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| Tell-Tale Docs Our Discoveries - Your Insights |
| John Q Citizen. This is your life. "The documented facts by official governmental aviation safety agencies, and industry, that will provide you with a totally objective 'education' of what you don't know about aviation safety, yet have the right to know. " IASA Chairman (Lyn Romano) | These documents are stand-alone testimony to the inability [of the industry and regulator] to admit to and cope with endemic aviation safety problems. Read and judge for yourself. A mini-history or concise summary will accompany each. |
Where are we AT with Wiring?? (SAVE as MS Word
File-282kb
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pdf file | It's not correct to say that nothing is happening on the wiring front. They know that Kapton's a Risk, that other wiring types have undesirable attributes - but action is mired in angst over cost and risk. This FAA paper tells part of that story. |
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Special Maintenance / Safety Considerations |
UKAAIB and BASI The
same incident: with and without vital detail |
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FAA Policy on Use of the Aircraft Materials Fire Test Handbook | FAA
Policy on Use of the Aircraft Materials Fire Test Handbook.
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The IWG's Executive Summary | Herewith the Executive Summary. Is it a collection of Homespun Platitudes or a Prescription for Affirmative Action on Wiring? Your call. See the Formation of IWG (below) |
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The NTSB's Recommendations to the FAA on Wiring
| The NTSB, as a result of findings, make recommendations to the FAA for regulatory action to rectify identified safety-related deficiencies. Does the FAA always adopt the suggested course? Where wiring, fire and smoke are concerned you would think so, wouldn't you? |
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IASA STUDY OF 270 WIRE-RELATED ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS | Because of the incomplete nature of their incident data-bases, which the FAA and NTSB admits, you have to trawl and sieve to surface all the wiring incidents. Even so it is continually being added to as more incidents are uncovered (and occur). If you know of one that's not here in this searchable file, drop us an email. |
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An FAA Policy on Resetting CB's (Aug 2000)
| This should take care of one important aspect of aviation electrical safety. Note well that the consensus on this is world-wide and reflects IASA's long-term preaching on the subject. It also answers the Feb 00 ALPA letter's concerns. But it's like telling the child not to play with matches. The child still has the match-box. |
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The Formation of IWG (Jun
2000) | Under the chairmanship of the ATA (Air Transport Association), ATSRAC (Aging Transport Systems Rulemaking Advisory Committee) had gone about as far as it could go. Its limitations were becoming evident. IASA appeals to the Executive Office of the President gave rise to a new, differently composed, wiring oversight committee called IWG (The Wire Systems Safety Interagency Working Group). It is designed (and was always destined) to take wiring insulation concerns in markedly different directions. |
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The Undercurrents in Wire -A chronology of Defective Oversight | This is the story of bad aircraft wiring insulation in the late 20th Century. As plagues go, it hasn’t killed many. However it is a plague because it is everywhere, it won’t go away, much of it is dangerous and aging ungracefully. You cannot innoculate against it and you cannot isolate it like leprosy, but you can preach against ignoring its predations. Ed Block is one of the pre-eminent preachers and this is his story. It is actually also the story of a denial process that continues to this day. |
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The Long Beach MD-11 Bulletin | About
10 months after sr111 the Boeing paralysis was broken by the release of a Supplementary
Flight Ops Bulletin purporting to give electrical fire and smoke guidance to MD-11
aircrews. It admitted that a properly done drill would take up to 30 minutes to
complete and that they'd decided not to issue amended guidance: "Boeing is loathe to yet formally publish or actually propose this alternative course of action as it would make matters very complex for crews in deciding which is the most appropriate course." Yes, keep it dead simple. |
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Advisory Circular 25-16 | What has always been known about arc-tracking, aromatic polyimides, electrical failure and fire; and the other many hazards of deficient aircraft wiring in a casually informal circular. It should have become the bible of aviation wiring insulation. This Chapter is GENESIS. |
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on the Advisory Circular | If you were wondering about the relevance of the above document, here are some points to ponder. |
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RAF Kapton | The FAA doesn't "know" about wire - but the USN does, and the RAAF, RAF, Canadian Armed Forces and now NASA's Shuttles have been shuttle-cocked. Wire is apparently going to great lengths to gain notoriety. |
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Boeing Aware? | To
be a leader you have to demonstrate leadership qualities such as honesty, integrity,
credibility, veracity, candidness, "quality first" specifications .....all
quite commercially compatible virtues. If, however, you hide safety concerns in internal memo's classified Commercial-in-Confidence or Proprietary Secret, you have something to hide. You've then given up any aspirations toward leadership and you're then just one of the "MADDING CROWD" - no matter what your stature or size. |
| Trapped
in the Middle | The FAA has a license to support the industry that it must also regulate. This dichotomy has led to an unwholesome alliance with the Air Transport Association (ATA) which is the Washington Lobby for the major US Airlines. How can it successfully walk any middle path? Is there a bias? |
| The
Wojnar Letter | Ronald Wojnar still works for the FAA. He's in the big league. Back in 1992 he wrote a very interesting letter. He knew what he was talking about then. How about now? |
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Cahill Documents |
Omissions and Deletions to FAA / NTSB Databases A Fraudulent Contrivance? |
| The
Blake-Cahill Documents |
Development and Growth of Inaccessible Aircraft Fires under Inflight Airflow Conditions |
| AD
Cancelling the MD-11 STC for the IFEN |
Commonsense prevailed and the illegality and hazardous nature of the MD-11 Inflight Enertainment System is eventually acknowledged by a mandatory Airworthiness Directive prohibiting the IFEN's reconnection. Another "own goal" for the Regulator. |
| The
McSweeny Testimony of Sept 99 |
Quote: "The team also believed that a systematic process to identify and address potential catastrophic failures caused by electrical faults of wiring systems was needed." But what specifically was it that he forgot to mention here? It wasn't as if it was irrelevant and hadn't been brought to their attention repeatedly. See the next panel. |
| A
Ground-Breaking Letter (Feb 00) |
ALPA helps out. ATSRAC identifies a problem that has been ignored, yet may well be behind many of the catastrophic outcomes. The solution is simple and logical but the question remains: Can the FAA ever be pro-active? Or will it simply be contrary? Re-read the panel above - and predict the outcome. |
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Errant Arcs | In the aftermath of TWA800 the known facts about wire's iniquities started to emerge..... |
| Reserved for Your Contribution | The FACTS are known but...........It takes evidence to make the case |
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