Air Line Pilots Association, Int’l

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 797-4033

Good morning Mr. Chairman, I am Captain Duane E. Woerth, President of the Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA). ALPA represents the professional interests of 55,000 pilots who fly for 51 airlines in the United States and Canada. I am here today to address three issues that have arisen in the aftermath of last year’s tragic crash of Egypt Air Flight 990. They are: 1) the installation of cockpit video recorders 2) psychological testing of airline pilots, and 3) strengthening the English language proficiency requirements for foreign pilots.

While we agree that improved communication skills of all pilots is needed and will enhance safety, we strongly disagree with the notion that video monitoring and psychological testing of flight deck crews will make any contribution at all toward increase air safety.

One of the more recent 'hot topics' in air safety and aircraft accident investigation is the installation of video recorders in the cockpits of our airliners. While the exact genesis of cockpit video initiatives and discussions may be unclear, there can be no doubt that the issue is a complex and contentious one. To the uninitiated, cockpit video has the false allure of the inexpensive, all-inclusive solution to the nature and cause of every aircraft accident & incident. "If we could just see what is happening in the cockpit" the flawed reasoning goes, "we would easily solve this accident and prevent the next one." The reality is actually quite different.

There can be no argument that all pilots have a vested interest in improvements in equipment and procedures that will make their work environment, and the air transportation system, safer. But like any positive change, the benefits must outweigh the detrimental effects associated with that change. The cockpit video issue has two key areas of discussion: what air safety, social and economic costs will be incurred if these video initiatives come to pass, and what will be the actual air safety benefit(s) derived from such installations? In the end, the argument can be boiled down to the singular question of whether air safety would be best served by the installation of cockpit video cameras. The decision mechanism is complex, but the answer is simple: No, it would not. Given the state of existing protective legislation, cockpit video is an egregious invasion of privacy for minimal, if any, safety data. Air safety will be far better served by continuing to focus on improved flight recorders and proactive safety programs such as Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) and Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP).

The privacy issues stemming from the installation of cockpit video cameras are of prime importance to the Air Line Pilots Association. Preventing the release of the imagery for inappropriate purposes is ALPA's highest concern in this regard. ALPA has the responsibility to protect our members from the misuse of recorders, but that is sometimes difficult or impossible to achieve. Based on past experience and existing legislation, ALPA has no confidence that we can completely prevent cockpit video abuses and inappropriate releases, either domestically or internationally. While our industry and government generally acknowledge the need for protection of recorded information, this acknowledgement is not necessarily recognized or embraced outside these organizations. Nor is there a consensus on how best to achieve appropriate, absolute protections. And therein lies the problem.

Our experience with cockpit voice recorders (CVRs) should be instructive in this regard. The CVR was introduced almost 40 years ago, solely as a tool for accident investigation. Although it was reluctantly accepted by airline pilots, the CVR continues to serve its purpose admirably. However, along the way, there have been numerous events that are worth remembering, and lessons that we should have learned with regard to abuses and inappropriate information releases.

The CVR has been used for sensationalistic purposes by the media. It has been used by litigants in civil and criminal cases. It has even been used by employers for surveillance and disciplinary purposes. So although the NTSB has internal procedures to guard against such abuses and events, we are still not where we need to be with regard to providing absolute protections for the CVR recordings.

Beyond our shores, the sanctity of the CVR (and by extension, cockpit video recordings) is an entirely different matter. Other countries have different laws, and often different cultural perspectives, as to what is acceptable. This lesson was made very clear to ALPA on more than one occasion. Last year at the International Civil Aviation Organization's Accident Investigation Group meeting (ICAO AIG 99), the issue of strengthening Annex 13 protective language for sensitive recorded information was advocated by the International Federation of Air Line Pilots Associations (IFALPA). The Group agreed that this information does need protection, and that failure to give it adequate protection would have prejudicial effects on aviation safety. However, the Group, which is an international safety organization, could not agree on its ability to override the legal schemes in each particular country. Consequently the Group refused to take any action towards modifying existing ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS), leaving the data functionally unprotected. It is important to note that in the same AIG 99 meeting, the Group rejected the need for cockpit video cameras, due to the fact that it did not believe that such devices are technically warranted.

While ICAO acknowledges the need for data protection, its ability to force change is limited. The real changes must be made on a country-by-country basis, in the form of new or revised legislation. Even if the desired Annex 13 language changes had been accomplished, the ICAO SARPS are not binding, and countries can choose non-compliance simply by filing a 'Notification of Difference'. Finally, not all countries are ICAO signatories. Despite these shortcomings, changes to the ICAO language do have the potential to be one impetus for initiating changes in the laws of individual countries. We believe the United States and other countries should continue to pursue this goal.

Another telling event was the recent playing of the CVR from the American Airlines Cali accident on NBC's 'Dateline' television program. This occurred despite the circumstances that this was a US crew operating an aircraft of US registry, that the US NTSB participated in the investigation, and that the CVR was read out and transcribed at NTSB Headquarters in Washington, DC. This airing of the American Airlines CVR recording was an outrage to many pilots in this country. However, the release and subsequent airing of this recording was not a violation of any Colombian or US law.

It should be clear that in the event that video recorders are mandated on US registered aircraft, even with significant changes to US and NTSB regulations, all protections would cease to exist once those aircraft cross the 12 mile limit and exit the United States. That situation is unacceptable.

In recent years, the NTSB has expended significant time and resources on increasing the consideration afforded to the families of airline accident victims. ALPA urges all involved to ensure that the flight crewmembers' families be afforded at least these same considerations. Under current equipment requirements, this is already a serious concern due to the fact that the cockpit crewmembers' last words are routinely recorded. One need not extrapolate far to gauge the harm done to the families of deceased crewmembers should a video of their last living moments be aired for public viewing.

In a worst case situation, assuming cockpit video with CVR-like protective measures, it would just be a matter of time before the world shares first-hand the cockpit environment in the seconds before a disaster. Will the release of this information into the public domain enhance safety? Certainly no investigators or air safety personnel believe that. Would such a development be acceptable to the world's airline pilots? Absolutely not. It is for these reasons that, prior to the installation of any video recording devices in the cockpits of our airliners, it is imperative that we develop and implement the best possible protective measures for such information. The members of the Air Line Pilots Association, and very likely all professional pilots flying for US airlines, will not even consider cockpit video cameras unless and until appropriate, unyielding protections are in place.

It is widely acknowledged among air safety investigators that cockpit video is not the panacea that laymen believe it to be. The benefits perceived by lay persons far exceed those that trained air safety investigators recognize and acknowledge as possible. Installation of advanced flight recorders and implementation of FOQA programs are two of the most effective air safety improvements being incorporated into our air transportation system today, and these offer far more safety potential than the installation of video cameras.

In recent years, the air transportation industry and the Federal Government have expended a significant amount of effort and money aimed at achieving the most safety benefit with the available or foreseeable technology & resources. Some examples of these efforts include the DOT Aviation Safety Action Plan ('Zero Accidents'), the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security ('Gore Commission'), the National Civil Aviation Review Commission, and the FAA Safer Skies Initiative. These efforts have identified the most important issues affecting air safety, and industry and government continue to work together at identifying issues and their solutions. Almost unanimously, these studies advocate strong industry focus on risk management and analytical tools for proactive safety programs. The current industry thrust, and rightly so, is towards a proactive approach (incident identification & analysis), instead of the traditional reactive approach (accident investigation). In other words, provide the air transportation industry with the tools to detect & remedy the unsafe and undesirable trends that will eventually result in accidents, and thereby prevent the next accident without having to wait for the 'smoking hole.'

When it comes to improving air safety, cockpit video is not the answer. Today's state of technology is such that we can garner far more, much higher quality, information from properly instrumented aircraft than could possibly be derived from video recordings. Flight Data Recorders (FDRs) in the latest generation of transport aircraft typically record more than a hundred parameters. Enhanced recording technology, combined with proactive air safety schemes such as FOQA and ASAP, will help us accurately identify and quantify airplane and airspace system deficiencies. It can also identify procedural and human performance shortcomings. More sophisticated FDRs, perhaps with real-time data downlink capability, would seem to be a logical development of instrumentation capabilities. It is worth keeping in mind that even with much older technology, there have been very few major accidents for which probable causes have not been determined.

Together, industry and government have defined a methodical, data-driven approach towards improving air safety. Nowhere in any of these plans is cockpit video suggested or advocated. It is imperative that we stay the course, and not divert industry resources and attention in a reactionary, 'knee jerk' manner to solve the headline 'accident du jour.' Such an approach is not in keeping with either good scientific or management practices, and has the potential outcome of actually adversely affecting air safety by blurring the focus of concerted safety efforts.

Routine, recurrent psychological testing of airline pilots in the United States is a solution in search of a problem. Airline pilots are certainly the most frequently tested and monitored professionals in the world, in regard to physical and mental health as well as professional performance and competence. Psychological health and performance of airline pilots in the United States has never been cited as a safety issue, and the mere suggestion that pilots should be required to undergo psychological testing on a regular basis is not only unnecessary but offensive to our profession.

The typical pilot is subjected to a rigorous and thorough screening and evaluation by airlines prior to employment. This includes psychological testing and performance evaluation. Most of the major airlines perform psychological testing as part of their pre-employment medical screening and interview process. This commonly includes what is called personality inventory testing such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). Memory, judgment and problem-solving are tested as well.

After being hired, airline pilots are subject to at least an annual medical certification examination. Airline captains take a medical examination at least semi-annually. In these medical examinations, airline pilots are evaluated on broad mental standards that might affect their performance capabilities. In addition to the medical evaluations required by FAA, pilots are subjected to additional company mandated medical examinations at intervals determined by their employers.

Airline pilots are also subject to pilot training sessions that typically include performance evaluation. These training sessions are conducted on an annual or semi-annual basis. Crew resource management (CRM) is an integral part of pilot training and airline operations. CRM emphasizes crew interaction and pilot performance as a crew. Any deviation from accepted airline standards and procedures are subject to being called into question by other crewmembers. In some cultures outside the United States, the captain’s word on the flight deck is law and honest questioning is not allowed. In the United States, crewmembers are strongly encouraged to work together. If a first officer observes a captain deviating from safe procedure or action, for whatever reasons, questioning is immediate and the captain is responsive to crew input.

In addition, the Air Line Pilots Association has a Professional Standards infrastructure that is available to evaluate allegations of aberrant pilot behavior at the individual airlines. Pilots who do develop emotional difficulties have an array of medical services available, both through their companies or unions (and often both). These include company sponsored employee assistance programs (EAP’s), airline medical departments, and confidential medical assistance provided by their respective pilot associations.

Routine psychological testing of airline pilots is unnecessary. There are already ample means during daily operations and recurrent training and evaluations to identify improper pilot behavior. Overlying this entire support network is FAA oversight provided by the FAA’s Aeromedical Certification Division in Oklahoma City, and the FAA Office of Aviation Medicine in Washington, DC.

Over the past several years ALPA has been a strong advocate of several initiatives to improve voice communications between pilots and controllers. This effort has focused on air traffic control communications in the domestic as well as international arenas and included pilot and controller procedures, performance of those procedures, and communication technology improvements. These issues are in addition to the basic issue concerning English language proficiency for pilots whose native language is not English.

In air carrier operations, airplanes operate with approval given through voice communications, and airplanes simply do not operate safely without clear, concise, and unambiguous voice communications. One of the basic checks and balances in the ATC system is the readback/hearback process between the controller and the pilot. With more and more flights being jammed into the ATC system, the readback/hearback process allows us to operate at the safety level we enjoy today. With the recent interpretive rule relating to Pilot Responsibility for Compliance with Air Traffic Control Clearance and Instructions issued March 26, 1999, the pilot confidence in the readback/hearback process has been seriously jeopardized. This is the system we operate in and it is not going to change dramatically in the near or mid-term.

On the technology front, even though future systems, such as data link, promise advantages and efficiencies, voice will remain as the communication system. This is especially true in the terminal areas where high density air traffic and high workloads for the pilots and controllers make exchanging data by voice the only practical method. Even where data link may be used, ICAO and FAA policy is that voice will always be available.

ALPA recognizes the improvements that may be possible because of data link and strongly supports increasing the funds to expand data link research and development work. Of critical need is the work on the design of cockpit systems to make data link delivery of air traffic control information, clearances and instructions compatible with the pilot’s responsibility to maintain visual surveillance under the see-and-avoid concept. Data link, as a supplement to voice, has the potential to relieve the controllers and pilots of many routine communication functions, especially in the enroute environment. Data link will improve the safety of air operations and free the pilots and controllers to concentrate on other critical tasks.

However, data link, if it is to be an effective substitute or supplement to voice, presents some issues that must be solved. The use of data link causes pilots to focus their attention inside the cockpit and exacerbates the problem of "head-down time." It also reduces the pilots’ situational awareness of other air traffic because the pilot in many cases will only receive data link information on his flight and not the surrounding traffic. These are critical issues that must be solved if data link is to be used in the terminal area. Additionally, much work needs to be done on how data link will be used in a mixed fleet of aircraft of both old and new aircraft. Nevertheless, data link holds strong promise for improving the efficiencies of operation and must be pursued.

The purpose of discussing data link is to point out that the most promising technology on the horizon will not negate voice communications. We can expect technology to provide relief in the immediate future. If data link is not the immediate answer, what can be done to improve communication efficiency and therefore the safety of air operations?

Voice communications must be standardized. As any safety expert realizes, standardization is the key to safe operations. Standardization solves the human factors problems associated with operating aircraft. This is as true for communications as it is for any flight procedure pilots must follow. To that end, ALPA has been a long time and major participant in all programs that further the goal of standardization.

In 1988, the FAA and aviation industry representatives collaborated on an effort to improve pilot/controller communications titled CALL TO ACTION. This initiative was founded on the demonstrated need to foster improved communications between pilots and controllers as a means of reducing system operations problems, increasing user professionalism, and enhancing system safety. Of prime emphasis was the identification of individual professional performance in all duties and acknowledgment of the human factor issues involved in the communications process. A key issue was the need for pilots and controllers to use standardized ATC phraseology and avoid ATC "slang."

In December 1994, the Secretary of Transportation sponsored a conference of industry, government and union aviation officials to address safety in the aviation industry. Several workshops were formed and tasked to produce specific issues and recommendations. The ATC and Weather Workshop produced two that have yet to be accomplished.

The first issue was the use of non-standard phraseology by pilots and controllers. The FAA/industry approach to address this was to develop a publication of ATC Communication Phraseology for pilots and controllers that provides definitions of ATC communications (words/phraseology) to facilitate and ensure common understanding and knowledge of the other party’s intentions and expectations. The FAA/industry initiatives to resolve the issue was that the FAA would lead a project to develop a "user friendly" pamphlet to explain commonly used phrases and clearances. The pamphlet was to explain what actions are expected on the part of pilots and controllers and to consider issues associated with foreign flag carrier pilots.

The second issue is the use and proficiency in spoken English by foreign flag carrier pilots and foreign controllers. The initiatives to resolve this were to propose to ICAO: 1) a spoken English test for all commercial pilots; 2) controllers be required to pass a spoken English test and use only English on ATC radios; and 3) standardize ICAO phraseology by pilots and controllers. The FAA/industry initiatives to resolve this issue were that the FAA would develop standards for a proposal to ICAO on the use and proficiency in spoken English. No ICAO standard currently exists that identifies English as the official language to be used in ATC. Additionally, pilots were to be made aware of any country differences from ICAO standardized phraseology. The FAA/industry initiative on this was to identify the differences between ICAO phraseology and US phraseology.

The Call to Action and Zero Accidents are just two of many FAA/industry forums and work groups that have done an excellent job of identifying the problems. However, the solutions are yet to be implemented. All of these goals are achievable but have not been attained.

Regarding the need for a common language, English is the recommendation of the ICAO. It is only a recommendation and not a requirement.. The essential part of ICAO Annex 10: Aeronautical Telecommunications Section 5.2 Radiotelephony Procedures is:

The practicality is that, in many parts of the world, air traffic control is conducted in the native language and English is used only when non-native speaking pilots are involved. Controller proficiency is minimal, limited to aviation terms, and results in an inability to deal safely with any pilot controller operational scenario that is not routine, such as enroute weather deviations and diversion to alternate airports for mechanical or weather problems. When plain text communication is needed the systems break down. This is not only true on the controller side of the microphone, but also in the cockpit. Even in countries where English is adhered to, the language comprehension of many pilots from foreign countries is not adequate to deal with non-routine air traffic control situations.

There is a myriad of reasons why we have the current situation and a myriad of reasons why the system has not yet been corrected. But the aviation community can not wait any longer. The projected increase in traffic will put the air traffic system at critical mass, and in some locations, that is already the case. Nevertheless, we don’t have to wait for traffic to increase for the problem to become acute. It does not matter whether the traffic density is light or heavy or if the pilot and controller workload is light or heavy. Programs are needed to help pilots and controllers to become more comfortable with the use of English or else they will simply not use it.

It is essential that all users of the system recognize the need for an English language proficiency standard for pilots and controllers. This is an often-discussed goal that is politically difficult to implement. We urge the United States to take the lead in the development of a training program for English language comprehension that can be made available to pilots and controllers. It is realistic to suggest that an interactive computer program could be developed and be given the widest distribution at a very reasonable cost. It is logical that this training program should culminate in a test of pilot and controller proficiency, which is a goal that must be embraced.

Regarding the need for standard phraseology, it must be realized that the United States has not accepted many of the ICAO recommended phraseologies and has adopted unique phraseology. That is the reason the Zero Accident ATC Issues Workshop recognized the problem and accepted an initiative to identify differences between ICAO and US phraseology. Had this initiative been followed through, the extent of the problem would be evident.

An example is the use of "Taxi into position and hold" versus the ICAO standard terminology of "Line-up and wait." There are other examples and all were submitted to ICAO based on supporting rationale. The question is: Is that rationale still solid?

ALPA believes that the US must take the lead in this area also. A comprehensive review of the US exceptions to ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices on phraseology is needed. Clearly, it behooves the FAA to make every effort to conform to international standards so that our support of the use of English as the language for aviation has the highest credibility.

One of the ICAO recommendation (5.2.1.1.2) states that pending the development and adaptation of a more suitable form of speech for universal use in aeronautical radiotelephony communications, the English language should be used. ALPA believes that ICAO must review this recommendation. Is it realistic to expect that another form of speech can and will be developed? The FAA should propose that English be accepted as the language to use and that ICAO reword the recommendation that English is the standard. The goal would be to have the international aviation community realize that there is no alternative on the horizon and that resources must be allocated to train pilots and controllers. States must accept the concept of committing to the use of English as an investment in improving aviation safety.

ICAO must do all in its power to encourage aviation officials to consider the importance of safe and efficient aviation operation to the economic development of their countries. Aviation growth is fast out stripping the capability of the individual countries’ aviation infrastructure to provide safe and efficient services to regional and international air carriers. Immediate attention is required to assure aviation safety on the one hand and aviation’s support to the economic growth of the individual countries on the other. Better comprehension of English and greater standardization of air traffic control communications is a part of this broad outlook and an essential part of making air operations safer and more efficient.

In recent years, we have seen a number of programs undertaken each with the goal of identifying high priority safety initiatives which would lead to safety improvements. Since 1994, these programs have included:

• Secretary of Transportation Aviation Safety Action Plan
• FAA 90 Day Safety Review
• White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
• National Civil Aviation Review Commission
• FAA Safer Skies Initiative.

Each activity began with the goal of identifying and implementing those high priority safety initiatives that could lead to significant improvements in aviation safety. With the advent of each program, the aviation community responded and dedicated significant resources in order to participate in the program and to work towards that goal of identifying and implementing those high priority initiatives. Of the three items discussed in this testimony, only English language proficiency – communications was identified as a safety issue in any of these five programs.

Resources are limited. The aviation community should be encouraged to continue to focus on those safety items identified which, when implemented, will lead to safety improvements and a reduction in the accident rate. If the industry continues to have to divert resources and revise its work program in response to the latest media whim, it will be more difficult to achieve our goal.