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Thu Feb 10, 2005 4:58 PM ET
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By Deborah Charles
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - U.S. aviation officials failed to
respond to dozens of warnings of a possible terrorist threat
months before Sept. 11, 2001, according to a previously
undisclosed report by the panel that probed the attacks.
The report, which was recently declassified and obtained
by Reuters on Thursday, said federal aviation officials
reviewed 52 intelligence reports between April 1, 2001, and
Sept. 10, 2001, that warned about Osama bin Laden or al
Qaeda.
Most of the intelligence summaries created by the Federal
Aviation Administration's security branch dealt with
overseas threats, the document said. It noted there was no
evidence the FAA knew of a plot to hijack commercial planes
in the United States to use as weapons.
"Nevertheless the FAA had indeed considered the
possibility that terrorists would hijack a plane and use it
as a weapon," said the August 2004 staff report, which gave
more details on what the FAA knew than were included in the
Sept 11 commission's overall report released in July.
The staff report, not officially released but censored
and given to the National Archives, took the FAA to task for
failing to take steps to deter the attacks. The report was
first disclosed in The New York Times in Thursday's
editions.
It said FAA officials had enough information to hold
classified briefings between March 2001 and May 2001 at 19
of the busiest U.S. airports to warn of the danger of an
attack, including bin Laden's threats against aviation.
'SUICIDE IN A SPECTACULAR EXPLOSION'
The agency also distributed an unclassified CD-ROM
presentation to air carriers and airports citing the
possibility terrorists might conduct suicide hijackings, but
said "fortunately we have no indication that any group is
currently thinking in that direction."
The CD-ROM briefings said a domestic hijacking would be
difficult.
"We don't rule it out ... If however, the intent of the
hijacker is not to exchange hostages for prisoners, but to
commit suicide in a spectacular explosion, a domestic
hijacking would probably be preferable," the report cited
the CD-ROM as saying.
Still, it concluded that aviation officials did not
direct adequate resources or attention to the problem. At
the time, it said, the FAA seemed more concerned about
airport congestion, delays and safety than about security.
| An FAA spokeswoman said
the agency had been making improvements in aviation
security prior to the attacks.
"Without specific information about means and
methods, there was no way we could tailor the
countermeasures specifically to deal with the threat
that we learned about on Sept. 11," Laura Brown told
Reuters.
Before Sept. 11, the airport security system was
run by the airlines but overseen by the FAA.
After Sept. 11, the government ordered cockpit
doors hardened, took over screening of passengers
and bags at airports and coordinated "watch lists"
among intelligence agencies of known or suspected
terrorists.
The panel's account said prior to the attacks,
aviation officials had a false sense of security
because there had been no attack on U.S. soil and
the threat seemed to be overseas.
"The fact that the civil aviation system seems to
have been lulled into a false sense of security is
striking not only because of what happened on 9/11
but also in light of the intelligence assessments,
including those conducted by the FAA's own security
branch, that raised alarms about the growing
terrorist threat to civil aviation," the report
said.
(additional reporting by JoAnne
Allen and John Crawley) |
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