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The Rapid Response
Team for Aircraft Security gave the following report on ways to improve
airplane security to Secretary of Transportation Norman Y. Mineta on Oct.
1.
Executive
Summary
1.
Introduction APPENDIX A Table of Recommendations APPENDIX C Unsolicited Proposals from Companies APPENDIX D Digest of Ideas and Suggestions from Private Citizens and Comments Received from Industry 1.
Introduction
The threat to aviation safety has changed, and so must our response. The events of September 11 changed forever our concepts of appropriate aviation safety. The use of a hijacked aircraft as a weapon requires a new strategy to ensure that the crew always retains control of the aircraft. In addition, the catastrophic destruction of lives and property has temporarily paralyzed America's will to continue flying. This is contributing to the disaster's adverse economic effects on the nation. To combat the new threat and restore public confidence in commercial aviation, this report documents our consideration of changes to aircraft design and operation. Recommendations are highlighted throughout the report. At Appendix A is an abbreviated table of immediate, short-term and long-term recommendations for all aspects considered. The time periods in our recommendations are "Immediate" meaning within 30 calendar days; "short-term" meaning up to 6 months; and "long-term" meaning 1 year or longer. At Appendix B you will find Options papers featuring the greater details of each aspect considered. Appendix C includes unsolicited industry proposals. Appendix D is a digest of ideas, comments, and suggestions from concerned private citizens and from industry. Back
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2. Personnel and Organizations Involved
The Secretary of Transportation quickly established a Rapid Response
Team to identify specific measures to improve aircraft security. The
Rapid Response Team for Aircraft Security considered onboard countermeasures
against hijacking, including actions to recover control in the event
of a flight deck breach by hijackers.
Rapid Response Team members include Robert W. Baker, vice chairman
of American Airlines, Robert Davis, former vice president of Engineering
and Technology for The Boeing Company, Patricia Friend, president of
the Association of Flight Attendants (AFA), and Captain Duane Woerth,
president of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA). We were supported
by staff from the Department of Transportation's Office of the Secretary
and Federal Aviation Administration.
We hosted an industry meeting attended by representatives from the
Air Transport Association, the Southwest Airline Pilots Association,
the Federal Express Pilots Association, the Allied Pilots Association,
the Association of Professional Flight Attendants, the Regional Airline
Association, Airbus Industries, and others. Before our meeting, ALPA
had initiated a series of telephone conference calls with many of these
same participants. That work resulted in a jointly submitted formal
report entitled "Security Issues Related to Flight Standards and Certification"
(September 25, 2001). In addition, The Boeing Company hosted several
meetings of technical experts. In addition several airlines and other
manufacturers have provided information for our consideration. Finally,
we have received and considered hundreds of recommendations from the
public.
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3. Defining Concepts
We began our work developing options to address newly identified risks
to aircraft security. Augmented by the suggestions and recommendations
received from all sources, we evaluated all approaches based on whether
they supported one or more of the following goals:
We have included all of the options considered at Appendix B although there are some options we do not recommend. Back
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4. Flight Deck Door Design
The multiple attacks of September 11, 2001, require that changes
be made to the flight deck door that will deny access to an intruder.
The safety requirements related to rapid decompression and emergency
access, however, must be considered. Flight deck doors on U.S. airline
aircraft were designed principally to ensure privacy, so that pilots
could focus on their normal duties, uninterrupted by activity in the
passenger cabin. Doors were not designed to meet significant security
threats such as small arms fire or shrapnel, or the use of blunt force
to enter the flight deck.
The prevention of unauthorized access can be improved by the simple
addition and use of a deadbolt, a cross-bar, a net or other barrier
devices. Our discussions and consultations with other aviation experts
indicate that this installation on any individual aircraft can typically
be accomplished overnight.
Besides affording an orderly work environment for the flight crew,
flight deck doors have other important safety characteristics. Current
design standards require that the door must not hinder emergency exit
from the flight deck or impede rescue efforts into the flight deck
after an accident.
Current doors are designed to ensure that rapid decompression does
not cause a failure which could have catastrophic effects on the aircraft.
Such a failure is theoretically possible in such an event, if the
pressure cannot be equalized between the flight deck and the cabin
in an expeditious manner. Preliminary research indicates that a rapid
decompression on the flight deck side of the door has a low historical
occurrence. This research has revealed no accidents caused by a rapid
decompression in the flight deck. This may be because the decompressions
have not been rapid enough or the venting method worked as designed.
The addition of a deadbolt or another barrier may hinder crew exit,
rescue, and the venting that the door's original design provided.
Given the newly identified security risks, we recommend the FAA allow
the use of a deadbolt or other barrier device, in the short-term,
until the impact of these devices on decompression and rescue/exit
can be determined and an alternative approach is designed.
(1) Approve a door design to ensure:
(2) Provide a barrier against access by an intruder through
the venting feature of those flight deck doors having vents.
Within 1 year from approval of the door design, conduct a
retrofit of the entire U.S. fleet of aircraft. There may be more permanent and effective solutions that require
longer time for implementation. The current flight deck door and associated
bulkhead are not designed to minimize or mitigate the negative impacts
from breaches caused by blunt force, ballistics, fragmentation, or
other explosive effects.
Strengthening of the flight deck door can be divided into the following
areas: (1) Improved locking, hinge, door handle, and door frame integrity;
and (2) Using specialized materials to mitigate the catastrophic effects
from ballistic, fragmentation, and explosives devices attacks. A design
and performance specification with specific design requirements must
be developed and approved which would include identification of the
amount of load(s) the door and bulkhead must sustain from an attack
and take into account the force that can be expected in an explosive
decompression.
Safety considerations must address flight crew evacuations, venting,
or an emergency crew response by flight attendants if one or all of
the flight deck crew become incapacitated. There have been situations
where a flight attendant was able to pull an incapacitated pilot from
the controls and allow the other pilot to fly the aircraft safely
to the ground.
Another strategy for controlling access on some aircraft in the longer
term is a mantrap, which is a set of two doors that requires the person
to enter the first while the second is closed. The person cannot pass
through the second door until the first door is closed. This system
provides security in at least three ways. It makes it difficult to
forcibly gain entry by knocking down a single door, it allows time
to evaluate the person in the mantrap before releasing him or her
through the second door, and it allows entry of only one person at
a time. This design will have limited applicability to most aircraft
in the U.S. fleet because, for example, the passenger entry door is
too close to the flight deck to accommodate this design.
Back to top 5. Flight Deck Access With an immediate goal of adding barriers to the flight deck, we
must address access to the flight deck and how it will be controlled.
Since the events of September 11, airlines and their pilots and flight
attendants have implemented their own procedures, which include:
With the flight deck no longer readily accessible to flight attendants, they must have a method for immediate notification to the flight deck during a suspected threat in the cabin. On receipt of such a warning, the pilot would check to make sure that the flight deck door is secure and begin immediate landing procedures. Consideration should be given to systems that might be installed in the aircraft as well as a device that could be carried by a crewmember. In those aircraft equipped with an automated evacuation alarm system, it may in the near term be an effective tool for such notification.
Under Security Directives already issued, airlines have restricted use of the jumpseats aboard their aircraft to their own pilots and flight engineers, and FAA inspectors. For the short term, these restrictions should be endorsed and continued. Qualified flight deck personnel in jumpseats provide safety and security benefits to the crew and passengers. The extra person assists the flight deck crew in many ways. That person is an extra set of eyes, ears, and hands, and may be able to take action for the crew while the crew flies the aircraft. Some airlines have instituted additional screening of pilots from other airlines and are accommodating them by seating them in the passenger cabin on space-available basis. We agree that improved screening should be required until credential verification can be improved, consisting of identification check before boarding the aircraft and again after boarding the aircraft, by the flight crew. A simple question and answer technique is recommended. Additionally, jumpseat occupants should display conspicuously a picture identification at all times on the aircraft.
In the long-term automated or other systems should be considered to accomplish positive identification of all flight crewmembers before entering the aircraft.
We recommend FAA and industry define requirements for an automated system to validate, in real time, the identities of persons with legitimate access to the aircraft, within 6 months. (Universal access identification). Implementation will be based on those requirements, when defined. There is consensus that cameras to monitor and view the area outside the flight deck door may add value. There should be continuous lighting outside the flight deck door for visibility, as well as to provide lighting for cameras. However, placement of a monitor in the limited space on the flight deck is a challenge. While there may be value in video or audio systems which provide information about activities throughout the cabin, we have no consensus on whether or how to proceed with this technology.
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6. Defensive Capabilities in Cabin
and Flight Deck Areas
We support the notion of crewmembers using non-lethal defensive capabilities
in the cabin area and on the flight deck in hijack emergencies. This
is a new approach to aircraft security, provoked by the attacks of
September 11th. Our proposed security strategy would require that
the flight crew door remain locked during a suspected security threat,
leaving flight attendants with the responsibility to address all cabin
disturbances without the help of the flight deck crew. The crewmembers
should have access to non-lethal devices and specific self-defense
training.
In the case of non-lethal devices, there is consensus that the goal
of such devices is to deter any terrorist plan, deny access to the
flight deck, retain control in the cabin, or if necessary recover
control on the flight deck. There is no clear consensus on what type
or how many non-lethal devices should be placed on the aircraft or
who should have access to such devices. However, ALPA recommends installation
of stun guns on the flight deck. To reach consensus, the following
factors must be evaluated:
As to lethal weapons, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) has
taken a public position that a volunteer program be established with
specific guidelines for arming pilots in flight. Other members of
the task force have identified numerous issues requiring resolution
before consideration is given to arming the pilots. These issues should
be considered to determine whether they can be overcome.
7. Security Training and Delivering Information
Security training is recognized as outdated in respect to today's
threats. Both initial and recurrent training programs must be rapidly
modernized and delivered to all crewmembers reflecting current threat
information. As a minimum, this new training should prepare crewmembers
to identify and understand the different levels and types of threats
to the safe passage of crew, passengers, and aircraft. Development
of this training should use at a minimum the expertise of law enforcement
organizations and professionals familiar with hijacking situations.
A related issue is the delivery of relevant security information
to crewmembers and other affected personnel in a timely manner. For
international operations, there is a requirement that crew briefing
include relevant security threat information. The same practice should
be applied to U.S. domestic operations. We need a delivery system
to permit crewmembers and other appropriate persons to receive the
latest security advisories, as needed. Airline dispatchers must take
on the responsibility to forward all immediate threat information
to affected aircraft in flight. The system should take advantage of
available technology for distribution of this information.
Recent security directives require cabin search procedures to minimize
risk. Current procedures do not guarantee that those conducting cabin
searches are trained adequately on best practices and use of the most
recent technology. We are concerned that access to the aircraft between
the time the cabin search is conducted and flight is not restrictive
enough. We endorse the recently introduced FAA Security Directives
requiring cabin search procedures. However, there is a need for additional
training for those personnel conducting cabin searches.
As a long-term option, we believe this task should be assigned to
some sort of Federal security force. Creating such a force would avoid
the need to assign additional responsibilities to current carrier
personnel who may not be as familiar with dangerous items or who may
be performing other duties under limited time constraints.
One lesson from the attacks of September 11th is the importance of
ensuring continuous transponder communication with air traffic control
(ATC) following a hijacking. Without the transponder switch in a fully
active position, ATC can track an aircraft only by primary radar,
which does not indicate aircraft identity and altitude. The loss of
this information causes other aircraft to lose awareness of the flight
in progress.
While it is possible that a major redesign could be required, we
have learned of possible modifications that could be accomplished
more quickly. The task force should examine all alternatives that
would allow the ability to set and lock-in the hijacking code so that
the hijacker cannot disable it; a panic button that initiates the
hijacking code in an emergency situation; and an independent transponder
that cannot be disabled by the hijacker.
10. Aircraft Defensive Methods
We have received many suggestions regarding the use of aircraft defensive
maneuvers as a tactic to thwart a hijacking. After industry discussion,
we feel that these tactics should be used only as a last resort. While
we do not openly recommend it, we acknowledge that aircraft defensive
maneuvering and aggressive use of cabin pressure systems may be beneficial
under certain extreme situations. Since limits in aircraft performance
and pilot capabilities may prohibit/preclude the use or limit the
effectiveness of such methods, any proposals must be validated for
effectiveness and trainability before implementation.
APPENDIX
A Table of Recommendations
APPENDIX
C Unsolicited Proposals from Companies
APPENDIX
D Digest of Ideas and Suggestions from Private Citizens and Comments
Received from Industry
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America Attacked