SAFETY DEFICIENCY

On two recent occasions the Civil Aviation Safety Authority has found it necessary to specifically mandate operator compliance with an aircraft manufacturer's airworthiness recommendation contained in a Service Bulletin, even though compliance was not mandatory in the State of design and manufacture.

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FACTUAL INFORMATION

On 22 December 2000 Australian registered Boeing 767 aircraft VH-RMD/E/F/G/H/K/L were grounded after it was discovered that certain structural inspections had not been carried out. Initial indications were that a significant safety deficiency existed within the airline operator's system of maintenance. Subsequent investigation has established that there are also safety deficiencies within the Australian system of control for the continuing airworthiness of Class A aircraft (as defined by the Australian Civil Aviation Regulations 1988).

The Australian system of aircraft certification provides for the automatic acceptance of aircraft type certification, and continuing airworthiness requirements, from other national airworthiness authorities recognised by Australia. Any omission, or incompatibility between the system of continuing airworthiness in the State of design and/or manufacture and the State of registry, may have the potential to compromise the safety of flight.

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority recently mandated two Service Bulletins related to Boeing 767 aircraft. This action was subsequent to the identification of safety of flight issues. In both cases the Service Bulletins were not mandatory in the State of manufacture of the aircraft.

It is essential that the Australian system for continuing airworthiness of Class A aircraft is robust in itself and is not reliant on actions that may, or may not, be taken by other national airworthiness authorities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation R20010092
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority take steps to ensure that the continuing airworthiness requirements for Australian registered Class A aircraft are not compromised through any lack of action by the national airworthiness authorities of other countries.

Recommendation R20010093
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority take responsibility to ensure that all service bulletins relevant to Australian registered Class A aircraft are received and assessed for safety of flight implications. The assessment process should ensure that those aspects affecting the safety of flight of Class A aircraft are implemented or mandated as necessary and that appropriate systems are in place to ensure compliance.

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 http://www.basi.gov.au/rec/r20010092.htm