TESTIMONY OF PAUL HUDSON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AVIATION CONSUMER ACTION PROJECT

BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY POLICY, NATURAL RESOURCES AND REGULATORY REFORM OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. DOUG OSE, CHAIRMAN

HEARING ON FEDERAL REGULATIONS NEEDED TO ENSURE AIR SECURITY

RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ROOM 2154

November 27, 2001

Good afternoon Chairman Ose, Congressman Tierney and Members of the Subcommittee.

My name is Paul Hudson. I am executive director of the Aviation Consumer Action Project (ACAP), a nonprofit organization, which since 1971 has acted as a voice and ear for the public on major aviation issues. ACAP has been a national advocate for strengthened aviation security measures since the 1980's and has been a member, representing the general public on the FAA's Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) and its Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee since 1991. In 1998 and 1999, I co-chaired the ASAC working group on Public Education. Since 1989, I have testified before Congress and two presidential commissions over a dozen times on aviation security representing ACAP and previously, the Pan Am 103/Lockerbie relative organizations. Since September 11^th, I have served on an FAA Ad Hoc Aviation Security Subcommittee evaluating new aviation security technologies and procedures and on a team evaluating Airport Screening.

Thank you for holding this hearing today. With the enactment of legislation last week federalizing the aviation security system and creating a Transportation Security Administration, it is very timely and essential to consider the next steps to improve aviation security to a level needed to thwart or deter more terrorist attacks such as those that occurred on September 11^th and to restore public confidence in air travel and the safety of locations on ground that could be subject to attack using civilian aircraft.

I will not repeat my testimony to the House Aviation Subcommittee on September 25^thor our advice and comments to the House Senate Conference Committee on the aviation security legislation earlier this month, but would refer the subcommittee to our web site at www.acap1971.org where copies are available. Instead I will concentrate on the specific regulations and details that are needed to make aviation secure.

However, I need to first mention the goals that must be kept in mind. First, to deter or prevent a repeat of the 9/11 attacks or any variation thereof, whereby US civilian aircraft are used as weapons of mass destruction. Second, to protect air transportation which is an important part of the nation's infrastructure and way of life.

As we go through the process of security regulation, we need to keep in mind a unique feature of this type of regulation: That the details of security regulations are secret. Therefore it is essential that there be a very high level of oversight by Congress and that the new Transportation Security Advisory Committee have effective public members, as the normal public scrutiny, industry peer review and public comment process for other types of regulation does not apply in this field. Otherwise, egregious policies, such as permitting passengers to carry box cutters and knives up to 4 inches on airliners, failure to check passengers against terrorist watch lists or provide a high level of scrutiny to passengers meeting terrorist profiles (that played a role in the failure of aviation security on September 11^th), could potentially be repeated. Moreover, the FAA practice of granting largely unrestricted waivers and exemptions to air carriers, airports and others is likely to continue as such practices are deeply imbedded in the current aviation security and DOT/FAA regulatory culture.

The first test of whether aviation security will be improved to level needed will be the people the Administration appoints to lead the effort. The second test will be what those people do, particularly the key areas of security regulations and standards. The third test will be the performance of the new agency in the coming months, and the final test will be whether additional large scale aviation and transportation terrorism is prevented.

In addition to the basic requirements in the new law that screeners and most other security personnel should be US citizens, proficient in English, pass criminal history checks, physical and mental tests, some additional criteria should be national security background checks (especially for supervisory employees and nationalized US citizens).

With pay and benefits having been effectively tripled for screeners, hiring can and should be on a competitive basis with only the best being hired for training, only those who meet high standards surviving training, only those who pass a probationary period being retained.

There should be a minimum of 30 days training for all security personnel or 175 hours. This compares to prison guards, military personnel, flight attendants and even police officers, who generally meet or exceed this amount of training and are paid comparably.

Training needs to include screening and searching of baggage, searching of passengers, questioning of passengers. Air marshals need a different type of training but no less and perhaps more extensive.

At present, proficiency tests are inadequate and occasional spot testing fails to maintain a high level of alertness and seriousness. The current system fosters boredom, constant small talk and social chit chat among screeners, and a general lack of seriousness and competence, all of which is noticed by passengers and undermines public confidence and well as the actual security of air travel security.

A universal, in depth screening system should be used in the future. Such a system could have the following features: a) A second screening of 10% of all passengers/carry-ons on a random basis, plus selectees (at least another 10%) (this would provide continuous quality control for the main screening checkpoints and would quickly weed out incompetent or tired or impaired screeners); b) hand searches of all passengers meeting selectee criteria plus a random group, plus hand searches of their carry on baggage; c) questioning of a selection of passengers (at least 5%) most of whom would be advised in advance to report early for security checks. Recently, a second search was done at a gate in Chicago prevented a passenger from carrying on board 7 knives, a stun gun and a can of pepper spray in his carry on bag.

The analogy is that of the triple seal on medicine containers first developed by Johnson & Johnson , the maker of Tylenol after incidents of tampering and poisoning threat to destroy the brand and the company. The triple seal is effective and highly visible to the consumer. No fancy explanation is really needed, and it has acted as a deterrent as well as a preventive against tampering, terrorism, and blackmail of drug companies.

Cockpits need to be triple sealed and secured with both passive measures and especially until they are in place with armed security, using flight crews and properly trained state and local law enforcement officers as temporary sky marshals.

Reduction of carry-on luggage to levels at which screening check points can reliably detect at least 95% of prohibited items should be required immediately to mitigate against the risk of more airliner hijacking. Reductions to date are not sufficient.

Frequent testing of screening check points with red teams and with test object exercises, as well as proficiency testing is vital to maintaining high standards of competence, readiness and alertness. Screening personnel need to be rewarded for superior performance and penalized for inferior performance. Also competition between screening teams, and esprit de corps needs to be fostered. These methods and especially war games are used by the military, to maintain and improve readiness and efficiency, and should be adopted for screeners. Unlike law enforcement officers or even most security guards who often face criminal situations, most screeners will never come face to face with a terrorist. Only with testing and anti-terrorist gaming methods can we expect screeners and their supervisors to reach and maintain a high level of competence and alertness.

A model aviation security program and training facility should be established at Reagan National Airport and all personnel should initially go through the same training and testing program. In this way a truly national standard and high level system can be established. This airport is currently operating well below capacity due to the need for extra high security to protect the nation's capital. It has the features needed for such a program and facility.

Biological technologies such as fingerprint scanners and face recognition have a role to play in enhancing transportation security, particularly for access of employees to sensitive areas in airports, however they should not be used to enable passengers to bypass or avoid standard security checks.

Some airlines and security ID firms are pushing the use of ID cards with biologic identification information encoded in them (smart cards). The basic problems are they are only as good as the methods used to initially establish ID, and there is presently no real time capability to check names against data bases such as terrorist watch lists.

Accordingly, smart cards must not be issued to passengers, contrary to what is being advocated by some, because smart terrorists will be able to obtain them and use them to bypass most or all security. We know that the US is faced with smart terrorists who often have good ID , that terrorists and many criminals are adept at identity theft (several of the 9/11 hijackers are reported to have used this method, and the most notorious terrorist now in US custody, Ramzi Youssef, is suspected of having stolen the identity of a British resident), document forgery, and the creation of fictitious identities. Some terrorist cells are known to use credit card fraud as a way to support themselves.

Smart ID cards may have some use with employees, but even here caution is needed in that they should not be used to bypass security (only for additional security), since there is always a risk they may go over to the Adark side. At present, there are reported to be over 40 pilots on the FBI terrorist wanted list, and US based terrorists have been discovered with airport ID that would allow them access to airliners. After 9/11 box cutters were reported discovered on several airliners flying out of Logan Airport. Employee corruption, smuggling, theft and other criminal conduct is a known problem at a number of large US airports.

The 19 Sept. 11^th hijackers are reported to have had generally clean criminal history records, to be foreigners from the Middle East (16 from Saudi Arabia, others from Tunisia, Egypt, all US allies), radical Moslem men, eight with pilot training, between the ages of 21 and 34, and all with US State Department Visas, and passports. Some had US driver's licenses, Social Security Cards, pilot licenses, frequent flyer cards and bank cards. The reported leader also had a graduate degree in city planning. And an associate of the 9/11 terrorists arrested in Britain is reported to be a commercial pilot.

Other master terrorists have often had engineering backgrounds, some like the Pan Am 103 terrorists were foreign airline security personnel, others like the Air India bombers were respected businessmen (Sikhs who were long time Vancouver, Canada residents), or decorated ex US military personnel (e.g. Timothy McVeigh). Barring some very legally questionable profiling and discrimination based on national origin, religion, age, sex, educational background, etc., the typical smart aviation terrorist of today would qualify for and probably obtain a smart ID card to avoid airport security checks, if they were made available.

The argument that we need to pre-clear a large group of passengers (some advocates of smart cards suggest pre-clearing tens of millions of frequent flyers) so we can concentrate on a smaller group of non-cleared passengers is specious, because the history of aviation security indicates this does not occur, for cost and commercial convenience reasons. Moreover, the risk of giving smart terrorists little or no security checks is far too great.

Finally, a smart card issued to certain frequent flyers is reverse or positive profiling, and profiling has generally been a failure in aviation security, particularly when used for anti-hijacking security. Prior to 1970 the anti-hijacking profiling system then in place was completely ineffective to prevent nearly one hijacking per week, versus the success of universal security screening with X-rays and metal detectors that deterred or prevented most US domestic airliner hijackings as soon as the system was installed.. The failure of CAPPS to stop any of the 19 Sept. 11th hijackers should give pause to anyone even contemplating such systems to be anything more than an auxiliary to a universal security system. Profiling also failed in the case of the Unabomber even after six years of serial bombings.

Hardened cargo and baggage containers should used on an expedited basis. This technology has been well tested and is ready for deployment. Its deployment would mitigate or prevent airliner bombing to a large degree, especially if coupled with check baggage and cargo screening.

Center fuel tanks should be inerted. This measure would also prevent accidental explosions of these tanks as happened in 1996 with TWA 800 and earlier this year in the Far East. The FAA is presently considering such a measure, and it has been studied at length by two industry task forces (in 1998 and 2001) who both found it to be technically feasible. It is presently pending before the executive committee of the FAA Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC). This is also mature technology that has been used in military aircraft for decades. ACAP originally petitioned the FAA to mandate this technology in the mid 1980's.

Banning of unscreened mail and cargo over 12 ounces unless contained in a bomb resistant container on all passenger airliners. The ban was instituted during the Gulf War and was in place from Sept. 12 to 17^th, 2001, when it was replaced with enhanced know your shipper regulations. The current FAA policy is inadequate. Technology for screening cargo is available and needs to deployed if airliners are to safely carry mail and cargo over a certain weight known to be sufficient to bring down an airliner with a bomb.

Passenger Bag Matching is still a valid method to prevent aviation bombings by a terrorist planting a bomb in checked luggage (the method used on the Lockerbie bombing and at least four other airliner bombings that killed all on board the airliner). Notwithstanding the suicidal nature of the 9/11 attacks, there is no history of terrorists engaging in suicide bombing attacks by planting a bag in their checked luggage and then boarding the aircraft. Bag matching computer technology is available and is used by some airlines now. Bag matching has long been used on international flights and studies indicated that the expense and delay of this measure would be minimal. Bag matching should also be extended to ensure that passengers who exit the airliners at intermediate stops and do not reboard, have not left checked or carry-ons on the aircraft.

Explosive Detection Equipment for Screening Checked Baggage needs to be expedited with regulations if necessary to ensure that there is sufficient equipment in place. This may involve requirements for the CTX 5000 by INVISION, now the only machine really in use, to be manufactured by more than one company at more than one factory.

Until this or better equipment is available at all airports, temporary regulations need to be issued providing for spot hand searching, use of advanced X-rays, and baggage limitations.

The most serious failure of air security that allowed the 9/11 attacks to be successful was the failure to anticipate and plan for and implement measures to prevent a suicide hijacking of airliners using well trained terrorists, some with pilot training as weapons of mass destruction. In all my years attending meetings and listening to security experts I never heard the possibility of a 9/11 type attack ever even mentioned. We cannot afford to just fight the last war and fail to take measures to prepare for or thwart the next type of attack. While it is true that we cannot anticipate, plan for or prevent every type of attack, we can plan for those that are believed to be most likely and are major threats to US national security (i.e. those involving killing thousands to millions and destroying key national and economic assets). Since the 9/11 attacks, much more is now known about about such likely future major terrorist threats. These new major threats in my view are:

1) Use of small aircraft to spread biological or chemical aerosols in urban areas, with the potential for killing several hundred thousand to several million. This is in my view the most likely means for terrorists to top the 9/11 attacks. We have reason to believe they were considering or planning such attacks, and we of course have already been attacked by weaponized anthrax in the mail. Hundreds and perhaps thousands of young men from Middle Eastern countries have received pilot training at US flight schools, generally with no criminal history or security (ads for US flight schools are reported to have recently been discovered in bin Laden terrorist facilities in Afghanistan). News reports have said that 44 pilots are on the FBI terrorist suspect list.

According to the Johns Hopkins Biodefense web site (citing US Congress Office of Technology Assessment and UN agency analyses, and referenced by the CDC) 50 kilograms of aerosolized anthrax (1 gram contains a reported 1 billion spores), as has already been used against the US Government and media, spread by a small aircraft for less than a mile could be expected to create a deadly aerosol that would kill 100,000 to 3 million in a metro area of 5 million. As there is no system of detectors, we would not know an attack occurred until the people fell ill with inhalation anthrax, which is often to usually fatal. In sum, we know terrorists have these weapons and that our defenses are inadequate to nonexistent, and that they are capable of obtaining and using small civilian aircraft in the US. What we do not know is how much they have and whether it will soon be dispersed by aircraft or some other means.

2) Use of larger non-airliner civilian aircraft to crash into US landmarks, nuclear facilities or mass gatherings.

Nuclear power plants are potentially vulnerable to attack by air. A typical nuclear power plant contains about 1,000 times the radioactive material of a Hiroshima size bomb, so even a 1% release to the atmosphere could do enormous damage.

The security on non-airliners in the US is minimal to nonexistent. Accordingly, the main security currently is the US Air Force, which is spread much too thin for good air cover protection over likely targets.

3) Use of civilian aircraft to deliver nuclear or radiation bombs over US cities. A present overt threat has been made by the bin Laden terrorists and the Taliban leader backed up by some intelligence reports; the nation's top leaders say it cannot be completely discounted. A nuclear device would probably do the most damage to the widest area if exploded in the air over or near a major city.

4) Use of large (tractor trailer trucks) with fertilizer bombs to wipe out airports or other ground targets up to several square blocks. The use of truck bombs is presently the third most deadly form of terrorism actually used, we know now that some suspected terrorists in the US have obtained commercial trucking and even hazardous materials licenses which would allow far more powerful bombs to be used.

5) Use of Stinger missiles against airliners on take off or landing. Hundreds of such weapons are reported to be on the black market or in the hands of terrorists.

All of the above scenarios could result in thousands to millions of deaths and injuries, some could make certain urban areas uninhabitable for many years, and all would cause the US and probably the world economy to go into a deep recession..

Terrorists tend to want each act to match or exceed the ones before it, otherwise it will not shock or terrorize the population.

The ways to mitigate against the new major threats are to restrict general aviation and cargo flights near urban areas until security measures are in place to identify both aircraft and pilots as friendly, to deploy detectors or use targeted geographic testing to detect biological and chemical attacks when they occur, to update and test evacuation and other civil defense plans for major cities, to stockpile antidotes and protective devices for known forms of biological, chemical or nuclear attack for the general population with necessary public health resources, to provide for public education to prepare and protect the public from such attacks and avoid panic, and to provide military air cover over likely target areas.

Such measures in peacetime seem inconvenient, expensive and unnecessary, but in wartime, such measures are not only appropriate but may well make the difference between victory and defeat in the war between the US and international terrorist organizations and their supporters. The US faces a global war against elusive decentralized terrorist organizations with a multimillion dollar and person support structure, and several thousand terrorists, coupled with the need to defend against civilian targets both at home and abroad. This is unprecedented in our history and will require both strong offensive and strong defensive measures.

The US is no longer at peace. We are not faced with some bothersome terrorist threats and the remote possibility of more serious threats in the future. In light of the Sept. 11^th Attacks and subsequent events, we must presume that terrorist threats of mass destruction and more aviation terrorism are likely and plan accordingly.

The old approach of discounting more serious attacks as too unlikely to seriously plan for must be discarded. The usual calculus of multiplying the likely damage times the likely risk of occurrence must be updated at the very least to increase the likelihood of major attacks on the US homeland by terrorists and also to increase the range of uncertainty in our estimates of the probabilities. The Government should not heavily rely on the opinions of terrorist experts as their prediction track record is very poor. War is inherently uncertain.

The public has entrusts the Government fight and win wars and protect the national security. A major portion of federal taxes are used for national security. In general the public is looking for leadership from the Federal Government, will follow its lead and put up with many inconveniences, especially if the present perceived incompetence and inadequacy of aviation security is ended. The new approach must be to plan for and defend against more serious attacks in anticipation that they will be attempted in the future, unless there are very strong defensive or deterrent measures in place. No new form of terrorism has not been repeated without strong defensive or deterrent measures in place. Deterrence against terrorist organizations has been nearly nonexistent, unlike terrorist nations that cannot hide once they are identified.

We must also assume that some attacks cannot be prevented and have contingency plans in place for civil defense measures to mitigate the physical, economic and psychological damage of such attacks. Such plans were in place in varying degrees during the Cold War and World War II.

Where national priorities are necessary due to limited resources, in my view the focus should be on defending against major threats (those that would kill thousands or millions or destroy national symbols or Government command and control centers), rather than defending against minor threats (those that would kill hundreds or less).

In conclusion, the challenges and terrorist threats we now face, especially in aviation security are immense, but the resources of this nation are also enormous. The consequences of a second failure to secure against the use of US civilian aviation by terrorists as weapons of mass destruction would be both devastating and unpredictable than the attacks of September 11^th. For the Federal Government not be place its full power and energies to secure the skies over America would be unforgivable.