Page 18 of 18

Inquiry Transcript      Page FOUR of Four

DR KLATZOW: Well if that had been said, do you find that reprehensible?

MR VAN DER VEER: I wouldn't understand an attitude like that.

DR KLATZOW: But let's assume for a moment that it was said, what would you say?

MR VAN DER VEER: That's what I'm saying, it's unthinkable that that could happen, sorry, that's all I'm saying.

DR KLATZOW: Have you read - do you remember who Guiseppe Belagarde was?

MR VAN DER VEER: Yes.

DR KLATZOW: Did you see there an affidavit from his wife?

MR VAN DER VEER: I saw that.

DR KLATZOW: She was with Jimmy Mouton the day he was called in to judges chambers... (intervention).

MR VAN DER VEER: I read that one just now.

DR KLATZOW: ...he came back visibly shaken.

MR VAN DER VEER: Uhum.

DR KLATZOW: That's what she says. Is there any reason why she should lie?

MR VAN DER VEER: No.

DR KLATZOW: Is there any reason for you to doubt that that was correct?

MR VAN DER VEER: No. If that's what she said, I don't know whether she did this under oath, I don't know.

DR KLATZOW: It is, it is a sworn statement.

MR VAN DER VEER: Then I must accept what it says.

MR VAN DER VEER: Are you aware that the same information has come to this commission from a number of different sources?

MR VAN DER VEER: No. Except from what I've read here.

DR KLATZOW: Correct.

MR VAN DER VEER: Okay.

MR VAN DER VEER: Those are a number of sources, they are three sources... (intervention).

MR VAN DER VEER: Okay.

DR KLATZOW: ...independent and independently gathered, and furthermore wrung from the witnesses at great cost, this was not something that they were wishing to tell, they told it at great personal anguish and pain. Is there any reason why we should disbelieve them?

MR VAN DER VEER: Not if it's a sworn statement, and I mean... (intervention).

DR KLATZOW: Even if it's a statement of what happened, unsworn, is there a reason to disbelieve what I tell you... (intervention).

MR VAN DER VEER: No.

DR KLATZOW: ...and only to believe it when I swear to it?

MR VAN DER VEER: No, why should I?

DR KLATZOW: So there's no reason to disbelieve them?

MR VAN DER VEER: I don't think so.

DR KLATZOW: If that is true, would you accept that that points towards Margo wanting to cover certain information?

MR VAN DER VEER: I cannot make any deductions, all I'm saying, it's very, is the word incomprehensible?

DR KLATZOW: Would you accept, Mr Van der Veer, that if that happened, a reasonable and probable explanation is that Margo did not wish that information to come before his tribunal?

MR VAN DER VEER: That's one of the deductions one could make.

DR KLATZOW: Give me another one?

MR VAN DER VEER: Gosh, you're jumping this on me right now. I don't know. If that's the deduction you want to make, I think it's fair.

DR KLATZOW: I'm happy, Mr Van der Veer, for you to mull over that for as long as you like, and to give me a better explanation.

MR VAN DER VEER: I cannot, I cannot explain, you understand, if this is true, then I cannot explain what Judge Margo's attitude was, and again then I would suggest that one, you mentioned the name of certain individuals, that you get them before the commission, because I'm not aware of it, I'm sorry.

DR KLATZOW: Mr Van der Veer, they are terrified to the point of patheticness.

MR VAN DER VEER: Why? Sorry, I mean... (intervention).

DR KLATZOW: I would like to ask you.

MR VAN DER VEER: I don't know.

DR KLATZOW: Because I can't think of a reason other than that they've been intimidated.

MR VAN DER VEER: Right.

DR KLATZOW: And each and every one of them... (inter-vention).

MR VAN DER VEER: By whom?

DR KLATZOW: ...has told me that they've been intimidated.

MR VAN DER VEER: By whom?

CHAIRPERSON: Let's put it in another fashion. Here is a judge of the supreme court (indistinct), and I'm assuming for the moment, I am not in a, this is an investigative inquiry, let us assume that it happened as they say it did happen, I mean they are saying it almost 12 years after the event, and the judge says to you, "The security of your work and your family is at risk", and I want you to contextualise this in the period that we are talking about, we are talking about 1988, and we now know, even if we didn't know then, from all the things that the De Kocks and everybody else have said, that we lived in a time and period when people did die, when people did disappear, when people did get killed, and if a judge could have said that, wouldn't it have been enough reason for anyone to be afraid?

MR VAN DER VEER: I guess so, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And if we again assume that this took place as is indicated by these people, and I'm asking just your own opinion, don't you find that this was very discomforting?

MR VAN DER VEER: And inexplicable, and I'm very sorry it wasn't brought to my attention.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, well we can now explain some of the things that we couldn't explain in that era. I mean the work that we've been doing over the last 2½ years, exhuming bodies, being led to those bodies by senior police persons, colonels, say "This is where we buried so and so", I mean those are things that ordinarily were inexplicable. So I think what I'm trying to get at is really to get your own sense of what you, whether you now are able to say those were really bad times, "If this is true, then it explains a lot of things that I have in my own mind been refusing to accept because they were totally incomprehensible and inexplicable in what I regarded as a normal and decent, civilised society".

MR VAN DER VEER: Then totally inexplicable, I mean if this is true, then it's inexplicable, okay, and that's the last thing you would expect from any board or any inquiry. I mean I have had myself 25 years of experience in the Railways, of accidents, and I've headed boards, and the last thing I would have done, as chairman or whatever of the board, or member of the board, to point people away and ignore any evidence that they might give. Okay?

CHAIRPERSON: Let me give you another example. We lived through a period where allegations were made about hit squads and hit squad activities, there was even a commission of inquiry that was instituted, presided over by a judge, Judge Harms, evidence placed before it by an advocate of the supreme court, Tim McNally, and that went through the course, evidence was led, cross-examination took place and all that, and a finding was made by that judge, that there's no evidence of these hit squad activities, but that same judge has now had to say, in the light and in the wake of revelations, that "Had I just but known", that is more, it's in a sense that's what he says, "Had I just but known that these things were actually taking place, because now I'm able to accept", I mean it's not only Dirk Coetzee and Mfumelele(?), it's a whole legion of security police persons. So I'm just trying to get you to appreciate that this is not just an idle inquiry, even judges then were misled, that's supposing (indistinct), but then when there is evidence that says he himself took an active role in saying things about national security, things about the security of your family, things about the security of your job, and as it turns out, there were many people whose jobs, and I think that will be put to you, whose jobs took a better turn in the wake of this inquiry, but then that's something else that Mr Klatzow - but I think what I was trying to get you to understand is that if the allegations are true, and it's not just a question of it being inexplicable, it's totally reprehensible, and I would like to know that if we qualified it by saying let's imagine that these are true, would you take the view that this was the most reprehensible thing any judge, any person, let alone a judge, could have done? Are you able to say that?

MR VAN DER VEER: Yes, but I don't know about the facts of it, but the answer is yes, I mean, okay.

DR KLATZOW: Predicated totally on if it was true, we're reaching the end of our session and I don't want to delay you more than I have to, but there are some important things I have to ask you.

MR VAN DER VEER: By all means.

DR KLATZOW: And please bear with me, Mr Van der Veer... (intervention).

MR VAN DER VEER: I've got no problem.

DR KLATZOW: ...how much was a Boeing in those days, ballpark figure, give or take a few shillings here or there?

MR VAN DER VEER: Well the new 400's we bought just subsequent to that, when was it, '91, 1991, were 135 million dollars, you can work out the rand value.

DR KLATZOW: So it was, would a figure of 400 million rand be close, give or take a few shillings?

MR VAN DER VEER: Ja.

DR KLATZOW: Small change?

MR VAN DER VEER: Ja. 350, something like that, or depending on - okay.

DR KLATZOW: Let me put to you an interpretation on what Margo said to Scott. "The country cannot afford, it's going to cost the country 400 million rand", which is give or take a few shillings, the price of a Boeing.

MR VAN DER VEER: Okay.

DR KLATZOW: Okay? And the interpretation which I wish to place on that is that if the insurers had known about the true facts of the Helderberg, they would have delayed or refused to pay out that claim.

MR VAN DER VEER: Ja, one can make that deduction.

DR KLATZOW: Did they ever pay you out the claim?

MR VAN DER VEER: Yes, they did.

DR KLATZOW: Lloyds of London paid out the full amount?

MR VAN DER VEER: I don't know whether it was Lloyds, because we go through a whole consortium.

DR KLATZOW: But believe me it was Lloyds.

MR VAN DER VEER: Okay.

DR KLATZOW: And they paid out?

MR VAN DER VEER: Yes they did.

DR KLATZOW: Did you ever make any disclosures to Lloyds that the airline may or may not have been carrying weapons of war?

MR VAN DER VEER: No.

DR KLATZOW: Did you ever say to them, "On the odd occasion, we're going to be carrying explosives for Armscor"? 

MR VAN DER VEER: We never did.

DR KLATZOW: So if they found out about the fact that you were, that would have been a material non-disclosure?

MR VAN DER VEER: Yes.

DR KLATZOW: And they would have told you to take your claim and take a hike?

DR KLATZOW: Yes.

MR VAN DER VEER: And that is probably what Margo meant when he said that to Ray Scott?

MR VAN DER VEER: I don't know.

DR KLATZOW: Okay.

MR VAN DER VEER: I mean... (intervention).

DR KLATZOW: Now, let me deal with another point. The role of a radio operator at ZUR, how would you describe that in the hierarchy of SAA, was it close to your position... (intervention).

MR VAN DER VEER: No.

DR KLATZOW: ...in terms of seniority, was it a lowly position?

MR VAN DER VEER: Yes.

DR KLATZOW: Very lowly?

MR VAN DER VEER: I wouldn't say very lowly.

DR KLATZOW: Well how much lower could you get than a radio operator, apart from being possibly a cleaner or one of those very menial tasks? It was, as I understand his job, it was menial and it required very little skill, he had to keep notes of what was said... (intervention).

MR VAN DER VEER: Uhum.

DR KLATZOW: ...and he had to see that the tapes didn't get fouled up, and it was not a job that required a rocket scientist to do?

MR VAN DER VEER: No.

DR KLATZOW: What is Mr Nadel doing now?

MR VAN DER VEER: Was he the operator?

DR KLATZOW: Yes.

MR VAN DER VEER: I have got no idea.

DR KLATZOW: Are you aware that he became the area manager for SAA in Miami?

MR VAN DER VEER: No, that was subsequent to my time.

DR KLATZOW: It was very close to your time that that happened.

DR KLATZOW: When was this?

DR KLATZOW: It was shortly after the accident, Mr Van der Veer.

DR KLATZOW: No.

MR VAN DER VEER: You retired in '93?

MR VAN DER VEER: That's right, but we didn't fly to Miami then.

DR KLATZOW: Well... (intervention).

MR VAN DER VEER: We started flying, when was it, July, was it 1990 again.

DR KLATZOW: Yes.

MR VAN DER VEER: And I introduced, we introduced, when did we introduce the first flight to Miami? I can't remember.

DR KLATZOW: You tell me.

MR VAN DER VEER: Probably '91, I don't know. I'll have to check up.

DR KLATZOW: '91?

MR VAN DER VEER: Was it? I think so, I don't know.

DR KLATZOW: Yes.

MR VAN DER VEER: I honestly don't know.

DR KLATZOW: Correct, which is two years before you retired?

MR VAN DER VEER: Yes.

DR KLATZOW: And therefore you did fly to Miami shortly after the accident?

MR VAN DER VEER: No, that's not shortly after the accident... (intervention).

DR KLATZOW: It's within a year?

MR VAN DER VEER: ...that's four, five years later.

DR KLATZOW: No, '91?

MR VAN DER VEER: I'm sorry, the accident happened in '87.

DR KLATZOW: Yes. Yes, after the inquiry.

MR VAN DER VEER: After the inquiry.

DR KLATZOW: When was the inquiry?

MR VAN DER VEER: The inquiry happened about 18 months after the accident, so that... (intervention).

DR KLATZOW: So that's '89.

MR VAN DER VEER: ...must have been the middle of '89.

DR KLATZOW: And within two years, in other words within a year, 18 months, Vernon Nadel was the manager for SAA in Miami, is that correct?

MR VAN DER VEER: I cannot, I cannot, sorry, if you look at the records, then that's correct.

DR KLATZOW: That is correct.

MR VAN DER VEER: Okay, I'm not denying that.

DR KLATZOW: I want to put it to you that that is correct.

MR VAN DER VEER: Okay.

DR KLATZOW: Is that, in your experience, a fairly meteoric rise?

MR VAN DER VEER: No, not necessarily.

DR KLATZOW: Can you give me the name of one other person who has enjoyed a similar rise from radio operator status to area manager in your airline?

MR VAN DER VEER: I'm sorry, I can't answer that question, you can look at the records, but the point I'm trying to make, first of all, cargo, at one stage, at that stage, was not the most important section of SAA, we had no cargo division, if you remember, and the reason for that simply is this, because in the sanction time we had to fly around the bulge, and the aircraft has a limited payload, so you carry the kilo that brings you the best result, which means passengers, so it was only, if I'm correct, round about '91, and I stand corrected, you can look at the records, that we started in fact with the cargo division, okay? So if he was cargo manager, Miami, at that point in time, I don't know how many flights we had, but it's probably one or two flights a week, initially, and that would not be a very high job.

DR KLATZOW: No, it wasn't cargo manager, it was area manager.

MR VAN DER VEER: Was it area manager? Well then he was, gosh, you're talking '91, I think it's later than '91.

DR KLATZOW: Do you remember Vernon Nadel?

MR VAN DER VEER: Ja. I remember the name.

DR KLATZOW: Does it not strike you, because it has struck many people, in the airline and outside the airline, as a rather spectacular rise in fame and fortune?

MR VAN DER VEER: I can't comment. I would have to look at the gentleman's record, okay, where he had been, what his background was.

DR KLATZOW: Yes.

MR VAN DER VEER: All right?

DR KLATZOW: Now, let me ask you another question, if a serious incident occurred aboard a South African Airways plane on a foreign airfield... (intervention).

MR VAN DER VEER: Yes?

DR KLATZOW: ...is it likely that you would get to hear of it? Let's assume a nuclear cargo fell out of it on Miami Airport, would you get to hear of that?

MR VAN DER VEER: If it was nuclear, yes, but then we never transported nuclear cargo.

DR KLATZOW: If it was military, would you get to hear of it?

MR VAN DER VEER: No, not necessarily, because we don't transport military equipment.

DR KLATZOW: Are you certain?

CHAIRPERSON: Or at least not to your knowledge?

MR VAN DER VEER: Unless - ja.

CHAIRPERSON: Because you didn't check what was being put there and what have you?

MR VAN DER VEER: No.

CHAIRPERSON: I think that is what is being conveyed to you, that people like you either would be unaware of what was conveyed, but that did not remove the fact that it was conveyed, or were colluding about it and were not prepared to disclose it, no such a suggestion has been put to you, but I think you must accept that... (intervention).

MR VAN DER VEER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: ...we can put propositions, because there is investigation that has gone on that has revealed, so whenever he says, he premises, "Look, you were carrying, you know, military hardware", etcetera, etcetera, it is on the basis that there is information to that effect, and therefore you are entitled to say, "I didn't know about it", but I don't think you are entitled to be as emphatic as to say, "We never carried it".

MR VAN DER VEER: Not to my knowledge.

CHAIRPERSON: It would never have been licensed... (intervention).

MR VAN DER VEER: Definitely not.

CHAIRPERSON: ...for you to carry those, because... (intervention).

MR VAN DER VEER: Well, again... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: ...(a) you had an arms embargo, which was an international arms embargo, and secondly I don't think the aviation rules would have allowed you to carry dangerous substances in passenger airlines... (intervention).

MR VAN DER VEER: The point is... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: ...and since the Helderberg was a passenger airline, though it had what I understand in your technical terms, kombi, kombi aircraft, but nonetheless it was a passenger aircraft and I'm sure your rules would have made it impossible for you to carry dangerous substances on an airline that was supposed to be carrying human beings as well.

MR VAN DER VEER: Quite correct, but the point is, certain military equipment, okay, we would, one, not know that it was military, but that military equipment would not be a danger at all, okay? There is lots of equipment that all airlines transport. I mean we transport our own aircraft components and everything else, okay?

DR KLATZOW: Would you carry rockets?

MR VAN DER VEER: I would carry a rocket if it was classified under IATA and it wasn't loaded or charged.

DR KLATZOW: Are rockets classified under IATA?

MR VAN DER VEER: I'm not sure, you will have to ask the people.

DR KLATZOW: Well let me put to you a proposition... (intervention).

MR VAN DER VEER: Okay, please.

DR KLATZOW: ...Mr Van der Veer, do you know a pilot called Flippie Looch?

MR VAN DER VEER: I've heard of the name.

DR KLATZOW: Have you heard of a pilot called Deon Storm?

MR VAN DER VEER: Yes.

DR KLATZOW: Are you aware that both pilots, whilst refuelling and being parked on the apron at Tel Aviv Ben Gurion Airport, experienced a very similar experience?

MR VAN DER VEER: I'm not aware of that, I have heard the rumour subsequently.

DR KLATZOW: Are you aware that, let me tell you what it is, and it is not a rumour, it is true.

MR VAN DER VEER: Uhum.

DR KLATZOW: During the loading of his plane, Looch saw them drop a piece of cargo out and walked around to find that it was rockets. Are you aware of that rumour?

MR VAN DER VEER: No, not that it was a rocket.

DR KLATZOW: What were you aware of?

MR VAN DER VEER: That there was, as it says here basically, there was a crate and something fell out of it that they might interpret as a missile. I don't know what's a missile, but it could have been a rocket then.

DR KLATZOW: Well... (intervention).

MR VAN DER VEER: But tell me, when did that happen?

DR KLATZOW: That happened a few years before the Helderberg.

MR VAN DER VEER: A few years?

DR KLATZOW: Yes.

MR VAN DER VEER: Before '83?

DR KLATZOW: Yes.

MR VAN DER VEER: Okay. I just want to put it clear that before '83 I wasn't there... (intervention).

DR KLATZOW: Correct.

MR VAN DER VEER: ...so I wouldn't know. I know the rumour.

DR KLATZOW: Yes.

MR VAN DER VEER: I never investigated the rumour, there was no need.

DR KLATZOW: It happened '84, '85.

MR VAN DER VEER: I'm not aware of it.

DR KLATZOW: Okay.

MR VAN DER VEER: Okay.

DR KLATZOW: Now, Looch has confirmed that and so has Deon Storm. Can you think of a reasonable explanation as to why SAA have gone to extraordinary lengths to suggest that these were mirage wing tanks?

MR VAN DER VEER: No.

DR KLATZOW: Surely, and I want to put it to you, Mr Van der Veer, that if they were rockets, if they were something which Captain Looch and Deon Storm, both ex Defence Force pilots, would have easily recognised, and would not have been confused between that and a drop tank, if they were in fact things that were classified to be carried aboard your airline, the airline could have easily said, "These are IATA approved, they are uncharged, we'll carry them and mind your own business", can you think of a reason why they didn't say that and why they tried, as recently as three years ago, to try and convince me that they were drop tanks for a mirage?

MR VAN DER VEER: Who tried to convince you? Sorry, I just... (intervention).

DR KLATZOW: Theuns Kruger tried to convince me.

MR VAN DER VEER: Theuns Kruger... (intervention).

DR KLATZOW: Yes.

MR VAN DER VEER: ...Dr Theuns Kruger?

DR KLATZOW: Yes, the same man.

MR VAN DER VEER: And Captain Storm?

DR KLATZOW: Well, Deon Storm never spoke to me, I have a report of his, but Flippie Looch did, and he was very unwilling to talk until I suggested to him that SAA had already suggested to me, and incidentally the other person who told me that was John Hare.

MR VAN DER VEER: John Hare wasn't with the airline then.

DR KLATZOW: But he was when I asked him the question... (intervention).

MR VAN DER VEER: Okay.

DR KLATZOW: ...and that's the answer he gave me.

MR VAN DER VEER: Okay.

CHAIRPERSON: There's an interesting linkage there again, talking about weapons and I mean armaments and SAA, because John Hare was in Armscor, wasn't he?

MR VAN DER VEER: Yes, he was.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VAN DER VEER: And I recruited him from there, Mr Chairman, if you're worried about it, and that he was one of the experts on money, and I think I included him... (intervention).

DR KLATZOW: (Indistinct) expert on... (intervention).

MR VAN DER VEER: Well... (intervention).

DR KLATZOW: Is that all?

MR VAN DER VEER: We took him in as financial manager specifically for that job.

DR KLATZOW: Yes, but the picture I'm painting for you, Mr Van der Veer, is a very simple one. You've got a series of inexplicable things happening. In each and every occasion the airline has reverted to some kind of devious way to escape the truth, "It's not rockets, it's mirage wing tanks", okay?

MR VAN DER VEER: Uhum.

DR KLATZOW: "We never fly that sort of cargo". Inciden-tally, as recently as a few years ago, well after the Helderberg, one of your officials was involved in a similar issue. Do you have or did you ever have a man in your airline by the name of Mike van Rensburg?

MR VAN DER VEER: In what position?

DR KLATZOW: Was he not the cargo manager at Singapore?

MR VAN DER VEER: There was a Mike van Niekerk in Singapore.

DR KLATZOW: All right, I might have got the name wrong.

MR VAN DER VEER: Because we started flying very late to Singapore, you may recollect... (intervention).

DR KLATZOW: Okay.

MR VAN DER VEER: ...and the gentleman was Mike van Niekerk.

DR KLATZOW: Mike van Niekerk. I accept that I may have been wrong in that. He was with one of your employees at Singapore, and the employee, who was a contract worker for you, overheard the following conversation, quote, "How are the Armscor shipments going?", "Fine, thank you". "Are they still being shipped out under the title of hairdryers?" Could you comment on that?

MR VAN DER VEER: I can give no comment on that at all.

DR KLATZOW: Well, you see, what I'm suggesting to you is that senior members of staff of your airline knew that Armscor was breaking the regulations, they knew that cargo was being misdeclared, and they continued to do this even after the Helderberg had happened?

MR VAN DER VEER: I'm not aware of that, okay? As I said earlier on, I mean I'm not denying that we have not shipped Armscor equipment or whatever it is, but then it would have been without the knowledge. Secondly, if you... (intervention).

DR KLATZOW: Without whose knowledge?

MR VAN DER VEER: On my instructions of the management, okay? But if people had been aware of that, then I would be very, I mean I would have been very disappointed they did not tell us about it.

DR KLATZOW: Well it goes further than that... (inter-vention).

MR VAN DER VEER: Okay.

DR KLATZOW: ...Mr Van der Veer, because these are senior people, this is not a boy pilot or a boy running the airline, these are senior members of your staff, and what I want to say to you is this, that are you aware that Boeing employed a fire expert to examine the cause of the fire in the Helderberg?

MR VAN DER VEER: Yes.

DR KLATZOW: Do you remember from which firm he came?

MR VAN DER VEER: No.

DR KLATZOW: His name was Mr Southeard and he came from a very, very reputable firm called Dr J H Burgoyne and Partners in London.

MR VAN DER VEER: Uhum.

DR KLATZOW: They are probably the finest fire experts in the world. Do you remember what his conclusions were?

MR VAN DER VEER: No, but I remember speaking to him.

DR KLATZOW: Well let me tell you what his conclusions were. His conclusions were that the fire was unlikely to be a fire which was fuelled by ordinary packaging material, that it had to be a promoted or accelerated fire with something that contained its own oxygen.

MR VAN DER VEER: I do not remember that, but carry on.

DR KLATZOW: Believe me, that is what he found. Can you give me a reasonable explanation why Margo ignored that finding?

MR VAN DER VEER: No. If that was his finding that was given to Judge Margo, no I cannot give you any explanation. But I mean there were many - if he was an expert on that, sorry I'm just trying to, while I'm talking I'm just trying to recollect, you understand? You are aware of the experiment that was done where we rebuilt... (intervention).

DR KLATZOW: Yes, I am aware of it.

MR VAN DER VEER: ...the back of the aircraft... (inter-vention).

DR KLATZOW: Yes.

MR VAN DER VEER: ...and tried certain experiments as to what could and could not have happened.

DR KLATZOW: Let me stop you there.

MR VAN DER VEER: Okay.

DR KLATZOW: I'm aware of that experiment.

MR VAN DER VEER: Thank you.

DR KLATZOW: I know that Theuns Kruger and Dr John Bland conducted that experiment, and I must tell you at the onset that if ever that were to be presented in a court of law, it is so deficient in experimental design that anybody would have little difficulty in shredding it.

MR VAN DER VEER: Okay.

DR KLATZOW: It was simplistic in the extreme.

MR VAN DER VEER: Okay.

DR KLATZOW: Here you had a man who had done intimate calculations, and furthermore he was the only man called under oath... (intervention).

MR VAN DER VEER: Yes.

DR KLATZOW: ...at the Margo Inquiry, and Margo inexplicably ignored his findings. Can you give me an explanation?

MR VAN DER VEER: No.

DR KLATZOW: Right. What I'm saying to you is that everything here points, that I've told you today and I've been open with you, Mr Van der Veer, everything points to a situation where Margo either deliberately misdirected the inquiry, or was stunningly incompetent in actually getting at the truth, it points to a cover-up, in terms of missing documentation, where people would be justified, in the light of no better explanation forthcoming, in saying "Where did the tapes go?" It points to a situation where vital evidence, and you've conceded that the tape recording of the cockpit voice recorder is vital evidence, has been ignored, and in fact the judge directed that that not be heard in open court, everything points to an interpretation of a cover-up, which if it is to be ever waylaid and refuted, requires now urgently a new inquiry under proper director-ship, to be launch forthwith. Would you give that your blessing, having heard what you've heard today?

MR VAN DER VEER: I would say anything that can throw light on the cause of the accident, and I said that earlier on in this inquiry, I would support.

DR KLATZOW: But, Mr Van der Veer... (intervention).

MR VAN DER VEER: Okay?

DR KLATZOW: ...you've heard an interpretation today which I've given you, which you have... (intervention).

MR VAN DER VEER: I've got no objectoin.

DR KLATZOW: ...you have no answers to many of the questions.

MR VAN DER VEER: No, no.

DR KLATZOW: Not only do you have no answers, you claim today at this inquiry that you've never heard these inter-pretations before.

MR VAN DER VEER: I've heard the rumours.

DR KLATZOW: But I've given you certain interpretations to that.

MR VAN DER VEER: Okay, you've given me certain inter-pretations.

DR KLATZOW: And they're not rumours, what I've given you today is not rumours, I have given you factually based material and you have no answers... (intervention).

MR VAN DER VEER: No.

DR KLATZOW: ...to them?

MR VAN DER VEER: No.

DR KLATZOW: Can you think of any reason why this inquiry should not be started again and the entire Margo report be reworked?

MR VAN DER VEER: I think that's for you to decide, okay?

I don't... (intervention).

DR KLATZOW: I'd like an answer to the question please.

MR VAN DER VEER: If you want an answer, then it's no.

DR KLATZOW: You don't think that the Margo Inquiry should be restarted?

MR VAN DER VEER: No, I didn't say that, I've just said if you want to restart the Margo investigation and it is a panel of experts, no objection.

DR KLATZOW: But you see, do you see the reasons why those of us who have investigated this for so long, have the deepest, darkest misgivings about the whole affair?

MR VAN DER VEER: That I can understand.

DR KLATZOW: Well that alone, Mr Van der Veer, should enable you to motivate strongly that the inquiry should be re-opened, that fact alone... (intervention).

MR VAN DER VEER: I'm sorry, I've seen a couple of pieces here, you have a whole line-up of people coming in for the rest of the week, okay, and I would, at the end of that, I would like to see exactly what their, let's say not their reactions are, that's irrelevant, but their statements as to the facts, but if it is necessary, please do re-open it.

DR KLATZOW: What would be your response, would you welcome... (intervention).

MR VAN DER VEER: I would welcome it.

DR KLATZOW: ...an inquiry and a reinvestigation?

MR VAN DER VEER: I would welcome it, if there's any doubt, then I would welcome that you open it up and, as you're doing now... (intervention).

DR KLATZOW: Do you see the need for it, Mr Van der Veer?

MR VAN DER VEER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Dr Klatzow, I don't think you can take the matter any further with Mr Van der Veer, I think he has - have you further questions?

DR KLATZOW: Mr Commissioner, thank you very much, I've run out questions. If there are some which re-occur, maybe Mr Van der Veer would give me the opportunity of putting to them in his private capacity at a later stage, or as I pursue my investigation. Would you have any objectoin to that, Mr Van der Veer?

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, no, no... (intervention).

MR VAN DER VEER: I can't do that.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct).

MR VAN DER VEER: I mean if there's anything to be submitted... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: He forgets that he's now an employee of the commission.

MR VAN DER VEER: That's my problem, sir, that's my problem. If the commission comes back to me on any other questions, I'd only be willing to answer, I have no problem with that, but I cannot answer individuals, I'm sorry.

DR KLATZOW: I withdraw the question.

MS TERREBLANCHE: If you remember or have anything more on the matters that were discussed with you that you perhaps would think of making a written presentation on it to the commission?

MR VAN DER VEER: I will.

MS TERREBLANCHE: Thank you very much, Mr Van der Veer for... (intervention).

MR VAN DER VEER: Pleasure.

MS TERREBLANCHE: ...making yourself available.

CHAIRPERSON: Any questions from the panel? Mr Magadla?

MR MAGADLA: Mr Van der Veer, are you aware of a delay of the departure of that plane from Taipei?

MR VAN DER VEER: No. No, I think, sorry, again, I have to think very very carefully, I must be very honest with you, I have closed my mind to the Helderberg, okay, it was one of the most traumatic experiences in my life. I haven't read anything on the Helderberg subsequent, I even was given a book by somebody who wrote it, I haven't read that, okay? It's past, and one tends to say, "Look, get it out of your mind". A question which still stays with me is the cause of that fire, but I think there was a slight delay, if I recollect, I think there was a slight delay in the departure, but the record will show that very clearly.

MR MAGADLA: Could there have been an explanation for that slight delay?

MR VAN DER VEER: Sir, aircraft have delays, okay, for umpteen reasons, there would be umpteen reasons, and if somebody hid the reason, that would also be quite acceptable, because aircraft, I mean 20% of them get delayed normally. I may also just say something, where's the doctor, is he not here, on his cockpit voice recorder, I'm at present on the board of an airline in India, they had an incident on Saturday morning on the runway. What is very interesting is that the cockpit voice recorder tape stopped at a certain point, and started again later on. Okay, that's one of the first things we found out. I'm just referring to what Dr David asked me about, you know, when the cockpit, the tape stopped. Again, what I'm just saying, these things happen, to explain them away is very, very difficult, and I'm very interested to see what the Bombay story is. I'm just giving this to the panel, to say that these things don't work perfectly, unfortunately.

CHAIRPERSON: Well thank you very much, Mr Van der Veer. I have, on behalf of the commission and on behalf of this panel in particular, to thank you for having made yourself available, at what, in ordinary circumstances, was short notice really, and in circumstances where you have not even had an opportunity to prepare yourself, and that you were even prepared to come without any legal representations.

These are heavy matters for us and we feel ourselves totally inadequate to the task, but we have a job to do which we hoped we would do, and if your attendance here has assisted us in getting a better picture of what was going on in those days, we are very, very indebted to you.

When you read, if you had an opportunity to do so, letters from scores of people who write to the Archbishop in his capacity as chairperson of the commission, and some letters in representative capacity from institutions such as the Friend of the Victims of Helderberg, an organisation calling themselves FOVA, people who were enraged even about the fact that we are having this in camera, because there is a burning suspicion that once again the matter is being covered up because there's something to be hidden away, you can appreciate why we may have gone a little bit further in our probing in the manner in which questions were put by Dr Klatzow. It was not intended to be any reflection on your integrity, it was intended to possibly cause you to reflect also, and for us it is in fact moving to hear you say you have not wanted to look on this incident, to a point where you have not even read any books that have been written on it. It can only explain to us that you are a human being and you are aware of the allegations that have been made, and for us who have been entrusted with the duty to establish the truth, and we are not very successful in most cases, it is something that we have to do, even if it means dragging you into these hearings. Believe you me, it's not something we do with relish or with glee. We are endeavouring to find, in the interests of this country and in the interests of future government, if there was a group of people or some people who were involved in a tragedy that cost this country and very many other countries the sort of trauma that you also have been going through, then those facts need to be established, if it is possible, not for their own sake, but to make sure that in the future your children and my children can live in societies where deviousness should not be of a nature that lives can be sacrificed at the altar of political expedience, and if our inquiries are going in that direction and we prove that, then your coming here would not have been in vain, because you will have added in a way you cannot understand, a thread that, taken together with others, might bring us closer to finding out what exactly happened.

It's a long way of saying thank you for having come, and believe us when we believe that there are certain aspects that we think you can assist us with, we will officially communicate with you.

For the moment you are excused, and I am sure we have no longer, or no more use for you.

Thank you very much.

MR VAN DER VEER: Thank you, Mr Chairman, that last word I don't like, "no more use for you", but - I'm an old man already, but no, all I want to say is that if there's anything that the Truth Commission needs, or other questions subsequent to this, I will be very grateful to answer them, I don't have a problem with that, and if I recollect things, then I will also, you know, like Christelle asked me, I will slowly start this computer moving again and say, "Look, you know, what can you or what can't you remember?"

The other thing is, there are other people you may also want to ask to come to the commission. I've mentioned for instance, what's it, Mr Lewis, as one name, who was my deputy, and I mean he was deeply involved in that. The other gentleman that was deeply involved in this is Mr Boschoff, who in fact was later on seconded to the DCA to help them with the investigation on the island. Another gentleman, Mr Nic Vlok, who's now with Comair, okay? What I'm trying to say is, if you look for more evidence, then there are more people who could throw light. Captain Jimmy Hippert, I think is a gentleman that could help very much. I don't know whether you're going to bring Captain Deon Storm in, I have the highest regard for him as an individual. All I'm saying is, you know, then that should happen, and if there's anything else I can be of assistance with, please shout.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Van der Veer.

WITNESS EXCUSED

CHAIRPERSON: Is there any more evidence you are calling, Ms Terreblanche?

MS TERREBLANCHE: Not today, Mr Commissioner.

CHAIRPERSON: We're adjourned until half past nine tomorrow.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

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