Long Beach Division
Flight Operations Bulletin
ATA: 01-00
Bulletin No. MD-11-99-04
Applicable to: All
MD-11 Aircraft
Subject: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION TO MD-11 FLIGHT
CREWS ON INFLIGHT SMOKE/FIRE PROCEDURES
Following the tragic crash of an MD-11 last September, The
Boeing Company has been conducting exhaustive reviews of various aspects of
the design and operation of the airplane, including our recommended smoke
procedures. While the cause of the
accident is still unknown, and The Boeing Company is not sure which procedures
the flight crew used, several operators have requested that Boeing review
the existing procedures, as well as possible alternatives.
I. The Smoke/Fumes
of Electrical, Air Conditioning, or Unknown Origin checklist procedure
developed for the MD-11 is derived from several DC-10 checklist procedures.
It was designed to reduce crew workload while trying to identify the
source of smoke or fumes. The smoke switch used in this procedure will
isolate and de-power one electrical bus and one air conditioning system in
each position other than NORM. This
will quickly accomplish the same multiple functions that the flight engineer
would do in a DC-10 during isolation of electrical or air conditioning smoke
or fumes. It must be stressed that
this switch consolidates the many steps that the flight engineer has done
for many years in the DC-10 procedures.
II.
III. The decision to perform the Smoke/Fumes of Electrical, Air Conditioning,
or Unknown Origin procedure must be made by a pilot (usually the captain)
based on the circumstances of an event.
IV. If an event occurs while the aircraft is in
a reasonable position to land, the flight crew may elect to use alternative
procedures – such as unpowering all non-essential electrical or air conditioning
systems. For example, this could be
done by placing the electrical system in MANUAL, tripping the engine generator
bus relays, and opening all AC and DC bus tie relays. This would put the aircraft on Emergency power
and isolate all but the battery bus and the left AC and DC emergency busses.
If desired, the ADG could be deployed and ADG ELEC selected to provide
power to the battery charger and the right AC and DC emergency busses.
Boeing is considering publishing this as an alternative procedure but
has yet to propose this because of the many factors which might be involved
in the decision of which action to take.
The captain would have to assess each situation to determine which
procedure might be more appropriate. How
close is the nearest suitable airport? Is Fuel dumping required? Is
there a confirmed fire? The list of
variables is too great for the manufacturer to be able to develop one single
procedure that would be the best for all possible scenarios. Based on experience and sound judgment, the
captain must use aircraft system knowledge and a thorough understanding of
the situation to determine the best course of action.
V. As a supplement to the existing FCOM procedures,
here is some advice that the Boeing Company can give:
A. Consider using the Cabin Bus Off switch immediately
if there is a reason to suspect a specific cabin component, such as a galley,
lavatory, lighting, or the passenger service units. Continue with the Smoke/Fumes procedure if
needed.
B.
C. Consider using every available resource, including
the cabin crew, in attempting to determine if a fire exists, or to determine
if the smoke or fumes are dissipating.
D. Analyze the situation and determine if an
emergency landing is necessary. If
so, don't delay to dump fuel if a runway of sufficient length is available. As the manufacturer, Boeing has demonstrated
landings at maximum takeoff gross weight.
The structural placard does not even require a hard landing inspection
if the touchdown sink rate is less than 6 feet per second at these weights.
Stopping distance is the only real concern.
But even then, consider whether you would rather be on the ground –
or in the air.
E. If it has been confirmed that there is/was
a fire, it must be dealt with immediately.
Direct resources to fight the fire and/or ensure that it does not rekindle.
Prepare for a landing as soon as possible, with a possible emergency
evacuation. Determine who will fly the airplane, talk on the radio and make
landing decisions, and decide who will direct the fire fighting duties. One person cannot do it all. Maintain responsibility and control, but delegate
duties. Have a plan. Descend to as low an altitude as possible –
considering fuel and terrain.
F. If there is smoke without a confirmed fire,
what is the impact? Is it incapacitating?
Does it impact visibility? Could
it create an emergency, even in the absence of a fire (an overheated motor)? There are many unknowns when smoke is detected; one thing for sure
is that smoke is NOT normal. Therefore,
Boeing advises that anytime smoke has been detected and the source cannot
be POSITIVELY identified and eliminated, the aircraft should be landed as
soon as possible. Consider an emergency
descent after a landing decision has been made.
G. Has there been any damage as a result of smoke
or fire? Following an event where
smoke or fire has been confirmed, there is the possibility of loss of intended
function of some equipment. The loss
of function might be major or minor depending on the nature of the event. However, it might not be possible for the crew
to anticipate the results of such events, and the indications may vary with
time. Therefore, as the manufacturer,
Boeing recommends that the aircraft should be landed as soon as possible following
any event in which a fire has occurred, or in which an electrical malfunction
has been identified and cannot be completely analyzed by the crew to include
its impact on other systems. Consider
an emergency descent after a landing decision has been made.
VI. The Boeing Company has spent many months considering
whether the existing procedures for smoke and fumes identification and isolation
are adequate – and has concluded that the current procedures are appropriate.
A review of all previous in-service smoke incidents has confirmed that
the vast majority could have been isolated and controlled using the existing
Cabin Bus Off/Smoke switch procedure. However,
circumstances associated with specific events might require a flight crew
to use judgment in modifying or tailoring procedures.
VII. The Boeing Company has also determined that
the industry should consider issues that have been raised in the aftermath
of the SR-111 accident. Crews must
be given sound advice about analyzing specific situations and using judgment
in determining the proper course of action.
Each situation will be different, and a canned solution may not be
possible. Here are some topics that
Boeing feels are appropriate for further consideration on an industry-wide
basis:
A. Are there established training programs for
fighting in-fight fires? Is there
guidance available from fire fighting professionals?
B. Are in-flight fires different from ground
fires? What is the effect of cabin
altitude? Should the cabin altitude
be raised during a fire to reduce the amount of oxygen in the cabin – or is
that insignificant?
C. Are procedures in place which would involve
using the cabin crew in the cockpit?
D. Do crews have a fire fighting plan?
VIII. Boeing will forward the recommendations in
Paragraph VII to the appropriate regulatory/safety agencies.
Should additional
information be required, please submit your inquiries through your local field
service representative or to Boeing Long Beach Division, ATTN: Flight Operations Customer Service, 3855 Lakewood
Boulevard, Mail Code: D094-0026, Long
Beach, California 90846-0001, USA, fax: (562) 593-3471.
T. J. Melody
Senior Manager/Chief Test Pilot
Experimental Flight Operations
& Customer Service