For years, government watchdogs and outside experts have warned that
U.S. airport security is no match for an organized terrorist organization.
Loose enforcement of tarmac rules, limited background screening and a
poorly paid workforce all increased the chances that a coordinated attack
could succeed.
Study after study has shown that people with evil designs and the means
to make trouble could board an aircraft or hide enough explosives to blow
it from the sky. When Department of Transportation investigators tried to
breach security at eight airports three years ago, they succeeded 68
percent of the time.
In July, the Federal Aviation Administration said it would seek $99,000
in fines from American Airlines because of lax security. Terrorists
hijacked two of the airline's planes yesterday -- a Boston flight that
crashed into the World Trade Center and a Dulles International Airport
flight that slammed into the Pentagon.
On a single day in June 2000, the FAA said, American failed to perform
a passenger identification check on two flights, hauled unaccompanied bags
on five flights and failed to ask proper questions about baggage on two
flights. An American spokesman called the fine "excessive" and said the
problems have been fixed.
"The domestic and international aviation system has serious
vulnerabilities," Keith O. Fultz, assistant comptroller general in the
General Accounting Office, told Congress in 1996. "Protecting civil
aviation from a terrorist attack is an urgent national issue."
There is no indication how the hijackers chose the three busy airports
or the two airlines involved in yesterday's attacks. Federal investigators
provided no information about how the terrorists may have breached
security or transported what one passenger described in a cell-phone call
as knife-like instruments. Authorities discovered one flight's "black
box," which contains voice and data recordings that can provide clues to a
flight's last minutes. But pilots can turn off the devices.
Some veteran pilots and aviation experts reasoned yesterday that the
hijackers must have had flying experience to guide the jetliners to their
targets. In a courtesy extended widely, pilots from other airlines can
occupy a spare jump seat in the cockpit by showing an identification card
that can be counterfeited easily.
"You show your credentials, and you look around until you find a
captain who will let you go," said Clark Onstad, a former FAA chief
counsel, who added that visitors can reserve the jump seat in some cases.
"The pilots, most of the time, if they drive up to an employee parking
lot, they have these big briefcases and they get on the bus, they go to
the terminal, they are never screened."
Public studies have shown that people can slip into supposedly secure
areas and onto airliners. A 1999 Department of Transportation study cited
"piggybacking," the practice of slipping through a gate behind employees,
as the method of entry used most often. Investigators were successful 71
of 75 times.
Logan International Airport in Boston, where two of the jetliner
flights in yesterday's attacks originated, was cited for 136 security
violations from 1997 to 1999. The FAA fined the Massachusetts Port
Authority $178,000 for the breaches after the airport failed to screen
baggage properly or restrict access to secure areas and planes.
After yesterday's attacks, the FAA ordered all aircraft grounded
nationwide while it reviewed the situation and prepared for an orderly
resumption of traffic under tighter security. When commercial airplanes
begin flying again, more uniformed law enforcement officers will be
patrolling airports and no curbside check-in will be allowed, said
Transportation Secretary Norman Y. Mineta. An armed marshal drawn from
federal agencies will be aboard each plane.
Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-Tex.), a member of the Commerce, Science
and Transportation Committee and the Appropriations Committee, said
yesterday that Congress must find ways to plug security gaps involving a
wide range of airport service personnel, from runway workers to food
handlers. Answering significant criticism, Congress spent $550 million
from 1997 to 2000 on security efforts. An additional $600 million is
budgeted through 2004. Hutchison acknowledged that the systems failed.
The challenge is vast. Each day, nearly 2 million passengers depart
from 460 airports controlled by the FAA. On average, 35,000 to 40,000
commercial flights take off and land -- and 4,000 to 5,000 are in the air
at any one time. Planes must be moved, cleaned, fueled and supplied with
food and other provisions. Passengers and luggage must be channeled and
screened -- all with the clock ticking toward departure time.
"It's very easy to have someone get on a plane and wreak havoc," said
Harvey W. Kushner, a Long Island University professor and terrorism
consultant to several federal agencies. "The security at airports is
pathetic."
The last hijacking of a plane in the United States occurred in 1991,
when a California man, upset that he was forbidden to smoke during a
90-minute flight, tried to commandeer the plane by claiming to possess
explosives. Testifying before Congress last year, Gerald L. Dillingham,
the GAO's senior air transportation expert, spoke of a later hijacking in
the Philippines that seemed to portend trouble. He said it was meant as a
dry run for a simultaneous assault on U.S. airliners in Asia.
"The trend in terrorism against U.S. targets is toward large-scale
incidents designed for maximum destruction, terror and media impact --
exactly what terrorists intended in a 1995 plot to blow up 12 U.S.
airliners in a single day," Dillingham said. "Concerns are growing about
the potential for attacks in the United States."
Dillingham criticized the FAA for failing to heed repeated warnings
about airport security -- warnings sounded by two presidential commissions
and numerous GAO and inspector general reports.
Security at U.S. airports is provided by a variety of agencies and
private security concerns. There is no centralized federal command. When
it comes to monitoring passengers and their baggage, the airlines
themselves are responsible.
"I feel nothing but frustration, because the issue of who should
provide airport security has been raised time and time again," said
Onstad, the former FAA chief counsel. "It is the only place in America
where law enforcement has been delegated to private companies: the
airlines."
Onstad spoke of poorly trained and paid screeners who operate airport
X-ray machines and metal detectors. It is a tedious job in which equipment
designed for earlier challenges -- preventing passengers from carrying
metal guns and knives -- is no match for a calculating terrorist.
"The airlines are not the 82nd Airborne," Onstad said. "They catch the
insane, they catch the sloppy and they catch the ignorant, but they're not
going to catch a sophisticated terrorist."
Even the newer sensing machines in some airports are only as good as
their handlers.
"Testing shows that screeners do not detect as much as they should,"
said John Anderson, a senior GAO official who oversees transportation
studies. "Very often, folks that work at the fast-food restaurants at the
airports make more money than the screeners."