1 LP compressor
Engines 1 and 2 showed signs of damage (FOD) by a soft object on the
LP compressor rotor blades. Engine 1 also showed signs of FOD by a hard
object. The damage found on engines 3 and 4 showed that they hit the ground
with an N1 much higher than that of engine no. 1.
None of the engines showed signs of any fire occurring before the crash.
12.3.4 Examination of Wheels and Tyres
Wheel number 1
The entire wheel was burnt. The tyre, although burnt, showed no abnormal
absence of material before impact at the accident site. There was black
powder, the residue of combustion, on the base of the wheel. No trace
of fire prior to the crash was observed.
The two half rims appeared to be intact.
The brake pack was separated from the wheel, being found about two metres
away in an area affected by fire. It was covered with a deposit of soot.
Wheel number 2
The tyre was damaged by fire. The two beads were not linked by the tread.
The outer bead of the tyre was complete and almost intact. The inner bead
was broken and the metal wires of the bead cores were exposed and broken
at the same point, characteristic of overload bursting on impact. The
wire's protective rubber was burnt.
The sides showed local ruptures oriented at about 45°, this being characteristic
of lateral overload.
There was an abnormal lack of material at the site. The black material
which is left after the rubber combustion that would have corresponded
to the volume missing at the base of the tyre could not be found.
The two half rims seemed to be complete.
The wheel coloration was still blue, which seems to indicate that it
had not suffered from fire prior to the crash.
The brake pack was in place on the wheel axle.
Wheel number 5
The tyre showed no abnormal lack of material. It had a static rupture
characteristic of overload. The entire wheel appeared normal except for
the part exposed to the ground fire where the tread had been superficially
burnt. This wheel did not suffer from fire during flight.
The two half rims seemed to be complete.
The brake pack was in place in the wheel.
Wheel number 6
The tyre showed no abnormal lack of material. It had a static rupture
characteristic of overload. The entire wheel had a normal appearance,
without traces of burning.
The two half rims seemed to be complete.
The brake pack was in place in the wheel.
Link to "FOR WANT OF A SPACER"
|