Page 17A

Too timid on air safety

For weeks now, President Bush and Congress have been promising the nation a safe and secure air-travel system as an antidote to the glaring failures of Sept. 11. But with each passing day and each added detail, the sweeping reforms promised look more like a patchwork makeover of the current mess.

Under Bush's plan, as it stood Thursday, baggage screeners who serve on the front line of air security would remain employees of private companies -- long criticized as one of the system's worst frailties. Under the Senate's security bill, those workers would become federal employees. That's a good start, but one quickly obliterated by the fact that they would come under the Department of Transportation, the parent of the agency most responsible for the system's miserable failures.

If the front-line workers aren't of the caliber to keep deadly weapons or explosives off planes, then no matter the other changes, the system will fail. And if the lead agency has already failed repeatedly, why rely on it to succeed now? In failing to change air security at its core, national leaders are missing an opportunity borne of the Sept. 11 tragedies.

Fashioning the details of security bills will take time, as will making the drastic changes needed. But neither can be tackled before the president and congressional leaders map out guiding principles.

Among them:

* A fresh start. Trying to build on a system that has been immune to criticism for decades is foolish. For years, government audits and investigations have faulted private baggage screeners for missing loaded guns, simulated bombs and undercover investigators who sneak into secure airport facilities. None of it has spurred change.

* A strong leader. One person who commands government resources and public confidence needs to take charge of all security functions, which are now spread among the Federal Aviation Administration, airlines and state and local airport authorities.

* A police function. Air security is a law-enforcement function and that should be the central mission of the agency in charge. The Department of Transportation's inspector general last month called for placing responsibility in an agency that maintains close ties to the intelligence community and has the ability to revise procedures without a lengthy rule-making process. Neither the FAA nor its parent, the DOT, fills that bill.

* A willingness to spend. None of this will come cheap. Government audits have found for years that the minimum-wage pay of security screeners was a major reason for high turnover, low morale and poor performance. Training and pay for 28,000 new federal screeners would be $1.8 billion a year, the DOT has estimated. A cadre of air marshals would cost more than $1 billion a year.

Yet never again will the public be more amenable to paying for the necessary changes. Even so, some airlines still are balking at increasing passenger ticket fees to cover improved security, and some in Congress are buying their rhetoric. They're squabbling over a trivial fee increase of less than $2.50 per one-way flight, which may not be enough.

While some proposals -- increasing armed air marshals and securing cockpit doors -- will give a quick boost to safety, it's time for a fresh start.

There is both a need and an opportunity here to scrap the failed system and build something that works. If the government fails to seize the moment, the public will have little incentive to fly.