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Madame Chair, Mr. Traficant, Members of the Subcommittee:
I am Tom McSweeny, the
Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification of
the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA"). I am
pleased to be here today to discuss with you aircraft
electrical system safety. The FAA's Regulation and
Certification division is the line of business of the FAA
responsible for the oversight of aircraft systems, both
structural and non-structural. This afternoon, I would like to
discuss with you the FAA's aging aircraft program, and in
particular, our focus on non-structural components, including
aircraft wiring. Joining me this morning is Beth Erickson, the
Director of our Aircraft Certification Service.
Following the Trans World
Airlines Flight 800 tragedy, President Clinton established the
White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security,
chaired by Vice President Gore ("Commission" or
"Gore Commission") in August 1996. The Gore
Commission delivered its final report to the President on
February 12, 1997, which contained numerous recommendations to
improve the safety and security of our National Airspace
System ("NAS"). Among the many recommendations, the
Gore Commission specifically identified the need for the FAA
to expand its Aging Aircraft program to include non-structural
systems.
The FAA has been aware of the
need to scrutinize aging aircraft structural systems, and
placed additional emphasis on aging structures, since a 1988
incident involving a Boeing 737 in Hawaii. In that incident,
the aircraft suffered severe structural failure of the forward
fuselage sections due to corrosion and disbonding which was
not visible through normal maintenance inspections.
The FAA expanded its structural
integrity inspection program by forming the Aging Aircraft
Program. The FAA developed an approach to deal with aging
structural issues by first focusing on older aircraft used in
commercial service and with a focus on gathering and using
data for decision-making. This included a comprehensive review
of service information and conducting detailed inspections and
research. The data and information were then used to develop a
comprehensive system of focused actions. These actions ranged
from issuing airworthiness directives ("AD's"),
developing enhanced maintenance protections, conducting
training for FAA personnel and aviation industry personnel,
and conducting research programs. Since the introduction of
this program, there has not been another aging structures
related accident. We believe that by all measures, the program
and its comprehensive approach have been successful.
As correctly noted by the Gore
Commission report, the FAA aging aircraft program related only
to the structural components of aircraft. At that time, there
were no service data that indicated a need to give the
non-structural systems of the airplanes the same enhanced
scrutiny we gave to the structures. Because of a concern that
maintenance and inspection procedures may not be sufficient to
prevent safety related problems caused by the deterioration or
damage of non-structural components, the Gore Commission
recommended that the FAA work with airlines and manufacturers
to expand the aging aircraft program to include non-structural
components, through steps including: full and complete
tear-downs of selected aircraft scheduled to go out of
service; the establishment of a lead-the-fleet research
program; an expansion of the cooperative aging aircraft
program between the FAA, the Department of Defense and the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
("NASA"); and, encouraging the development of modern
technical means to ensure and predict the continued
airworthiness of aging non-structural components and systems.
Pursuant to the Gore
Commission's recommendations, the FAA established an Aging
Non-Structural Systems Plan. This plan went beyond the Gore
Commissions recommendations to focus on wiring by including
all systems on an aircraft, including electrical and hydraulic
systems. The FAA formed the Aging Non-Structural Systems Study
team. Led by the FAA's Transport Airplane Directorate
("TAD"), the team was comprised of FAA employees and
industry personnel. The team developed several initiatives to
re-examine the FAA's approach to aging systems and to
ascertain the scope of any problems. Three on-site visits to
maintenance facilities were accomplished.
As with the aging structures
program, the FAA began with data collection, including the
examination of the state of the fleet with a sampling of older
aircraft. Three DC-10's, a DC-9 and a Boeing 727 were
evaluated. These aircraft were selected because they represent
the core of the domestic airline fleet considered aging: the
DC-10's were all over 24 years old and had in excess of 24,000
cycles (cycles represent the number of landings that an
aircraft experiences over the course of its life), the DC-9
was 29 years old and had approximately 70,000 cycles, and the
727 was 19 years old and had approximately 21,000 cycles.
Evaluations of these aircraft were primarily based on visual
inspections with a special emphasis on wiring, lightning
protection, hydraulics and flight control systems. At the time
of the FAA's team inspections, these aircraft were undergoing
heavy maintenance visits. A "heavy maintenance
visit" requires that an airplane be out of service for
approximately two to five weeks. This level of inspection and
maintenance is typically performed every three to five years.
During such maintenance, most of the airplane's major systems
are available for viewing because skin panels, outer body
fairings, seats, galleys, and floor panels are removed. In
addition to these on-site evaluations, the team conducted a
number of meetings with a group of the FAA's Principal
Maintenance Inspectors who are tasked with oversight of the
major carriers, to assess their concerns with respect to aging
aircraft.
The on-site inspections
revealed some deterioration of wiring components. However,
none of these situations presented immediate safety concerns.
Contamination of wire bundles in some areas was evident. The
team also found that maintenance practices and guidance to
mechanics needed improvement. The team also believed that a
systematic process to identify and address potential
catastrophic failures caused by electrical faults of wiring
systems was needed.
From the observations and
recommendations in this initial study, the FAA developed a
comprehensive plan for the non-structural components of aging
aircraft. An Aging Transport Systems Oversight Committee
("Committee") was established in September 1998.
Membership on the Committee is drawn from across the FAA
professional workforce, including representatives from the
Flight Standards Service and Aircraft Certification Service
divisions. This Committee has the primary responsibility to
manage the overall aging transport non-structural systems
plan. The Committee is pro-active and is working with an
industry advisory committee to initiate research projects,
participate in industry fleet reviews, sponsor periodic
technical exchanges with the Department of Defense and NASA,
identify training needs for FAA and industry personnel in
wiring practices, and develop with industry a better reporting
system which will allow more visibility to incidents and
maintenance actions which have an aging system root cause or
component.
To facilitate broad
governmental and industry participation, both domestically and
internationally, in October 1998, Administrator Garvey
established the Aging Transport Systems Rulemaking Advisory
Committee ("ATSRAC"). ATSRAC was created to provide
a mechanism for public input into the FAA's activities with
respect to the overall plan for aging systems on aircraft. The
ATSRAC serves the public interest by providing a forum for
interaction among the FAA, the Department of Defense, NASA,
airlines, labor organizations representing pilots and
mechanics, manufacturers and their representatives. The level
of expertise and balanced viewpoint will enable the committee
to identify necessary actions for both long-term improvements
and, at the earliest possible moment, the potential for
problems and accelerate development of appropriate corrective
action.
In establishing the ATSRAC, the
Administrator charged the committee with several tasks. Among
them: (1) to review service histories, service bulletins and
service letters for the aging transport fleet which pertain to
aging systems for possible mandatory action and provide
recommendations to the FAA; (2) to conduct evaluations of
in-service transport airplane models; (3) to provide
recommendations to the FAA for improvements to airplane
maintenance to better address aging airplane systems,
including the study of inspection criteria for systems; and
(4) to propose revisions to the Federal Aviation Regulations
("FAR's") and associated guidance material as may be
appropriate to institutionalize the lessons learned from the
aging systems program.
It is important to note that in
many respects, the FAA and indeed, the entire aviation
industry, are only now beginning to have a greater
appreciation and understanding about the need to examine
non-structural aspects of our aircraft. The so-called
"aging aircraft fleet" will soon include those
aircraft that were introduced in the early 1980's. Aircraft
such as the Boeing 757, 767, and the Airbus A300, have been in
service for 15 years. These aircraft designs include
substantially more electronic equipment and wiring. More
importantly, the introductions of new aircraft, such as the
Boeing 777, are increasingly relying on more electronics for
flight.
The FAA is moving aggressively
to address concerns with respect to the effects of aging on
aircraft non-structural systems. Like our aging structures
program, the FAA is working to ensure that our non-structural
program is data driven. We are just beginning to collect the
data necessary to assist us in our efforts. It is important to
recognize that we must prioritize our actions to identify the
interventions that will yield the highest level of safety
benefit.
Through our fleet sampling
inspections, the comprehensive review of service data and
research and development projects, the FAA is continually
working to develop a systemic and data-driven strategy. It is
important to note that we are not waiting to complete our
review of the aircraft fleet or service data. We are taking
corrective actions as we progress. For example, the FAA has
already issued over 20 airworthiness directives addressing
wiring within fuel tanks and fuel pumps, in the wake of the
TWA Flight 800 incident. In addition, the FAA has issued
several airworthiness directives on the MD-11 aircraft
regarding the wire harnesses within the aircraft structure.
We are confident that this
approach to non-structural aircraft systems is already proving
beneficial and making improvements for the continued safe
operation of the civilian aircraft fleet. We are confident
that our record of success with respect to structural systems
is being replicated with non-structural systems. As we move
forward with our non-structural aging systems program, we will
continue to learn and make decisions to enhance the safe
operations of our civilian aircraft fleet.
This concludes my prepared
testimony. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you
and the Members of the Subcommittee may have.
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