Security lapses exposed

Airport security is failing to deter the terrorist

Chris Yates

COMPROMISED SECURITY CAN HAVE devastating results. This was revealed all too clearly at the end of 1999 when hijackers smuggled weaponry aboard an Indian Airlines flight from Kathmandu Airport in Nepal to Delhi in India. The hijackers held the plane, its passengers and crew for seven days before the Indian government capitulated to their demands. Only weeks later, the Ariana flight from Kabul to Kandahar was hijacked and flown to London Stansted, where the hostages were freed and many of the flight's occupants claimed asylum.

It appears in both cases the hijackers simply carried their weapons through screening checkpoints unchallenged. Airport security experts say that such incidents serve to illustrate how poor passenger and hand baggage screening is at some airports, and that unless steps are taken to bolster the checks in place at all airports, other security measures are futile.

In the US, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has started to address the issue, and is seeking powers to vet the growing number of independent security firms being hired to provide security services at American airports.

The FAA admits that in tests it has been found that screening personnel in Europe are "able to detect twice as many test objects as their counterparts in the United States." It suggests that this is because European security personnel are much better trained, have more experience and are higher paid.

0032869.jpg The FAA wants mandatory certification for companies hired by the airlines to perform security screening at airports. It also wants to establish uniform standards for security screening company performance, strengthen training and testing standards for screeners, and impose more stringent experience and training requirements on screening company managers and instructors.

"The airport security screeners play a crucial role in protecting the flying public," says FAA Administrator Jane Garvey. "This rulemaking will give us the tools we need to regulate screening companies and make sure screeners meet our rigorous standards for detecting dangerous objects and keeping those objects from being brought on board passenger planes."

The FAA initiative is being driven, at least in part, by a perception that in the constant drive to cut costs, passengers are being put at risk by carriers hiring so called "bargain bucket" firms to provide security services. This has led to several high profile instances of security screeners being employed with little or no training at minimum wage. According to the FAA, the average pay for screeners is US$5.75 per hour and some screeners do not receive fringe benefits. Turnover rates exceed 100% in many locations.

The proposed regulation would make screening companies accountable, along with air carriers, for screener performance and screener training. The FAA believes this would encourage firms hired by the airlines to employ qualified staff and train them effectively.

Security at US airports has been shown to be less than effective on several occasions. It was discovered in June last year that despite the FAA having spent in excess of US$100 million a year for the past three years on high tech solutions to the security conundrum, inspectors from the Department of Transportation (DOT) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) had successfully penetrated the major airports' security infrastructure many times unchallenged and been able to board parked aircraft.

Further evidence of lax standards came in August when a sting operation by the US Customs Service resulted in 56 employees of American Airlines and Lufthansa Sky Chef being arrested and indicted on charges of smuggling cocaine, hand grenades and other weaponry in passenger flights through Miami International Airport. US Customs Commissioner Raymond Kelly said, "This is about more than shutting off a major drug conduit to the United States. It's about protecting passengers from the risks of aircraft that have been tampered with and travel facilities in which security has been compromised."

The customs chief said the investigation had revealed a catalogue of security lapses. The weaknesses include 24-hour access to the airport by all employees, unlimited access to any and all aircraft without accountability and unlimited ability to depart the airport without accountability. Staff could gain access to secure parts of the airport even when off-duty, and carry contraband unchallenged.

Some US airports have set about raising standards individually. San Francisco introduced a safety and security programme in response to the OIG audit which it claims is among the most comprehensive in the world. The airport created a task force specifically to improve security access. The airport now has security guards stationed 24 hours a day at key airfield access doors. All have alarms and most have cameras which are connected to the emergency communications centre. Card and palm readers are used to identify movements, and to selectively restrict access.

The airport has also installed seven explosive detection devices (CTX 5000) and trace detectors at all security screening areas.

However, until this technology becomes the norm at more airports worldwide, many remain exposed to risk.ˇ

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Nepal suspended security personnel pending an investigation into how security safeguards were breached



ŠJane's Information Group 2000