by Mark Phelps
What is the realistic likelihood of
your aircraft being targeted by a shoulder-launched
surface-to-air missile (SAM) in the hands of a terrorist?
After an Israeli charter airliner was unsuccessfully attacked
by such weapons in Mombasa, Kenya, on November 28, the threat
of man-portable air defense systems (manpads) has elevated
concerns about terrorists shooting at airplanes. A media blitz
raised the specter of Western airliners being blasted from the
sky.
Some have proclaimed that 11/28 will have
darker implications for the aviation industry than 9/11. Other
security analysts believe the threat is overblown, pointing to
what they consider more prominent concerns over possible
attacks on infrastructure and the availability of nuclear and
biological weapons of mass destruction. Meanwhile, corporate
pilots have been huddling– comparing notes and experiences to
assess their own vulnerability and what they can do to lower
their profile as a potential target–both within the U.S. and
in more remote areas of the world.
Manpads have been around since the Vietnam war. Primary
producers have been the U.S. (Stingers and their follow-ons)
and the former Soviet Union (SA-7, -14, -16, -18) and its
licensees. Typically, manpads are small rocket-propelled
warheads with heat-seeking sensors. They are designed to be
triggered by a trained operator from a tube-like, disposable
launcher and to follow the heat of a jet engine’s exhaust to
its source.
Handily portable at about 35 lb, including the launcher,
manpads are thought to be easily smuggled throughout the
world. Over the years, each new generation of manpads has
grown more capable. Once launched, a manpad’s missile moves
out at some 1,500 mph, though the weapons are generally
considered to be effective only on relatively slow-moving
targets at low altitude. Unfortunately, transport-type
aircraft in takeoff or landing configuration accurately fit
this profile.
Early versions of manpads topped out at a range of three to
five miles, with a ceiling of 10,000 ft. They were also
considered ineffective on targets below 150 ft. (That could be
what spared the chartered Israeli Boeing 757-300 operated by
the state airline Arkia. Its pilots reported that they saw the
two Vietnam-vintage SA-7 missiles pass off their wing just
after liftoff, before the Boeing 757 had reached 150 ft. The
airplane
 |
| A
C-141B Starlifter from McGuire Air Force Base, N.J.,
fires off a salvo of flares on its final pass over the
"danger zone." The training exercise allowed loadmasters
to use a new Plexiglas bubble to look for surface-to-air
missile plumes and allowed aircrew members to practice
evasive maneuvers. |
carried 261 passengers and 10 crewmembers.) Today’s
latest, most sophisticated manpads may be effective up to
15,000 ft with upgraded seekers designed to defeat the newest
countermeasures. Also, the SA-7s used in the Mombasa attack
apparently were not equipped with proximity fuses, which would
have detonated the warhead when the missile got within range
of the target without having to score a direct hit.
Among the confusion surrounding manpads is the incorrect
reporting of several attacks. According to Jane’s Intelligence
Review, some governments have reported manpad attacks that
were actually carried out using rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).
Most attacks on aircraft at low level–below 1,000 ft–were done
with RPGs rather than manpads, but they may have been
erroneously reported as missile attacks. It was RPG fire that
brought down two U.S. Army Sikorsky MH-60 Black Hawk
helicopters in Somalia in October 1993.
Another apparent misconception concerns the shelf life of
manpads. Some believe that the nature of the missiles’
batteries, propellant and seeker coolant limit their useful
life. But other experts contend that the weapons are
hermetically sealed for rough, battlefield conditions and
replacement batteries can be adapted from commercially
available units. With proper care, they say, a manpad can
remain potent for at least 22 years.
Dozens of countries have produced hundreds of thousands of
manpads over the past three decades. Experts differ on how
many of the Soviet-designed weapons may have been sold on the
black market, and how much they may cost. According to a
pre-November 28 article in the online magazine Salon, soldiers
of the former Soviet republic of Georgia seized a supply of
missiles during a 1998 uprising. Reportedly, Chechen rebels
likewise attacked and pilfered a Russian armory to equip
themselves with manpads to use against Russian helicopters.
Chris Hellman, a spokesman for the Washington, D.C.-based
Center for Defense Information, told AIN, “There are
credible reports that, after the fall of the Soviet Union,
Russian soldiers simply walked into their armories and took
whatever they wanted off the shelves to sell.” While conceding
that an accurate number is tough to assess, he said there
could be “tens of thousands” of Russian or license-built
SA-series manpads in the hands of so-called “non-state” or
guerrilla/terrorist groups. Hellman said manpads of Soviet
origin could be bought on the black market for as little as
$50,000 each. An editor for Jane’s World Armies told USA Today
that the price could be as low as $5,000 for someone with the
right connections. Jane’s Intelligence Review estimates that
manpads are now in the hands of up to 27 terrorist groups that
have the deep pockets, the connections or both.
Perhaps more ominously, American-made Stinger manpads–said to
be more sophisticated and effective than their Russian
counterparts–may also be available on the black market in
great numbers. From 1979 to 1988, at the height of the Cold
War, the U.S. supplied more than 900 Stingers to the Taliban
government in Afghanistan and its Al-Qaeda operatives who were
fighting the Russian army. What may have seemed like a good
way to cripple the then-Soviet military has come back to haunt
the U.S.
Political scientists call it “blowback,” and it’s been going
on since the beginning of technological warfare. In the 1930s,
scrap steel from Brooklyn’s demolished elevated-train trestles
was exported to then-friendly Japan, which used the material
in its military buildup. In the early days of U.S. involvement
in World War II, Brooklyn-raised Marines ducking incoming
Japanese artillery groused, “Here comes another chunk of the
8th Avenue el.”
An unknown number of Stingers remained unused against the
Russians in the 1980s and as many as 300 of the manpads have
found their way onto the black market. Despite an expansive
buy-back program initiated by the CIA in Afghanistan (which
drove the black market price as high as $100,000 each), some
believe that Osama bin Laden himself may be protected by a
circle of Al-Qaeda loyalists armed with Stingers.
The first reported attempt to use a manpad against a civilian
aircraft came in 1973, when Palestinian terrorists in Rome
were arrested before they could launch their weapons. In the
first successful attack, in 1978, an airliner was downed by a
shoulder-launched SAM over Chad. Jane’s Intelligence Review
reports at least seven fatal attacks on commercial aircraft
world- wide from April 1996 to October 2000. According to
Salon, U.S. government agencies estimate that, since the
1970s, at least 42 civilian aircraft have been hit by manpads–with
29 going down. The FBI claims some 550 people were killed in
those crashes. Hillman of the Center for Defense Information
said there is strong evidence that there have been
unsuccessful manpad attacks on civilian aircraft in Saudi
Arabia over the past few months.
Two other factors confuse the question of how many attacks
there have been on civilian aircraft by manpads. As reported
above, some of the aircraft may have been attacked by
rocket-propelled grenades or other ordnance; and the civilian
status of some aircraft is open to question. For instance, a
pair of C-130s shot down in Angola in December 1998 and
January 1999, killing 13, were chartered by the UN, but may
have been reported as military.
Although struck by an air-to-air missile, the Hawker 800
carrying Juvénal Habyarimana, the president of Rwanda, shows
what a manpad can do. In the late 1980s, the business jet was
flying over Angola when an Angolan MiG-23 pilot attacked it
with two heat-seeking air-to-air missiles. The first warhead
struck the right engine, tearing most of it from the mounts
and puncturing the pressure vessel. The second missile locked
onto the heat signature of the falling engine, which spared
the airplane and the president. After an emergency landing,
the Hawker was crated back to the UK and rebuilt to fly
another day.
Some years later, another Rwandan government business jet
wasn’t so lucky. A Falcon 50 operated by the African country
was downed by a political dissident using a shoulder-fired SAM
in April 1994, killing Habyarimana (and his counterpart from
Burundi) and helping to spark the savagely bloody Hutu-Tutsi
civil war. As best as AIN can determine, that’s the only known
case so far of a business jet being brought down by a manpad,
though numerous airliners and military aircraft have fallen to
SAMs. In fact, www.globalsecurity.org reports that 80 percent
of all U.S. fixed-wing aircraft losses during operation Desert
Storm came at the hands of manpad operators.
Manpads are out there and they’re deadly, so what’s a pilot to
do? A pilot wrote on the NBAA Air Mail Internet chat site:
“The ‘endgame’ as it’s called is the three to 10 seconds
during which the missile is in flight. You are not going to
maneuver a 2.5-g aircraft to defeat the threat! Knowledge is
the best defense. The envelope is three to five nautical miles
and
150 ft to 16,000 ft agl, and that bubble moves with you. If
hit, fly the airplane, assess what you have left and land
ASAP. The small warhead may not inflict severe damage, though
later missiles got larger warheads. Night works to your
advantage because it is difficult to aim the missile.”
Though not widely advertised, infrared (heat-seeking)
countermeasure equipment is available for business
aircraft–and is already in use. Gulfstream offers the BAE
Systems AN/ALQ-204 Matador, estimated to cost about $3.5
million, including installation and crew training. Gulfstream
said the system has been installed on seven of its aircraft,
as well as on some Boeing 747s and BAe 146s. On a Gulfstream,
the Matador system weighs about 350 lb and is claimed to incur
no aerodynamic penalty. It can be installed during a regular
maintenance visit, according to the airplane manufacturer.
The Matador is a “lamp based” system. That is, it uses a
matrix of heat transmitters to confuse the heat- seeking
sensor in the missile. One device used by military aircraft
uses burning phosphorous flares that are ejected in all
directions to fool the missile. This is considered impractical
for civilian applications, since the flares often start fires
when they fall to the ground. The most sophisticated systems
use lasers to deflect the missiles’ sensors. Among
manufacturers of countermeasure systems, there is disagreement
about how much sophistication is enough. Some say lamp-based
systems can do the job and lasers are too expensive. Laser
proponents say their systems weigh less, take up less space
and are capable of thwarting the most sophisticated manpads.
Among Russian-designed manpads, the SA-16/18 class is the
state of the art– said to have shot down the lion’s share of
allied aircraft lost during Desert Storm.
Meanwhile, manufacturers of countermeasures systems anxiously
await the reaction from airlines, hoping they will choose to
outfit their aircraft with anti-manpad technology. Of those
manufacturers, two Israeli companies are pressing to develop
civilian versions of their military systems. Rafael and Elta
are said to be adapting systems that could cost $1.5 million
to $1 million, respectively. Though airlines are the most
tempting market segment, bizav could also benefit.
|