International Security
Domestic Security
Mail and Cargo
The FAA
Research and Development
Intelligence
Threat Notification
Treatment of the Families of Victims of Terrorism
National Will
Executive Summary
Examination of Policies and Procedures
Major Recommendations of the Commission

International Security

• The lead negotiating role in aviation security should be shifted from U.S. carriers to the Department of State.
  
• United States should continue to press vigorously for security improvements through the Foreign Airport Security Act and the Foreign Airport Assessment Program.
  
• The United States should rely on bilateral agreements to achieve aviation security objectives with foreign governments.
  
• The State Department should create the position of Coordinator for International Aviation Security and the President should nominate that office holder for the rank of Ambassador.
  
• The U.S. should continue to work through ICAO to improve aviation security internationally.
  
• The FAA should create an active formal technical assistance program to provide aviation security help to countries upon request and concentrate its efforts wherever the threat is greatest.
  
• The Summit Seven should amend the Bonn Declaration to extend sanctions for all terrorist acts, including attacks against airports and airline ticket offices.

• The FAA should seek the assistance of the FBI in making a thorough assessment of the current and potential threat to the domestic air transportation system.
  
• The FAA should initiate immediately the planning and analysis necessary to phase additional security measures into the domestic system over time.
  
• The FAA should take the necessary action to clearly define responsibilities under exclusive area agreements and contingency plans to ensure that existing problems are corrected and the contingent security system is capable of meeting the specified threat levels.
  
• The Congress should require criminal record checks for all airport employees. The legislation should identify certain criminal records that indicate a potential security risk and enable airport operators to deny employment on that basis.
  
• The FAA should determine the security features necessary for new airport facilities and ensure that such features are included in airport facility design and construction.
  
• The Commission endorses the recommendations of the Office of the Secretary of Transportation Office of Safety Review Task Force and recommends full implementation expeditiously.
  
• The FAA should eliminate the discretion afforded private carriers for reporting bomb threats and searches of aircraft and facilities, and require the immediate reporting of all threats to FAA, airport and public safety authorities, and recognize that public safety authorities have the responsibility for deciding whether and how searches should be conducted.
  
• The FAA should change the minimum training requirements for ground security coordinators so that minimum training periods are in line with the amount of material that has to be covered.
  
• The FAA should establish and apply standardized testing requirements for ground security coordinators and expedite the development of standards for actions to be taken prior to each flight.
  
• The FAA should require carriers to assure that all baggage associated with passengers who meet FAA's criteria as possibly having explosive devices in checked baggage, are subject to security controls and then are not carried unless the passenger is on board the aircraft.

• The USPS should effect a regulatory change redefining the category of mail "sealed against inspection" to include written materials and those parcels below a specific weight.
  
• The air carriers must be initially responsible for any screening of air mail.
  
• Any screening of mail should be instituted first at "extraordinary security measures" airports and then phased in at other airports as the threat warrants.
  
• The FAA Part 109 program should be replaced. Instead, responsibility for screening of cargo should rest with the air carriers and procedures should correspond closely with those measures pertaining to checked baggage.
  
• The FAA should foster research and development of a technology designed to screen cargo for explosives; until this system is developed, interim screening measures must be instituted.
  

• The FAA must begin to develop stronger security measures for controls over checked baggage, controls over persons with access to aircraft, testing of security systems, the use of modern X-ray equipment, and the pre-screening of passengers.
  
• The FAA must take the lead in stressing the role of human factors in the security equation; training must be improved.
  
• The FAA Administrator should establish on office of security reporting directly to him.
  
• The Secretary of Transportation should appoint, on an interim basis, a Secretarial Assistant Security for Aviation Security and Intelligence. The Secretary should obtain legislative authorization to appoint an Assistant Secretary of Transportation of Security and Intelligence and authorize this official to develop an aviation transportation security policy and long-term strategy for dealing with a potential increase in the threat.
  
• The Secretary of Transportation and the Administrator of FAA should ensure that the necessary resources are provided to fully staff the respective security offices, both at the headquarters and field levels.
  
• The FAA resources currently in place at the major domestic airports, as well as overseas, should become the accountable entity for security-the federal security managers.

• FAA should undertake a vigorous effort to marshal the necessary expertise to develop and test effective explosive-detection systems.
  
• The FAA should establish an expert panel of persons from the national laboratories, other government agencies, academia and industry to oversee the design and development of this high priority initiative.
  
• The FAA should undertake an intensive program of research and experimentation with the structure of aircraft to determine the kind and the minimum weight of explosives which must be detected by any technology.
  
• In the interim, the requirement for widespread use of present TNA equipment should be deferred while the technology is developed further.
  
• The FAA should conduct research to develop the means of minimizing airframe damage that may be caused by small amounts of explosives.
  
• To avoid the undesirable reliance on any single commercial source for TNA equipment, the FAA must make every possible effort to encourage the development of additional sources.
  
• FAA must think ahead and anticipate how to counter the next generation of terrorist weapons before they are used to kill innocent people.

• Policies and procedures should be put in place to ensure that international terrorism reporting received by U.S. law enforcement officials abroad will be shared with other members of the U.S. intelligence community, as well as the FAA where appropriate.
  
• The FAA and the FBI should work together, as is now planed, to assess the vulnerability of U.S. airports to the threat of terrorist violence. Additionally, the level of terrorist threat in the United States must be analyzed and monitored on a continuing basis to ensure the proper level of security at domestic airports, and the FAA and FBI should work together to arrive at the most effective method for this to be done.
  
• Consideration should be given to placing greater emphasis within the intelligence community on strategic (as opposed to operational) efforts, by developing a specific unit with limited day-to-day responsibility, whose principal function concerning terrorism.
  
• The function of the FAA's Intelligence Division, now located within the Office of Civil Aviation Security, should be moved to the Department of Transportation, where it will report directly to the Secretary through a newly created post of Assistant Secretary of Transportation for Security and Intelligence. This move should accompany the move of the security function.
  
• The Director of Central Intelligence should promptly designate one or more intelligence officers, from the Central Intelligence Agency or other appropriate intelligence agency, to serve in a senior capacity at the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Transportation. In doing so, the Director should consult closely with the Secretary of Transportation.
  
• All MOU's and written working agreements between FAA and the intelligence and law enforcement community members should be reviewed and updated where appropriate.
  

• The intelligence and law enforcement communities, and those that receive information collected or analyzed by those communities, should review their procedures to reduce to the minim the number of persons with access to information on civil aviation threats.
  
• The State Department Bureau of Diplomatic Security should daily transfer a copy of the content of the OSAC EBB to the Bureau of Consular Affairs, and that Bureau should establish a system of public access to that information.
  
• The U.S. Government should, as a matter of course and policy, consciously consider the question of notification and carefully review the factors outlined. The Department of State, and the Department of Transportation, should establish a process and mechanism by which clearly identifiable officials will consider when and how to provide notification to the traveling public.

• The State Department must quickly obtain from the airline in an aviation disaster a manifest with sufficient detail to permit the prompt identification of passengers. A regulatory or legislative solution is likely to be required. In the interim, the State Department should pursue agreements with individual carriers.
  
• The State Department should always contact the families of victims, even when the airline has made a prior notification of the deaths. In addition, it is essential for the Department promptly to provide a personal written notification.
  
• The State Department should, wherever possible, assign to each family one person, and an alternate, to act as designated liaison. Two separate 800 numbers should also be established, one just for the families.
  
• The State Department is encouraged to consult further with death and bereavement counselors to assure that the entire counselor services corps is sensitized to the demands posed by tragedies such as Pan Am Flight 103. The Department should consider supplementing its training programs by either (1) providing specialized training to create a team of "disaster specialists" to deploy immediately in a crisis or (2) securing outside experts to be brought in during the initial phases to assist counselor personnel.
  
• The State Department should dispatch at least one senior official from the Bureau of Consular Affairs to the scene of each and every terrorist disaster.
  
• The State Department should promulgate criteria for staffing disaster scenes that also define responsibility for these decisions. In the event of a disaster, the resources of individual posts must be monitored under these new criteria, and supplemented if necessary.
  
• The State Department should require that in any disaster at least one person be assigned the sole function of providing on site assistance to families who may visit, and be the ombudsman in matters involving local government authorities and social service agencies.
  
• The State Department should establish "crisis teams" to handle all aspects of a major disaster, to join in-country staff familiar with the local language, laws, customs, and personalities.
  
• The State Department should share with its embassy and consular posts any assessment of the Flight 103 experience and new guidance on response to terrorist disasters. This action needs to be complemented with clear direction, training and equipment support.
  
• The State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs should assign personnel qualified in terrorism cases to assist families in the recovery and disposition of remains and personal effects, and to act as their ombudsman with foreign authorities and agencies.
  
• The State Department should provide some ceremony appropriate to recognize the families' sacrifice. The Department should have discretion, in consultation with our Armed Services, to adopt appropriate ceremonial procedures compatible with the families' own preferences. Whatever the procedures, the Department must institutionally recognize the special status of U.S. citizens who are victims of acts of terrorism against this Nation.
  
• The United States should ratify Montreal Protocol 3 together with a supplemental compensation plan that would provide all U.S. citizens and permanent residents, for any international flight, full recovery of all economic and non-economic damages. Following ratification, the United States should commence a diplomatic initiative to increase the $130,000 limit on carrier liability.
  
• The Congress should enact legislation to require the FAA to commence a civil penalty proceeding whenever there is reason to believe that a carrier's violation of FAA requirements may have contributed to loss of life or serious injury. If the FAA so finds, it should be required to levy fines.
  
• The President should seek legislation to authorize and permanently appropriate funds to provide monetary benefits and tax relief for any American victim of an act of terrorism. The President may wish to consider a board to develop criteria for compensation in terrorist cases. One question at the outset should be whatever benefits should be made available retroactively for the victims of Flight 103.

• The United States must heighten emphasis on the second element of U.S. counterterrorism policy; that state sponsors should be made to pay a price for their actions.
  
• The United States must refuse to allow terrorist attacks to alter U.S. political and economic policies.
  
• The United States must improve human intelligence-gathering on terrorism, in cooperation with other nations.
  
• The United States should work with other nations to treat as outlaws state sponsors of terrorism, isolating them politically, economically, and militarily.
  
• The United States must develop a clear understanding that state sponsored terrorism threatens U.S. values and interests, and that active measures are needed to counter more effectively the terrorist threat.
  
• The United States should ensure that all government resources are prepared for active measures--preemptive or retaliatory, direct or covert-- against a series of targets in countries well-known to have engaged in state-sponsored terrorism.

• National will and the moral courage to exercise it are the ultimate means for defeating terrorism. The President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism recommends a more vigorous U.S. policy that not only pursues and punishes terrorists but also makes state sponsors of terrorism pay a price for their actions.

• With other nations of the free world, the United States must work to isolate politically, diplomatically and militarily the handful of outlaw nations sponsoring terrorism. These more vigorous policies should include planning and training for preemptive or retaliatory military strikes against known terrorist enclaves in nations that harbor them. Where such direct strikes are inappropriate, the Commission recommends a lesser option, including covert operations, to prevent, disrupt or respond to terrorist acts.

• Rhetoric is no substitute for strong, effective action.

• Commission's inquiry also finds that the U.S. civil aviation security system is seriously flawed and has failed to provide the proper level of protection for the travailing public. This system needs major reform.

• The Commission found the Federal Aviation Administration to be a reactive agency--preoccupied with responses to events to the exclusion of adequate contingency planning in anticipation of future threats. The Commission recommends actions designed to change this focus at the FAA.

• Pan Am's apparent security lapses and FAA's failure to enforce its own regulations followed a pattern that d for months prior to Flight 103, during the day of the tragedy, and--notably--for nine months thereafter.

The destruction of Pan American World Airways Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988, was the reference point for the mission of this Commission. Pursuit of the full story of Flight 103 led the Commission also to a series of conclusions on counterterrorism policy in general, as detailed in the section on National Will at the end of the main body of this Report.

Examination of Policies and Procedures

The Commission also conducted a thorough examination of certain civil aviation security requirements, policies and procedures surrounding Flight 103. It is a disturbing story.

Preventing Flight 103 Destruction
The destruction of Flight 103 may well have been preventable. Stricter baggage reconciliation procedures could have stopped any unaccompanied checked bags from boarding the flight at Frankfurt. Requiring that all baggage containers be fully secured would have prevented any tampering that may have occurred with baggage left in a partially filled, unguarded baggage container that was later loaded on the flight at Heathrow. Stricter application of passenger screening procedures would have increased the likelihood of intercepting any unknowing "dupe" or saboteur from checking a bomb into the plane at either airport.

The international criminal investigation has not yet determined precisely how the device was loaded onto the plane. Until that occurs and subject to the conclusions reached, the Commission cannot say with certainty that more rigid application of any particular procedure actually would have stopped the sabotage of the flight.

Enforcing Existing Regulations
This Report contains more than 60 detailed recommendations designed to improve the civil aviation security system to deter and prevent terrorist attacks. Before new laws are passed and more regulations are promulgated, existing ones must be fully enforced and properly carried out. The Commission emphasizes that no amount of governmental reorganization or technological developments can ever replace the need for well trained, highly-motivated people to make the security system work.

The Commission salutes the thousands of men and women in the public and private sectors of the U.S. civil aviation security system. The recommendations in this report are designed to help them perform their jobs more effectively. The Commission urges management to face up to the security system failures disclosed by this investigation.

Facts About Pan Am 103
A few facts can be stated with certainty about Pan Am 103. A terrorist element did succeed in having a bomb placed aboard the aircraft. That bomb blew the aircraft apart at 31,000 feet over Lockerbie, killing 259 persons on the airplane and 11 on the ground.

The criminal investigation has indicated that the bomb was placed in a radio cassette player and packed in a suitcase loaded into the plane's baggage hold. The Commission, therefore, was able to concentrate its investigation on security procedures for checked baggage.

Authorities also believe that the bomb was made of a very small quantity of semtex, a plastic explosive, and that it probably was placed aboard at Frankfurt, West Germany, where the flight began.

At the end of an October 1988 inspection of Pan Am's security operations at Frankfurt, the FAA inspector was troubled by the lack of a tracking system for interline bags transferring from other airlines and the confused state of passenger screening procedures. Overall, the inspector wrote, "the system, trying adequately to control approximately 4,500 passengers and 28 flights per day, is being held together only by a very labor intensive operation and the tenuous threads of luck." Even so, the inspector concluded, "it appears the minimum [FAA] requirements can and are being met."

Unaccompanied Baggage
Passenger/baggage reconciliation is the bedrock of any heightened civil air security system. Under current FAA requirements for international flights, implemented since Pan Am 103, every bag carried on an aircraft must belong to someone who is also on that flight.

A key focus of the Commission's inquiry was the FAA written regulation in effect in December 1988 that unaccompanied baggage should be carried only if it was physically searched.

When Pan Am Flight 103 pushed away from the gate at Frankfurt and again at Heathrow, on December 21, 1988, no one knew whether the plane was carrying an "extra" interline bag that had been checked through to Pan Am from another airline. Months before Pan Am stopped reconciling or searching interline baggage and began simply X-raying this luggage.

Records examined by this Commission indicate that Pan Am Flight 103 might have carried one such interline bag that did not belong to a passenger on the flight. While this extra bag would have been X-rayed, the explosive semtex cannot be reliably detected by X-ray used at airports.

Pan Am officials told the Commission that the FAA Director of Aviation Security had given the airline verbal approval to X-ray interline bags rather than searching or reconciling them with passengers. The FAA official denied this.

Passenger Screening
Passenger screening procedures required by FAA at Frankfurt and Heathrow included questioning to identify for additional screening those fitting a "profile" as most likely--knowingly or unknowingly--to be carrying an explosive in any manner, including checked baggage.

The subsequent FAA investigation of Pan Am 103 found that several interline passengers who boarded at Frankfurt were not even initially screened. Several others identified at the check-in counter for further screening did not receive that additional screening at the gate. A large container holding baggage waiting to be loaded on Flight 103 arriving at Heathrow from Frankfurt was left open and unattended for half an hour. At the time, however, that practice did not violate any FAA regulations.

Pan Am Security Violations
The FAA investigation of the Pan Am 103 disaster began immediately and concluded on January 31, 1989. While the results were not announced for over three months, the FAA proposed fines totaling $630,000 against Pan Am for violations of regulations, both on December 21 and during the five-week period thereafter.

The FAA, significantly, did not cite Pan Am for substituting X-ray for interline passenger/baggage reconciliation. The official FAA report made no reference to the fact that the investigation had found that one interline bag loaded on Flight 103 could not be accounted for in any passenger records. The agency also noted in its announcement that none of the violations cited by its investigation had contributed in any way to the bombing.

Both the public and the regulatory spotlight were focused on just those types of security problems throughout early 1989. Congressional hearings were held. The Secretary of Transportation set up a task force expressly to look into the matter. The Commission would have expected the FAA to give top priority to security operations at the two airports that loaded and dispatched Flight 103.

Separate from the Flight 103 probe, the FAA found numerous security discrepancies by Pan Am at Frankfurt and London in January and February of 1989, but took no official action against the airline.

In a major inspection conducted May 8-23, 1989, the FAA found that major security violations still existed in Pan Am's Frankfurt operations.

One FAA inspector wrote in the report dated June 7, 1989, that while the operations of the four other U.S. carriers operating at Frankfurt were "good," Pan Am was "totally unsatisfactory."

Wrote the FAA inspector: "Posture [of Pan Am] considered unsafe, all passengers flying out of Frankfurt on Pan Am are at great risk."

When the FAA Associate Administrator with responsibility for the security division learned of the May inspection results, he called a June 14 meeting with Pan Am officials, who presented a plan for corrective action while contesting some of FAA's allegations.

Continuing Violations
Still, the security violations and deficiencies at Pan Am's Frankfurt station continued. An unannounced inspection in August of 1989 found that many of the same security problems from the May inspection remained uncorrected, especially unguarded airplanes and failure to search personnel maintaining the aircraft.

Pan Am came to a September 12 meeting with FAA on security at Frankfurt with yet another "action plan." A later gathering, however, included a private session between the FAA Administrator and the chief executive officer of the airline. That same evening, a team of high-level Pan Am managers, accompanied by FAA security inspectors, flew to Frankfurt.

Within one week, personnel changes at the station had been ordered and all security violations and deficiencies corrected. At the next FAA regular inspection, Pan Am at Frankfurt was rated a model station. This corrective action occurred nine months after the Flight 103 bombing.

Warnings of Bombing
The bombing of Flight 103 occurred against the background of warnings that trouble was brewing in the European terrorist community. Nine security bulletins that could have been relevant to the tragedy were issued between June 1, 1988 and December 21, 1988. One described a Toshiba radio cassette player, fully rigged as a bomb with a barometric triggering device, found by the West German police in the automobile of a member of the Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestine--General Command (PFLP-GC). The FAA bulletin cautioned that the device "would be very difficult to detect via normal X-ray," and told U.S. carriers that passenger/baggage reconciliation procedures should be "rigorously applied."

On December 5, 1988, an anonymous telephone caller to the U.S. Embassy in Helsinki, Finland, said that sometime within the next two weeks a Finnish woman would carry a bomb aboard a Pan Am aircraft flying from Frankfurt to the United States. The FAA Security Bulletin on the threat was issued December 7 and was redistributed by the State Department to its embassies worldwide December 9.

Passenger Warnings
At the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, the senior staff, with concurrence of the Ambassador, decided that the warning should be made public. Thus the Helsinki threat information was publicly posted at the Embassy on December 14 and was generally made available throughout the 2,000-member community of Americans, including news media and private contractor personnel, in Moscow. For these Americans, Pan Am through Frankfurt was the most accessible and most commonly used route to the United States.

The Commission found no passenger who changed his or her travel plans because of the Helsinki threat except one civilian who was scheduled to fly Pan Am to the United States through Frankfurt on December 16 and switched to a direct flight on December 18. While there were no passengers from Moscow on flight 103, the connecting Pan Am flight from Moscow was not scheduled to fly on that date.

Any distribution of threat information to one segment of the population, such as the posting of the Helsinki threat in Moscow, creates the perception of a "double standard"--the intentional choice to warn some people but not others. At the same time, the Commission believes that the public notification of aviation threat information is appropriate under certain circumstances, described in detail in this Report. Therefore, the Commission recommends that a mechanism be established to consider in individual cases when and how to provide public notification.

As for the Helsinki threat, Finnish police quickly determined that the call was unreliable. All subsequent investigations by other governments have also concluded that the call had no connection to Flight 103. The Commission found no evidence suggesting otherwise.

Aftermath Response
The Pan Am 103 families registered bitter complaints over the treatment they received from the State Department, and the Commission found that the Department was unprepared to respond effectively and compassionately to the largest aviation terrorist disaster in U.S. history.

The Commission found that the Department failed to obtain a list of passengers, develop a list of next of kin, and notify the families in a timely and compassionate fashion, and failed to staff adequately its consular services effort in Lockerbie.

Although the State Department appears to have begun to recognize the scope of its Pan Am 103 failures, it has only begun to institutionalize mechanisms that will remedy the problems. More must be done, and the Commission's recommendations help point the way.

The Commission firmly believes the U.S. Government owes victims of terrorist act directed against this country more than just processing the return of remains and personal effects, however important that may be. Accordingly, the Commission recommends that the United States extend financial benefits to these victims and develop appropriate ceremonies to recognize their sacrifice. The outdated Warsaw Convention should be revised to speed increased compensation to passengers families.

Keeping Pace with Terrorist Technology
The Commission also finds that the FAA's research and development program should be significantly intensified to keep pace with the changing terrorist threat to civil aviation. Under a contract awarded in 1985 to Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC), the FAA has purchased six thermal neutron analysis (TNA) machines to detect plastic explosives.

These machines, by design specification and by actual performance as observed by the Commission at JFK Airport in New York, will detect plastic explosives in an operational mode only in amounts far greater than the weight of the most sophisticated bombs actually used by terrorists. For example, the bomb that destroyed Pan Am Flight 103 is believed to have weighed half or less than the amount the TNA machine would reliably detect in an operational mode at an international airport.

Despite these limitations, FAA has announced a program to require U.S. airlines operating internationally to purchase 150 TNA machines (or the equivalent, although there is no competing equipment available) and to install them at 40 international airports at an estimated cost of $175,000,000. The Commission recommends that this program be differed, pending development of more effective TNA machines or an alternative technology.

Strengthening Security Programs
The Commission's examination of the security program applied by U.S. carriers at foreign airports revealed that much has been done to strengthen them since December 1988, especially at high threat airports. However, foreign governments have not imposed equally stringent requirements on carriers under their jurisdiction, and the U.S. has relied on weak international standards for foreign carrier security. As a result, there are significant imbalances. The Commission recommends steps to improve aviation security internationally and to promote the use of bilateral agreements negotiated by the State Department as the mechanism to achieve a consistently high level of international aviation security.

As part of its mandate, the Commission assessed the coordination and evaluation and dissemination of intelligence information collected. The Commission found that, because of the government's increased intelligence activities targeted at terrorism and the increased resources being devoted to intelligence functions by the FAA, the system is working reasonably well.

The Commission's review showed that no warnings specific to Flight 103 were received by U.S. intelligence agencies from any source at any time. It also showed that no information bearing upon the security of civil aviation in general and flights originating in Frankfurt in particular was received beyond that which was promptly disseminated to the FAA and, in turn, immediately to U.S. air carriers.

Major recommendations of the Commission

• The United States should pursue a more vigorous counterterrorism policy, particularly with respect to nations sponsoring terrorists.
  
• Congress should enact legislation to create a position of Assistant Secretary of Transportation for Security and Intelligence, an appointment with tenure to establish a measure of independence.
  
• The FAA security division should be elevated within the agency to a position that reports directly to the Administrator.
  
• Through existing FAA resources, the federal government should manage security at domestic airports through a system of federal security managers.
  
• The State Department should conduct negotiations with foreign governments to permit U.S. carriers operating there to carry out FAA-required screening and other security procedures. Airlines cannot be expected to conduct international negotiations in order to comply with regulations of their own government.
  
• The FAA should launch a top priority research and development program to produce new techniques and equipment that will detect small amounts of plastic explosives, operationally at airports. The program to require U.S. carriers to purchase and deploy the existing TNA machine should be deferred. However, the Commission expects the FAA to continue aggressively its new emphasis on upgrading the aviation security system's human and technical capabilities.
  
• Public notification of threats to civil aviation should be made under certain circumstances. As a rule, however, such notification must be universal, to avoid any appearance of favored treatment of certain individuals or groups.
  
• Victims of terrorist actions aimed at the United States Government should qualify for special financial compensation as victims of acts of aggression against their country.
  
• The State Department must take major steps to ensure that the families of victims receive prompt, humane and courteous treatment and service in overseas disasters.
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