regarding the in-flight fire and the 'dense continuous smoke in the cockpit'

issues. The FAA and the Air Transport Association (ATA) have both claimed that

because there was no 'data' concerning such fires and their sources. With

this claim in hand, they have said there was no need for actions regarding wire

insulation types that burned or gave off excessive smoke or for more reliable

tests for flammable insulation blankets that provided yet more fuel to in-flight fires.

Contrary to that, the FAA Tech Center did identify wire types that do just

that. Another FAA Tech Center report did say that past flammability standards

(Bunsen burner) were unreliable and that the "industry requested" swab tests

were far more reliable and that insulation blankets passed back to 1975 now

must be replaced at first opportunity. In-short, there were ignition and smoke

sources (wire insulation) and there was plenty of fuel (insulation blankets).

At this point it is known that the 'insufficient data' claim was

accomplished by various means and they included;

1. The FAA Tech Center wire (Cahill) reports that were not posted to the

author's credits at the Tech Center library database until our complaints last year.

2. The production of those 3 Cahill reports came only after persistent

FOIA requests. Each was produced following denial and then claimed ignorance of the

companion reports.

3. FAA's claimed issue of a 'Handbook Bulletin' has not been found in the

(8300) database including 440 other such 'Bulletins'. This bulletin (91-15,

"Origin and Propagation of Inaccessible Aircraft Fire Under In-Flight Airflow

Conditions,") was intended to "request(s) Flight Standards Principal

Maintenance Inspectors to review their operators' maintenance programs to

ensure that the programs include inspection of aircraft wiring, and to ensure

that effective quality control procedures are in place that would discover

insulation breakdowns." To date, only a draft and another Tech Center report

has been produced. The FAA has verbally said they do not have it. Further, a

FOIA response from the NTSB, which was said to have received this Bulletin, has

now said they do not have it.

4. Now it is fact that references to the involvement of flammable insulation

blankets in prior aircraft fires have been removed from the NTSB's Synopsis of

Accidents (30,000 accident database). See the attachment here. This

attachment is offered in a draft form for comment.

The above gives reasons why the flight crews, air safety inspectors and the

travelling public were, until after Swissair 111, unaware of the dangers and unaware

of the FAA's extensive tests and findings as to the failure modes of certain

wire insulation types. The same is true of certain flammable insulation

blankets that further propagate those wire-iniated fires. As a consequence the

flight 111 crew was as unprepared as all the previous crews who, by their wits

or good luck, escaped past in-flight fires and smoke encounters.

The database omissions to those events is so bad that the FAA now says that

they cannot use their own database to analyze these issues. Independent count

of such in-flight events may be as high as 700, yet a database tally offers less than

10% of that. The FAA and NTSB policy of omitting database virtually all non US

carriers events to their database is easily seen. Illustrative of that FAA and

NTSB policy was their recent claim that 1998 was among the safest year for air

travel. Like the many other past events, Swissair operated a US certified

design, using US certified and tested materials and no claims have been made

that US standards of operation or maintenance were compromised. In-fact, the

crew followed the US certified check lists to their death.

Comments are invited, particularly comments and possible aditions of

specific methods used to block the flow of such information to the flight

crews, inspectors and the public. Of course, any of the above documents are

available.

(REMOVAL OF REFERENCES TO FLAMMABLE INSULATION BLANKETS)

"Development and Growth of Inaccessible Aircraft Fires Under Inflight Airflow Conditions."

Page 1, "Background".

"In August of 1985, an Eastern Airlines 727 was forced to make an unscheduled landing after a fabric handbag laying against a cabin return air grille along the floor caught fire. The initial ignition and fuel sources were a book of matches and a leaking bottle of flammable hair spray, both in the handbag. Flames from the burning bag were drawn into the return air grille and caused partial burning of some aircraft parts including insulation blanket, return air grille parts, air-conditioning duct, underside of floor panels, and overhead cargo compartment liner. The fire was eventually extinguished by flight attendants using several hand-held extinguishers."

SOURCE:

NTSB - Accident Synopses. 30,000 Accident Database http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/months.htm

Search By Date.

"NTSB Identification: BFO85IA065. For details, refer to NTSB microfiche number 31602A. Scheduled 14 CFR 121 operation of Eastern Airlines, Inc. Incident occurred AUG-11-85 at Richmond, VA. Aircraft: Boeing 727-225, registration: N8856E. Injuries: 78 Uninjured. The flt (flight) was in cruise at fl 350 when the cabin crew reported a cabin fire in the vicinity of seat 28a. Shortly after, a lower aft body overheat warning was recvd (received). The flt diverted to Richmond, Va. During descent, the flt crew performed the appropriate checklist and the lower aft body ovht (Overheat) light went out about 3 to 4 mins. after it illuminated. Later examination revealed that a pax (passenger) handbag that was on the floor against the cabin exhaust outlet adjacent to seat 28a was extensively fire damaged. The carpet under the handbag was unburned except for a small portion leading to the cabin air exhaust outlet. Localized fire damage was present behind and below the outlet. Among the contents of the handbag was a bottle of hairspray, found with the cap loose. The label on the bottle warned that the contents were flammable. Row 28 was in the smoking section for that flt."

Probable Cause

Miscellaneous..Inadvertent..Passenger

NEXT EXAMPLE

SOURCE: SOURCE:

FAA Technical Center Report # DOT/FAA/CT-91/2 By David Blake, February 1991.

"Development and Growth of Inaccessible Aircraft Fires Under Inflight Airflow Conditions."

Page 1, "Background".

"In April of 1988, a Continental 737 had a fire above the cabin ceiling on final approach into Cleveland, Ohio. The fire started when a flourescent light ballast burned and ignited insulation blankets and foam air-conditioning duct insulation. The fire burned insulation blankets, damaged wire bundels, burned through the back of a stowage bin, and ignited a carryon bag inside the bin and burned some duct insulation. Smoke started to fill the cabin when an emergency evacuation was performed using all four evacuation slides. Fire department personnel extinguished the fire."

SOURCE:

NTSB - Accident Synopses. 30,000 Accident Database http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/months.htm

Search By Date.

"NTSB Identification: ATL88IA147 For details, refer to NTSB microfiche number 36399A. Scheduled 14 CFR 121 operation of CONTINENTAL AIRLINES CORP. (D.B.A. TEXAS INT'L AIRLINES INC.)

Incident occurred APR-17-88 at CLEVELAND, OH. Aircraft: BOEING 737-200, registration: N433PE

Injuries: 2 Minor, 106 Uninjured. While on final approach smoke and flames developed in cabin above overhead luggage bins over seats 16a,b & c. Acft (aircraft0 was within 2 miles of rwy (runway). Crew declared emergency, landed, turned off rwy expeditiously, stopped on rwy 18, & evacuated. Smoke poured from the opened cabin doors. Examination of the acft revealed that a ceiling flourescent light fixture shorted internally resulting in the fire. An AD (Airworthiness Directive) was issued which required the installation of a fuse assembly in the input wire to the ballast."

"Probable Cause

Passenger compartment light(s)..Shorted

Acft/equip, inadequate design..Manufacturer