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International Aviation Safety Association®
Chairman: Mrs. Lyn Susan Romano
A TARGET LIST
IASA will be initially concentrating on the following aviation safety issues
1. The various types of a/c wiring.
| (a) | Advantages and disadvantages of their composition, the in-flight hazards of Kapton, Tefzel, PVC, Poly-X, Stilan and TKT. |
| (b) | Compliance with FAR 25 [minimum] standards in terms of smoke or fire hazard? Wiring must also be installed so that operation of any one unit or system of units will not adversely affect the simultaneous operation of any other electrical unit or system essential to safe operation. Cables must be grouped, routed and spaced so that damage to essential circuits will be minimized if there are faults in heavy current-carrying cables. |
| (c) | Wire types installed on which a/c models/types. So far, most of the MD-11s were wired with Kapton wire. Only the very last MD-11s were wired with TKT wire. McDD was in the process of changing over to TKT just before they merged with Boeing. Boeing uses two different types of wire: B-737s and B-757s are wired with TKT [BMS 13-60], and the B-747s, B-767s and B-777s are wired with Raychem’s X-linked Tefzel [BMS 13-48]. |
| (d) | Kapton wire [BMS 13-51] is no longer used on Boeing jets. It took a decision by UAL around 1989, in a letter to Boeing, that UAL would no longer buy B-737s and B-757s with Kapton installed. This was the main reason for Boeing to develop BMS 13-60 [TKT], produced by Tensolite and Teledyne. |
| (e) | The product liability issue in view of FAR 25 and under the proper FAA certification conditions (for McDD/Boeing, Raychmen, DuPont, Tensolite, Teledyne]. |
| (f) | Manufacturers are still allowed by the FAA to choose (and test the suitability and safety aspects of) the wire types for their a/c. |
2. Characteristics of Flashover and wet and dry arc-tracking of certain types of wiring insulation
| (a) | Laboratory test-bench results. |
| (b) | New Jersey FAA Tech Lab reports and their practical consequences. |
| (c) | Available (archived) technical reports that have been shelved and disregarded. |
3. Aging and wear Characteristics of Wiring
| (a) | By time/flight cycles/ incident occurrences/routine maintenance. |
| (b) | Training of and instructions to a/c mechanics [in]adequate? |
| (c) | Methods to evaluate wire status during [heavy] maintenance, and the cost of it in terms of cost/benefit analysis [see also #16]. |
| (d) | Average aircraft age [example, source: DOT, January 1998]: Alaska: 7.6; American: 10; America West:11; Continental: 14.4; Delta: 12.2; Northwest: 19.9; Southwest: 8.3; TWA: 17.0; United: 10.8; US Airways: 12.8. |
4. Ticking faults.
| Circuit-breakers may not protect wire from ticking faults. |
5. TKT wiring.
| (a) Compliance with FAR 25 safety standards? |
(b) Maintenance, wear and tear resistant. |
| (c) Installed on which a/c models/types [at least on B-737s and B-757s built since 1992]? |
| (d) Effects of TKT in mixed-wire bundles [mixed with X-Tefzel, etc.]. |
6. Warnings on wiring.
| (a) | Kapton insulated wiring abandoned by the military in the late seventies/early eighties because of numerous aircraft fires (and losses). |
| (b) | TWA’s letter of June 30, 1977 addressed to Boeing’s Jack Miller [Executive in charge of B-727 customer engineering] strongly objecting against the use of Kapton on TWA’s new B-727s [after TWA’s bad experiences with Kapton installed on L-1011]. Is a copy of this letter available? [The FAA claims not to know about it]. |
| (c) | United Air Lines refusing Kapton in SWAMP [severe wind and moisture prone] areas [in Navy document ‘Civil User Problems’] |
| (d) | Air Force 1997 memo. |
| (e) | Report of April, 1992 by scientists of the Air Force’s Aeronautical Systems Center, Dayton, Ohio. |
| (f) | Ed Block’s Chronology [by John D. King]. |
| (g) | McDD installed Kapton insulated wire with full knowledge of arc-tracking and topcoat flaking problems. |
| (h) | The limited value of ADs and SBs [see also #24][Airworthiness Directives and Safety Bulletins] |
| (i) | The pretence of maintaining high safety-standards that do not in fact exist. |
7. TKT wire.
| (a) | Boeing said their change from Kapton to TKT (Teflon-Kapton-Teflon) had nothing to do with the hazards associated with Kapton. "TKT is cheaper and lighter than Kapton, and has better abrasion resistance" [said a Boeing spokesman]. Thus far Boeing has not received any FAA or NTSB directive in respect of faulty Kapton-insulated wiring. |
| (b) | Patrick Price’s own lab arc-tracking tests are not mentioned by Boeing [Price was instructed by his superiores to keep the results under his hat]. |
| (c) | Boeing refused to acknowledge the consequences deriving from the FAA 1998 technical lab report [wires tested under dry conditions formed a conductive char upon thermal degradation, and severe arc-tracking occurred]. |
| (d) | Boeing needs to be invited to respond to the facts. |
8. Armin Bruning PhD (his methodology for checking wiring in situ)
| (a) | Are his methods failure-proof? Wiring in inaccessible spots can be subject to severe degradation without knowing. How is it then possible to determine the percentage of life remaining? |
| (b)
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His methods only prove themselves on accessible wiring. Wiring damaged by short-circuits or component swap-out (e.g. metallized mylar) (versus chafeing and ageing) will not be necessarily detected by his methods. No airline has granted permission for Bruning to test their aircraft wiring. |
9. Airworthiness Directives on wiring anomalies.
| (a) | These ADs [on wiring] are inadequate when it comes to wire checking, an example being the FAA’s AD of May 7, 1998 to inspect and ‘possibly’ replace fuel-tank wiring insulation in B-737s, B-747s and B-767s. In the announcement it was said that ‘chafing could expose the wires and potentially lead to electrical arcing that might penetrate the conduit, resulting in a possible fire or explosion of the fuel tank." Another, very recent example is APA 19-99 issued on January 28, 1999. |
| (b) | This AD does not force the airlines to check wiring in inaccessible spots, within conduits and through insulation blankets, and wire harness protective wrap. A copy of the 11 Jan 99 NTSB MD-11 Safety Recommendation (which led to a watered down FAA Airworthiness Directive being issued) is available at this URL. You will need Acrobat Reader (for a free download, click here). The SR resulted from an inspection of wiring in other MD-11's. |
| (d) | Superfluously said, there cannot be a thorough, adequate wire check at the cost of $ 720 per aircraft – if any, because reports have shown that even bore-scoping is not an adequate method. In the case of the US President aircraft, the safety hazards were simply recognized and dealt with promptly: Air Force One has been fully rewired [NTSB’s statement in 1996 to Center for Public Integrity]. |
10. Evaluation.
| (a) | How to map out the numbers and model/type of a/c flying with each type of wire insulation. |
| (b) | How to conduct tear-down inspections. |
| (c) | The industry is supposedly committed to the effort involving sampling the condition of wiring on 10-20 high-time a/c by the end of May, 1999, to provide initial insights into the overall condition of the fleet. Is this ‘effort’ really in progress? |
11. Cargo doors.
| In-flight spontaneously released cargo-door latches - due to faulty wiring. |
12. Thermal insulation blankets.
| (a) | Inadequate FAA testing: the 12 seconds Bunsen burner test. Refer to Duvon McQuire’s memo to the FAA already dated back in March, 1988. |
| (b) | FAA’s recent recommendation to remove/replace thermal/acoustic lining blankets in all a/c. |
| (c) | FAA ignoring Chinese warning on thermal/acoustic blanket flammability June, 1995 report (following extensive under-cockpit fire in a China Airlines MD-11 aircraft. |
| (d) | Alternative? There is a desirable alternative to the metallized mylar blankets but tooling up to produce the stuff (Tedlar) in the huge quantities required is a matter of years. i.e. change-over will take at least five years. |
| (e) | Going to press, the FAA announced that on approximately 12,000 aircraft the current thermal insulation blankets in use are to be replaced by higher fire-retardant type, such as Curlon insulation batts wrapped in a Kapton film (see Air Safety Week, March 15, 1999). |
13. Al Gore Commission.
| (a) | Results so far [after their February, 1997 final report] |
| (b) | McSweeny’s response [his letter of May 21, 1997 to Rep. James Greenwood]. |
| (c) | The FAA plans to undertake a major examination of the problems as a direct result of the Al Gore Commission’s report. |
14. Technical Database.
| (a) | Combined statistics not cited in NTSB figures via Incident/Accident Reports (i.e. 1996 report on massive electrical failures/anomalies on a Boeing 767 listed four other similar 767 examples in one year in the investigation report, but they weren’t similarly cited in either the NTSB or FAA database). |
| (b) | Projection of technical database specifically for pilots, mechanics, inspectors, ATC staff, journalists. |
15. EVAS.
| (a) | Despite full FAA certification and successful in-flight testing, EVAS is still not in use. Swissair intended its purchase in 1993, but blocked the investment for economic reasons. Swissair has experienced a 1970 CV880 fatal crash in Zurich and also a near-fatal 1993 dense smoke incident at Munich. |
| (b) | EVAS is not a medicine against the disease [wire faults, electrical malfunctioning], but contributes to controlled flight under dense, continuous smoke conditions in the cockpit [X-Tefzel has optical smoke density of 96+%]. Or to put it succinctly: blinded pilots cannot even control the plane despite the fact that the smoke source and fire may not be destructive or otherwise survival critical. |
| (c) | Which tools can be developed to stimulate airlines to install the [portable] EVAS? Airlines are now maintaining an unsafe condition because of [other] financial priorities. Raising ticket price by one cent does not seem to be attractive? Promoting EVAS would not fit into glossy brochures and commercial ads? The FAA has still not mandated that all commercial airplanes must be equipped with EVAS. Safety initiatives are neither a saleable product nor a commercial selling-point for passengers who are ignorant of the risk factors. |
16. Emergency checklists.
| (a) | ‘Air Conditioning Smoke’ checklist comes first in crew's Standard Operating Procedures [possibly because it is not taking power off the busses]. This is a lengthy checklist, leaves the power on the arcing wires and permits the electrical fire to develop unchecked. |
| (b) | The ‘Smoke & Fumes of Unknown Origin’ checklist comes second and needs to be started if the ‘Air Conditioning Smoke’ checklist proves unsuccessful. Especially in ‘Kaptonized’ a/c these two checklists are in the wrong order, because air conditioning smoke is no killer [but interim developing electrical system fires are]. |
| (c) | The MD-11’s Smoke/Elec/Air [rotary selector] switch has four positions that de-select [and then re-select] a third of the aircon packs and gens and busses at a time. There is no mention of what to do if a benign configuration is never found (beyond "LAND ASAP"). At some stage during the checklist the #2 tail-engine is liable to flame-out because of power coming off its pumps [i.e. there is no gravity feed option]. The rotary selector is designed to trace smoke. By going to one position it turns off a third of the electrics and one of the aircon packs; going to the next position it turns off a different third of the electrics and a different aircon pack, and similarly for the third position. But each third of a system is re-engaged – powered back up – as the selector is rotated - putting power back on the charred wiring insulation. |
| (d) | Resetting tripped circuit-breakers or switching them off/on manually is another hazard that could cause an immediate flashover. |
| (e) | An electrical system short may be sufficient to trip remaining gen, leaving batt liable to overload. With a dead-short to the battery bus, no gen reset may be possible (despite self-excitation). |
| (f) | This vital and life saving information should be accessible to flight-crews [through pilot organizations and airlines]. It must be added that the FAA [and other agencies] knew of the dangers of Kaptonized a/c, but did not inform the flight-crews about it. The FAA simply robbed them of critical Kapton related information and also continued to ignore the known dense continuous smoke problems, leaving the crews to sort it themselves. |
17. Full-face smoke-mask.
| (a) | Current smoke-masks need to be checked on reliability and effectiveness [vision effects of misting, eliminating hypoxia/toxicological anaemia, sealing over beards, peripheral vision]. Some airlines provide separate goggles and smoke-mask PBE for their pilots (Personal Breathing Equipment). |
| (b) | Integrated battery for focused mask-mounted lighting in dark environment should be obligatory [instead of cockpit emergency flood-lights tending to reflect internally off flight-deck screens and windows]. |
| (c) | All souls aboard an a/c should be provided with a similar device to increase survival chances. Current drop-down oxygen masks are specifically designed for supplemental oxygen supply at higher cabin altitudes and offer no protection from ingestion of toxic smoke in the ambient cabin air. This is particularly relevant when the aircon circulation is restricted or inoperative due to air packs being secured by the checklist. See following URL: http://www.geocities.com/Eureka/Concourse/7349/EVACU8.html |
18. Third Man.
| (a) | On long-haul routes a systems-oriented engineer is needed. He should have good systems knowledge, a role in the checklist and be mobile with aa portable oxygen-set to search for smoke/fire source [especially in cabin]. Superannuated age-retired captains would be eminently suitable in this role but it can also be a route to the right seat for a second officer. Long-haul airlines are presently carrying a second officer (or second crew) only because of flight crew duty-time limitations |
| (b) | Note that the pilots are both legally and physically unable to operate hand-held fire-extinguishing equipment and do en-route (emergency diversion) trouble-shooting - because, once on oxygen, they are umbilically tied to their seats. This limitation may have been a factor in the incapacitation of the sr111 captain. |
19. Sofware and The Human Factor.
| (a) | Glass cockpit environments stimulate increased reliance upon electronics. Software designers have pilots intentionally designed out of the control loop - supposedly to minimize human error. However reliance of "electric jets" upon trouble-shooting systems controllers is akin to putting one's faith in a fire-engine that is itself on fire - when the basic problem is a wiring-bundle insulation fire. |
| (b) | Supposedly, triple redundancy makes a/c computer systems essentially flawless. However they are dependent upon an electrical system that, as far as wiring is concerned, has zero redundancy built in. |
| (c) | Flight control systems [including elec-powered hydraulic pumps] should be secured/restored under a full electrics-out condition. No ability to fly hydraulics boost-out = die. No true electrical redundancy exists. |
20. Electrical fundamentals.
| (a) | Some flight-crews have no ready access to circuit-breaker panels in-flight. |
| (b) | They have no technical knowledge of [or reference manual about] individual circuit-breaker functions, which is disturbing given the fact that in any electrical system C/Bs are protective devices. Failure of a C/B to pop can cause a fire. |
| (c) | It is essential that flight-crews be able to fall-back on standby analogue flight instruments in an emergency situation, when their CRT EFIS screen displays are lost. Circuit-breakers are becoming increasingly dangerous devices because of the interrelated and interdependent systems in glass-cock-pitted airliners. Pulling just one C/B can affect multiple related and interconnected systems – and this is way beyond flight-crew technical knowledge. |
21. Flight-Essential Systems Integrity.
| (a) | Tracing the origins of the smoke/fire maybe unsuccessful. To get the fire off the wire = energy off the wire. |
| (b) | Which systems need to be operative in a glass cockpit environment? |
| (c) | Batt power will not last for more than approximately 20 minutes. If a system connected to the Battery Bus is shorting out the battery will rapidly expire. |
| (d) | A fully capable integrated "stand-alone" Virgin Bus has not yet been accepted as a safety enhancement. |
| (e) | What alternative solutions are left to guarantee operable flight-essential systems and instruments at night / in IMC (instrument meteorological conditions) [in the sense of a one-switch bare-bones electrical configuration for continuous powering of essential systems in IMC?]. The only fall-back position available to modern aircraft is a battery-powered emergency bus (with very limited life and power). |
22. Flight-Essential Bus
| (a) | The integral Flight Essential ("virgin") Bus is the only ‘get-you-home’ one-switch configuration that will really be an adequate tool in an electrical fire situation [i.e. the only alternative if the entire electrical system needs to be promptly inerted]. It rules out the old-fashioned strategy of cutting only 1/3 of the electrical power at a time [through the emergency check-listing] and so giving ample opportunity for the fire to develop [Airbus A320 cuts 70% of power instantly]. The FEB also eliminates the batt problem [not always fully charged on take-off, not lasting for more than approximately 20 minutes, or just overloaded or shorted out by bus-tie or other electrical failure]. Last, but not least, there is no survivable ‘ditchability’of large underwing turbofans. Large turbofan engine intakes are giant water scoops that give a plummeting nose-down pitching moment upon water contact. Frangible fuse-pins in the under-wing attachment pylons are not designed nor guaranteed to avoid this. |
| (b) | It is neither difficult to design nor costly to install such a life-saving device as an integral "stand-alone" TKT-wired Virgin Bus. Moreover it will afford a measure of electrical redundancy that does not now exist in standard aircraft electrical systems (because of the hundreds of kilometres of singular, very vulnerable wiring bundles that run throughout the aircraft). |
| (c) | It could be incorporated during heavy maintenance. |
| (d) | Modification kits could be made up from "off-the-shelf" components. |
23. Digital Flight Data Recorders.
| (a) | Installation of better DFDRs on a/c [particularly in B-737s]. The FAA ignored a NTSB recommendation of February 22, 1995 leading to further quandaries about B737 rudder incidents in 1999. |
| (b) | Reliable power sources for CVR and DFDR in the event of an electrical failure that results in some data being collectable. |
| (c) | Routing CVR/DFDR information automatically through a satellite transponder telemetry link, immediately after a PAN or Mayday call [for instance through separate INMARSAT Emergency Channel for proper read-out after the crash]. Following an interface modification, this could be automatically achieved by switching the ATC transponder to the distress code of 7500/7600/7700 (or initiated by any number of other "triggering" abnormal events) |
24. Jettison.
| (a) | Under emergency conditions also, fuel dump [to reach more or less Max Landing Weight fuel levels] needs to be closely monitored. This can normally be achieved electrically by the FMS software, but it fails once electrics are monitored off [no power to jettison circuit’s bus, and possibly also to all fuel gauges]. |
| (b)
|
A mechanical device [auto-closing, float-operated dump valve] needs to be installed to stop unattended dumping once it reaches specific minimum fuel level. In some a/c it is easy to start jettison early in the checklist [then forget about it and perhaps the auto-shutoff will be electrically disabled by completing the checklist – leading to fuel shortage]. This may not have been a factor with sr111 but it is apparent that Smk/Elec/Air Switch position 2/3 OFF disables the Fuel Dump (auto low-level shut-off). |
25. Flight Simulator.
| (a) | Training deficiencies and ‘modal confusion’ are causing accidents and incidents. Flight-crews need to be drilled in Flight Sims under severe, but practical circumstances. These would include dense, continuous smoke in the [Flight Sim] cockpit and progressive unrelated systems failures. |
| (b) | Line-oriented Flight Training (LOFT) Programs need to be developed to increase the flight-crew’s awareness, basic flying skills and emergency handling, and should not be directed to softened emergency handling to facilitate passing a test ‘with flying colours’ (or instilling false confidence). |
| (c) | Crews are often told to "sit on their hands" in order to avoid precipitous over-reactions. This is a dangerous philosophy where electrical wiring insulation fires are concerned. In similar vein, simulator instructional staff should avoid providing crews with "good solution awards" as a reward for a properly conducted smoke-in-the-cockpit drill. Because real life is just not like that, crews should be inculcated with an expectation of unrelated and perplexing developments, perhaps inevitably terminating in a loss-of-control, incapacitation or ditching scenario. |
26. Cockpit Intrusion.
| Provision is needed to prevent panicked passengers from entering the cockpit. |
27. Airbags.
| (a) | Each seat aboard an a/c needs to have an airbag installed. |
| (b) | Recent news is that some airlines are going to install these. If they are justified for cars then they should be easily justifiable for airliners. A sensible alternative may be aft-facing seats, however these would have to be mandated, because no single airline would ever be the first to take this sensible initiative. |
28. Seats.
| (a) | Stronger seats were proposed by the NTSB in 1981 and encouraged by Congress in 1987. This issue is still on the FAA’s ‘to-do’ list, despite NTSB reports showing that seats failed in 84.4 % of the crashes (and cargo-door losses). |
| (b) | Stronger seats [at least 16-g resistant] should also apply to non-US airlines. |
| (c) | Safety seats for infants and toddlers [rather than in an adult’s lap] were proposed by the NTSB in 1990. This issue is still on the FAA’s ‘to-do’ list, but may be shortly implemented. |
| (d) | Safety seats should also apply to non-US airlines. Code-sharing and Alliances mean that passengers can not reliably predict with which carrier they will be travelling on a multi-sectored journey. |
29. Evacuation.
| Emergency evacuation of trapped, panic-stricken or injured passengers is hampered by broken seats, narrow aisles, tear-down of overhead lockers, monitors, panels, fire and (toxic) smoke. The time test of 90 seconds works on paper only. Especially in tourist class, space is too limited to guarantee 90 seconds evacuation for everybody. Fire/rescue reports have revealed the impossibility of a quick evacuation (within the FAA’s own time limits). See also # 31. |
30. PIP.
| Person Identification Packs for frequent air travellers, containing finger prints, DNA sample, blood type and dental record to accelerate post-crash body identification. PIP to be sealed and stored at home office or any other appropriate place to facilitate [more] easy/speedy verification with body fragments. |
31. Toxics.
| (a) | Cabin materials should not release life threatening toxics under any circumstance. |
| (b) | Handheld fire extinguishers (BCF, Halon or foaming sealant). Number and location? Fire suppression via Nitrogen inerting of a sealed cockpit? |
32. ATC.
| (a) | Upgrading of [old-fashioned and worn out] ATC systems (including the presence of ground radar on all airports used by commercial aircraft) was proposed in 1981 and is still not completed. |
| (b) | Measures against drug abuse by traffic controllers. |
| (c) | Adequate ATC reporting of weather conditions at (and on approach to) the airfield. |
| (d) | English language standards should be mandated under ICAO. Pilot/controller confusion is exacerbated by poor standards of English expression and comprehension. This situation normally deteriorates further during an emergency. |
33. Rescue.
| (a) | Adequate emergency crash/fire and rescue response capability near and at all airports. A local Disaster Plan must be promulgated to all emergency services and hospitals. All crash/fire vehicular access routes must be clearly delineated, marked and kept clear. |
| (b) | More frequent rescue and evacuation training for cockpit and cabin crews in-flight and particularly on the ground. |
34. Maintenance.
| (a) | FAA’s inadequate manpower and expertise. |
| (b) | Cozy ties between FAA and airlines and the US airlines' powerful Congressional lobby (Air Transport Association -ATA) |
| (c) | Promised FAA’s new computerised radar tracking system still not in service. |
| (d) | Undetected use of bogus parts. |
35. Same procedures for all.
| (a) | Emergency procedures need to be developed that apply to each and every model/type of aircraft in conjunction with the nature of the trouble[s] and to which airlines are imperatively subordinated. Today we see that each and every airline issues different pilot handbooks (QRH). |
| (b) | No uniform rules on how to deal with emergency descent and landing above MLW. |
| (c) | There should be clear instructions for flight-crews when smoke or odour is detected [and no ‘retaliatory’ measures afterwards if it turns out to be ‘false alarm’]. |
| (d) | Such procedures would apply to European airlines as well. |
36. Supplemental Type Certificates.
| (a) | Jim Bennett provided the publicly available FAA approval criteria for Designed Alteration Stations [DAS]. DAS license holder is authorized to issue STC. |
| (b) | Reading shows that a separate FAA physical check of an airline-initiated modification is not required? |
| (c) | There are questions about the wiring standards, bus configuration and the test conditions subjected to the In-Flight Entertainment system installed on Swissair’s MD-11 and B-747 fleet. |
| (d) | There are also questions about the proper registration of the applicable STC [not found in FAA’s database so far]. |
| (e) | The Bilateral Agreement between US and Switzerland shows that the Swiss FAA [CAA] could simply follow the FAA STC [approval]. |
37. FAA [by John D. King].
| (a) | The self-denial process. |
| (b) | Chronology |
| (c) | Consequences of deregulation |
| (d) | Wojnar letter and related issues. |
38. Donations.
| (a) | Active partisan lobbying by well-funded organisations (such as the ATA and the Flight Safety Foundation) defeat attempts by organisations (such as IASA) to have safety measures implemented. US Federal Law should prohibit any financial or other donations to [public] US institutions, political parties, politicians and high-ranking public servants. |
| (b) | Any payment or any other gif"t should be considered a criminal offence and punishable by Law. |
39. Europe [EU].
| (a) | So far, all EU member countries operate their own Safety Board and Aviation Agency. |
| (b) | The EU political organization established a Transport Safety Unit, but it is very low-key and electively subordinates itself to each of the Airbus Consortium, US Manufacturers' and the FAA's safety edicts. |
| (c) | There are some ideas about founding an EU Safety Board and Aviation Agency supported by all member countries. The JAA (Joint Aviation Agency) is the equivalent of the US FAA and the UK's CAA (Civil Aviation Agency). It is presently promulgating EU licencing standards. |
40. Flight Safety Association. (See Annex #3.)
| (a | Objectives |
| (b) | Tasks |
| (c) | Tools. |
| (d) | Territories. |
.
41. Action.
| (a) | IASA is fighting an entrenched bureaucracy, financially sensitive politicians, lobby-circuits and governmental institutions dwelling in a twilight midway between safety and economics. It requires long-windedness, and it will be a long-haul way to go before the institutional cookies crumble. Each accident along the way will doubtless reinforce IASA resolve and provide more meat for the grinder. |
| (b) | We need to know our opponents - and their strengths and weaknesses. |
| (c) | We must have access to the proper expertise/knowledge. |
| (d) | We must use the power (reach and communicability) of the Internet. |
| (e) | We need the power (voice and political clout) of the Popular Press. Aviation oriented magazines are too sensitive to the usual blather about "We must wait for the report to come out before speculating". This point-of-view ensures that nothing (but the most desperately needed fixes) are in place for years. TV is the medium most suited to a rapid response dissection of an accident. Whereas daily News coverage is looking for spectacle and horror and is of little use in this regard, professional investigative TV journalists have the resources to do very credible investigative work. IASA will support these individuals/organisations with all the resources at its disposal. |
| (f) | Politicians represent no sworn values, but they might be either interested after a new crash or when they feel that the public can not ignore the problem any longer (i.e. when there is political capital to be made). The Gore 2000 campaign is particularly associated with aviation through the VP's Committee work - so this association should be exploited, particularly with regard to the Aging Aircraft Evaluation Program. |
| (g) | Statistics, data-basing and historical documentation (letter-hunting). |
| (h) | Increasing experience and credibility. |
| (i) | Recognition by Trade Journals. |
| (j) | Recognition by Travel organizations. |
| (k) | Acknowledgement by Pilot organizations and unions. |
| (l) | Awareness of IASA by Airlines [see Annexes #1 & 2]. |
38. Memoranda.
|
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| (a) | KLM. |
| (b) | Airbus. |
| (c) | Further ‘routing’ [FAA, NTSB, Boeing, US Congress, US Senate, a/c underwriters, etc.] |
| (d) | Text and graphics amendments will be incorporated as further information comes to hand (including release of pending interim and final accident reports) |
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| ANNEX #1 |
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 |
LIST OF ‘KAPTONIZED’ COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT |
||
[source: http://forumsb.compuserve.com/gvforums/default.asp?srv=aviationweek] and the list from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada dated Feb 1997. It is from a document entitled "The Use of Kapton in Aerospace Applications." The document appears to be several pages long, but only the first page was received, which contains a chart, listing the aircraft carrying this wiring. At that point, TSBC was aware of only one confirmed accident involving Kapton, an L1011 that made an emergency landing in Newfoundland several years ago.
As of Apr 1997, out of almost half a million Service Difficulty Reports (SDR's), Transport Canada was aware of only 7 that related to Kapton, two of which were caused by improper production procedures. Installation standards are critical. Improper inspection (moving the bundles) can also damage the insulation.
- L1011 Tri-star
- A310 Airbus
- A320 Airbus
- A330 Airbus [?]
- A340 Airbus
- Concorde SST
- DC10
- MD11
- B707
- B727
- B737
- B757
- B767
- Mercure
- CL 600 Series
- SD-3-30
- GII, GIII
- HS125.700
- Bell 212, 214
- Sikorsky S61, S70B, S76
- Westland 606
| ANNEX #2 |
|
LIST OF AIRCRAFT BY AIRLINE |
|
Delta [14] MD-11s
http://www.delta-air.com/inside/investors/corp_info/fleet/index.jsp
American [under query]
United [current fleet]
http://www.ual.com/airline/default.asp?section=current.asp&SubCategory=Our_Gallery
- A319
- A320-200
- B727-200
- B737
- B737-200
- B737-300
- B737-300
- B737-500
- B747-100
- B747-200
- B747-200-YR
- B747-400-OA
- B747-400-OB
- B747-400-OP
- B757-200
- B767-200-MT
- B767-200-MV
- B767-300-MD
- B767-300-MZ
- B777
- DC10-10
- DC10-30
USAir [under query]
CAAC [under query]
http://usa.china-airlines.com/index-e.htm
Northwest [under query]
http://www.northwestairline.com/
http://www.northwestairline.com/travel/trave/seatm/select.html
Aircraft Type Aircraft Number
- A320
- A320-200
- B727
- B727-200
- B747-100
- B747-200A
- B747-200B
- B747-200Z
- B747-400
- B757
- B757N
- B757R
- DC10-40
- DC10-40J
- DC9-10
- DC9-30
- DC9-40
- DC9-50
- MD80
Southwest
Only flies various versions of the B737
All Nippon [no fleet listing]
http://svc.ana.co.jp/eng/index.html
Continental [no fleet listing]
http://www.flycontinental.com/products/store/model.html
Lufthansa [under query]
Note: Lufthansa allegedly (i.e. its agents claim) prohibited the use of Kapton in Airbus except for non-essential electrical configurations.
British Airways [no fleet listing]
Japan Airlines [under query]
http://www.japanair.com/journey/aircraft/Default.htm
- B747
- B777
- MD11
TWA
- B727
- B727
- B757
- B767
- DC9
- MD80
Alitalia
- A321 [17]
- ATR72/42 [13]
- B747/200 cargo
- B747/200B [8]
- B767/300ER [6]
- MD11 [8]
- MD80 [90]
Korean Airlines
http://www.koreanair.com/air_md11.htm
- A300-600
- A330-200
- A330-300
- B747-200
- B747-300
- B747-400
- B747-400 Regular First Class
- B747-SP
- B777-200
- Fokker 100
- MD11
- MD82
- MD83
SAS [no fleet listing]
America West [no fleet listing]
Qantas [no passenger fleet listing]
Cargo Aircraft:
- B737-300
- B737-400
- B747-200
- B747-300
- B747-400
- B747F (Freighter)
- B747-SP
- B767-200
- B767-300
- MD11CF (Freighter)
Air France [no fleet listing]
Iberia
- A300
- A320
- A340
- B727
- B747
- B757
- DC10
- DC9
- MD87
Thai [no fleet listing]
site is down
Malaysia [no fleet listing]
http://www.malaysiaair.com/business/seating.htm
Japan Air System
- A300-600R
- A300-B2
- DC9
- MD81
- MD87
- MD90
- YS11
KLM
http://www.klm.nl/about/english/profile/fleet.htm
- B737-300
- B737-400
- B747-300
- B747-400
- B767-300
- Fokker 100
- Fokker 50
- Fokker 70
- MD11
- Saab 340B
Type MD-11 Nr. Registration Delivery date Name
1 PH-KCA December 1993 Amy Johnson
2 PH-KCB March 1994 Maria Montessori
3 PH-KCC July 1994 Marie Curie
4 PH-KCD September 1994 Florence Nightingale
5 PH-KCE November 1994 Audrey Hepburn
6 PH-KCF December 1994 Annie Romein
7 PH-KCG May 1995 Maria Callas
8 PH-KCH September 1995 Anna Pavlova
9 PH-KCI* November 1995
10 PH-KCK April 1997 Ingrid Bergman
* PH-KCI has been leased until November 1998
A NEW FLIGHT SAFETY ASSOCIATION
TARGETS: Aviation industry, governmental institutions, politicians, travel organizations, multi-nationals.
TOOLS: Technical expertise, statistics, databases, own funds.
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IASA Mission
Statement
