August 9, 2002

Fixing The TSA
Shut It Down & Start Again. Before It's Too Late.
[Before It Destroys The Air Transportation System].

An Open Letter To President Bush and The Congress

(If you agree with these points, feel free to pass this letter on to your congressional representatives)

On the eve of the first anniversary of 9/11, it's time the Washington elite admitted the truth.

The Transportation Security Administration is a failure.

Unless the TSA's fundamental direction and structure are changed immediately, it will result in a system that gives the 9/11 terrorists their wish - a terrorized public and a deteriorating air transportation system. It is on the road to becoming an airport secret police, not a security organization.

The proof is incontrovertible, and the longer congress and the Administration heel to the dishonest and outrageous fantasy that all is well at the TSA, the less chance we have to retrace our steps and implement professional security at the nation's airports. The TSA is increasingly inflicting its sloppily-directed and ponderous mass on airports across the nation. Given events over the past six months, there is more than ample evidence that this FAA-In-New-Uniforms is fundamentally unable to do what it was intended to do.

Worse, the TSA itself has become a threat to the American public.

Yes, a threat. The burgeoning, out-of-control, and poorly-directed TSA is incompetently smothering the air transportation system. Not making it materially more secure, but simply choking it. It is becoming a clumsy juggernaut that has become a rogue bureaucracy (as we predicted) that is accountable to no one, and has taken on a life of its own. Furthermore, there is growing evidence that American citizens are being literally threatened for not showing the proper "respect" when being screened at airports. So let's stop the Pollyanna nonsense. This TSA is a failure. It was built on failure, and it cannot evolve into anything effective or positive for the nation's security.

Putting The Inmates In Charge. First, to be fair, the TSA was stillborn. It simply never had a chance to be what it was cracked up to represent. That's because congress and the Administration did not first clean house at the DOT/FAA after 9/11. They left the same people in charge - the ones who had ignored security threats, covered up failures, and repeatedly thumbed their noses at mandates to bring aviation security up to date. Run at the top by the very people who were in charge of bad security before 9/11, the TSA's chances of being anything different from the FAA were doomed from the start. Then the President administered the coupe de grace by putting a politically-connected incompetent in charge - John Magaw - who proceeded to irresponsibly create an empire that is terribly off the mark.

The TSA Is Already Contaminated Beyond Repair. Not only are most of the top officials at the TSA the same perpetrators of the pre-9/11 FAA security fiasco, but the hiring processes of the TSA indicate that sloppy work and political favoritism has run rampant, too. The TSA, far from being a new approach, simply became more of the good-ole-boy management empire that years ago rendered the FAA incapable of achieving its goals. As one example, there was Norman Mineta's former bodyguard who was put in charge of assuring that background checks were accomplished of all TSA employees. He was just removed from the post (not fired, just moved someplace else), under a cloud of "rubberstamping" applicants, and, in former work for the Commerce department, allegedly doctoring reports. Some news reports indicate that when this individual worked for the Clinton Administration, major mistakes were made in hiring people without the proper security clearances. With the arrival of the new TSA chief, Admiral Loy, the guy was moved to another department. But the damage done in possibly hiring the wrong people with the wrong backgrounds is still there, festering.

The Public Threatened By TSA. The willy-nilly rush to "do something" has backfired into the formation of a fearsome de facto security apparatus at the nation's airports where Stasi-like arrogance has filled the void created by the lack of a clear, defined set of objectives. There have been too many incidents where common citizens have been intimidated, and sometimes arrested, not for security violations, but for simply not being sufficiently cowed by the TSA. There have been more than enough such events to show that, far from being isolated incidents, they are instead an illumination of a TSA that has no direction, and is developing into a Gate Gestapo often with employees on a power trip who will tolerate no free-speech criticism from American citizens. Almost a year after 9/11, outrageous event after outrageous event show beyond doubt that the TSA has no clear concise management, and not even a clear direction regarding security standards. The result is a screening process where standards and goals from airport to airport are often confused, improperly applied, and inconsistent.

Again, the range of incidents reported are indicative of a "security" agency simply tossing untrained and poorly managed people into the screening process. Making it worse is the fundamentally confusing, ineffective and outrageous policy of "random" screening, instead of professionally identifying and anticipating threats. We even had the former vice president of the United States taken out of line to be wanded and patted down. Not once but twice. It's time the politicians admitted the truth here, too. This was just intentional "non-profiling." Al Gore was singled out for a media show, not for security. That only shows how mis-managed the TSA is right from the top.

Then there are the instances of intimidation of anyone who voices protest against what they, as free citizens, feel is out of line.

Like the woman escorted out of Portland Airport when she demanded to watch as screeners went through her purse.


The 80-year old WW-II veteran in Hartford who asked if the screeners going through his wallet expected to find a rifle. He was arrested for using the word "rifle" and - tellingly - the arresting officer admitted the man wasn't a threat. Okay, then why was he arrested? Answer: because he said something the screeners didn't like. That's Gestapo treatment, not security.


The woman who was forced to drink her own breast milk she was carrying on to an airplane for her infant. That is not security, but an indication of

 government-sponsored amateur thuggery. "You'll do as ordered" is the verbal and non-verbal message increasingly expressed by he barely-trained but now federalized screeners.


The woman with the GI Joe toy equipped with a 2-inch plastic replica of a rifle. This was deemed a dangerous object, and confiscated. That is not security. It is more evidence of a shortage of direction at the TSA.

Incidents where mothers are separated from their small children for "secondary" screening. Terrorizing families is not security.

Time To Stop This Idiocy. It clear beyond a doubt that the TSA is off in the wrong direction, run by the wrong people who have no real idea of what they need to accomplish. The bottom line of all this is that the TSA is not a security agency, but has been established as a self-feeding bureaucracy from whose failures and outrageous actions the American public have no redress. It is out of control. It is a threat.

What Must Be Done

Start Over. Politicians must face the fact that the TSA is a total misfire. It is just more of the pre-9/11 FAA, the one that ignored threats and incompetently managed airport security for decades. We must recognize that the TSA is billowing into something that cannot do the job it was created for. As a result, it must be stopped in its tracks right now, and rebuilt from the ground up. Trying to fix it will be impossible - it is an out of control rogue bureaucracy that is already too contaminated with the wrong management, the wrong direction, and the wrong leadership to ever be effective.

Define the Mission & Objectives. Aside from the objectives of taking sharp objects from passengers, the TSA has obviously had no really focused goals. (If they did, the above incidents would never have happened. If they did have clear, focused goals, John Magaw never would have been fired.) The TSA is running willy-nilly to look for sharp objects, instead of making our aviation system secure from the next wave of terrorism. The TSA must have a clearly defined mission before it goes ahead and throws phalanxes of people at airport screening points. What are the threats to airports? Where might they manifest now and in the future? What must be done to ensure that the public is safe from anticipated security threats, while at the same time we do not bow to terrorism by hamstringing the efficiency of our nation's air transportation system.

Establish Standards. On 9/11, the FAA's airport security management got away, literally, with murder. Failures in security, failures to meet deadlines, and even doctoring inspections were events for which the FAA was never held accountable. The TSA must be different. There must be zero tolerance of any security failures by TSA staff. Zero. The way it is structured today is the same as the FAA - no standards and no accountability. And when the screeners all become federal employees, we can expect the same mis-managed labor playpen that has developed at other government agencies. Accountability means that failure is met with termination. Lives are at stake here. The current TSA has zero tolerance of any passenger criticism. This must be replaced by zero tolerance of TSA failure.

Establish Certification of Management. The Federal Security Director program is a joke. Norman Mineta is appointing resumes to the position, and not necessarily people familiar with the unique needs of airport security. To do it right, every FSD must undergo testing and training in not only airport security but in the basics of airport and aviation operations before they are hired. A retired general may be a fine person, but that by itself does not indicate the skills, qualifications, nor the mindset needed for the FSD job.

Establish Strict Budgeting. The TSA must be held financially accountable for its expenditures. Currently, it has no accountability for the billions it is lavishing in all directions. A budget must be developed, approved, and monitored to maintain professional discipline.

Establish Outside, Independent Oversight. The TSA today reports to the same DOT that was responsible for the FAA's criminally-negligent security activities. There must be an independent agency - one free from political intervention - to routinely check and test the TSA's performance at every airport. Having the DOT monitor itself is exactly the reason that airport security was bad before 9/11, and the reason the TSA has become a loose cannon instead of a tightly-disciplined security apparatus. The corrupt system of having the DOT monitor the TSA, as they did with the FAA, threatens the safety of the American public.

Implement Total Event-Determination and Process-Mapping. The TSA is trying to find sharp objects. Real security is defending not only lives, but also protecting the viability of the institutions on which our society depends. At airports, security must include total awareness of all areas, and immediate identification of any events that may - may - be out of the ordinary. From that, a system of automatic process mapping of the response must be developed and in place. A simple example: a catering truck appears at the fuel farm. That's an event. The process would be to check it out immediately, with a pre-determined contingency response ready and on the shelf regarding attacks on that part of the airport facility. The current TSA is merely equipped to react to events after they happen, at best.

The Fat's In The Fire. Regardless of what the TSA may say, or what the Administration may argue, the TSA is not a security organization but instead has evolved into nothing less than the Department of Motor Vehicles from Hell, vainly trying to counter terrorism with overwhelming bureaucracy inflicted on the American people.

The leaders in Washington have the option of taking action now to redress something going terribly wrong, or they can take the cowardly option of refusing to admit that they have made a mistake.

Congress and President Bush have the responsibility to do the right thing, and that would be to stop this unfolding TSA burlesque, and implement a professional, non-political, and accountable security organization. The TSA is a proven failure. The nation is therefore still vulnerable to terrorism.

Real leadership is not just making decisions. It's having the integrity to admit when a decision was wrong.

The question is whether Congress and the President have that level of integrity.

© 2002 The Boyd Group/ASRC, Inc.

WASHINGTON, D.C., May 31, 2002 – U.S. Secretary of Transportation Norman Y. Mineta today announced the appointment of retired Coast Guard Commandant James M. Loy to the newly created post of Deputy Under Secretary for Transportation Security and Chief Operating Officer of the Transportation Security Administration.

In his new position, Admiral Loy will report directly to Under Secretary for Transportation Security John Magaw, the head of the TSA. The secretary's announcement was included in remarks he gave at today's change of command ceremony, when Admiral Loy was succeeded by Admiral Thomas Collins as Coast Guard commandant.

"Jim Loy is a world-class executive and an experienced transportation professional. TSA's already strong team will benefit from this phenomenal addition. Our mission, protecting every facet of America's transportation system, remains daunting," Secretary Mineta said. "But when individuals like these are willing to continue to serve their country, even formidable challenges become attainable. It is difficult to imagine a stronger, more experienced team to lead the TSA."

Magaw, the former head of the U.S. Secret Service and of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, praised Loy's willingness to continue his public service.

"All of us at TSA welcome Jim Loy to TSA as chief operating officer,'' said Under Secretary Magaw. "Admiral Loy has gained an international reputation for operational excellence and innovative leadership as Commandant of the Coast Guard. Jim brings his enormous talent to the TSA team to help this new agency meet our vital transportation security mission."

Admiral Loy, who retired today after 38 years of commissioned years in the Coast Guard, will take up his new duties after a brief vacation with his wife, Kay.

"I am honored that Secretary Mineta has provided me this opportunity for further service," Loy said. "I look forward to bringing my experience in management, security issues and the maritime domain to bear as the TSA grows from its transition phase to maturity. Along the way, I expect to foster close public-private partnerships with TSA's industry stakeholders in the longstanding tradition of the Coast Guard."

Loy, a native of Altoona, PA, graduated from the U. S. Coast Guard Academy in 1964 and holds masters degrees from Wesleyan University and the University of Rhode Island. He also attended the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and interned at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.